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§ 1. CREATION AND INFINITY 
Creation and Infinity. No two terms are more 
central to a monotheistic metaphysics of the divine. 
All other traditional attributes of the divine either 
derive from them (from creation one can derive 
omniscience, omnipotence, etc.) or are synonymous 
with them (infinity is synonymous with perfection, 
eternity, omni-presence, omni-benevolence, unicity, 
etc. and creation is part and parcel of God’s necessity 
as modal arguments for God show). It is bewildering, 
then, that while contemporary philosophy does in 
some cases attribute infinity to the divine (if only from 
the perspective of that which exceeds human 
cognition), it has abandoned a view of God as creator. 
However, the centrality of these two aspects cannot be 
denied. No thought of the divine can avoid the issue 
of the infinite and God’s own infinity, whether it 
refers to the question of multiple infinites, if there are 
some infinites greater than others, or if God’s infinity 
necessitates God’s identification with all that is 
(pantheism), etc. On the other side, unless one is 
willing to reduce theology to a species of human 
psychology and anthropology, the reality of creation 
must be accounted for. And if one cannot find a way 
to account philosophically for God as creator and 
absolutely infinite, then one can turn to mysticism for 
inspiration. 
 




§2. COGNITIO DEI EXPERIMENTALIS 
Gershom Scholem attributes to Thomas Aquinas 
the definition of mysticism as “cognitio dei 
experimentalis, the knowledge of God through 
experience” (Scholem 1995, 4). Scholem and others 
highlight this definition because it simply captures the 
essence of mystical experience.1 The mystic attempts 
to achieve knowledge of God experimentally. Rather 
than rely on reason or science, the mystic desires a 
direct experience of the deity and, amazingly, records 
and presents the results of his/her investigations for 
public inspection. What is interesting about these 
results is that insofar as they depend solely on the 
unique lived experience of the mystic, they cannot, at 
least not from the philosophical perspective we hope 
to abide by in this text, justify themselves as true or 
false. The experimental results of the mystic’s 
adventure rest on intuition alone and await 
confirmation. In this way, mystical experience inverts 
the manner of experimentation associated with the 
empirical sciences.  
It is our contention that philosophy can take the 
results of such experimental knowledge and see 
whether they can pass the test of reason and find 
confirmation in being converted from intuitive, often 
opaque and mysterious, and even paradoxical 
statements into metaphysical positions as such. Here, 
in particular, some of the fundamental results of the 
                                                                                     
1 One model of mysticism is that of female mystics such as 
St. Teresa of Avila in the Christian tradition. Jacques Lacan 
in his twentieth seminar, On Feminine Sexuality (1999), 
famously uses her as an example of female enjoyment 
beyond the realm of being. For us, this would mean direct 
mystical contact with the withdrawn nature of God. But 
such contact while witnessed is itself ineffable. For this 
reason, while one can point to something beyond the 
conceptual, it is only from within the framework of 





Jewish mystical experience commonly categorized 
under the name Kabbalah (we think here of what has 
been called in this literature tzimtzum, shvirah, eyn 
sof, ayin, etc.) will be articulated in such a way as to 
see if they can be understood as characterizing a 
fundamental ontological and theological perspective. 
The intention is not to explain Kabbalah, but rather to 
take what it says as the aftermath of a trial that needs 
itself to be weighed and examined. The tools for doing 
so will be the resources of philosophy alone and 
thereby the ultimate goal is to see if the returns of 
Kabbalah can yield philosophical insight. The entirety 
of Kabbalah will not be addressed, only those key 
issues that relate to metaphysics at its basis. The 
bookshelves of any still-standing bookstore’s 
mysticism section already offer in abundance 
introductions and explanations of the Kabbalah on its 
own terms.  
It is the ultimate hope of this attempt at 
confirmation that the spiritual impressions of the 
Kabbalist will not simply translate into well-known 
concepts and arguments of previously understood 
metaphysics, but rather will help to articulate new 
ideas via the aid of philosophical discourse. It must be 
emphasized that we are not comparing philosophy 
and Kabbalah.2 If all that is produced here is a 
comparative study where philosophical ideas are seen 
as analogous to Kabbalistic ones, then based on the 
declared intention, the project will have failed. It is 
also not our desire to discuss the possible historical 
                                                                                     
2 For such comparative studies, one can turn to Coudert’s 
Leibniz and the Kabbalah (2010) or Leon-Jones’s Giordano 
Bruno and the Kabbalah (2004) for examples of studies of 
how Kabbalah influenced particular philosophers. For 
comparing specific philosophies to what the Kabbalah says, 
one should turn to the work of Sanford Drob referred to here 
throughout or Guetta’s Philosophy and Kabbalah (2009). 




influence of Kabbalah on philosophers, as has been 
done with thinkers such as Spinoza, Leibniz, Bruno, 
etc. and could be done on thinkers such as Levinas, 
Maimon, Schelling, etc. Nor do we want to focus on 
how the Kabbalah itself is or was possibly influenced 
by some ancient doctrine such as Pythagoreanism, 
Neo-Platonism, or Stoicism, not only because most 
often such suggestions are not based on any textual or 
historical evidence rather than speculation and 
because such suggestions could always be inverted 
given Kabbalists own understanding of the historical 
dates of their texts and experiments, but more 
importantly because such an analysis can only result 
in rehearsing what the ancient doctrine said or 
attempting to define the basic ideas of Kabbalah. 
  We take the basic Kabbalistic ideas as having 
already been defined. This means we will select a 
specific picture of what the Kabbalah says not in 
attempt to be true to the best interpretation of what the 
many Kabbalists have tried to say, but rather in order 
to bring forth what we should want the Kabbalah to 
say based on what it has. In this way, rather than 
explaining the Kabbalah, by attempting to convert it 
into a set of ontological positions we are arguing for a 
specific vision of what Kabbalah could and should be 
about rather than what it might appear to be saying 
literally. Thus, for us the true Kabbalah requires a 
philosophical supplement to take the yields of a lived 
experiment and render its essence.  
Of course, in engaging this project we will not be 
prevented from selecting from the sciences which 
function in the reverse form as already noted. The 
results of the theoretical and experimental sciences (in 
particular, physics) function not to confirm 
philosophy (rather than philosophy confirming it), but 
rather to give empirical weight to its theses. For 
instance, ‘Big Bang’ theory and the evidence 





the idea that God creates the world. In this manner, as 
philosophy can help to confirm the mystic, the 
physicist can help to push one to one side of a debate 
between two reasonable metaphysical positions. 
Famously, this was in part Maimonides’s own 
approach when he took the physics current in his day 
as leaning more to a Platonic version of creation rather 
than an Aristotelian one. His recourse to physics came 
from a seeming inability to show using pure reason 
alone that one vision of God must be true.  
 
§3. OUR DEAR FRIEND ATHEISM 
Maimonides’s reference to the pagans Plato and 
Aristotle might seem strange given his accepted place 
as the philosophical theologian of Judaism. But as 
Maimonides himself understood, a monotheist often 
can find aid in articulating his/her own position by 
working through the positions of one’s opposite or foe. 
Today, few pagans remain. Rather, the monotheist is 
opposed by the figure of the atheist. And just as 
Maimonides passed through the Aristotelian discourse 
to articulate his own position, here we will pass 
through the discourse of three declared atheists (or at 
least anti-religious) thinkers in particular (although we 
will not be restricted to their work). I am referring to 
the work of perhaps the two most important living 
metaphysicians, Alain Badiou and Quentin 
Meillassoux, as well as the philosopher Gilles 
Deleuze. Whereas Deleuze can be said to be atheist 
insofar as his neo-Spinozism relies on a purely 
immanent understanding of being, Peter Hallward, 
Badiou’s main interpreter in English, emphasizes the 
secular and atheistic nature of Badiou’s project by 
noting how Badiou wants to further the idea of the 
“laicization” of the infinite by breaking the “religious 
veil of meaning” as the “true vocation of thought” is to 
desacralize experience (BST 9).  




Badiou derives from the work of Georg Cantor 
that “God is really dead” (Badiou, qtd. BST 9). His use 
of Cantor already hints at how a self-declared atheist 
might help form a monotheistic theology, since Cantor 
himself was one of the greatest theologians of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such that the 
reliance on Cantor is already a reliance on a 
theological discourse. In the list of possible ways 
theology can engage with Badiou’s ontology, we 
thereby select what Kenneth Reynhout calls the 
second possibility: “A second possible response 
would be to largely accept Badiou’s ontology but argue 
that his atheist conclusion is unwarranted. This would 
involve demonstrating that his specific ontological 
construction, using mathematical set theory does not 
in fact lead to a denial of an absolute infinite God” 
(Reynhout 2011, 220). 
Meillassoux himself sees his own project as an 
attempt to combat the religious turn that contem-
porary phenomenology has taken in France (AF 42). 
He militates against the legitimation of ‘belief in an 
absolute’ that he says has arisen due to “scepticism 
with regard to the metaphysical absolute” itself (AF 
46). He detects in French philosophy a “becoming–
religious of thought” after the “destruction of the 
metaphysical rationalization of Christian theology” 
(AF 42). His main point of contention in opposing the 
new religious reason found in the work of French 
phenomenologist Jean-Luc Marion (about whom we 
will have more to say) is to attack the “idea of a 
supreme being” as the anchor of thought (AF 45).  
Ultimately, Meillassoux thinks this religious 
thought finds its support in what he calls 
“correlationism.”  Correlationism is the view that we 
cannot know the ‘in-itself’ without it becoming a ‘for 
us’ as Hegel would say. All that we can know 
according to Meillassoux’s presentation of the 





and how we come to know it: “The first decision is 
that of all correlationism—it is the thesis of the 
essential inseparability of the act of thinking from its 
content. All we ever engage with is what is given-to-
thought, never an entity subsisting by itself” (AF 36). 
What is important is that for correlationism not only is 
the in-itself unknowable, but unthinkable as such 
outside of how the human relates to it. For a 
correlationist, we cannot talk about what might exist 
or take place outside of the human orientation to such 
things.  
  Such a view represents idealism as opposed to 
realism. But while Meillassoux seems to believe that 
such correlationism finds its ultimate expression in 
religiously-inspired phenomenology, wherein the 
nature of the divine’s disclosure to thinking is 
discovered (in addition to Marion, one can list the 
work of Jean-Yves Lacoste, Jean-Louis Chretien, 
Emmanuel Levinas, and Michel Henry as 
representatives of this trend), a theism is traditionally 
a realist orientation and for good reason. A monotheist 
must at some point posit and discuss a God that 
transcends human thought and what can be known, 
thought, or disclosed to human thought. In this way, a 
true monotheism will have to oppose correlationism 
as much as an anti-religious thinker like Meillassoux.3 
                                                                                     
3 Of course, Meillassoux is not the only one opposing 
correlationism in contemporary philosophy. The philo-
sophical orientation founded and formulated by Graham 
Harman called ‘Object-Oriented Ontology’ also does so. 
However, while Harman professes realism throughout his 
work, his views ultimately devolve into a generalized 
Kantian idealism as it cannot escape its Husserlian 
foundations. For Harman, all possible perceivers must be 
seen as Kantian subjects just as much as the human being is 
(Harman 2009, 132). Just as the human subject for Kant only 
ever confronts mental representations of the world 
conditioned by the specific spatio-temporal structure of 




                                                                                                     
human intuition, Harman’s endless perceivers whether 
living or intimate also only ever confront ‘mental’, as it 
were, representations of the things that they perceive 
(Harman 2009, 133-35). In another text, Harman attempts to 
use the very idea of their being multiple observers to attempt 
to prove the reality of his substance ontology: “this means 
that there are discrete observers and perspectives on the 
world. And if there are discrete realities of this sort, then 
there must already be individuals, whether or they are the 
enduring things of traditional substance theory” (Harman 
2010a, 782-83). But noting there are many observers does 
not guarantee that reality in and of itself is constituted by 
withdrawn things, since even in Kant one has multiple 
human observers. And from within Harman’s own theory, 
the only way a person or a rock can know that there are 
other observers is through observation. This implies that we 
can only know by analogy that something else perceives. But 
we also perceive ourselves without ever perceiving what we 
are in and of ourselves. It may simply be the case that we are 
an ever-changing flux. There mere fact of observance or 
multiple observers does not give evidence to the contrary.  
Harman’s favorite example to support his view consists 
of cotton and fire (Harman 2010b, 102). Fire in devouring 
cotton does not perceive cotton as it is in and of itself, but 
only profiles and adumbrations of the cotton. Harman here 
insists with Kant, that there is a thing in itself (the cotton 
itself) that stands over and above the thing experienced. 
Even if an object were viewed “from all possible angles 
under every conceivable condition” (Harman 2009, 132), 
there is still something about it that withdraws into the in-
itself. And for Harman, anything that can be conceived or 
seen to be a unity whether it is made of up of other objects 
or not, is itself then ultimately a thing in itself withdrawn 
permanently and unchangeably form the world (Harman 
1999, 241). Making objects withdrawn ultimately leads 
Harman to an infinite regress and the problems of Kant’s 
second antinomy (Harman 1999, 245). And such problems 
have no obvious solution in light of anything Harman 
elaborates conceptually. In addition, insofar as Harman 
concludes that any conceptual unity of determinate objects 





                                                                                                     
must hold with Leibniz that to be a being is to be a being. 
The implication of that position is that no further 
differentiation can be made between the real and the 
intentional (I will advance explicitly and consciously this 
position later for different purposes following Badiou).  
 But for Harman the object will always contain some 
sort of reality in itself that cannot be touched or known or 
represented by an observer. Objects are thereby withdrawn 
or in a vacuum for Harman. In fact, for the thing in itself is 
not even made up of what once were called ‘primary 
qualities’ as they are not enough to capture the fundamental 
nature of objecthood (Harman 2009, 195). But without even 
primary qualities, it is unclear what the thing itself could be 
for Harman other than a rigid designator or mysterious 
substrate and ineffable substrate. While later we will argue 
that anything named is a being, it does not appear Harman 
wants that sort of seeming ontological idealism, but by 
turning the thing itself into the name of a secular negative 
theology of everyday objects without noting why such 
objects must be so withdrawn as would be gods due to an 
infinite nature or something else it appears as though it does 
without cause. Harman here attempts to distinguish his own 
position from Kant by suggesting that the Kantian thing-in-
itself simply “haunts” human knowledge without these 
things interacting with each other (Harman 2009, 186). But 
as noted, this point merely generalizes Kantian idealism 
without changing its basic structure. While he insists on the 
thing itself, Kant’s positing of the thing in itself was the most 
dogmatic moment in Kant for even if after Kant one will 
agree that how we perceive reality may not match what it is 
in itself, that does not in and of itself allow one to conclude 
that the in itself is itself structured by vacuum-packed 
objects and withdrawn ineffable substances (Harman 1999, 
210).  
Harman’s real versus sensuous (intentional) distinction 
falls back into the problems of naïve realism as well as 
highlighted more so by phenomenology (Harman 2010b, 
102). The issue with the in-itself is not that it is withdrawn, 
but whether we can say how it is structured. Later, in this 
text, we will argue that the in-itself should be seen as 
structured by structure itself or information. This structural 




                                                                                                     
or informational realism stands in sharp contrast to the 
substance ontology of Object-Oriented philosophy. Everyone 
says the in-itself is withdrawn from phenomenal contact. 
But Harman’s theory is thereby not far removed from Plato, 
although he would seemingly deny this type of realism 
vehemently. Plato thought that my experience of this 
computer for instance means there is a computer in itself. 
Harman’s theory does the same. We then have all the 
problems of the relation between the thing in itself and the 
phenomenal representation, etc. In particular, one could 
here enter into a deconstructionist critique as it is not clear 
that my idea of the tree does depend on the tree itself. Why 
could it not be that we are born with an idea of a tree? Can 
we recognize the tree without first having its mental 
representation? We have the intentional relations that 
overlay the real ones.  
But the problem for Object-Oriented Ontology is that 
the in-itself might simply be objectless in its structuration. 
Harman’s theory very clearly presupposes it must be 
constituted by individual substances as much as Kant’s did. 
But again nothing shows it must. For instance, I experience 
about 1000 objects on my desk. But my computer might only 
experience everything as a part of one object or simply as 
experienced as such (that is, without singling out distinct 
objects). My phenomenological consciousness looks at a 
mountain range and can separate a single mountain, but who 
is to say there is not just the range, earth, etc. While Harman 
insists on the realism of his positions, Husserl in Logical 
Investigations at the beginning is great on how we can 
decide what aspects of a thing are essential and what 
accidental, what separable and what not, in a new 
phenomenological way. For instance, he shows that 
coloration is not something separate. But this is all done on 
the basis of consciousness. It is not clear how Harman would 
be able to differentiate himself from Husserl in order to 
claim that one version of the object is the one that truly 
mirrors or mimics the thing in itself. Now, Husserl would 
agree with Harman that an object is “an ideal unity over and 
against its objects” (Harman 2009, 152), but only 
consciousness for Husserl can know that. It is not clear 





                                                                                                     
foundation and constituting moment how Harman can make 
and substantiate his claim. When we add up the two 
‘experiences,’ we do not have reason to say that the in-itself 
has a particular structuration.  
Further, Harman’s contention that no matter how many 
perspectives on a thing one has (Harman 2009, 261), one 
never has the thing in itself has to presuppose that things are 
infinite. If a thing is finite in any sense and capable of only a 
finite number of perspectives, then it would be added up. 
But what demonstrates for Harman or otherwise that a tree 
or hammer is infinite in character? Are there truly an infinite 
number of perspectives? If there are, do they exist in 
actuality all at once or only potentially and indefinitely? 
Until it can be shown that a flame is infinite in nature, 
Harman’s point cannot hold. But that is the problem with 
founding realist ontology on what is essentially basis of 
Kantian idealism and Husserlian phenomenology. Object-
Oriented Ontology would have to show somehow that the 
very ability of phenomenological consciousness to divide up 
the world necessitates that the real is structured as a 
plurality of objects/things/substances. I am not familiar with 
such an argument. Just saying we use a hammer so there 
must be a hammer that overlies it remains easily within the 
phenomenological and intentional sphere (cf. Harman 2009, 
133-35). Harman also believes that from Heidegger’s analysis 
of the hammer as something ready-to-hand one can deduce 
substance ontology (Harman 1999, 209-11). But Heidegger’s 
distinction between the present-at-hand and the ready-to-
hand is not about establishing that reality in itself is 
structured by withdrawn impermeable substances rather it is 
to emphasize how practical engagement precedes theoretical 
engagement, how intentionality is not characterizable in 
terms primarily of a disinterested scientist and observation 
consciousness as Husserl did, that intentionality hammering 
for example is an intentional stance with its own correlative 
object pole just as much seeing or thinking, and that the 
attitude of seeing things as mental representations always 
follows from a pre-consciousness access to the world. That 
is to say, the notion of tool-being does not escape the 
correlationist circle, but rather forms one of its key radii. 
The hammer only appears as a present-at hand object when 




                                                                                                     
it is broken, but before that it is a pole of a hammering-
hammered relation that shows how consciousness is too-
limited a sphere for how Dasein relates and comports to the 
world in every action. The broken hammer merely shifts 
Dasein into a new form of comportment. Most comportment 
is not reflective.  
In still other contexts, Harman puts forth that, for 
instance, our knowledge of a tree does not reproduce the 
tree (Haman 2010, 788). Since our mental representation of a 
tree for Harman does not bear fruit or grow, there must be a 
real tree in itself out there. First, as we know from 
Heidegger’s Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (1997), 
Kant begins in a way with the idea that imagination is finite 
and not creative as opposed to the imagination and mind of 
God where the hammer is made real. It really does hammer, 
etc. That is, for Kant our infinitude is a productive limitation 
that structures experience and is felt most directly via the 
nature of our imagination, its limitations, and its powers. I 
do think and will try to substantiate later that knowledge of 
a thing can produce that thing in its full stance. God is of 
course the agency that best shows how this can be done. 
Leibniz also with his identity of the identical also shows 
how perhaps even a very advanced computer with a Star 
Trek-like holo-room might be able to do it. In any event, the 
excess of the hammer as I know it in its profiles over the 
thing as such is internal to consciousness. It is also not 
necessarily something that for Husserl in principle cannot be 
done. The profiles could be added up. The other side of the 
coin, or all the sides of the cube, at best can be added up and 
at worst shows the incompletion of experience rather than 
the thing itself. An important text here is the key section in 
Totality and Infinity (1969) where, for Levinas, it is the face 
of the other that is infinite and not a pair of dice. The face is 
infinite due to the way in which the otherness of the other 
can never be presented phenomenally and yet calls upon 
me. The other side of the coin can be presented 
phenomenally just not at the same time as the first side. 
Unless Harman can show how something like consciousness 
informs each thing in the same way as it does for the other 
in Levinas, there cannot be a claim to the same implications. 





To accept Meillassoux’s characterization of 
contemporary philosophy as trapped in understanding 
the world only as it appears and not as it is in itself is 
not also to accept Meillassoux’s anti-religiosity, but 
rather to accept religion itself. To truly articulate a 
thought of God (and in particular, God as a creator) 
requires that all of being not circle around the self and 
the world as it discloses itself to it. In this way, a 
philosophical confirmation of Kabbalah will entail a 
viewpoint that also criticizes and departs from the 
correlationist view. 
  
                                                                                                     
must exist, and that each view presupposes it. Kant himself 
often speaks as though the phenomenal computer must be 
mirrored by a computer in itself (and thereby retains the 
dogmatism he thinks he has overcome). It is only with 
phenomenology and the reduction that that issue is 
neutralized so we can speak about the meaning of Being 
without these problems of dogmatic (at least after Kant we 
use that term) realism. In any event, it is precisely Harman’s 
own articulations that show that objects only exist for a 











§4. THE CRITIQUE OF ONTO-THEO-LOGY 
One of the main challenges such a theistic 
realism would have from philosophy today is the 
critique of metaphysics that characterizes it as ‘onto-
theo-logy.’ Ontology means the investigation of beings 
as beings with regard to what is most fundamental and 
essential about being. Theology on the other hand 
traditionally attempts to understand the nature of the 
highest or most supreme being. Metaphysics as onto-
theo-logy per this rendering understands beings as a 
whole in terms of the supreme being. This might mean 
that God as the supreme being is seen as the ground 
and cause of beings and being itself (Heidegger 2002, 
34, 58, 61, 69-70) or that God is being itself (all beings 
are ultimately expressions of God), as Paul Tillich 
famously posited. Onto-theo-logy then consists of this 
view that all of being and the nature of individual 
beings cannot be understood with reference to a 
particular being.  
 For the early 20th-century philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, such a promotion of God obliterates the 
difference between Being (the experience of something 
as being, that something is) and beings (the individual 
beings themselves) (Heidegger 2002, 50-51). Another 
way to put this ontological difference is to say it 
names the difference between “that which is 
composed of [a] thing in its talitative ‘suchness’ and 
the same thing in its transcendental unity. After all, 
the ‘this’ is nothing if not a specific unity, a ‘this’ in 
opposition to all that is not this” (Harman 1999, 258). 




To explain further: metaphysical thought 
characterized as onto-theo-logy obfuscates the 
difference between the universality of being–ness and 
the individual instances of such being presumably by 
not allowing for a thought of existence as such to 
appear without reference to how a particular exists. 
No particular being can encapsulate what being is any 
more than a particular type of fruit (strawberry, 
banana, etc.) can name what fruit itself is insofar as 
fruit covers all the different types of fruit (Heidegger 
2002, 66).  
However, while many take onto-theo-logy as a 
category of critique, Heidegger, who defined it, 
asserted and insisted that Being itself does not appear, 
but rather necessarily withdraws. One never has an 
experience of pure is-ness, but only ever encounters 
particular beings (Heidegger 2002, 66). In this sense, 
the difference between Being and beings is veiled and 
the forgetting of the difference belongs to the very 
difference itself between the two terms (Heidegger 
2002, 50). It is not a matter of human forgetfulness, but 
rather pertains to the very structure of Being itself that 
it is veiled in particular beings (Heidegger 2002, 51). 
In addition, for Heidegger “the onto-theological 
character of metaphysics has become questionable for 
thinking, not because of any kind of atheism, but from 
the experience of thinking which has discerned in 
onto-theo-logy the still unthought of the essential 
nature of metaphysics” (Heidegger 2002, 55). In other 
words, for Heidegger himself, onto-theo-logy may be 
unavoidable until the very nature of the difference 
between Being and beings can be thought. Here, the 
challenge is to think of Being as not grounded in 
anything other than its own givenness.  
 While these remarks by Heidegger emphasize the 
non-arbitrary nature of metaphysics as onto-theo-logy, 
Heidegger and those following him still see this 
characterization as a decisive critique of philosophical 




theology. For Heidegger, ultimately, it is connected to 
the enframing power of technology.4 Technology 
objectifies and reifies beings as entities available for 
mastery and exploitation. Technological thinking can 
never think Being itself.  
For Heidegger, God’s reign over being ends up the 
same, since God as ground freezes beings in their 
status as caused entities. One is called by Heidegger to 
overcome metaphysics and think Being itself without 
any reference to individual beings primarily to avoid 
the technological manner in which contemporary 
science evaluates beings. More importantly for our 
purposes, onto-theo-logy is taken in contemporary 
discourse to articulate a decisive critique of the 
concept of God, one that shows that it is no longer 
permissible. But what is truly the nature of the 
critique here and is it successful? As far as I can tell 
this critique attempts to show that God as a being 
cannot be being itself, the ground of being itself, and a 
particular being (even if the most supreme and 
highest) at the same time, since in doing so it makes of 
one being the ground of Being itself. But one being 
cannot ground or found all of being since in being a 
being it is already characterized by Being. If the series 
                                                                                     
4 The entire history of metaphysics forms different ways and 
manners of forgetting this difference. In each different 
epoch, the difference between Being and beings is forgotten 
(Heidegger 2002, 44). History then forms the different ways 
in which this difference was forgotten by way of the 
different ways in which Being is identified with a being or 
the whole of beings. For Heidegger, our particular epoch is 
the epoch of technology since technology names for us 
Being and how the difference between Being and beings is 
forgotten (Heidegger 2002, 44-45). In particular, the onto-
theological constitution of metaphysics forms the primary 
manner in which ontological difference is forgotten and 
concealed.  
 




of beings is to found itself in yet another entity, the 
foundation is a bluff that cannot end the infinite 
regress. In the chain of beings, one finds one more at 
the end.  
In turn, if God is identified with Being as such, as 
Tillich did, it would be as though one part constituted 
the whole. Being itself is reduced to one being/entity 
and for Heidegger Being as such can be thought of 
independently of Being as a universe and experienced 
or disclosed in an intuition of is-ness. In this way, the 
critique says that to understand ontology one must 
exclude God in order to focus on how Being itself is 
disclosed to thought.  
But any monotheist would and should thoroughly 
endorse these criticisms. For monotheism, God 
transcends being as such. All beings are contingent, 
limited, and so forth. God should not and cannot be 
thought of as a being. In particular, the Heideggerian 
view rejects God as timeless since it sees all of Being 
as temporal in nature. If all Being is temporal, no 
entity can be eternal. But this temporality is only true 
of this world. Second, what this critique actually 
rejects and undermines is pantheism rather than 
monotheism (and monotheism itself is a rejection of 
pantheism). Monotheism does not see every being as 
just a particularization or part of Being/God. 
Pantheism says that all beings are contained and 
constituted by God: God is all. Pantheism in particular 
obscures the ontological difference, as now any being 
is synonymous with Being itself and Being itself is 
synonymous with any being.  
Here the difference between things also falls, as 
all things collapse in a monistic whole. And this is 
one of the blind spots of the Heideggerian stance. It 
sees Being as being all-comprehensive to the point 
where a God beyond Being becomes itself 
incomprehensible. Such a Heideggerian view is also 
contingent upon making good on the idea that Being 




itself can be disclosed without any reference to a 
transcendent moment. For Heidegger, such an 
atheological ontology is based on the saying of a 
mystic, Angelus Silesius, who interestingly enough is 
known for seeing God and man as being one and for 
being accused of pantheism: “The rose is without 
why: it blooms because it blooms, it pays no attention 
to itself, asks not whether it is seen” (Heidegger 1996, 
36). In its Heideggerian interpretation, such a view 
takes beings as ungrounded and as appearing in and of 
themselves on their own basis. In this way, the rose 
like any other being is not seen as a creature or 
creation, but without cause. Nothing transcends it. It 
is immanent to itself.  
But in treating Being as purely immanent, Being 
itself can only be understood as foundationless when 
taken as that which is disclosed to thinking (as we 
will see more clearly when turning to an examination 
of the work of Marion, the person to rigorously take up 
this Heideggerian gauntlet). That is, it is only via a 
correlationist orientation that Being itself can be 
thought as pure givenness without reference to ground 
and reason. Only when Being is taken for in and how 
it appears to the human and for the human will one 
have thereby avoided God. Heidegger is explicit about 
this since he emphasizes the “belonging together of 
man and Being” (Heidegger 2002, 30).5 In this way, if 
one adheres to Being as its own unveiling/veiling to 
the human, one can ignore God as it were, but only at 
the price of ignoring that something might transcend 
and exceed the closed correlationist circle of world 
and self. But whereas onto-theo-logy puts God 
                                                                                     
5 Yet Heidegger, despite this critique, does not abandon the 
notion of God. It is simply not the metaphysical God, but 
rather the gods who are opposed to mortals in his fourfold or 
the obscure “last god” that he refers to in his Contributions 
to Philosophy (2000).  




(supposedly an entity) at the foundation of Being, 
correlationism puts man at this foundation. Without 
the human to disclose and unveil, to witness and 
recognize, Being does not take place.  
 
§5. THE LEVINASIAN LURE 
The Heideggerian critique of the metaphysical 
notion of God did not end all attempts to conceive or 
engage with this topic even within post-Heideggerian 
phenomenology itself. Rather, the critique articulated 
under the aegis of the rubric ‘onto-theo-logy’ simply 
set the terms for what to avoid in any future attempt to 
pose the question of God’s existence. The two most 
prominent attempts to come to a positive post-
Heideggerian understanding of God are found, as 
noted, in the work of Emmanuel Levinas and Jean-Luc 
Marion. However, in both cases any sort of realist 
sense of God is lost. In particular, any notion of God as 
creator (which forms for monotheism a central, if not 
the central, aspect of God) is completely lost due to 
the idealist and correlationist nature of their thought. 
While both Marion and Levinas are able to convey in 
amazingly poetic prose some of the key aspects of 
religious experience, above all the consciousness of 
relation to the divine and the meaning of spirituality, 
they are only able to do so by abandoning or rendering 
impotent any true attempt to engage with the 
metaphysical nature of God as God in and of himself 
and as creator of the world. In this way, their thought 
remains bound to what correlationism can discover, 
the relation between the human and the world, rather 
than engaging in the world itself as created and 
marked by the divine outside of how the human 
worshiper notices it. As long as one takes the work of 
Levinas and Marion as beautiful and thrilling treatises 
on the lived experience of the religious mind, there is 
nothing to indict in their thought. It is only when their 
thinking is taken as more than a limited psychological 




analysis and as fundamental theology that it proves 
lacking. But let us first examine how and why that is.  
It may be surprising that, in a work devoted to 
translating Jewish mysticism into philosophical 
theology, a figure like Levinas is not here given more 
pride of place, since Levinas is taken by many in 
academic circles to be a key expression of what could 
be called ‘Jewish Philosophy’.6 However, an honest 
                                                                                     
6 There are many names that can be listed as Jewish 
philosophers. We will not treat to engage with all or even 
many of them. In particular, most are covered by what is 
said in our engagements with Levinas, correlationism, 
process theology, and/or onto-the-logy. To take a simple 
example, Martin Buber has gained a lot of attention in the 
last 100 years as a Jewish philosopher. But his theory is 
thoroughly correlationist insofar as it focuses not on 
showing how God creates the world, but how God for us is 
only an addressee of our speech acts. That is, God is a ‘thou’ 
addressed by us, a referent for our speech acts, but the key is 
the analysis of this act of address by us rather than anything 
about God as creator. This view is elaborated by Buber in I 
and Thou (1958). Even a thinker such as Joseph Solo-
veitchik, who is thoroughly grounded in Halakha (Jewish 
Law), bases his philosophy on phenomenology precisely 
because it brackets existence claims and engagements with 
the nature of the world outside an analysis of human 
actions: see Soloveitchik, Halakhic Man (1984). For a good 
overview of the entire history of Jewish philosophy, see 
Frank, Leeman, and Manekin, eds., The Jewish Philosophy 
Reader (2000). An interesting possible exception to the rule 
set out here would be the work of Franz Rosenzweig. In his 
Star of Redemption (2005), Rosenzweig does emphasize God 
as creator and God’s relation to the world and the world’s 
relation to God. Rosenzweig certainly does not want 
Feuerbach’s view of God as an inversion of the human and 
projection of human qualities to stand. God transcends the 
world and creates it in this philosophy. But Rosenzweig is 
still very much a primarily anti-Hegelian thinker à la 
Kierkegaard. The focus is on the individual’s difference from 
the absolute and a need to focus on the consequences of 




examination of his work would show that it stands on 
its own and cannot be described as ‘Jewish’ in any 
strong sense.7 Levinas’s work should be taken on its 
own merits as a phenomenological analysis of the 
experience of otherness.  
It is well-known that Levinas centers his focus on 
otherness by examining the relation between oneself 
and one’s neighbor. While the Husserl of The 
Cartesian Meditations sees another self as something 
only known via analogy (as an alter ego), insofar as 
one can only truly and certainly know one’s own 
consciousness, Levinas will argue that such an 
understanding of otherness reduces it to a mirror 
image of the same as otherness, and if it is to be truly 
analyzed, must be seen as maintaining its otherness. 
                                                                                                     
human finitude. One needs to focus for instance on how 
things are revealed to humans in the special temporality that 
characterizes human life. The most lucid and intelligible 
parts of Rosenzweig center on the need for a focus on how 
things appear to the individualized self in relation to the 
other. For instance, it is via the fear of death that idea of 
nothingness is revealed. Another issue with Rosenzweig is 
that while God is conceived as infinite, the problems of 
onto-theo-logy are not addressed, and it is not clear that God 
has any freedom.  
7 It is true that Levinas has devoted texts to an analysis of 
the Talmud, but even there his own thinking appears as an 
alien supplement that does not articulate anything funda-
mental concerning the Talmud’s fundamental view. For 
example, while Levinas emphasizes one’s radical obligation 
to one’s neighbor and makes that the basis of all other 
phenomena, Judaism in and of itself is founded on the 
relation to the otherness of the God. In this way, it should 
not be surprising that Levinas is almost completely ignored 
by the great Talmudist of our generation and given almost no 
attention by those engaged in serious study of Kabbalah. For 
Levinas’s Talmudic engagements, see his Nine Talmudic 
Readings (1990), New Talmudic Readings (1999), and 
Beyond the Verse (2007). 




In other words, whereas Husserl and others see 
another as only ever an alter ego, Levinas attempts to 
isolate otherness as such by positioning the self in 
relation to an otherness that cannot be domesticated or 
seen as similar.  
 This encounter takes place vis-à-vis the human 
face of the other. It will also be on the basis of the 
encounter with the human face of the other that any 
experience of divinity itself takes place for Levinas. 
This otherness for Levinas always exceeds any totality 
(TI 22). It does so because the face of the other signals 
and enacts an infinity that “overflows the thought that 
thinks it” (TI 25). Such infinity demonstrates the 
absolute alterity of the other (TI 34). And such infinity 
is reserved for this encounter. Despite Levinas’s many 
references to Descartes on the idea of the infinite, 
Levinas does not draw the lesson Descartes does or 
follow him. Whereas for Descartes this idea shows that 
there is something beyond consciousness that created 
oneself, Levinas limits the idea to the idea itself and 
also the human face. It is from being called by the 
human other in speech that one experiences an 
infinite demand to respond to the other (TI 69). It 
appears that only that which speaks can signal true 
otherness for Levinas, making it only human in 
nature. In fact, Levinas has called his philosophy in 
many places a ‘humanism of the other person’.     
But what phenomenologically founds this 
analysis? It would appear that whereas for Husserl the 
fact that consciousness is not a piece of reality implied 
that one cannot know the mind of the other, for 
Levinas it means that, in confronting another who 
signals through speech that they are conscious, one 
confronts something that can never be given and can 
never be encompassed. Unlike a cube, where even 
though one cannot see all sides at once, one can see all 
of them at some point, with the other, one cannot ever 
experience or have given to one’s own consciousness 




the consciousness of the other. It is always missing, 
always exterior to the world and oneself. And yet the 
other speaks to me and engages with me thereby 
signaling that a consciousness is there. For Levinas, 
this experience, rather than provoking sheer wonder, 
elicits a sense of obligation. Yet it is not clear why it 
would not simply evoke fascination and Levinas’s 
description here appears highly idiosyncratic or 
simply reflective of an already constituted 
psychological disposition. Without a doubt, one could 
find examples of people who in seeing another feel 
obligated, but only when the other makes some sort of 
appeal via facial expression, word, bodily gesture, etc.  
Now perhaps it is precisely only these types of 
moments that Levinas is highlighting, as later in 
Totality and Infinity he analyzes what he calls ‘the 
caress of the face’ that occurs in an erotic engagement 
with otherness. In any event, his main analysis centers 
on the face in its ethical dimension and how absolute 
difference there appears. The face inherently “appeals 
to me” and commands (TI 200-1). In the speech of the 
other, one no longer sees a visual face, but is exposed 
to transcendent experience that cannot be grasped of 
the infinity that “puts the I in question” (TI 195). This 
expression can never result “in giving us the Other’s 
alterity,” but rather exposes something “incommen-
surable” and ungraspable (TI 202). The self is thereby 
introduced to what is radically not the self.  
While Levinas insists that “the Other is not the 
incarnation of God,” despite the way in which 
Levinas’s own description mirrors in many ways the 
descriptions of God found in negative theology, 
Levinas’s God can only appear as it were and the self 
can only find a relation to God via the face of the 
other, “in which he is discarnate, is the manifestation 
of the night in which God is revealed” (TI 79). Part of 
the reason Levinas does not want to locate any 
understanding in direct relation to God is due to his 




seeing any metaphysical conception of God as falling 
prey to the critique of onto-theo-logy: 
  
Theology imprudently treats the idea of the 
relation between God and the creature in 
terms of ontology. It presupposes the logical 
privilege of totality, as a concept adequate to 
being. Thus it runs up against the difficult of 
understanding that an infinite being would 
border on or tolerate something outside of 
itself, or that a free being would send its 
roots into the infinity of a God. But 
transcendence precisely frustrates totality, 
does not lend itself to a view that would 
encompass it from the outside. (TI 293)  
 
In this case, Levinas argues that any conception of 
God as creator can only see a creature as being part of 
some greater totality. In this way, Levinas not only 
precludes a different conception of God outside of 
onto-theo-logy, but also leaves aside any under-
standing of God as creator on its basis. In particular, 
Levinas sees a metaphysical understanding of God as 
infinite as only allowing a pantheism in which all 
finite being is swallowed up into and made part of the 
infinite being of God. No outside of God is allowed. 
Levinas is here at his least Jewish insofar as it is the 
Kabbalah that posits God as both infinite [Eyn Sof] and 
withdrawn from the world that is outside of God, as 
we will later show.  
For Levinas, transcendence undermines any 
sense of totality, but monotheism itself does not argue 
for a pantheistic totality of existence. By refusing to 
think God as infinite in any other manner and to think 
God as creator in a specifically Jewish sense here, 
Levinas reduces God to some sort of vague reference-
point that can be alluded to in the encounter between 
human self and human other. In this way, Levinas 




effectively reduces God to the human other and even 
states that the face of the other “resembles God” (TI 
293). We can agree with Levinas that transcendence 
produces an outside and undermines totality, but a 
thoroughly monotheistic understanding of God in and 
of himself (and not as something found only in the 
face of the human other) both as infinite and as creator 
will also insist on these points.  
At the same time, in another context, Levinas 
contends that an appearance of things from nothing 
can affirm the way in which things are exterior to each 
other while being related (TI 293). However, this one 
mention does not mean that Levinas in any way truly 
thematizes or conceptualizes creation as such. While 
we agree here with the idea that God is not a being for 
Levinas and that existence is for the contingent, we 
cannot agree with Levinas that locating God as creator 
eliminates religious transcendence as such 
transcendence can only be found in the encounter 
with the face (cf. Levinas 1981, 5, 197). To say that 
God is beyond being does not cancel creation or take it 
away as a prime determination of God, as we will later 
argue. All of this is not to say that Levinas does not 
directly state and affirm that God is beyond naming 
and beyond any phenomenological reduction, that 
God is infinite and transcendent. But even when doing 
so, Levinas does not attempt to think God on the basis 
of God alone, but only God in relation to human 
consciousness and the relation with the human other. 
Even to say that God is other than the radically other 
human other is not enough. Certainly saying so 
highlights how God is not an object or entity in any 
pedestrian sense, but it does not highlight how God 
must precede any human otherness. This is not to say 
that the glorify of the Infinite One can appear in itself 
as or that representational consciousness could 
contain, imagine, or know God in the same way one 
knows a tree or pen. Infinity does break totality and 




exceed consciousness, as Levinas so often reminded 
us. But we do not have to be only witnesses to this 
truth.  
We can move beyond the correlationist circle of 
the human relating to the world, otherness, and God 
and look at God as being infinite for what that means 
in and of itself. This is the path the Kabbalah lays out 
before one. For Levinas, God is only heralded in the 
excess presented in the impossibility of grasping the 
exteriority of the human face. But it is not clear why 
God need even be referenced in this context. Levinas 
seems at best to insert God here as an ad hoc addition. 
In addition, it is not clear that one cannot in mystical 
experience or contemplation accede to a thought of 
the infinite God outside of any reference to the face or 
said encounter. Does one encounter God in prayer, 
and is prayer said with eyes closed in a place where 
one encounters the face of one’s neighbor?  
In the encounter with the other one finds oneself 
in a “relation without relation” that involves in-
equality and completely asymmetrical terms such that 
one cannot step back from the relation and examine it 
as a spectator because one is completely enfolded in it 
(TI 148). But it is not clear why there are not other 
experiences of pure otherness and transcendence that 
relate purely to God himself that implicate one in the 
same way and lead one to conclude other than that 
one has an ethical obligation to others. One may not 
experience God in this world, but Jewish and other 
mystics have claimed to. Are the results of their 
experiments illusory for Levinas or pure nonsense?  
Drew Dalton claims that Levinas does have a 
theory of creation as something that takes place in the 
future (Dalton 2006, 239). In addition, Dalton notes 
that Levinas does at one point in his philosophical 
trajectory attempt to think what existence outside of 
human consciousness could mean via the notion of 
the there is [il y a ] (Dalton 2006, 219). But the il y a 




does not truly form any theory of creation as it is only 
the impersonal and anonymous murmuring that 
consciousness itself imagines as taking place when 
consciousness is removed from the scene. It is 
anonymous being without any human consciousness 
to give it meaning or engage with it. It is an absence or 
void. It would be the unthinkable background from 
which a self sees itself arising. But note that here 
Levinas does not argue that God creates the self, but 
rather purely posits a void time before self-awareness. 
Given that for Levinas, as a phenomenologist, 
consciousness can appear as its own Cartesian 
foundation, il y a merely marks what would precede 
such an absolute foundation—an impersonal and 
undifferentiated emptiness. In fact, it can only be seen 
as a logical positing of a past that never was, as far as 
the eternal present of conscious thinking is concerned. 
In this way, when attempting to think what exceeds or 
precedes the self or gives rise to it, Levinas makes no 
reference to God, which is why it is wrong for Dalton 
to say that a Kabbalistic understanding of God is at 
work in the notion of the Levinasian il y a (Dalton 
2006). This would be a moment when such insights 
could be formulated, but Levinas does not do so in his 
own text.  
When Levinas does attempt to think the world 
outside of the human correlationist circle, it appears 
as a godless murmuring that forms the imagined 
background of phenomenological consciousness. In 
fact, Levinas will later go so far as to write that to 
understand “the transcendent as stranger and poor one 
is to prohibit the metaphysical relation with God form 
being accomplished,” that “the direct comprehension 
of God is impossible for a look directed upon him,” 
and that “comprehension of God as a participation in 
his sacred life . . . is impossible” primarily due to the 
relation of transcendence being a “social relation” that 
occurs only in relation to the “human face” (TI 78). 




Divinity is only found in the human face in relation to 
an exploded consciousness and at no other moment. 
For these reasons, Levinas does not shy away from 
speaking of “the atheism” of his position based on a 
rejection of theology in favor of ethical behavior (TI 
78). Levinas emphasizes this point when he writes in 
another text that “I do not want to define anything 
through God because it is the human that I know. It is 
God that I can define through human relations and not 
the inverse” (Levinas 2008, 29). One cannot speak of 
God except by speaking about human relations which 
is to say by expressing what happens to consciousness 
in relation to the world in which another human face 
is encountered. Any other talk of God is abstract and 
imprecise.  
For Levinas, it is wrong to “start form the 
existence of a very great and all-powerful being” 
(Levinas 2008, 29). While Levinas here refers to Jonah, 
Jonah is not confronted by the human face but directly 
by God. Jonah is held responsible and cannot escape, 
but it is from the voice and gaze of God and not the 
human other appealing to him. In fact, if anything, the 
human other asks Jonah to leave their presence rather 
than come to them. This is not to say that Levinas 
does not attempt to conceive God directly. He does so 
using the term illeity in his essay “The Trace of the 
Other.” Here Levinas emphasizes how God takes place 
beyond being (TO 347). In addition, Levinas refers to 
the experience of Moses at the burning bush and that 
this reveals the “infinity of [God’s] absence” from this 
world (TO 359). God shows himself only in a trace 
(TO 359). Here, of course, Levinas is at most Jewish 
and least correlationist. But even at this moment 
Levinas still says that the trace of God, of illeity, is 
founded upon and encountered in the relation with 
the face (TO 36). But it is not clear how that it is so. 
Moses does not encounter the face of the human other 
in the burning bush. Certainly, the Biblical tradition 




insists on how humans are made in the image of God. 
But Levinas sketches out no understanding of creation 
itself and instead makes finding God contingent upon 
the face rather than the inverse. Also, it is not clear 
from other passages if illeity refers to God or refers 
simply to a third party that observes the relation 
between self and other and by this observation asks for 
justice. Yet it is not clear why this third party or third 
man need be God. It could be one’s own conscience or 
superego. Also, such thirdness can only come later on 
the scene since otherwise one would be looking at the 
relation from the outside and miss the infinity of the 
other person. Thus it is not clear if Levinas means that 
there is a third party observing the relation or simply 
that even though one is absorbed by one’s own 
relation to the human face, one can also play the role 
of the face since a third waits to see one. That is, one 
is also observed.  
But does this observation require God as observer 
and has Levinas shown why rather than just positing 
it? He states that God is 
 
not simply the ‘first other, ‘the other par 
excellence’, or the ‘absolutely other’, but 
other than the other (autre qu’autrui), other 
otherwise, other with an alterity prior to the 
alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond 
with another and different from every 
neighbor, transcendent to the point of 
absence to the point of a possible conflation 
with the stirring of the there is. (TO 360)  
 
But immediately after stating this, Levinas returns to 
insisting on how the infinite arises in its glory only 
relation to one’s neighbor. In an essay called “Name of 
God,” Levinas turns again to a Jewish context and 
discusses God who is revealed by its name (Levinas 
2007, 120). But Levinas here merely interprets well-




known Jewish positions rather than offers an 
elaboration of his own philosophy. His comments on 
the nature of the name of God refer to a Jewish 
monotheism that is not dependent on the human face 
and thus appear as an alien and exterior moment in 
Levinas’s philosophical corpus. While Levinas 
emphasizes how the name of God notes the radical 
otherness of God, this never leads to conceiving of 
God as creator. From the Kabbalah, we will learn that 
the trace (reshimu) of God is precisely found in and 
through the act of creation itself. While the Kabbalah 
would agree with Levinas that “a trace is a presence of 
that which strictly speaking has never been there” (TO 
358), this trace is not found in just the human face, but 
rather in creation itself. The divinity that transcends 
leaves traces everywhere and not exclusively in the 
face. Nor is it a question of cause and effect, as we will 
see.  
 While the human is surely made in the image of 
God, this does not mean the trace of God is only 
manifested in human relations. Levinas insists that 
God as illeity stands outside one’s relation with the 
Other and monitors it and demands justice. But it is 
not clear why the face of the other is not sufficient to 
achieve those things in Levinas’s analysis. Rather it 
seems that God appears as an afterthought in the 
Levinasian system. The human face reminds one of 
one’s obligations, so why would God be needed to do 
so? Only an analysis that would allow for God to be 
seen and related to in and of himself could explain 
such issues. To return to Moses, Moses witnesses the 
infinite in the burning bush itself and is called to 
present himself as much as Abraham is, just from the 
voice and call of God. They both witnessed the 
infinite without any reference to human others, but 
only to the Other as such. It is time that we turn to the 
divine Other outside of correlationism, to discover 
again its nature and to witness its truth as creator and 




sustainer of worlds. This Other does not ask one to 
feel infinitely obligated or develop a guilt- or perse-
cution-complex based on this call. Such obsessional 
gestures can only lead to poor health and fear of the 
real truth of religion.  
Furthermore, there are commands that God issues 
directly and on the basis of those commands we learn 
how to relate to the human other. Moses and Abraham 
already bore witness to these truths and it is amazing 
that in Levinas’s own text there are scant mentions of 
their experience and acknowledgement of how it is at 
odds with his insistence on the foundational nature of 
the human face and its expression. It is our hope in 
this text that by translating Kabbalah into philosophy 
we can reposition the relation with the human other 
as something truly human and allow thought to 
attempt to that which is not founded on the human at 
all—God himself. Levinas already laid out some key 
ideas on how to direct this approach, as witnessed in 
some of the quotations provided earlier. But Levinas 
never went as far as we plan to go in focusing on the 
nature of God himself as infinite and as creator, due to 
his insistence on the foundational relation with the 
human other and due to the implicit and explicit 
correlationism at work in any phenomenological 
analysis (despite its dedication to transcendence, 
exteriority, and otherness). It cannot be emphasized 
enough that we do not disagree with anything Levinas 
says about God except his most fundamental point 
that God appears as it were only on the basis of the 
relation with the human other. In this way, the 
critique is only that this view is partial and incorrect 
and not that, for instance, Levinas’s determination of 
God as infinite, other than the other, transcendent, etc. 
are false. But despite Levinas getting so much right 
and having taught us so much in his deeply moving 
and inspiring prose, any monotheist will desire more, 
namely, an engagement with the Creator himself. 




§6. THE THOUGHT OF JEAN-LUC MARION: BEING GIVEN 
(ONLY TO HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS) 
 Such an engagement seems to be promised by 
Levinas’s most important and famous disciple, Jean-
Luc Marion.8 After all, it was Marion who wrote God 
Without Being, a text whose very purpose consisted of 
an attempt to save philosophical engagement with 
God from the critique of onto-theo-logy and the 
correlationist circle of phenomenological analysis. But 
a closer analysis of what Marion succeeds in 
articulating in this text along with the other main 
work of his entire corpus, Being Given: Toward a 
Phenomenology of Givenness, reveals that Marion 
does not provide us with much more than Heidegger 
and Levinas already offered (and that we have found 
lacking) in terms of a contemporary thought of God.  
First, Marion agrees with the Heideggerian 
determination of metaphysics as onto-theo-logy 
                                                                                     
8 I will here limit my analysis to Marion as it is not my goal 
to survey all the manners in which contemporary 
phenomenologists fail to think God as such. It is simply my 
goal to show how contemporary phenomenology remains 
stuck in a focus on how the human subject knows or 
experiences God. The same analysis could be repeated for 
the work of Jean-Louis Chretien or Jean-Yves Lacoste. Michel 
Henry forms a slightly different instance and uses the word 
‘transcendence’, but in doing so rejects any notion of God as 
creator or architect of all things. Rather, by this Henry means 
life revealing itself and experiencing itself. Such ex-
periencing is thereby purely immanent and absolute and the 
human subject only later comes to find it. And it is 
something founded on experience itself, if life is 
experiencing itself. But life is not something created, but 
rather generates itself. The focus on is on affectivity and 
what allows for something to be affected. Henry is thereby in 
many ways advocating a Whiteheadian view of all things 
perceiving/affecting each other, and we will address the key 
issues related to it in our critique of Whitehead. For Henry, 
see his book I am the Truth (2002). 




insofar as he agrees that metaphysics saw God as the 
supreme being that grounds being itself and as the 
self-caused cause of foundation (GWB xxi, 35). In fact, 
Marion goes further than Heidegger, since for Marion 
it is even a metaphysical determination of God to 
determine God as “the withdrawal of the foundation 
into itself” (GWB 35). It is not clear what particular 
text or figure Marion here thinks of, and it is also not 
clear that such a view can be attributed to metaphysics 
as such, since it would then already begin to articulate 
the Heideggerian moment of turning towards a post-
metaphysical thought. At the same time, Marion 
believes that his own religion Christianity does not 
figure God in its theology as the self-causing first 
cause, since God is beyond and above the first cause 
(GWB 35). Yet it is still unclear to what Marion refers, 
given that orthodox Catholicism, as figured in the 
texts of Aquinas, does not make this assertion.  
  In any event, Marion takes up the mantle of not 
thinking God as a being and thereby releasing God 
from being primarily thought as a determination 
within ontology (GWB 45). Marion thus explicitly 
asserts that he will attempt to think God outside the 
notion of the ontological difference despite the 
difficulty of doing so (GWB 45). This difficulty arises 
due to the apparent fact that any assertion made or 
topic discussed is necessarily discussed as a being or 
within the framework of existence. For example, even 
if we discuss fictional non-being such as a centaur we 
already posit it as an entity and thereby as something 
that has an essence and possible existence in the 
world. However, Marion contends that God names an 
“excess” that we cannot think, but at the same time 
can (GWB 46). In this way, Marion admits that there is 
an inevitability that God will be thought as an entity 
amongst entities due to the very nature and limitations 
of thought, but there remains something about God 
that “saturates” thought and forces thinking to realize 




that God cannot be counted as an entity or an entity 
among entities (GWB 46). Here, the figure of paradox 
marks theology insofar as in thinking God one 
attempts to think the unthinkable itself. The thought 
of God transgresses thinking and undermines and 
criticizes it from the inside out because God as 
“agape” transcends it (GWB 47).  
Marion defines God as love on the basis of 
Christian texts. Such love “holds nothing back” and 
“transcends itself” such that “not even Nothingness . . 
. can contain the excess of an absolute giving” (GWB 
48). Love as absolute and excessive giving without 
reserve and without desire for return names both and 
the nature of God as such for Marion. For this reason, 
to think God for Marion is to contend with the nature 
of the “gift” as God himself is giving without cease 
and without respite. Loving and giving name the same 
thing for Marion since “What is it to give itself if not 
to love?” (GWB 49). Of course, as a Christian, Marion 
believes the ultimate Gift is Christ who is crucified: 
“God is revealed by, in, and as the Christ” (GWB 71). 
God is apparently revealed by the crucifixion of Jesus 
of Nazareth insofar as this act represents an act of 
supreme sacrifice, a gift.  
 But such a determination of God as incarnated in 
a human figure already betrays the notion of pure 
giving, as here one speaks of an act of self-sacrifice 
rather than, for instance, creation itself as a form of 
love and giving. God is restricted to the actions a 
human can perform rather than what would be 
specific to the deity. But not only is God here in 
human form literally, but God also, as giving, gives 
himself “to be envisaged by us” (GWB 76). This is not 
to say that Marion does not also claim that God is 
“charity” and names something anterior to the being 
of beings, but if the “Christian name of God is Jesus” 
then God is named in and by an entity, thereby 




contesting the claim that God names something before 
Being and beings (GWB 82).  
These considerations partly encapsulate the 
problems with Marion’s very discourse. At the very 
moment Marion appears to begin to articulate the 
nature of the God himself, he undercuts such a 
determination by centering the analysis on how God 
appears in the realm of beings as a being, as a gift, or 
how God appears to thinking. In this way, it appears 
more and more that Marion remains within the 
correlationist circle insofar as what is key to Marion is 
that the meaning of God is determined by how 
consciousness relates to the event of faith or 
crucifixion or the reception of love. Here also, 
Marion’s earlier claim that God is outside of the 
ontological difference can only find meaning by 
identifying God with the Heideggerian notion of 
Ereignis. Just as Heidegger in On Time and Being 
famously posited that ‘It gives [Es gibt] Being’ and ‘It 
gives Time’, Marion says that God gives Being/beings 
without being a being itself (GWB 100). But such a 
thought does not mean for Marion that “we are by, 
because of, or after God,” but only that we are “within 
God” (GWB 100-1). I take these enigmatic 
determinations to mean that we are given also and 
given as gifts. That is to say, just as phenomenology 
takes what is given to consciousness as fundamental, 
so we are gifts and what is perceived and noticed is 
given. Marion highlights this by borrowing the 
Levinasian notion of the il y a and highlighting the 
sheer facticity of givenness (GWB 103). But this is the 
moment in which thinking God himself as giving or as 
giver disappears since “the giver” is left “in 
suspension” and bracketed as something transcendent 
to the field of pure givenness to consciousness (GWB 
103-4). And here begin the problems, since even if this 
givenness precedes self-consciousness or full con-
scious awareness, it is still oriented towards its being 




recognized and processed and thought by con-
sciousness. To say that God is charity is possibly true, 
but it does not tell us how beings are created or that 
they are. It merely tells us that we experience things 
phenomenologically as presented without asking by 
what and from what. The language here of giving is 
thereby deceptive since what is meant is sheer 
facticity, the sheer fact that one has before oneself 
whatever is. Even if consciousness cannot anticipate 
or constitute that thing and only arrives later on the 
scene to register it, Marion still here means by 
givenness what is presented as raw data. In fact, it is 
not clear why one should even say that the giver 
withdraws from the gift as the raw data as perceived is 
simply taken as given. Only if this raw data can be 
seen as created does it make sense to say it is given. 
But in no sense does Marion mean by givenness 
creation, by God creator, or by the gift the created. 
After all, if all we have are the raw facts of experience, 
why say that those facts are given?   
If the notion of the given emphasizes how things 
appear without cause or origin and without any 
obvious anterior conditions, then it is not clear why 
there should be any reference to a giver withdrawn or 
present. If one finds a rock, is it understood as a gift 
without a series of complicated assumptions being 
introduced? Being is simply there in its brute facticity. 
Adding the notion of givenness means that we receive 
it somehow. Consciousness can look at the world as 
something it discovers. And in this way, it is given 
insofar as it was already given there. It was waiting. 
For phenomenology, one sees only one side of a 
house, but one walks around and finds the other side 
painted in another color and is surprised. The house is 
given and resides in givenness insofar as one 
discovers and unfolds what was waiting to be 
unveiled. Here one has anteriority, but it appears more 
apt to say it is discovered, uncovered, rather than 




given. But beyond the pure receptivity and passivity 
of the senses for example (which Marion does not 
mention in the analysis here), there is no a priori 
sense of receiving a gift. And such receptivity of the 
senses indicates that one is not oneself creating what 
is given, but not that it is in fact created. In this way, it 
is not clear that something gives or that there is a giver 
in suspension from this perspective.  
 Heidegger’s notion of es gibt was mostly based on 
an idiomatic expression of the German language, but 
in French with its il y a or in English there is, there is 
no sense of givenness. One could simply say there is a 
sheer ‘there is-ness’ to things rather than a givenness. 
Nothing in the analysis would change except for the 
unjustified ideas that givenness itself evokes. Should 
one adopt the notion of givenness simply due to the 
peculiarities of the German language? Should one 
accept with Heidegger that German after Greek is the 
language of ontology as such? How does a tree or 
flower from the perspective of consciousness refer 
back to a giver that withdraws on this analysis?  
God gives for Marion, but it is not clear how. We 
understand the why (a pure act of love and charity), 
but it is not clear that the analysis can justify the 
reference to God through the notion of givenness. It is 
clear that God as agape is not known and is not 
himself given (GWB 106), but at the same time Marion 
insists that God reveals himself in the human figure of 
Jesus (GWB 107). Does this mean God gives himself or 
only part of himself or is simply the same as an act of 
sacrifice? Either way, God is here not thought in terms 
of creation which would be the only way to think of 
God himself outside of the human and any relation to 
consciousness. Marion certainly begins an analysis of 
how God can be thought other than ontically as a 
being, but thinking God in actions is not enough 
unless those actions themselves are not solely depen-
dent on recognition and thought in and by con-




sciousness. There is no evidence here that Marion 
means or intends to describe God’s relation to the 
world as such, but rather how God relates to 
consciousness.  
Such a critique is confirmed by examining 
Marion’s other major work Being Given, published 
some 15 years after God Without Being, wherein the 
very aspects of Marion’s analysis in God Without 
Being that promised an analysis of God himself on the 
basis of givenness disappear and only the nature of 
givenness as related to phenomenological evidence is 
emphasized. Marion states at the beginning: “Thus 
when I say that reduced givenness does not demand 
any giver for its given, I am not insinuating that it lays 
claim to a transcendent giver; when I say that the 
phenomenology of givenness by definition passes 
beyond metaphysics, I do not imply between the lines 
that this phenomenology restores metaphysics” (BG 
5). In this way, Marion takes back some of the key 
insights and promising ideas of his earlier work by 
now admitting the idea of givenness does not require 
any giver or reference to one and that there is no 
transcendent giver. To say there is no transcendent 
giver is to say there is no God, not only in the sense of 
not being an entity, but also in these sense Marion 
used in earlier of the gift being marked by a 
withdrawn giver. In fact, the term ‘God’ barely appears 
in Being Given and does so primarily in the discussion 
of the thought of others or when articulating again the 
onto-theo-logic determination of a supreme being.  
In this text, Marion again returns to the 
Heideggerian formulation of the es gibt, but without 
attempting now to identify God with this giving. 
Marion simply insists that one must think the ‘It’ of It 
gives non-ontically (BG 33). In addition, Marion is 
now attuned to the deconstructionist critique of the 
notion of the gift. Jacques Derrida, in Given Time, 
attempted to show that the very things that make a 




pure giving possible make it impossible. For instance, 
if one recognizes that a thing is a gift, one will feel 
obligated to give in return, thereby making the gift not 
something purely given. In this way, a gift must be 
recognized, but in doing so, its pure givenness is 
annulled. If the giver withdraws and is totally 
anonymous as Marion seems to insist with his idea, 
then what appears does not appear as gift as we have 
argued already. Thus Marion has to admit that giving 
cannot appear as a gift, since that would cancel the 
pure giving such that the gift can only be abandoned 
and the giver completely withdrawn (BG 35). But if 
these observations are true, the very justifications for 
Marion’s analysis appear without foundation and the 
naming of Being as something given appears to be 
simply a linguistic trick.  
At best, Marion can here only rehearse the 
Heideggerian analysis of Ereignis wherein that which 
gives withdraws and what is anterior to being veils 
itself (BG 36). But Marion does not identify this 
withdrawal with God, even though he notes that this 
giving and withdrawal does not concern an entity. 
Heidegger says that the ‘it’ of ‘it gives [es gibt]’ is 
forever mysterious and to interpret it as a power, 
personage, or entity eliminates what is trying to be 
thought in it (BG 36). But this means that giving has 
no basis. It simply takes place. And that means again 
that there is just brute facticity in what is shown and 
presented. There is no reference to a transcendent 
moment on this analysis, nothing that necessarily 
marks what is given as created or connected to a 
beyond. Marion claims that “Heidegger violates his 
own interdiction” since he calls this es gibt also 
Ereignis (BG 37), but Ereignis names an event, the 
event of appropriation, rather than a being or supreme 
entity. It is the event-like nature of givenness itself 
that is described here and nothing else.  




Marion simply continues the phenomenological 
act of bracketing all transcendence. This bracketing 
includes God and the world itself. For Husserl, such 
bracketing was done in order to see how things appear 
to consciousness themselves without making any 
other presuppositions such as that things exist in the 
world or that what we claim to know about the thing 
is there in the evidence before us. Marion follows 
Husserl. Certainly, Marion does not think 
consciousness is always already there. He will argue 
that it comes later on the scene in many instances to 
hear or recognize something anterior to itself. But 
there is no real reference to God and only analysis of 
givenness in relation to consciousness. In fact, because 
of this bracketing one has to see what is given as a 
“causa sui,” as giving itself (BG 74). What could be 
further than determining God as creator and the world 
as created than seeing things as their own basis to the 
point where they cause themselves? What appears has 
no basis other than itself.  
Marion does give an example of givenness that 
does not depend on one’s consciousness, a life 
sacrificed to save another (BG 76). But even though 
the one saved does not know another gave this gift, the 
one who sacrifices himself would have had the 
intention or the ones who took the life. In this way, 
the gift does not surpass consciousness. 
Consciousness at some point arrives on the scene to 
acknowledge the gift. To say a gift, if not recognized, 
is still given ignores that another gave it or that 
another arranged for the exchange. As noted earlier, 
Marion is aware of Derrida’s critique, but by agreeing 
with Derrida that the gift appears in the present and 
that due to temporality all things are already passing 
simply further undermines Marion’s own position of 
determining what shows itself as a gift (BG 80-84).  
Marion wanted to show that there is a gift 
without recognition in order to show how the self or 




consciousness does not determine all in his model the 
way it did for Husserl. But even if consciousness is 
not that which gives things and receives them 
passively, the entire analysis for Marion still centers 
around how things arrive to a “me” and are “arriving 
to me affecting me” in an event (BG 125). In fact, the 
“contingency” of the phenomenon is determined only 
insofar as it “arrives to me as a knowing so that I 
might know it” (BG 125). Rather than the contingency 
of things being a result of their being created or related 
to a necessary instance, it is found in the way 
phenomena form their basis in the sheer facticity of 
their being given to me and my perception of them. 
This lived experience might not be something one is 
immediately conscious of, but ultimately conscious-
ness comes on the scene and registers it.  
The central part of Marion’s analysis here 
concerns what he calls “the saturated phenomenon” 
which is something that exceeds and overcomes 
consciousness itself (BG 211-13). In this way, it is the 
human imagination and capacity for containing and 
knowing things that show an excess givenness in the 
same way they did for Kant in his analysis of the 
sublime. The main difference is that, whereas for Kant 
it was an active subject that tried to comprehend 
sublime phenomena, for Marion the self is merely a 
“constituted witness” (BG 216). This constituted 
witness is passive and dominated as he/she is 
overcome by a spectacle that exceeds his/her powers 
to comprehend (BG 216-17). But this passivity does 
not help us to exit the correlationist circle. Rather, it 
highlights how the very analysis is centered on what 
the human subject can or cannot think, contain, or 
experience. It is also in the context of the saturated 
phenomenon that God might finally make an 
appearance in this text. The main analysis that would 
come close here is that of Jesus as regarding one and 
making one a witness of his sacrifice (BG 239-40). 




Here, Marion also says that a revelation of God himself 
as showing himself can only appear in the figure of 
paradox (BG 242). Granted, God poses an idea that 
exceeds the human, but Marion in no way says that 
this idea refers to a real instance or to something that 
truly lies outside the human. His index is only ever 
epistemological—can the human comprehend God or 
not?  
Mystics convey experiences of saturated 
phenomena and relate them to God. While Marion 
notes this, there is no analysis of its implications (BG 
244). Also, it should go without saying that God 
cannot appear in the world. It is in this way that once 
again, rather than think God as creator, Marion at best 
wants to think Jesus as incarnation of God. But to 
make this claim destroys the very idea of God as 
infinite or transcendent. While Marion thinks the 
philosophical tradition has failed insofar as it has 
always said that God does not refer to any intuition 
(BG 243), any reference to intuition is still a matter of 
analyzing the lived experience of what one 
experiences of God rather than attempting to 
determine God as he is in himself. Ultimately though, 
these references to God are sparse in Marion as his 
thrust lies on the human side. He wants to show that 
the self is itself summoned, surprised, and receives 
itself by being called to itself (BG 268-69). In this way, 
Marion thinks the human subject as the result of a 
calling that precedes reflective conscious awareness. 
His model here is the calling of Saint Matthew (BG 
283-85). Matthew is called and in hearing the call and 
recognizing the call receives a self and purpose. The 
call preceded Matthew such that the subject is not 
constitutive of himself, but rather constituted by 
givenness. But such an analysis leaves out whether or 
not there is actually something calling to one, 
something transcendent to the call. The call precedes 




one, but that is only recognized after the fact and after 
having heard oneself called in it.  
Marion is thereby interested in knowing how the 
human subject is formed rather than knowing how the 
world is outside this subject. But of course that was 
always phenomenology’s strength—to describe lived 
experience whether it be that of one who turns to God 
or turns away as it presents itself in itself to our 
thought. Nevertheless, as is usual, such strengths 
expose weaknesses. In this case, phenomenology 
(however poetically it can articulate our experience of 
the religious) is thereby restricted to articulating a 
human psychology or an anthropology rather than a 
fundamental ontology of the in-itself. What is then 
called for here, and what Marion does not provide, is 
an analysis of perception that takes place outside of 
consciousness awareness. 
 
§7. CONTRA THE PROCESS THEOLOGIANS 
Such a realist analysis was precisely what Alfred 
North Whitehead undertook. And beyond phenome-
nology, what is called process theology (Whitehead, 
Charles Hartshorne, David Ray Griffin, John Cobb, 
etc.) constitutes the other original and important 
philosophical engagement with God in the last 
century.9 Such process thought, as articulated by 
                                                                                     
9 Those who pursue what is called ‘Anglo-American 
Philosophy’ might here propose that the work of Alvin 
Plantinga and Richard Swinburne form a third grouping of 
key thinkers of God and theists. However, as Keith Parsons 
notes, Plantinga is mainly focused on justifying belief in God 
rather than attempting to ontologically or metaphysically 
with the very nature of God (Parsons 2007, 103). In this way, 
God’s existence is totally bracketed in attempt to aver that a 
faith-based approach is reasonable despite not having any 
ultimate evidence that God exists or that knock-down 
arguments to that effect. But this approach shows that 
Plantinga himself is focused on how the human believes, 




Whitehead, would at first blush appear to solve some 
of the problems we have listed regarding conceiving of 
God insofar as Whitehead unabashedly advocates 
realism and opposes on all counts limiting one’s 
analysis to the relation between the human and the 
world or to how the human understands things. For 
Whitehead, the human is just one perceiver amongst 
others. Yet while Whitehead conceptualizes God as an 
entity (what he calls an ‘actual occasion’), he does not 
attribute to God any of the main attributes that 
                                                                                                     
rather than how the things are in and of themselves. For 
Plantinga, belief in God is the issue, and such a belief is 
foundational (Parsons 2007, 104). But Plantinga wants to 
differentiate between belief in God and for instance a child’s 
belief in Santa Claus or Greek culture’s belief in Zeus. But to 
do so, Plantinga will have to show why it is reasonable to 
believe in God rather than Zeus on the basis of God being 
actual and real in and itself indecent of the belief. As 
Parsons notes, eventually Plantinga himself had to argue that 
one must know or decide upon the existence of God to say a 
belief is justified (Parsons 2007, 110). To my knowledge, 
Plantinga does so via an ontological argument. We will 
address this argument in general later on as we develop our 
own ontology. Swinburne, on the other hand, is focused on 
how empirical evidence seems to suggest God exists 
(Parsons 2007, 112). He focuses on arguments from design 
concerning the complexity of the universe for showing why 
it is more likely that God created the world than God did not 
(Parsons 2007, 113). But as we will argue later, we reject 
teleological arguments concerning God. In addition, 
Swinburne is attempting to show why it is reasonable to 
claim God created the world, rather than explaining 
ontologically how that is possible or how it takes place, 
which is also our concern. Empirical evidence may give us 
reasons to be pushed in one direction, but it is not an 
ultimate foundation. In addition, we first need a fully 
worked out ontology (and Swinburne seems to be saying 
simply that the framework of traditional metaphysics is 
itself seemingly confirmed by empirical considerations) and 
one that does not simply repeat onto-theo-logy. 




traditional metaphysics did (God is not the creator of 
the world for Whitehead, God is not all-powerful, etc.) 
and thereby would apparently escape the charge of 
repeating the problems of onto-theo-logy. 
Whitehead calls entities actual occasions since he 
does not see any entity as a merely existing object that 
persists and is passively perceived (PR 73). Rather, 
any entity also perceives as much as it is perceived: “It 
is subject-superject and neither half of this description 
can for a moment be lost sight of” (PR 29). Insofar as 
the entire world is constantly changing, a permanent 
self-identical object cannot occur. Actual occasions 
are part of the creative process and feel and apprehend 
the world and other actual occasions (PR 80). Here we 
see the outlines of what is commonly called 
Whitehead’s pan-experientialism. Such actual occa-
sions are everything from electrons and molecules to 
rocks, light bulbs, and planets. All actual occasions 
are related (PR xiv). However, it is precisely due to 
limiting God to being an actual occasion and not 
creator that causes Whitehead’s theory to founder.  
Whereas all actual occasions become and perish 
in the Heracletian flux that Whitehead posits as the 
fundamental aspect of existence (PR xv), God is non-
temporal: “God is [a] primordial, non-temporal 
accident” (PR 7). God is always already complete in 
what he is and not subject to change, for God is “free, 
complete, primordial, eternal” (PR 344). God thereby 
participates in the universe, but is at the same 
transcendent and beyond it insofar as God is eternal 
and outside change. But this implies that the world is 
not made of actual occasions in the same sense, that it 
does not universally obey the same principles. God is 
thus for Whitehead an exception. But God is not 
meant to be any different than any other actual 
occasion: “God is an actual entity, and so is the most 
trivial puff of existence in far-off empty space” (PR 
18). Describing God as an exception might make sense 




and be a defensible position, except that one of 
Whitehead’s other main principles, apart from the 
idea that all is flux, is that there are no exceptions to 
this rule: “There is no going behind actual entities to 
find anything more real” (PR 18). That is to say, 
Whitehead precisely criticizes other metaphysical 
theories with incoherency for not applying the same 
set of principles to any and all entities: “But, though 
there are gradations of importance, and varieties of 
function, yet in the principles which actuality exem-
plifies all are on the same level. The final facts are all 
alike, actual entities” (PR 18). In this way, Whitehead, 
who claims his theory is true due to its matching 
reality best, falls into incoherence when God is 
posited.  
Such a charge may not in and of itself be wholly 
convincing, but a more detailed rendering of 
Whitehead’s ideas can show the intractability of the 
problem, as well as others. For Whitehead, there 
cannot be a total set of all actual occasions since one 
would have to posit an actual occasion that would 
prehend/perceive that set (PR 211). Such an 
omnipotent perceiver cannot be God since God is one 
actual occasion amongst others. But if God is not an 
all-knowing perceiver, what work does God do in 
Whitehead’s system? First, God contains all possible 
predicates and thinks them. These predicates are 
called by Whitehead ‘eternal objects.’ Such eternal 
objects are essentially qualia or properties that cannot 
be seen to be unique to a thing itself (PR 149). For 
instance, wetness is a property of water, but it is not a 
property of the molecules involved and not something 
that the perceiver creates or projects into the thing 
perceived. Rather, the perceiver passively detects 
wetness in what is perceived. For this reason, 
Whitehead sees such a quality as existing eternally as 
an object in the mind of God. God orders and 
maintains these eternal objects and allows them to 




ingress into any relation wherein they would be 
perceived (PR 29-31). But in doing so, God does not 
create eternal objects. They are as eternal as God. This 
brings us to another exception to Whitehead’s rules, as 
these eternal objects are again outside the radical flux 
marking the world. In addition, it is not clear why God 
can perceive these objects any differently than any 
other perceiver given the principles of Whitehead’s 
thought. But the eternal objects would simply be 
eternal with God—uncreated, always there. They are 
closer to Platonic forms than anything else. But they 
do not appear out of nowhere or as nothing. They can 
at best be a potentiality eternally there, awaiting 
activation by God. But God does not originate or create 
these objects.  
Whitehead contends that God conceives all 
possibilities, but if God does so, it is not clear who is 
perceiving God, as Whitehead does not make God into 
a self-perceiver. God would need to have a non-
limited perception of all possibilities, but then the 
world would seemingly need some objective unity 
that it cannot have due to its radical flux. The world 
would need to be one process in and of itself, which it 
cannot be because it is constantly changing. As soon 
as God would try to allow an eternal object to ingress 
into a situation, the situation would have already 
changed. Otherwise, God would have to be outside the 
world and Whitehead would have to reform his 
principles to allow such an exception.  
Whitehead, as noted, rejects the idea of creation 
ex nihilo : “No actual entity, no reason” (PR 19). God 
is eternal. But so are the eternal objects. This means 
the world is always already there. There is no 
beginning or end to it. But if the world is eternal along 
with God and the eternal objects, it is not clear how it 
exists as a constant flux. For if the world constantly 
changes, and nothing in it is necessary, then it would 
eventually reach a point where there is nothing. In 




eternity there is an infinite amount of time, and that 
means an infinite amount of time would have already 
passed. All things become and perish, in an eternity of 
time of change, so nothing would eventually appear. 
Even if one posits an eternal return of the same, given 
the contingent nature of things, there has to be a time 
in that eternal return when all are reduced to nothing. 
But God is incapable of creating from nothing and 
only has possibilities as embodied in particular 
eternal objects at his disposal. In this way, as nothing 
comes from nothing, we should only have God, the 
eternal objects, and an empty world. That is to say, 
rather than flux we should have only non-temporal 
time. And yet we do not. Such a problem occurs 
precisely because God is not a creator for Whitehead. 
While Whitehead undermines the coherency of his 
doctrine by positing an actual occasion outside of the 
temporal flux, the theory founders by not making this 
entity necessary and also capable of creation. 
However, creation out of nothing would again be yet 
another violation of the basic metaphysical principles 
Whitehead says cannot be violated.  
For Whitehead, “things which are temporal arise 
by their perception in the things which are eternal” 
(PR 40). But unless temporal things always already 
are, it is not clear how they can arise from God (who 
cannot create) and from eternal objects (which only 
ingress into already existing actual occasions). Here, 
Saadya Gaon offers an instructive objection, arguing 
that an eternal being, which has “no form nor equality 
nor dimension nor limit nor place nor time, can be so 
changed that a part of it becomes a body possessing 
form and dimension and quality and place and time 
and other attributes belonging to corporeal beings”  
(Gaon 1948, 56). Following on this point, Gaon argues, 
“that the All-Wise, who is immune against all pain 
and unaffected by action and not subject to accidents, 
should choose to turn a portion of Himself into a body 




so that He would become exposed to accidents and be 
affected . . . seems absurd as God could not gain 
anything by such an action” (Gaon 1948, 56). One can 
also turn to Augustine for a critique of the idea that 
the world comes from God and is coeternal with God. 
The world exists in time so it cannot be eternal. If time 
is coeternal with God, then it makes no sense to speak 
of time, as time is not about the permanent but the 
impermanent (Confessions 11.140). In this way, the 
world itself has to be eternal for Whitehead and would 
have to be an actual occasion. It needs to consist of 
always-already-there actual occasions that exist as 
eternally as God and eternal objects. But as noted 
earlier, no one can perceive the world as a whole as it 
is always changing. The world as a whole cannot exist 
and be that general eternal thing that allows the 
system to proceed. Otherwise also, we have an infinite 
regress.  
These views also conflict with what is called Big 
Bang theory, which attempts to show that there were 
not always actual occasions perceiving each other 
since time and space themselves come into being at a 
certain point. If there is a horizon at which one does 
not have actual occasions to point to, then it is not 
clear on the basis of God and eternal objects alone 
how other actual occasions arise. In particular, every 
actual occasion only apprehends some other actual 
occasion that came prior it to (PR 208), further 
emphasizing the infinite regress here involved and the 
manner in which Whitehead’s theory is at odds with 
the insights of Big Bang theory. But every actual 
occasion is linked with all the others via the mutual 
prehending that takes place among them (PR 37, 41).  
Whitehead also defines God as ‘dipolar’, meaning 
that God has both physical and mental aspects. But it 
is not clear how there can be a non-changing physical 
aspect of God, especially insofar as God in this way is 
prehending the world itself, which means that God is 




both perceiving and affecting and being affected by it 
(PR 247-48). God would have to change, if only via 
these prehensions. But if God changes, God cannot be 
defined as Whitehead did earlier (as complete or 
eternal). The very notion of prehension for Whitehead 
does not mean merely passively registering change, 
but being affected and formed by that perception 
itself. God is also always obtaining new experiences in 
process theology. God experiences things for the first 
time and thereby is made new. In particular, God 
suffers and experiences our pains alongside us (PR 
351). In other words, even though Whitehead made 
God an exception, Whitehead is forced to conceive of 
God as he does any other actual entity in order to 
make his system work and struggle to keep up the 
appearance of coherence despite these issues: “In the 
first place, God is not to be treated as an exception to 
all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their 
collapse. He is their chief exemplification” (PR 343). 
God also must have new experiences because 
Whitehead insists that what happens in the world is 
the creation of novel and unforeseen things (PR 222). 
God suffers not metaphorically, but literally what we 
suffer. But a suffering God is one that changes and 
moves from one state to another: “It was true to say 
that the World is immanent in God, as that God is 
immanent in the World” (PR 348).  
If Whitehead, by saying that all possibilities exist 
in God, is saying that God conceives of all that could 
happen even before it does, then God always already 
perceives them forever in eternity (PR 46, 343-51). But 
such a rendering in Whitehead’s system means that 
God does not perceive the world as it is now, but only 
as it might be. God is then disconnected from the 
world in Whitehead’s terms. Through his idea of 
prehension, Whitehead also has to posit that all actual 
occasions are prehending God. But that then means 
that actual occasions can apprehend something 




eternal. But what does it mean to say all actual 
occasions know God in this way, unless in knowing 
God they also affect and change God? But if the future 
is open and unknown to God, it is not clear how God 
could envisage all possibilities and at the same time 
experience the future as unknown and open. In 
addition, if we posit that God is eternal and thereby 
the future happens eternally, then nothing new does 
happen to God, and it is not clear how God can 
perceive the world as an actual occasion: “In God’s 
nature, permanence is primordial and flux is derived 
from the World; in the World’s nature, flux is 
primordial and permanence is derivate from God” (PR 
350). The pure flux that Whitehead insisted on as a 
fundamental principle becomes, like for Hinduism 
and Buddhism, an illusion that we experience in 
ignorance as finite and temporal beings. 
If these tangles were not enough, Whitehead, 
although positing God as eternal, says that God is 
dependent upon the world. That means God exists 
contingently and not necessarily. Eternal cannot then 
truly mean timeless for Whitehead, as something 
contingent could cease to be. This view once again 
calls for the argument from contingency and necessity 
that shows that such a world filled with contingencies 
would end in nothingness. And nothing can come into 
the world once that occurs: “According to the 
ontological principle, there is nothing which floats 
into the world form nowhere. Everything in the actual 
world is referable to some actual entity” (PR 244). In 
any event, God then has definite states of being that 
depend upon the world to exist. Nothing restrains God 
from existing, but nothing makes it necessary. God’s 
dependence on the world also means God is 
influenced by the world. But then God is emerging 
and perishing with each event that God participates 
in: “Each temporal occasion embodies God, and is 
embodied in God” (PR 529).  




Some here might want to save Whitehead’s view 
from full see-sawing incoherence by stating that God 
is simply an actual occasion that takes forever to 
occur. But if it takes forever to occur, then it never 
occurs since an actual occasion is only ever in the past 
for Whitehead. God would have to pass into actuality 
at some point, but something taking forever to occur 
never does. When one actual occasion perceives 
another (and Whitehead claims God is perceived), it is 
what it was that is perceived, given the constant flux 
of change at work. Now Whitehead does say at one 
point that “in the case of the primordial actuality, 
which is God, there is no past” (PR 135). But if that 
means that God as eternal has everything eternally 
before him, then once again the key idea of process 
philosophy, flux, is not truly real as things exist in an 
eternal now laid out before God. Time is then no more 
than the “moving image of eternity” (PR 338), but such 
an image undermines the idea that what is most 
radical about existence is its impermanency.  
Either way we turn, we are forced to show the 
incoherency (the most devastating critique one can 
level at a metaphysics that asserts its truth based on 
the coherency of its conception of things and not the 
force of its argumentation) of determining God as both 
eternal and related to flux, an entity amongst others 
and somehow outside the world. Ultimately, 
Whitehead’s theology fails not due to any corre-
lationist problem, but due to its posting of a finite and 
contingent God who does not create the world, but 
only depends upon it and is influenced by it 
throughout eternity.  
 
§8. AN IMPERFECT LOGIC: CHARLES HARTSHORNE’S 
PANENTHEISM 
The critique here pertaining to Whitehead would 
in turn cover the process theology articulated by Cobb 
and Griffin in their Process Theology: An Introductory 




Exposition. There, the authors continue Whitehead’s 
rejection of creation ex nihilo  (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 
65). In fact, they emphasize how the process 
theologian’s God creates out of an always existing and 
eternal chaos (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 65-66). Also, 
God is once again related to the world such that God is 
dependent upon it (Cobb and Griffin 1976, 9). It is 
precisely at this point that the work of Charles 
Hartshorne, the most prominent process thinker after 
Whitehead and perhaps the most brilliant American 
philosopher of the last 100 years after John Dewey, 
requires consideration, since Hartshorne takes up the 
problems related to seeing God as both immanent in 
the world and the world as immanent in God. 
However, Hartshorne’s theory devolves into 
pantheism (what he calls ‘panentheism’) and thereby 
suffers the problems common to that orientation.  
Despite his commitment to the ontological 
argument in the The Logic of Perfection, Hartshorne’s 
own pantheism, coupled with the modal argument-
tation found in that text, undermine some of his 
claims. For instance, Hartshorne asserts all things are 
contingent to the point that contingency is necessary 
(LP 11). However, if all things are contingent, and God 
is a being, then God would have to be contingent. 
Also, if God is identified with a purely contingent 
world, then once again God is contingent and 
necessarily so. Hartshorne likes to claim that God and 
the world are related as a soul is to a body. But that 
does not mean God is independent of the body. 
Rather, it shows that God is not absolute or 
unchangeable, but rather relative to the world itself 
and affected by it (TDR ix-x). These relations are 
themselves contingent (TDR x) such that God himself 
is characterized by contingent relations. But such a 
view undermines the modal ontological argument 
Hartshorne taught us to defend. Hartshorne’s 
articulated pantheism leads to a “relative or 




changeable” God that “depends upon and varies with 
varying relationships” (TDR ix). Such change makes 
God contingent because if something can change, it 
can be otherwise. Hartshorne takes this idea to be 
superior to a necessary God as God therefore 
transcends a static absoluteness by including change 
within God (TDR 19). But the consequence of such an 
alleged transcendence is that God moves through 
states and times and thereby could be essentially 
otherwise than how God is.  
Hartshorne agrees with Hinduism that a 
“supreme being must be all inclusive,” as otherwise 
there could be a whole greater than God (TDR 61, 76). 
Here, Hartshorne falls prey to the critique of onto-
theo-logy, a critique it seems Hartshorne was himself 
unaware of. Also, if God includes all, then God 
changes as those things included in God change. 
Hartshorne’s defenders might here argue that 
Hartshorne’s view on relations and the relativity of 
God is being overlooked. Hartshorne defines relations 
as being “external to terms,” as relations primarily 
have being in the mind such that God might be seen as 
partly independent of the world (DR 8). But even for 
Hartshorne, relations “cannot be external to all their 
terms,” “for if no term is constituted by the relation, 
then relatedness is additional to all the terms, and 
must be related to them by a further relation, and so 
on” (TDR 64). In other words, once God is related to 
the world and affected by it, God must be constituted 
at least partly by this relation and not fully external to 
the world. While defenders of Hartshorne would say 
that God includes the world while transcending it, it 
is not clear how God can do so, and more importantly, 
the very act has decisive implications for positing God 
as anything other than one more contingent being. 
God becomes for Hartshorne in a manner it is not clear 
even Whitehead was willing to admit, given White-




headian statements concerning the eternal and 
immutable nature of God as noted above. 
Even if here we divide God into different aspects, 
such a division does not eliminate both sides from 
fundamentally defining God as such. Hartshorne also 
wants to distinguish a God that is necessary and 
immutable, but once God is defined as related to the 
world such that God suffers and changes with it, then 
God is either split into more than one God or rendered 
contingent, given that God could be otherwise. God’s 
transcendence is forfeited when God includes the 
world as the set of all possible and actual entities 
(setting aside for the moment the Cantorianism, which 
we will elaborate later, showing how it might render 
this thesis null and void). Also, even if one were to 
grant for Hartshorne that God does transcend the 
world and can exist independently of it, then God 
could not be identified with being all inclusive 
(except of God himself and nothing else). But then, 
given that God cannot create in Hartshorne’s view, 
there should be no world, as nothing comes from 
nothing unless the world comes from God himself. I 
am not aware that Hartshorne pursues the latter track, 
but it returns one to some of the more inherent 
problems of pantheism, such as a Cantorian critique 
(set theory seems to show there can be no set of all 
sets), onto-theo-logic critique, and so on. Also, if the 
world is created out of God, then the world is so 
indifferent to God that it is not clear how the two 
relate, other than as God relating to himself. This view 
implies that the world is not contingent as Hartshorne 
claims, since the world flows from the necessary and 
is part of it. And if the world comes from God, then 
once again God changes and becomes, with the 
implications of that mutability undermining the other 
claims Hartshorne wants to make.  
To return to the soul-body model, most 
proponents of Hartshorne’s view would say that just 




as a person’s identity remains the same over time even 
while one’s body changes, so God as the soul of the 
world can stay the same while the world changes. But 
Hartshorne is not saying God is unaffected by the 
world, but rather that God is related to the world such 
that, for instance, God is changed by the world and 
not just some physical aspect of God. Also, such a 
substance-based theory of identity leaves the actual 
enduring identity as a mysterious whatness that 
cannot be explained, but only posited, whether one 
speaks of an individual thing or God. This view also 
contradicts the Whiteheadian universe in which all 
actual occasions are merely events wherein they 
constantly change and are constituted by their 
interrelations with others without their being an 
enduring substance or identity. Hartshorne appears to 
adopt this aspect of Whiteheadian philosophy and 
process theology. Also, if Hartshorne is adopting a 
substance ontology wherein there are enduring 
substratums, then change is not a radical flux. It is 
also then not clear how change occurs insofar as all 
change becomes accidental. Why should the substance 
that endures disappear? As for God, if all of God’s 
changes are purely accidental, then they lose the 
relevancy and importance that Hartshorne wanted to 
attribute to them. If God lasts forever and is eternal, 
then how does God relate to changing things in the 
way Hartshorne wants without entering time itself? 
After all, one of Hartshorne’s main claims to 
originality relative to classical theism was that God is 
not outside of time, but that time comprehends and 
involves God as well. God does not here know the 
future such that God is changed by that knowledge. Is 
that a merely accidental change? One that can 
maintain God’s necessary character?  
Time’s being real and including God was also 
important to secure the fundamental nature of flux. 
God for Hartshorne loves the world, but is eternally 




loving. However, Hartshorne himself says love is a 
relation such that God’s loving the world cannot exist 
without the contingent relation to a particular world. 
Also, God as all-inclusive means that the relation 
between God and world takes place within God 
(otherwise there would be a relation governing God 
and the world that comprehends them and is thereby 
greater than God since it includes God). If the world 
must also be included in God, then if it is to be 
thought as contingent, God would be knowing part of 
himself and be changed by a knowledge of himself. 
We will turn to the problems of inclusion later when 
examining Cantorian influenced set theory. But to 
anticipate some of the argumentation, Hartshorne’s 
idea that God includes all, whether it be as thoughts in 
the mid of God or cells in an organic entity, might 
seem to mean that there is a cohesive unity, but it still 
falls prey to the idea that there cannot be a set of all 
sets thereby leaving something outside of God. If 
numbers are included, then with the infinity of 
numbers we may have a part that is greater than the 
whole itself. But then it is not clear how God can be 
divided between soul and body, as we are not 
discussing two independent things, but two things 
within the one.  
Ultimately, to treat God as split between soul and 
body is to treat God as an entity that is human-like 
and limited. Such an entity cannot create the world, 
and even if God is necessary, he would be alone, as 
the contingent world over infinite time eventually 
yields a nothing that Hartshorne’s God cannot change. 
And if the world pre-exists, it would have to be 
necessary, thereby undermining the claims to 
contingency. Hartshorne may not be thinking such a 
nothingness can occur, since he thinks it is a matter of 
what can be imagined or not, but the modal argument 
itself shows that it is a matter of the things themselves, 
given the inherent meaning of contingency and the 




nature of time. It also does not need to be experienced 
to be shown to follow, any more than the ontological 
argument requires an experience to be proven. While 
Hartshorne clarifies some of the key ideas concerning 
process theology and certainly articulates a novel 
conception of God, his view fails, as did the views of 
Whitehead and phenomenology, primarily for refusing 
to accept God as creator and accepting the 













§9. BADIOU’S FIRST THESIS: BEING IS SETS  
So far, we have focused on what is unsatisfying in 
the two key discourses on God in the current epoch—
phenomenology and process theology. These two 
elegant discourses have been criticized rather crudely 
for correlationism, a failure to think the infinite 
properly, incoherence, falling prey to the critique of 
onto-theo-logy, and/or the implications of refusing to 
accept God as creator. The only positive stance that 
has truly been defended is that the Kabbalah can be 
translated into philosophy and thereby offers a true 
rendering of God. But how does Kabbalah do this? 
Rather than simply spelling out how Kabbalah avoids 
the pitfalls related above to phenomenology and 
process theology, we will have to detour again through 
philosophical argumentation and the theories of more 
contemporary thinkers, since the goal here is not 
simply to present Kabbalistic ideas as such, but to 
present them as philosophically articulated theses. As 
noted, the work of the French philosopher Badiou will 
help us to do so, despite Badiou’s self-declared 
atheism. The first step in articulating the positive 
Kabbalistic theory of ontology will consist in working 
through some of the key theses of Badiou’s ontology.  
The first and primary thesis informing Badiou’s 
ontology is the idea that “‘ontology=mathematics’” (BE 
13). When we want to understand being in and of 
itself as being for Badiou, we must turn to 
mathematics, as mathematics articulates and inscribes 




this idea (BE 3). By mathematics, Badiou in particular 
refers to post-Cantorian set theory. Set theory sets out 
to treat all possible entities as included in collections 
or forming collections and thereby sets forth the 
extensional aggregate as the form of how all that can 
be can be presented. Now, when we want to say what 
being is in and of itself, being qua being, we have to 
exclude all other qualities or properties. Ontology, 
ideally, is just about what is expressible about being 
itself and not any other quality or trait. In this way, 
one is not asking how being appears to a subject, but 
rather how being is itself without reference to what it 
means to a specific entity or to consciousness. For 
instance, we are not asking how a particular being 
exists, but just about being in and of itself, is-ness.  
For Badiou, set theory forms the most basic 
expression of being because, following Leibniz, “What 
is not a being is not a being” (BE 53). The most basic 
thing that characterizes being is that it relates to unity 
and suchness, as noted earlier in reference to the 
Heideggerian rendering of ontological difference. 
Through its focus on extensional collections, set 
theory captures the very notion that nothing is that is 
not a unity or aggregate of some kind. But at the same 
time, one can distinguish in set theory between what 
is collected in a set and the set or frame itself. In this 
way, one should not confuse the transcendental unity 
of a collection with some substratum (eternal or 
otherwise) that underlies things or some Kantian thing 
in itself. Rather, the fact that set theory, in encoding 
ontological difference, allows us to distinguish what is 
in a set (regardless of what the set aggregates, whether 
it is of qualities, relations, perceives, etc.) means we 
no longer have to search for withdrawn substratums 
and suggest they hide from us in hidden dimensions. 
In this way, set theory is an actual writing and 
inscription of ontological difference as such. Set 
theory is only interested in what can be articulated as 




a unity and said to be such and such. Set theory only 
concerns itself with collections and collections of 
collections. It begins with “neither cosmos nor 
phenomena, neither cause nor substance” and thereby 
makes the least possible presuppositions about the 
nature and form of being (Badiou 2005, 23). Whereas 
another ontology will immediately attempt to describe 
the world in its qualitative richness and divide and 
categorize beings, mathematics as ontology, as set 
theory, only concerns itself with the most minimal 
aspect of being, which is to say, with being itself 
alone.  
Badiou’s first thesis is that ontology should begin 
simply by “saying there is a multiplicity of 
multiplicities” (Badiou 2005, 23). Here, one also has 
the distinction between being and existence. That is, 
set theoretical ontology does not make any 
presuppositions about what can exist or does exist, 
what is given to experience or what is not empirically 
found. It does not in its most basic axiom and 
beginning say if any particular person or entity exists. 
It is not even making any claims on space or time or 
their natures. It does not say what there is; it states 
what any possible “situation” can be about as such 
and in general (BE 27). Set theoretical ontology 
thereby describes the basic framework of any and all 
possible statements about being, precisely by 
remaining indifferent to what one might happen to 
run across in phenomenological lived experience. 
Badiou calls any general set containing things a 
situation. That is, for instance, one can speak of the 
situation of the room I am in now and state what this 
set includes in all its elements. In such a set one 
would include a computer, books, pens, chewing gum, 
a cell phone, etc. All these individual elements belong 
to the situation of ‘this room’ (Badiou 2005, 25). While 
for Badiou other discourses besides ontology speak 
about the actual nature of entities and how to 




categorize them, ontology does not say anything more 
about beings beyond their belonging or not belong to 
sets and the nature of sets (Badiou 2005, 22). For 
example, anthropology would tell us what types of 
humans there are, how they behave, etc. Ontology 
would simply state what can be said about the act of 
forming a unity as such, whether that unity be 
something that includes humans or not. A situation is 
simply the presentation of the multiplicities that are 
associated with it and included in it. Ontology is 
about the general form of situations. In particular, 
Badiou thinks ontology is about “the pure multiple,” 
“the multiple ‘in–itself’” (BE 28). This means that pure 
ontology would be about inconsistent multiplicities 
that present only multiplicities.  
Even to speak about there being a collection as 
such, as a unity, is already to speak about the state of a 
situation rather than the situation itself. However, for 
Badiou, one never truly encounters a pure situation; 
one always already finds oneself confronted with 
states of situation in which things appear as unities 
and as parts of defined totalities. In this way, to 
anticipate a further key thesis of Badiou’s, “the one is 
not” in the situation, but there are ones in the state of 
situation in which all things have been collected and 
counted as one (BE 29). Without the state of situation, 
the multiple would not even be recognized, since 
there would be endless multiples of multiples. 
Ultimately for Badiou, set theory makes good on the 
idea proclaimed since Parmenides that being and 
thinking are one and the same. Whatever can be 
thought and collected is itself a being. The thesis here 
that marks Badiou as the next great ontologist 
following Heidegger is that all is multiple, all is sets. 
 
§10. WHAT IS AN EXTENSIONAL SET? 
Before continuing, let’s be sure that we 
understand the specific way post-Cantorian theory 




defines a set. Set theory has what is called an 
“iterative” notion of the set (Moore 2001, xiv). A set or 
collection is dependent on its members. The members 
first must be. The members precede the set itself. That 
is, there is something that is collected into sets (to 
make the claims of pure ontology we will have to posit 
nothing and its marking and not any objects or things 
as commonly understood). This is why Badiou says 
that the situation as pure presentation is just multiples 
of multiples, as here he is naming the infinity of 
things that precedes sets. The state of the situation is 
already a seeing of things together as sets. Of course, 
as already noted, one never actually finds presented 
this pure situation and thereby only ever finds things 
as already grouped into sets and unities. Sets come 
later to collect these things into unities. But these sets 
do not refer to the properties or natures of the 
elements they aggregate. Rather, the sets merely gather 
them together. All can belong to sets including other 
sets. As we will see, set theory also claims that there is 
no one set encompassing the infinity of all things and 
sets, a set of all possible sets.  
We must be clear that a set is what it is simply 
because of the things included in it. For instance, the 
set of all human beings is not a set due to the 
properties of humans showing they belong together; 
the set of all human beings merely collects together a 
series of elements. A set is then a recognition of the 
many and its turning into a one. This is why one can 
talk about the set of all things in the cushions of my 
couch as much as the set of all sea mammals. Both are 
just the joining together of elements already there. 
This is also what is meant when it is said that set 
theory uses an extensional notion of a set. An 
intentional set would have a rule determining what 
can and cannot belong to it. For instance, the concept 
of rationality will determine what things can be 
grouped in a set of all rational things. But an 




extensional set or iterative set works from the ground 
up and just bundles together things willy-nilly, as it 
were.  
This is why one can say that consciousness itself 
aggregates sets. Consciousness (especially according to 
Husserl) has object-directed intuition. But that means 
it is always looking at things as unities, as sets. 
Consciousness itself is able both to recognize sets and 
to posit them. For this reason, I can be aware of the set 
of pillows on a bed, one pillow, the room, etc. 
Consciousness itself is constantly intending unities 
and recognizing them. But this is not simply true of 
consciousness. Being in and of itself is characterized 
by such unities. 
That a set, as a collection, is indifferent to the 
things it includes does not mean that one cannot take 
these elements and perform operations. For instance, 
one can take part of the elements of a set and make a 
new subset. If a set includes A, B, and C, a subset 
would be just A and C. For Badiou, one should 
“abandon all hope of explicitly defining the notion of 
a set” as the pure multiple is simply “founded solely 
by a relation of ‘belonging to’” (BE 43). Now, even 
though a set presupposes the things it collects, in pure 
ontology, as we will discover, the only thing that need 
be presupposed is literally nothing when articulating 
the general laws of being as such. In addition, Badiou 
will show how this nothing or void is to be identified 
with the infinite multiplicities of multiples of a 
situation that he sees as being without any unity as of 
yet. In some ways, there is a virtuous circle here, as 
one will only be able to show that sets presuppose 
infinities of infinites of things that they collect and 
aggregate into particular sets only once set theory 
itself has demonstrated the being of the actual infinite. 
In other words, this is an equation that will 
philosophically confirm the Kabbalistic view that zero 




and infinity not only exist, but that one equals the 
other and that that is the least one can say about both.  
It is due to the set having such a minimal being 
that it is articulated and understood via the axioms 
that govern its laws and functioning. One of the 
axioms, for example, precludes a set belonging to itself 
in order to avoid the paradoxes associated with such a 
condition as articulated famously by Bertrand Russell: 
“Russell’s paradox can best be illustrated by a famous 
analogy popularly known as the story of the barber of 
Seville. The barber of Seville shaves all the men in the 
city of Seville who do not shave themselves. Now 
comes the obvious question: Does the barber of Seville 
shave himself? If he does, then he doesn’t. If he 
doesn’t, then he does. This is a logical paradox” 
(Aczel 2001, 181). These paradoxes and this axiom 
show that there is no set of all sets, as such a set 
would have to include itself. This is also why an 
intensional set model is rejected, since such an 
intensional rule-governed set would ultimately be 
subject to the paradoxes of a set belonging to itself. In 
an intensional model, there is no reason not to define 
a set as governed by the concept of belonging to 
oneself. And for this reason concepts or laws cannot 
govern how sets and their elements and members are 
determined—only the mere act of collection can. This 
is also why one will presuppose that only zero, as 
zero, is identified with the pure inconsistency of the 
nonexistent whole of things.  
 
§ 11. THE SECOND THESIS: ‘THE ONE IS NOT’ 
On the basis of these ideas (that there is no set of 
all sets, that sets presuppose infinity of infinites, etc.), 
Badiou proposes his second main thesis: “The one is 
not” (BE 52). Badiou immediately asserts that the idea 
that there is no one-all means that God also does not 
exist (or perhaps more precisely, “God is dead”) as 
God for Badiou only names the whole and all-




encompassment of things (Badiou 2006, 26; BE 277). It 
is partly comprehensible why Badiou makes this 
assertion, given that God is defined as infinite, such 
that many have argued that there can only be one 
infinite, meaning that God is all-inclusive. Following 
Cantor, Badiou posits that there is an infinity of 
infinities. There is no whole or set of all sets, and thus 
God as the single infinite cannot stand. If God equals 
the infinite unity of all things, then such a God (if 
Badiou and post-Cantorian set theory are right) cannot 
hold true. As Hallward notes, “No one, perhaps, has 
taken the death of God as seriously as Badiou” (BST 
7).  
But God need not be identified simply with 
monism. In fact, this is only the pantheistic 
determination of God. And if Badiou’s theory 
demolishes pantheism as a viable option, then so 
much the better, as discussed above with regards to 
how the cash value of the critique of onto-theo-logy 
referred in part only to pantheism. Now Badiou seems 
to think that mysticism and theism, when they posit 
God beyond being, are only positing a One-All that 
does in fact exist: 
   
I often come across this path of thought. It is 
well known that, at a conceptual level, it 
may be found in negative theologies, for 
which the exteriority-to-situation of being is 
revealed in its heterogeneity to any 
presentation and to any predication; that is, 
in its radical alterity to both the multiple 
form of situations and to the regime of the 
count-as-one, an alterity which institutes the 
One of being, torn from the multiple, and 
nameable exclusively as absolute Other. 
From the point of view of experience, this 
path consecrates itself to mystical annihil-
ation; an annihilation in which, on the basis 




of an interruption of all presentative situ-
ations, and at the end of a negative spiritual 
exercise, a Presence is gained, a presence 
which is exactly that of the being of the One 
as non-being, thus the annulment of all 
functions of the count of One. Finally, in 
terms of language, this path of thought poses 
that it is the poetic resource of language 
alone, through its sabotage of the law of 
nominations, which is. (BE 26)  
 
It is true that even some versions of Kabbalah read as 
pantheistic in orientation (and we hope here to show 
why they should be rejected).10 But Badiou himself 
                                                                                     
10 Here is a famous quote from Kabbalah that suggests 
pantheism: “Do not say, ‘This is stone and not God.’ God 
forbid! Rather, all existence is God, and this stone is a thing 
pervaded by divinity” (Matt 1996, 24). Rabbi Meir ibn 
Gabbai said: “Everything is in him and he is in everything” 
(Michaelson 2009, 44). But none of the quotes the 
pantheistic Kabbalist brings forth need be interpreted in this 
manner. For instance, Isaiah professed “I am and there is 
none else,” but this could simply refer to the unicity of God. 
Jay Michaelson argues very directly for simplistic pantheism 
(if God is infinite then God must be all inclusive 
[Michaelson 2009, 27]). This observation of course would 
also count for Deuteronomy 4:35: “There is none besides 
him.” In Everything is God, Michaelson claims a 
straightforward pantheism relives one of the “burden” of 
monotheism (Michaelson 2009, 98). For us, it is the truth of 
infinity that relieves us of the burden of the pantheistic 
temptation. Michaelson is of course interested in defining 
Judaism as pantheism both to render its religious 
commandments as optional and to make it appear to be the 
same as so-called Eastern wisdom and thereby more attract-
tive to those born Jewish and who unfortunately reject their 
own religion (Michaelson 2009, 202-8). Spinoza is of course 
a famous pantheist, and I will return to a critique of his 
position via Badiou in another context. Of the many 




claims pure presentation of inconsistency 
(multiplicities of multiplicities, infinity of infinities) 
is itself not something we can encounter, but rather 
only posit. In this way, Badiou cannot apply his 
critique to negative theologies as long as they are not 
positing God to be the all-inclusive whole of all. 
Badiou’s theory also requires an unpresentable. 
Badiou will later posit something that is not being qua 
being, the event, so arguing that negative theology 
does so and (just on that basis) can also not hold as a 
critique. Mysticism does yield an insight into the 
absolutely other, but this does not mean it is 
necessarily positing that God is a set of all sets. It 
could be that the mystic is simply experiencing the 
pure inconsistency of which Badiou speaks. But God 
                                                                                                     
problems of pantheism, one is also that by making all things 
one with God things they lose their individuality. Diversity 
becomes an illusion. This is the view of Hinduism as 
articulated by Shankara. One then has the problem of 
making sense of all the diversity we see and experience. 
Monotheism takes it as real as it is created. God also 
becomes nothing as God is nothing in particular. Some think 
that the idea that all is God including myself opens up the 
idea that acting as God commands is just to do as God 
desires, which means to be true to oneself, and rather than 
begin against God, one is with God as part of God (Aaron 
2005, 151). But the idea of a command includes any instinct, 
etc. in a pantheism, thus rendering it not only incompatible 
with divine commands, but also as traditionally noted an 
amoral doctrine. Also, David Aaron here wants to state that 
we appear as a form of God, but that we are not God; 
however, his position metaphysically implies it and states it 
later as he says we exist within God (Aaron 2005, 134, 138). 
Besides being an interpretation of the infinity of God, I take 
pantheism to be arguing that there is no God without the 
world (and in many formulations that God without the 
world is nothing). Hence, the earlier engagement with 
process theology also counts as an engagement with 
pantheism. 




is also not the world or the whole, but rather beyond 
it, according to monotheism. God is not the one of 
being.  
That being is not a totality does not imply that 
God, as that which lies beyond being (as for negative 
theology, for instance), also falls to the wayside. 
Monotheism is posting that God is one. But God’s 
oneness does not mean that God is one in any 
numerical sense (one rather than three) (Seeskin 1991, 
7). What is asserted is something qualitative rather 
than quantitative: God is absolutely other, unique, 
beyond: “To whom will you liken Me, that I should be 
equal?” (Isaiah 40:25). In fact, to make a Lacanian 
point, God is that one point that in-exists or insists 
and is not part of the whole and is not included in it 
(showing that totality or the whole is always a sham 
and illusion). God as impossible from the perspective 
of being puts the lie to the whole or one-all. The 
whole cannot recognize God, as for it God does not 
exist, since from the perspective of the world God 
cannot possibly be part of it. When God is defined as 
absolutely other, it is not being as such that is being 
defined, but that which transcends it. After all, Gödel 
already showed us that there will always be axioms 
and statements fundamental to a system that cannot be 
proven within it.  
Now, before continuing, we can say that rather 
than showing that God is not, Badiou’s thesis 
concerning the one actually confirms a first 
Kabbalistic idea for us: the notion of shvirah (which 
literally means ‘breaking’). Shvirah names the 
mystical experience of creation’s imperfection, its not 
being perfect. Or, as Joseph Dan puts it, “Existence 
does not begin with a perfect Creator bringing into 
being an imperfect universe; rather, the existence of 
the universe is the result of an inherent flaw or crisis 
within the infinite . . . and the purpose of creation is 
to correct it” (Dan 2007, 75). In this context, the 




imperfect universe is itself imperfect precisely due to 
the excess of the infinite. It is not so much the purpose 
of creation to correct the infinite; rather creation itself 
is shattered and broken due to its relation to the 
infinite for Kabbalah. Lurianic Kabbalah posits the 
notion that we exist in a universe that is made of 
scattered and broken shards, due to its being created 
by and in relation to God as absolute infinity. Isaac 
Luria presents the results of his experience in this 
manner: “Afterward, Grace merged and shattered, 
/and the vessel collapsed and fell; / meaning, he also 
was unable to bear the light” (KC 16). Creation’s 
inability to bear infinity breaks it into pieces and 
renders it incomplete. The world is not closed. Dov 
Baer said: “God cannot be clothed in you, for God is 
infinite and no vessel can contain God—unless you 
think of yourself as ayin [nothing]” (qtd. Raviv 2008, 
82). All vessels of creation and creatures are exploded 
by what they cannot contain—the absolute infinite as 
such. Shvirah names the mystical experience of the 
world being shattered and made inconsistent precisely 
due to its being related to the infinite. Here then, with 
Badiou and post-Cantorian set theory, we have a 
philosophical confirmation of this experimental 
insight much more so than a denial of it, despite 
Badiou’s assertions. 
 
§12. THE INFINITE MADE FINITE: THE MEANING OF THE 
TRANSFINITE 
Given that much of the argumentation here 
depends on the Cantorian notion of the infinite, it is 
best to lay this idea out in some detail. Cantor actually 
does not talk only about the infinite, but rather defines 
something he calls the “transfinite (transfinitum)” or 
“supra-finite (suprafinitum)” which is an infinite de-
termined and well-ordered as much as any finite 
number (Cantor, qtd. Rioux 2000, 120). By inventing 
this term, Cantor wishes to emphasize the difference 




between his definition of the infinite and the notion of 
the infinite as some indeterminable and inconceivably 
large number. Cantor believes he has discovered a new 
type of number—an infinite kind. The concept of 
number is thereby expanded by the introduction of a 
new set of well-defined and distinguishable numbers 
(Rioux 2000, 117). What is key is that Cantor can 
propose the transfinite as a new kind of number by 
treating the infinite itself in finite terms.  
Unsurprisingly, there are finite sets that can be 
put into one-to-one correspondence with each other in 
terms of the amount of elements each includes. The 
set including A and B is in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the set containing C and D. 
Rather than numbers being something that one counts 
up like fingers or heartbeats in some intuitive act, for 
Cantor, “it is to sets or to collections that numbers are 
assigned” (Tiles 2004, 96). We do not determine that 
there are “as many cups as saucers by checking to see 
that there are no saucerless cups,” rather, a set has a 
determined number of objects and can be compared to 
another set (Tiles 2004, 96). If the two sets correspond, 
they have the same number. In this way, one can 
simply extend the notion of number to a set with an 
infinite collection such that we know that the set of all 
natural numbers has the same ordinal number as the 
set of all even numbers due only to seeing whether 
they correspond or not and not by counting one by 
one each element of each set (Tiles 2004, 97). This is 
what Cantor means by the suprafinite. It is a set with 
an actual infinite number of elements that can be put 
into correspondence with other sets of the same 
ordinality, just as a set with two elements can be 
known to have the same number as a set with 
corresponding elements. Since we could never sit 
down and count to infinity, the transfinite is known 
not by counting, but by correlating one set with 
another, one series with another. All the even 




numbers correlate with all the all odd numbers. This 
is a determination we can know just by the act of 
putting the two sets into correspondence, and thus we 
have transfinite numbers that are ordered and 
understandable. 
For Cantor, there will not be a largest transfinite, 
but there is a smallest transfinite, and it is precisely 
the set of all natural numbers. Cantor thereby can treat 
the infinite as countable and orderable by treating the 
infinite as finite. Cantor here differs radically from all 
previous philosophical thought. By stating that there 
is a set of all natural numbers, Cantor is not saying 
that such a set might one day in some vast future be 
articulated (it is not a question of what Hegel called 
‘the bad infinite,’ where we just have a sequence of 
one number after another and thereby a constant 
bounding and limiting of what is supposedly infinite), 
but rather an infinite that it is given all at once in 
reality and in thought and not by succession. The 
mere act of stating and marking that one has a set of 
all the natural numbers and showing how it 
corresponds to the set of all even numbers means it 
has been determined here and now. If we simply 
counted things one by one, we would only have non-
infinite numbers. But since number can also be 
determined by comparing sets, we can have transfinite 
numbers as well.  
From Aristotle onwards, the infinite was only 
seen as something potential (and never actual or 
given). It was something ideal that one could say 
possibly exists or that in principle exists, but not 
something that could be treated as a number in the 
same way that the number 5 could. But if the number 
5 is simply a set with 5 elements and any set 
corresponding one-to-one with that set also counts as 
5, then the same operation can be performed on the 
infinite. The potential infinite of Aristotle is always 
finite, since one will always only have counted a finite 




amount of numbers on one’s way to counting infinity. 
But if one discusses an infinite set in correspondence 
with another, one has already before one the set itself.  
For Aristotle as well, the infinite was 
“unbounded,” whereas Cantor’s transfinite numbers 
“are not entirely unlimited” as they exist in classes 
(all the even numbers for instance) (Rioux 2000, 119). 
Now some might say that even the posting of an 
infinite set is a conjuring trick of mathematical 
writing. Here the objection would consist of noting 
that when a normal set is written, one lists all of its 
elements and what it includes and contains. But here 
one does not of course list all the natural numbers. 
Rather one lists a certain number and then puts an 
ellipsis (…) or an ‘etc.’ or states ‘and so on’ or some 
other stand-in for the actual infinity of numbers. But 
then one will one say one does not have an infinite 
set, but only a marker of one. I agree. But I do not 
think this is purely a conjuring trick that undermines 
the Cantorian points here. Quite the opposite. The 
transfinite depends on the power of the signifier and 
itself encapsulates and names one of the key powers of 
the signifier, its power to always exceed and at the 
same time include itself. The signifier via an ellipsis 
names the infinity of numbers just by doing so. That is 
to say, one has a set of whatever can be marked as 
such. And it is the act of marking itself that shows 
how the signifier can both be used to hold a place and 
mention or refer to the content of that place in the 
absence of itself. It is this very power that makes for 
the inconsistency of the infinity of infinities that the 
transfinite will name, as the signifier refers to itself at 
the same time that it marks a place for itself and 
another. Once the world is subjected to the signifier, it 
is already subjected to the difference between frame 
and content (sets) and to the mark as content itself.  
When one writes ‘and so on’, one has all the 
numbers because all the numbers are themselves 




differences from each other. A signifier as pure 
difference (if only in the sense of not being any other 
signifier) allows it to take on any meaning in its 
negativity. An ellipsis is a perfect concretization of 
this power. Numbers themselves are differential in a 
similar way. And one can have them all by knowing 
their process of generation and thus can mark them all 
down in a signifier alone. The meaning of one signifier 
is always determined by another and so on. All 
numbers at once mark themselves and the rule of their 
formation, the very way in which the act of meaning-
definition through metaphor implies an endless 
regress and progress. The signifier is itself infinite 
insofar as it defines itself and its other without end. 
The signifier is always in excess of itself and always a 
surplus. It is already a transfinite set marking itself as 
set/frame by way of the space it requires and infinite 
via its endless production of meanings through other 
signifiers. The signifier bursts open and fractures all in 
this way. A signifier always contains more than it 
contains, just as the cardinality of the transfinite via 
the power set does. 
What we mean to say is always exceeded by what 
we say to mean. The lesser contains the greater that 
exceeds it. That is its infinity. This is in some ways 
another way of stating the sheer power of defining 
number in terms of one-to-one correspondence, for it 
is by stating ‘and so on’ that we have all the numbers 
since it is just a matter of what can be stated and not 
enumerated one by one. Only the signifier in its power 
of marking and defining can have all at once without 
having it. And because the signifier is self-referential, 
it exceeds itself in the same way (as we will show) the 
transfinite does. The signifier always has more in it 
than it initially has and leads to more signifiers. A 
book for example can lead to many books. The 
signifier “…” can contain an infinity of numbers. We 
are thereby arguing that what Cantorian set theory 




does in essence is to formalize the very power of the 
signifier itself. The transfinite defines the infinite as 
literally that which has no end or bound, the income-
plete. Cantorian theory writes out via the signifier and 
makes explicit the incompletion of the signifier. In 
this way, a transfinite set is a conjuring trick, but one 
that demonstrates the power of the signifier itself and 
how the transfinite is another name for that power.  
To return to the explicit content of Cantor’s 
views, there is no such infinity in an ordinal sense. If 
we name the set of all even numbers w, then we can 
always add another number to it and have w+1, etc. 
That is to say, when we take the set of all natural 
numbers, the last number would have to be larger than 
any of the preceding ones. But any natural number, no 
matter how large, is still finite such that what would 
be greater than the largest number is infinite. In this 
way, new infinites can be formed by adding finite 
numbers to an undetermined infinite set (Aczel 2001, 
142). In other words, based on the same principle of 
generation one uses in counting, a succession of 
infinities can be counted beginning with w. W names 
the idea that in an infinite set there is no greatest 
number. There is no limit. W names the limit of that 
which is limited only be being named as a whole set. 
One then simply adds a number and obtains the next 
greater number than w.  
However, Cantor is not really interested in 
identifying the transfinite with what we have called w 
or even w+1. There would be no greatest in this series 
as well. Rather, the transfinite is identified by Cantor 
not with ordinality but with cardinality. Every finite 
number does not have the same ordinality and 
cardinality except the numbers 0 and 1, where one has 
just as many subsets as the ordinal has sets, for 
example. In any event, no matter the ordinality of a 
finite set, its cardinality as marked by its power-set is 
also finite. The power of a finite set is as finite as its 




ordinal number no matter how one renders the 
elements it contains, even if the power set is larger. 
One could count all the elements. But with sets of 
infinite numbers, the power set (the total number of 
subsets that can be produced) is bigger than the 
amount of elements in it. This means that an infinite 
set, such as the set of all natural numbers, can be seen 
to lead to a power-set that contains more than infinity 
or a larger infinity. Cantor interestingly names the 
ordinal set with the Hebrew letter aleph (the first 
infinite—for instance, the set of all natural numbers) 
and names the power set produced by it the second 
aleph. Here, we truly have two infinities, and one is 
larger than the other. Aleph thus basically refers to the 
infinity of natural numbers and any set that can be put 
into one-to-one correspondence with it and all those 
sets have the same cardinality. This is the infinity we 
are familiar with (although we mostly thought of it as 
only potentially infinite). And it is not clear that 
beyond the infinities produced by taking power sets 
we can speak of any other numerical infinite. But now 
Cantor has shown via the power-set that we can 
generate ever larger infinites of larger cardinality. This 
process is endless. Just as we took the power set of 
aleph to reach the second aleph, we can take the 
power set of the second aleph to articulate yet another 
and larger infinity and so on. To speak then of an 
infinity of infinities is to truly speak of the infinity of 
ever larger infinite cardinalities.  
Whereas before one might have thought there 
might be only one infinite (and pantheists took this 
idea and the definition of God as infinite to posit that 
God is all), now we have an infinity of actual infinites. 
Not only is the first aleph without limits, but there is 
an infinity of infinities without limits. These infinities 
are distinct and distinguishable. The notion of the 
power-set also shows that even a part of an infinite set 
can be greater than its whole (Tiles 2004, 63), whereas 




earlier the use of one-to-one correspondence showed 
that a part cannot be equal to the whole. This is in 
many ways the two distinct revolutions Cantor 
brought to the idea of the infinite. On the side of 
ordinality via correspondence, one can see a part 
being the same as the whole, whereas on the side of 
cardinality the power set leads to ever larger and 
distinct infinities. And it is the latter that 
demonstrates the shvirah, the infinity of infinities, the 
lack of the one-all whole.  
   That Cantor named the first transfinite 
cardinality with a Hebrew letter constitutes a not-so-
secret wink towards how Kabbalah is at play here. As 
Amir Aczel writes, “Kabbalists seem to have had a 
firm grasp of the concept of infinity . . . They 
understood that infinity could contain finite parts, but 
that the whole, infinity itself, was immeasurably larger 
than its parts” (Aczel 2001, 36). And insofar as 
Lurianic Kabbalah sees the containers of the world 
shattered by the relation to the infinite, it already 
hinted at Cantor. Now, I do not know if Cantor knew 
Kabbalah. He would probably not reveal that any more 
than he would want to reveal that he and his wife 
were both descended from Jews who had converted to 
Christianity, but continued to marry only people 
descended from such Jews. In any event, “a kabbalist 
would appreciate . . . Cantor’s decision to symbolize 
various types of infinite with the alef” as “the alef is 
the uncarved black, preceding the shaping of words, 
the verbal formulations” (Matt 1998, 109). This idea 
for us will have even further implications and show 
the implications of Kabbalah for philosophy. For 
example, Badiou thinks being is in excess of language 
due to the infinity of infinities we have laid out here 
(Badiou 2005, 22). There is no reason that language 
could not be put into one-to-one correspondence with 
the set of all natural numbers via letters and their 
combinations that form words. It is in fact being’s very 




subjection to the signifier that enables it to be 
transfinite and to express an infinity of infinities. In 
this way, the issue is not being exceeding language, as 
all things are subjected to the signifier or 
differentiality and are thereby able to express the 
transfinite. As long as a word can be any length of 
letters, then letters can be treated in the same way as 
numbers. In this way, we will be able to use set theory 
to confirm the Kabbalistic idea that creation was made 
from letters and numbers. 
 
§13. CREATION FROM NUMBERS (SETS/LETTERS): THE 
SEFIROT 
The Kabbalah firstly insists on seeing divinity 
and creation revealed through what it calls the sefirot. 
This term literally refers to counting, to numbers. And 
just as numbers work on a base ten, so there are ten 
sefirot: “The ten Sefirot are the basis of all that is 
defined numerically; thus you see that the total 
quality of numerals is more than ten as mathe-
maticians well know” (Rav Yehuda Hayyat, qtd. 
Hallamish 1999, 127). While clearly one can list 
numerals beyond ten, the meaning and nature of them 
is already determined as they repeat what was 
determined in the first sequence. As number, such 
sefirot are like candles lighted in that no change 
occurs as the power of each is passed onto the next 
(Hallamish 1999, 158). If God is nothing or nought 
insofar as God is beyond human comprehension, God 
and God’s creation can be revealed through the 
procession of the divine numbers: “According to 
Lurianic thought, the structure of the ten sefirot also 
presents the basic structural characteristic of 
everything that exists, be it spiritual or material” (Dan 
2007, 71). God does not manifest himself, but he does 
create through a universe that has been coded and 
decoded in numbers and numerical terms. These 
sefirot are the language of God.  




As opposed to Neo-Platonism, which sees 
emanation as a process proceeding outwards from God 
or the One, Kabbalah sees God’s creation not as 
emanation, but rather as a textual enactment. God 
created the world using numbers, and its nature and 
meaning can be found by understanding the basic 
nature of numbers themselves. And if the world is 
made of numbers, then it shows not only a structural 
and combinatorial aspect, but also that differentiated 
beings are interconnected just as numbers are. Each 
number is bounded and limited by another in an 
immanent development. The later sefirot are 
contained in the previous ones until they are manifest 
as something new and independent. Such a 
development shows what many theoreticians of 
science call ‘emergence’. Emergence occurs when, for 
instance, atoms come together to produce an entirely 
new thing. Hydrogen and oxygen combine to form 
water. But water is something with new properties 
that cannot be found in the hydrogen and oxygen 
atoms. It is the sefirot that express and found this 
aspect of being. Entities may appear and seem 
independent, but they are still connected with the 
whole out of which they emerged. The world of nature 
expresses itself in this way and the sefirot explore its 
opening. Natural entities are founded on self-
organization, one that can be understood with 
reference to numbers. Thus, for Kabbalah numbers are 
just as natural as an organic entity. The complexity of 
the world is like the complexity one finds as 
numbering increases in the divine matrix. This is its 
self-differentiating enactment in creation via numbers 
and letters.  
It must be emphasized that these numbers exist 
independently of any numerals that code them. It is 
for this reason that zero itself will not simply be a 
mark, but the mark of the void itself that insists on 
itself. Such a stance should not be surprising given 




that set theory wants to speak about things in 
themselves, and numbers are the most primary things 
it can relate to. Number is not something we count 
and bring into existence. Sets collect together 
something already existing. But that does not mean 
the numbers already exist in those things themselves. 
In set theory, numbers are built out of the empty set 
and thereby presuppose only that set. That one has 
before one 2 apples does not mean the number 2 arises 
from the apples, but rather that number exists outside 
of the apples collected and is put into one-to-one 
correspondence with the two apples. That is, the 
number two both adheres in being itself (there are two 
apples) and is not dependent on the apples to exist. 
This position is Pythagorean in nature. Whether 
Pythagoreanism influenced Kabbalah or vice versa 
cannot be determined here, but what is clear is that 
the position of Badiou, set theory, and the idea we are 
developing is neo-Pythagorean in nature. As Aristotle 
explains, Pythagoreans  
 
devoted themselves to mathematics, they 
were the first to advance this study, and . . . 
they thought its principles were the 
principles of all things. Since of these 
principles numbers are by nature the first, 
and in numbers they seemed to see many 
resemblances to the things that exist and 
come into being—more than in fire and earth 
and water (such and such a modification of 
numbers being justice, another being soul 
and reason, another being opportunity—and 
similarly almost all other things being 
numerically expressible); since, again, they 
saw that the attributers and the ratios of the 
musical scale were expressible in numbers; 
since, then, all other things seemed in their 
whole nature to be molded after numbers, 




and the numbers seemed to be the first 
things in the whole of nature, they supposed 
the  elements of numbers to be the elements 
of all things, and the whole heaven to be a 
musical scale and a number. And all the 
properties of numbers and scales which they 
could show to agree with attributes and parts 
and the whole arrangement of the heavens, 
they collected and fitted into the scheme; 
and if there was a gap anywhere, they readily 
made additions so as to make their whole 
theory coherent. (Metaphysics AF, 985b, 24-
333; 986a, 1-7)  
 
Numbers enable one to know things, and more 
importantly, they compose the very ontological 
substance of things. It is not just a matter of things 
having to be numbered to be apprehended, but that 
numbers make up what things are and thereby are real 
in themselves. We have already noted how Badiou’s 
position that set theory expresses being qua being 
entails that anything countable can count as an entity. 
But this means that numbers themselves are entities in 
their own right as well. While we can say that 
anything that is known is numerable, more 
fundamentally, we have been saying that anything that 
is is numerable and expressible numerically. The 
whole world is structured in and through number. We 
do gain knowledge of the world via numbers and sets, 
but also have to recognize that numbers are things as 
well, forming what is and forming entities themselves.  
  Cantor himself upheld that numbers must exist 
outside of the mind: “Reality can be ascribed to 
numbers in so far as they must be taken as expression 
or image of the events and relationships of that outer 
world which is exterior to the intellect, as, for 
instance, the various number-classes (I), (II), (III), etc. 
are representatives of powers which are actually found 




in corporeal and intellectual nature” (Cantor, qtd. 
Rioux 2000, 122). The power of numbering does not 
depend on a human mind to count or enumerate them. 
For Cantor, the set of all numbers exists from eternity 
in God himself. The problem with this idea is that we 
are arguing that God insists beyond being. If we place 
numbers beyond being, then it is not clear how their 
inhering in God helps on this side of the equation, in 
accounting for how numbers compose being or how 
they exist independently of being.  
As Mary Tiles notes, Cantor uses an argument 
similar to Pascal: 
  
In order for there to be variable quantity in 
some mathematical study, the ‘domain’ of its 
variability strictly speaking must be known 
before through a definition. However, this 
domain cannot itself be something variable, 
since otherwise each fixed support for the 
study would collapse. Thus this ‘domain’ is 
a definite, actually finite set of values. Thus 
each potential infinite, if it is rigorously 
applicable mathematically, presupposes an 
actual infinite. (Cantor, qtd. Tiles 2004, 29)  
 
As Tiles notes, this argument presupposes that 
“mathematical entities unlike physical ones” do not 
“change over time nor come into being and go out of 
existence” (Tiles 2004, 49). But as we will argue, the 
numbers such as the sefirot arise and are created. If 
they exist already in God, can it be said that they are 
created? What can count as a number has a definite 
and specified definition and rule for membership. For 
this reason, Cantor can argue that even the idea of a 
potential infinite (that we can go on indefinitely 
counting from any number onwards simply by adding 
another) already presupposes an actual infinite. “No 
last number can be named” by us, but we also cannot 




“compute and therefore write down names for all the 
numbers” (Tiles 2004, 50). If all the numbers do exist 
they cannot exist in this world as such. The universe 
contains a definite (although mind bogglingly large) 
number of atoms. In addition, numbers cannot be our 
own creations as we only discover their nature. We are 
one person counting even before we count ourselves. 
They precede us. But if they precede the existence of 
the world, then God does not create them. God does 
not need to create them to create with them, but if 
they are eternal ideas, it is not clear how they create 
the world itself since the world would only be a 
reflection of something already given.  
If the domain of ideas that Cantor speaks about is 
simply a divine idea, then these numbers only exist 
imperfectly for us in our own minds. This was the 
position of Augustine in The City of God: “Every 
number is known to Him whose understanding cannot 
be numbered. Although the infinite series of numbers 
cannot be numbered, this infinity is not outside His 
comprehension. It must follow that every infinite is, in 
a way we cannot express, made finite to God” 
(Augustine, qtd. Aczel 2001, 140). God already 
comprehends all numbers including the ones Cantor 
calls transfinite. This view also holds that anything 
God creates must already be known by God. 
Something cannot be known by God as uncreated, 
since as God knows it is known perfectly and exists in 
the same way it would be for us in the world as all it 
is: “My thoughts are not like your thoughts” (Isaiah 
55:8). Additionally, even when God is not referenced, 
numbers are taken to be unchanging and eternal, as 
are the laws for their production and definition. Only 
our minds grasp them, as only our minds could grasp 
such entities, since numbers could not be discovered 
through empirical investigation. The senses only 
speak of multiplicities and never something as distinct 
as unity. We also perceive only ever a partial list of all 




the possible numbers that do exist around us. Since 
numbers are eminently cognizable, they must exist as 
one would not be able to know so well what was 
merely a product of minds. This view holds that for 
anything we do define sensibly, mathematics 
ultimately discovers something already there in 
transcendent reality.  
In this way we will have to hold that even if God 
knows something or something inheres in God, it can 
still be created out of nothing in this world. In this 
world, there are only 10 books on my desk. There 
could not be an infinity of books since there are not an 
infinite amount of atoms. Physical being is not 
synonymous with being as such. While being as such 
is incomplete and marked by the signifier (the 
transfinite), physical being might be finite and 
totalizable in some ways. The way in which this world 
is marked by the transfinite will have to be accounted 
for in another way. It will have to speak to the nature 
of the signifier, the incompletion of the world, etc. 
The Kabbalah hints at this idea when it claims that the 
sefirot are not truly separated from God, they are 
revelations of God, but God already includes all 
possible numbers. But not every number is created. 
However, numbers in their created form are not 
arbitrary or imperfect. They are just as they are for the 
divine and divine in themselves as they express it. 
While we cannot know these numbers as fully as God 
does, we have knowledge of the created world through 
numbers precisely because these numbers are the 
same as they are for God.  
When we study the Book of Nature, a book 
written in numbers, we decipher the structure given to 
it by the divine and thereby also what is known by 
God. The names and numbers of things have an 
ontological status of their own. It is therefore not only 
a question of Pythagoreanism, but also of Platonism. 
The essentials exist eternally. This is a realism no 




correlationism would tolerate. But at the same time, 
all the numbers that are cannot be written down in 
this world; they can only be noted and written in God. 
God can then write them out of nothing in this 
world—a limited amount. This divine writing itself 
marks the world as infinite, but in and through the 
world’s incompletion and by its very subjection to 
number itself. The transfinite is the infinite as finite, 
since it occurs here. Cantor is not putting forth that 
there is an actual infinity of, for example, atoms in 
this created world. Rather, he is showing how our own 
ability to count seemingly endlessly depends on 
something (and will lead him to an ontological proof 
of God) and that the infinite in finite garb, the 
transfinite, marks the radically finite and incomplete 
nature of a world that is composed in and by writing 
itself. To be realist, then, we do not need to argue 
there is an infinity of objects or things or numbers in 
this world. But an infinite of numbers must at least 
obtain somehow and/or somewhere if only in the 
mind of God.  
It must be clear that we are not saying that Cantor 
came up with a convention for merely speaking about 
numbers. Numbers obtain outside of any inscription. 
It is not a matter of ideal statements only, nor of 
mathematical norms. It is a matter rather of both 
holding that God obtains outside of mind along with 
an actual infinity of numbers and also maintaining 
that God as creator creates out of nothing in and 
through numbers and thereby creates what already 
was for Him out of nothing. 
 
§14. CREATION FROM LETTERS (SETS/NAMES): SEFER 
YETZIRAH 
In Hebrew, each letter is also a number. And in 
many cases these numbers are just aspects of each 
letter. Not surprisingly, the Kabbalah also says that 
letters are part and parcel of creation itself. The book 




of Kabbalah which best expresses this idea is the Book 
of Creation (Sefer Yetzirah), which the Kabbalah 
claims Abraham himself composed. It reads: 
   
With 32 mystical paths of Wisdom / 
engraved yah / the Lord of Hosts / the God of 
Israel / the living God / the King of the 
universe / El Shaddai / Merciful and 
Gracious / high and exalted / Dwelling in 
eternity / Whose name is Holy- / He is lofty 
and holy- / And he created His universe / 
with three books (Sepharim) / with text 
(Sepher) / with number (Sephar) / and with 
communication (Sippur). (SY 1:1)  
 
The Hebrew alphabet has 22 letters such that 
combining them with the 10 basic numbers leads to 32 
paths: “Ten Sefirot of Nothingness / And 22 
foundation letters” (SY 1:2). If there is an argument 
that Hebrew is truly the holy language and the 
language of creation (and not just another language), 
then it is largely on the basis of this aspect. Sefer 
Yetzirah insists on calling the ten sefirot the “Ten 
Sefirot of Nothingness” and we will later connect this 
idea to the notion of the empty set and void as the 
basis of number. But at this point we can also mention 
that for Kabbalah, “Their limit has no end,” again 
echoing set theory (SY 1:4). And this text insists that 
God is “singular” and “has no second,” thereby 
emphasizing that we will have to philosophically 
confirm the thesis of God being located outside of 
number as a unicity (SY 1:7).  
At this point, we need to point to set theory and 
Badiou’s use of it, so as to confirm a way of seeing 
being as numbers. For letters are themselves pure 
differences like two sets, differentiated only by one 
lacking an element the other has. In this way as well, 
letters are not just marks, but the very vehicle of 




creation: “these are the twenty-two letters . . . And 
with them He made three Books / And with them He 
created his universe, / and He formed with them all 
that was ever formed, / and all that ever will be 
formed” (SY 6:6). With these letters and their 
combinations, one can produce the infinities of 
Cantorian set theory, such that we can see all as a 
book infinite in length, even though it is formed on 
the basis of letters. This is the ontological function of 
letters and through letters the ontological structure of 
the world can be found. To know how to permute 
these letters and their basic rules is to know how 
“heaven and earth were created” (Brachot 55a).  
Now, if we simply want all the permutations of 
the entire Hebrew alphabet we arrive at the number 
1.12400073 × 1021. Such a number is not infinite, but 
it is certainly overwhelming and would be an index of 
infinity itself for those unable to articulate precisely 
its power. But even this number of permutations does 
not restrict the series from being counted ad infinitum. 
In this way, it may be very directly the infinite as the 
infinity of things themselves and the transfinite in 
particular characterizing the world. From the infinite 
One (God) comes itself an infinity, and an infinity of 
infinities as expressed by way of creation via letters.  
These letters are not atoms as indivisible, hard 
physical substances. But even a theory of atoms 
ultimately has to see letters as expressing the 
fundamental nature of things, as Lucretius did: “Thus 
easier ‘tis to hold that many things / Have primarily 
bodies in common (as we see / The same letters 
common to many words” (Lucretius 1977, Book 1). 
This reference is not arbitrary (NKS 861), but 
unavoidable given that any basic element, in order to 
be basic, will have to exhibit the characteristics of 
letters: “Compounded out of different elements- / not 
since few only, as common letters, run / Through all 
the words, or not two words are made, / One and the 




other, from all like elements. / But since they all, as a 
general rule, are not / The same as all” (Lucretius 
1997, Book 2). Once one admits a basic matrix, one 
will have to find a way for combinations to take place 
in the same way that one finds with letters. And 
letters form words not through individual units, but 
only in combination. The ancient Greeks emphasized 
this with the word stoicheion. It reflects the common 
way in which letters and physical elements both have 
an atomic character. But the atomic nature of letters is 
not to be hard, indivisible substances, but rather pure 
differences with their substantiality arising by being 
related to each other. Letters express basic ontological 
qualities and show how the physical should be 
perceived from a differential perspective.  
The structural character of letters reveals the true 
atomism. This structural character again comes from 
having no intrinsic substantial properties. Letters are 
seemingly purely conceptual entities except that they 
have form and sound. As phonemes, they are pure 
differences. They are almost nothing, without any real 
material, except that in opposition to each other they 
take on form and sound. They do not have any 
meaning in and of themselves, except if they are taken 
as numbers. But if they are taken just as letters they 
disappear as meaningful. They recede into visual 
marks, into images and pictographs. The letter thereby 
erases itself. This is why letters also relate to what 
cannot be said. Now, most would simply say that 
individual letters just represent phonetic sounds we 
hear. The shape of the letter is thereby totally arbitrary 
and bears no apparent connection to what we hear. In 
this way, letters have again no intrinsic meaning. They 
can only take on meaning by being related to other 
letters and in opposition to them. Alone, a letter is just 
a mark or sound without purpose or significance. It is 
for this reason that “the rabbis declared that writing 
must compose at least two letters” (Faur 2000, 28). To 




take one of the most classical examples in English, the 
phonemes b and p are opposed. However, in Hebrew, 
p is opposed to f. In English, one is voiced and the 
other not, but this difference in and of itself allows us 
to know that ‘bore’ is not ‘pore’. And it is via such 
differences that God signs the world with his own 
signature.  
Recall that for Badiou the elements of a set can 
themselves be represented by letters and the differ-
rence between the members of a set is “the difference 
of the same to same, that is, the pure proposition of 
two letters’” (Badiou, qtd. BST 172). And this is also 
partly the basis for saying that sets are made of sets, as 
the differences between sets is just such a minimal 
difference. These members themselves do not 
intrinsically belong to a set as the set is just a 
collection. For this reason, set theory can make all the 
claims it wants simply by saying that the elements of 
sets are pure differences, letters. What is interesting is 
that despite this aspect of pure difference, Lacan 
relegates letters to the register of the Real rather than 
to the Symbolic. The letters are excluded from 
symbolization for Lacan. The letter is a foundational 
exclusion of language. While language requires it as a 
condition, it is not read when one reads and 
understands a text for instance. If one were to focus on 
the letters, one would have pictures and lose meaning. 
Letters are thereby transcendent to what they give rise 
to. They are a nonsense out of which sense comes 
forth. It is thus only when a text becomes opaque that 
the letter insists and asserts its force.  
This is particularly true for Lacan concerning 
scientific and mathematics texts. They are composed 
of formulas, equations, etc. consisting almost 
exclusively of numbers and letters. These letters are 
not signifiers, but the “material structure that creates 
the possibility of the signifier” itself (Weiss 2009, 
117). Letters have “no referent” outside the register of 




signification itself (Weiss 2009, 117). But the letter 
insists in Lacan as an “exception to the chain” (Weiss 
2009, 117) and returns to upset it if only by way of 
slips of the tongue where one letter might substitute 
another and through a difference point to something. 
Since meaning is ideal, the letter is identified with 
materiality. And this material is opaque and resistant, 
but insistent insofar as it can destroy meaning. But it 
is not the materiality of the ink on paper. It is of the 
Real, which means it always returns to its place, is 
impossibility, and names the gaps or fractures of 
meaningful networks. For Lacan also, one can 
overcome fantasy precisely by turning to math and its 
way of reducing reality to letters, whereas in physics, 
letters often refer to something (the E of  E=mc2 is 
energy). But letters as pure differences cannot be 
replaced by another signifier, as they note the absence 
of a signified. Mathematics is thereby purer than 
physics insofar as it is a formal language with only 
letters: “A mathematical letter marks, not any positive 
entity, but the lack of objects and objectivity” 
(Clemens 2003, 89).  
For Derrida, Lacan’s idea that the letter is thereby 
something in-divisible is wrong insofar as there is 
always a “divisibility or internal difference of the so-
called ultimate element (stoikheion, trait, letter, 
seminal mark)” (Derrida 1996, 69). But it is not clear 
that for Lacan letters are not differences themselves. 
Letters, even if elementary, are not in one sense 
divisible except as pure difference, which is itself 
founded on nothing (as we shall see). More 
importantly, modern science, for Lacan following 
Alexandre Koyre, became possible once the real was 
reduced to the mathematical and that means to letters. 
Science thereby devotes itself to an analysis of purely 
differential being. It literalizes reality such that it can 
see it as diverse and multiple. This is why infinity 
arises in the world at the moment when modern 




science begins investigating reality in this way. This 
view also contends that the mark or letter creates 
space rather than space preceding the mark: “To 
inscribe a mark is to posit two things: the mark (its 
materiality, as a trace of ink, for example) and its 
place. If one affects the mark, its trace remains, in the 
form of place” (Miller 1997, 46).  
More importantly, one should not forget that 
letters are ultimately linked to names and compose 
them. But it may be that a letter can also function as a 
name. In particular, this issue will arise relative to the 
mark for the empty set. That occurs, as Badiou reveals, 
by identifying being qua being with the letter. The 
letter insists in its power by the mark that, while 
unfolding the infinite, also leads back to the unique 
one. For it is by way of the name that creation via 
letters finds one of its most powerful expressions: 
“This is a sign / [Alef with them all, and all of them 
with Alef] / he foresees, transforms and makes / all 
that is formed and all that is spoken / one Name / A 
sign of this thing / twenty objects in a single body” 
(SY 3:7). 
And as has already been argued, “What is not a 
being is not a being,” and that implies that every being 
is a set, named/numbered. Being qua being always 
occurs as counted as one. But to be counted means 
anything that is is already named and numbered. And 
this means that being itself consists of names and 
numbers at its most fundamental level. We already 
attempted to show what it means to speak to the 
world’s ontological constitution as letters, but letters 
already can be counted as numbers. When the 
Kabbalah says that things are composed from letters 
and numbers, it means on one side pure difference, 
and on the other, the numerable and nameable. Of 
course, many might suspect the Kabbalah to have a 
view of names as being natural and expressing the 
very essences of things. If things are divinely created, 




then its name is as well. First, Kabbalah only makes 
this claim for Hebrew names. That is, insofar as 
Hebrew is the divine language of creation, only the 
Hebrew name of a thing can reveal its true essence. 
Second, it is not clear that names do not often reveal 
such an essence. It is well-known that the numerical 
value of names of colors in Hebrew corresponds to the 
same proportions as the proportions between the 
wavelengths of colors when arranged properly. The 
word for water in Hebrew, for instance, has three 
letters—two of the same and one of another type 
apparently mirroring the molecule formula of water. 
Whether or not such a theory of essential names can 
be fully supported is not our concern here, as for us all 
that matters is that all that is is named and that name 
captures its transcendental unity and status as a being 
as such. In addition, the qualities of any given thing 
can be articulated by names, such that even if the 
names were arbitrary, taken all together they figure 
each thing. That is, one would not want here to claim 
that the map is the territory, or that a name is the thing 
named. But the name names a fundamental aspect of 
the thing no matter what the thing is, and no thing can 
go without name. Even if we name something 
‘whatchamacallit’ or ‘unknown’, we still have given it 
a name and thereby shown that it is a being. Anytime 
something is named a new existence is carved out of 
the world. All of this is to say that the materiality of 
language embodies essence. 
The transcendental nature of being (for instance, 
the transcendental unity each being requires) is 
apprehended only through names. It is not a question 
of names imitating something greater than them, but of 
names themselves forming the fundament of being. All 
that can be named can be truly known. We do not just 
label things, but rather true knowledge of the world 
arises by way of the name itself. Names are not then 
arbitrary in terms of their structure and function. Here, 




one has a nominalism in which universals such as 
whiteness are seen as themselves names, but therein 
lies their power to reveal being rather than merely 
abstract from it. Each name has an ontological status 
of its own as name.  
  From the perspective of Badiou’s ontology, every 
situation is rife with names. If it is possible that there 
is an infinity of names, then a specific situation might 
even be condensed into less than an infinite number 
of names. But this is no more than to say that it is 
made up of sets (names/numbers). And these names 
can be named by others without any reference to the 
nature of the thing named, just as a person can belong 
to a state simply by way of an “identity card” (BST 
85). As Hallward notes, “the only form of predication 
involved here is belonging itself,” such that a name is 
always a proper one (BST 85). Even if I simply refer to 
the pen and my keyboard, this designation numerates 
a being and offers it a proper name. Each being is 
individual—related to itself and differentiated from all 
others. But in speaking thusly, we are not restricted 
only to names, as each thing so named is numerable at 
the same time. We have then something larger than a 
mathematics. We have an ontology wherein the 
minimal constituents of any possible situation are 
noted. We do not need to ask what is re-presented by 
the name, but can just by names themselves learn 
about the being of it. The name finds itself in itself 
and not in something else outside of it.  
One might here than say that by looking at being 
as purely nameable/numerable, one simply brackets 
“the material qualities (this shape, purpose, history, 
and son)” and does not speak to the specific nature of 
a particular object (BST 57). But I do not think this is 
truly a worry, as we will later discuss how 
mathematization of things (which itself expresses the 
fundamental ontological thrust we have been 
articulating) captures these qualities. If anything that 




is, even in its material particularity, can be 
mathematized, then to seek out its being in this 
fashion is to seek out its very substantiality and 
nature. One can have a set of all relations, qualities, 
etc. of one marked-out thing. And that set of relations 
or properties can itself be marked by sets of further 
complex mathematical properties. Particular beings 
are not thereby truly excluded by this approach, as 
their nature will find itself captured by names, 
numbers, and letters given that reality itself is 
fundamentally informed by them. “[T]he concept of 
name is absolute,” such that any particular thing is a 
proper name first and foremost (BE 378). Before we 
ask what makes this car what it is or attempt to deal 
with it in its particularity, we know some basic things 
about it—such as that it has a transcendental unity as 
expressed in and by its name. We can also say that 
such names are, as Kripke called them, ‘rigid 
designators’. Such designators capture the 
transcendental unity of a being and what amounts to 
its substantial substratum. They are necessary 
components of any being. Without such rigid 
designators, anything would simply be dissolvable 
into its components. But at the same time, what is 
individualized can always be part of a larger set. 
It is important to note here that letters are sets 
even if they are purely differential relations. That is, 
when we are forced to account for numbers, letters, 
etc. as ontologically fundamental, we are forced to 
note that they too are sets and not just elements of sets 
(sets are after all made up of other sets—any element 
also plays the role of set). In doing so, it cannot be that 
objects or things are what is most fundamental. Letters 
are not clearly independent substances that exist in 
their own right solely. Rather they only exist as pure 
differences and as differences linked together—as a 
set. As we will argue later, this relationalism shows 
why letters are related to bits: “So what this means is 




that in a computer numbers are represented by 
sequences of 0’s and 1’s, much like sequences of white 
and black cells in systems like cellular automata” 
(NKS 117). Of course, in computer code bits make up 
letters and numbers: “But in a computer, numbers are 
not elementary objects. Instead, they must be 
represented explicitly, typically by giving a sequence 
of digits” (NKS 116). But this is true only insofar as 
these bits are themselves such relational entities—
meaning that bits themselves are a form of lettering. 
Once you admit that numbers, letters, sets, and bits 
are fundamental, then one’s very outlook on the world 
and its inherent differentiation changes. It is no longer 
a matter of the world being differentiated into chairs, 
moons, and frogs as substratums underlying all other 
qualities and properties. As letters become included in 
the list of fundamental things, the world is 
differentiated into sets as the objects we are used to 
are themselves sets and come into being through 
letters, numbers, bits. 
Also, two things may have all the same qualities, 
making them indiscernible. But there will always be at 
least one aspect that keeps them apart and shows they 
are two—their names themselves as two different 
collections. Names/numbers (sets) are themselves the 
very medium in which the nature of things is grasped 
in their being. Since Galileo, nature itself, in its 
diversity, reveals itself in a writing system that at its 
most basic is about what is numerable. Number is the 
form of being itself. When we reduce the plurality of 
what is to number, we retain its plurality even if its 
material qualities will have to be articulated at a latter 
point. Take here as an example my voice (and this will 
be an example we will return to). First, in its very 
being, my voice expresses itself as a being, as one 
thing numerable as such (and that is here expressed in 
its proper name as ‘my voice’). But my voice has or 
may have many qualities—hoarse, scratchy, quiet, 




deep, etc. When we determine my voice in its being as 
such, we do not treat it as a thing, but precisely as its 
name. It merely notes a set of which these qualities 
could belong. If we were to concentrate on my voice as 
a thing, then we end up describing how it appears to 
the perceiving subject or attempt to pinpoint which 
qualities seen are truly parts of the thing. But it will be 
our contention that only the mathematicization of the 
thing can reveal this ultimately. Also, treating a voice 
as a thing means attempting to understand its 
qualities—what makes something deep. Only an 
analysis of sound waves and the nature of sound 
could reveal this, as just describing the sound or 
contrasting it with other sounds adds nothing new. 
Finally, in treating it as a thing, we may be forced to 
search for a substratum that names that which 
underlies all these qualities and divides them between 
essential and accidental. But such a substratum 
always ends up only being a reification, 
hypostatization, and projection of the name itself into 
a shadowy thing in itself that haunts what is right 
before us: a named set of properties, relations, etc.  
The most famous attempt to achieve such a 
theory, Aristotle’s, reveals this. For Aristotle, 
substance is ultimately that of which all is said, but it 
is not said of anything else. Here, the very 
grammatical nature of things is taken for granted as 
naming being. In particular, substance cannot be 
anything other than proper names (all substance is 
treated as a proper name). My voice is not said of 
anything else, but many things are said of it. But while 
my voice can be said to be deep, depth itself can in 
turn be given the same status once it is seen as a name. 
In addition, when we will want to deal with its 
qualities, then we can express them as sound waves, 
etc., which means the same thing as mathematical 
relations. A recording of my voice is not a 
representation of my voice. It is my voice. And this 




recording is possible precisely since the voice itself 
can be expressed strictly in terms of mathematical 
relations pure and simple. This math is built out of 
sets, the sets that first express to us the most basic 
elements of being. 
 
§15. THE GOD OF CANTORIANISM 
First let us clarify the background of this 
Cantorian set theory, specifically, what it now means 
to speak of God as infinite. First, as opposed to Badiou 
who thinks that this theory undermines the idea that 
God exists by undermining the idea that that there is a 
set of all sets or whole, this theory potentially 
undermines viewing God as omniscient. That is, if 
there can be no set of all sets, it is not clear how God 
can be all-knowing, since total knowledge would 
presumably require a totality to know. Gary Mar lays 
out the issue in his essay, “Why ‘Cantorian’ 
Arguments Against the Existence of God Do Not 
Work.” Mar summarizes the argument against the 
existence of God based on the impossibility of 
omniscience in this manner: “1) If God exists, then 
God is omniscient. 2) If God is omniscient, then, by 
definition, God knows all [or alternatively, the set of 
all] truths. 3) If Cantor’s theorem is true, then there is 
no set of all truths. 4) But Cantor’s theorem is true. 5) 
Therefore, God does not exist” (Mar 1993, 430). Mar 
attempts to refute this argument by showing how “the 
non-existence of a set of all sets does not entail the 
impossibility or incoherence of quantification over the 
universe of all sets” and that a “set of all truths” is not 
“needed to make sense of the notion of omniscience as 
knowledge of all truths” (Mar 1993, 433). Following 
Mar, we can say that God’s not being able to articulate 
a set of all sets is no more problematic than God not 
being able to lift something heavier than the heaviest 
thing or know what color hair a non-existent person 
had (Mar 1993, 438). It is not required of an 




omniscient or all-powerful God to know or be able to 
do absurd or nonsensical things.  
These considerations adhere as well to Russellian 
set paradoxes. I would also add that the atheist 
argument begs the question in terms of truths. It is not 
clear that there are an infinite number of truths about 
the universe. One could then very easily have a set of 
these truths. Now some might argue here that there 
would be an infinite regress that would upset divine 
omniscience, even if we restrict the set of truths to 
being a finite set. This regress would occur insofar as 
the set of all truths would itself have to be recognized 
as a truth and so on. But even if that were so, there is 
no real introduction of new content such that to know 
the first set of finite truths is to know them even if 
such a regress were started. Second, the only thing so 
far shown to be infinite and thereby subject to the rule 
of infinity of infinities is numbers and perhaps letter-
combination/words. But in both cases, one has the 
very rule to know any possible word or number. Even 
a human can know any possible letter combination 
except those infinite in length. God could know a 
word infinite in length given God’s posited infinity.  
Mar further shows that the argument against God 
here undermines itself insofar as if it “were to 
succeed,” it would show that “there is for example, no 
universal propositional quantification” and so the 
argument’s propositions could not themselves be 
coherently articulated (Mar 1993, 438). To be more 
particular, to state “for all x, if x exists, then x is not 
God” is to already presuppose that one has total 
knowledge of all things (Mar 1993, 438). From 
whatever angle we look at it, the one key way in 
which Cantorianism might undermine monotheism is 
not successful. 
Badiou’s assertions and the above considerations 
might lead us to believe that God is not a part of 
Cantorianism explicitly. However, it is quite the 




contrary. Cantor himself used his notion of the 
transfinite both to clarify and to attempt to prove a 
monotheistic position. For Cantor, God is the 
“absolutely infinite,” and that means an infinity 
greater than anything one can conceive including the 
transfinite (Mar 1993, 439-41). Such a conception 
subtracts God from the order of finite and transfinite 
sets heretofore considered and places God on the level 
of that which is greater than anything conceivable. 
The transfinite can lead to larger and larger infinities 
via the power-set. But God is absolute. There is no 
way to show that a part or series of subsets exceed 
God. In this way, God names a qualitative infinite 
rather than a quantitative one.  
Such a qualitative and “absolute infinite can only 
be recognized, and never known, not even 
approximately” (Cantor, qtd. Moore 2001, 128). In 
some ways, we could say here that the sheer 
transcendent nature of God places God beyond the 
transfinite since as Cantor showed those could be 
measured and ordered numerically. God is not the 
largest possible number, but rather something 
qualitatively different from sets and numbering in 
God’s absolute infinity. God marks the mathematical 
conception of infinity as itself limited (which was 
always the case given Cantor’s treatment of the finite 
as an infinite number). God is without number for 
Cantor. The divine infinite then exceeds the contours 
of counting and collections. It inhabits its own space.  
If for Badiou being qua being is defined by sets 
and sets presuppose all that exists, then God does not 
remain within the field of Being. But rather than say 
that God does not ex-ist, we should say God in-sists 
(an idea we will elaborate further). It must be 
emphasized that God as absolutely infinite is not an 
attempt to find a set of all sets by other means. God 
cannot be expressed within set theory, but only as that 
which exceeds it. In this way, Cantor the mathe-




matician becomes Cantor the theologian the instant he 
posits an infinity outside the bounds of the transfinite. 
The greatest cannot be associated with a number. The 
transfinite as we noted was not perfectly infinite. It 
was always undermined by its own power set that 
exposed it as relative. But God is perfectly infinite. 
Such perfection is hidden from set theory. The 
absolute infinite is also one as unique. There cannot 
be two absolutes.  
Absolute infinity is not truly knowable. We still 
might say that we partly comprehend it and not just as 
that which cannot be known, but rather we gain 
partial insight into it via the infinity determined by 
the transfinite. For instance, the transfinite tells us 
what the entirety of all natural numbers would look 
like as a set and how that set can itself be exceeded. In 
pointing that out, we gain a sense of what the absolute 
largest would have to refer to. At the same time, God 
as absolutely infinite is a necessary presupposition 
and condition for conceiving the transfinite that is 
now exposed for Cantor. As has been noted, the 
identity conditions of sets are determined by their 
elements. A transfinite set, such as the set of all 
natural numbers, therefore presupposes the actual 
existence of all the natural numbers. For Cantor, “All 
these particular modes of the transfinite have existed 
form eternity as ideas in the Divine intellect” (Cantor, 
qtd. Mar 1993, 440). It is God as absolutely infinite 
that could guarantee the transfinite. Cantor has thus 
proposed a unique ontological argument for the 
existence of God using mathematical conceptions 
alone. Ignasi Jane writes:  
 
Indeed, the existence of the absolute is said 
by Cantor to be inferable from the limit-
lessness in the realm of the transfinite of the 
sequence of ordinals, in a way similar to that 
which one infers the existence of ώ, or 




equivalently, the sign of the set of all natural 
numbers, from the limitlessness of the realm 
of infinite, of the sequences of natural 
numbers. The inference principle here at 
work may be aphoristically expressed as: no 
potentiality without actuality. (Jane 1995, 
385)  
 
For Cantor, the potential infinite (the ability, in 
principle, to count endlessly) actually presupposes an 
actual infinite in order to make any sense. Cantor says:  
 
But there is another viewpoint from which one 
can irrefutably prove the occurrence of the 
actual infinite and its indispensability both in 
analysis and in number theory and algebra. 
There is no doubt that we cannot do without 
variable quantities in the sense of the potential 
infinite; and from this the necessity of the 
actual infinite can also be proven, as follows. 
In order for there to be variable quantity in 
some mathematical inquiry, the ‘domain’ of its 
variability must strictly speaking be known 
before hand through a definition. However, 
this domain cannot itself be something 
variable, since otherwise each fused support of 
the quantity would collapse. Thus, this 
‘domain’ is defined, actually in a set of values. 
Thus, each potential infinite, if it is rigorously 
applicable mathematically, presupposes an 
actual infinite. (Cantor, qtd. Jane 1995, 385)  
 
The domain of all numbers must already exist for 
there to be a transfinite set of them. But for them to 
actually exist, they must exist in the mind of God. Of 
course, earlier it has been argued that the transfinite 
itself is founded on the power of the signifier (and 
later we will argue it is identifiable with the void as its 




point of departure). But Cantor’s point here resonates. 
Even to discuss the transfinite one needs to pre-
suppose God (and the void and the signifier, as we 
will show, make the same presupposition). What this 
view opens up is the possibility of viewing creation 
itself as not strictly finite, but transfinite in nature.  
An absolutely infinite Creator can create and 
render a transfinite infinity of infinities in creation. 
There is something infinite in creation even if creation 
is created by number, because there are transfinite 
numbers. God is therefore not the only infinity, as 
traditional theology has asserted, as from God there 
can be an infinity of infinities without God’s status as 
absolute and creator being violated. But insofar as God 
names that which is greater than what can be 
conceived, God also is unnamable in his ineffability. 
Insofar as in Kabbalah the letter aleph names the finite 
nature and oneness/unicity of God, Cantor should 
have named what he is calling here the absolute 
infinite by aleph rather than the transfinite, unless we 
see the aleph as the first creation of God rather than 
God himself. Cantor may have intentionally chosen 
the letter aleph to hearken to Kabbalistic ideas, but 
insofar as the aleph is the transfinite, God is not aleph. 
God creates alephs and via alephs.  
All things that are finite or can be shown to have 
something larger than themselves, like the infinite 
itself, are all equally far away from the absolutely 
infinite. The transfinite, from a divine perspective, is 
as finite as any other number. God as eternal is not 
created, but the transfinite itself is created, created by 
the signifier, the void, the act of collection, etc. We 
can also here return to Levinas and say that the 
infinity associated with the human face is also not 
mathematical, but rather associated with the absolute 
infinity of God. After all, humanity is created in the 
image of God. But this is not an incarnation, it is 
rather the infinite in the finite as it relates first and 




foremost to what exceeds us in confronting the human 
face, rather than, as with God, what is absolute in 
itself. In any event, the holy one is withdrawn from 
the transfinite as much as the face of the other is 
withdrawn in its holiness from the grasp of the self.  
Such considerations also return us to the 
argument against God’s omniscience. God as absolute 
infinite has access to the infinite in a non-quantitative 
way. God does not need to enumerate things. “Every 
infinite, in a sense, is finite to God” as God’s 
“intelligence has no number” (Cantor, qtd. Jane 1995, 
399). Here, we also have the complete inversion of 
correlationism, as Cantor attempts to see numbers as 
they appear not only to us, not only as they are in 
themselves via the idea of sets and one-to-one 
correspondence, but also as they appear to an absolute 
infinite intelligence. For us, of course, it is most 
intuitive to see numbers as succeeding each other 
through basic counting. For God, all numbers are one 
finite number essentially since all are contained in 
each other. Perhaps, it was inevitable that God would 
appear precisely here, since one cannot simply ignore 
the idea that the infinite is that which nothing is 
greater than and the transfinite seemed to overturn 
that idea.  
Such considerations also overturn the idea that 
God is just a container of the infinite (like the infinity 
of positive integers) or of several infinites—that we are 
positing again a set of all sets or giving into the 
pantheistic temptation which Cantor himself at times 
did not resist (Newstead 2009, 545-50). Rather, since 
the transfinite appears finite to God (and even to us in 
writing it), all numbers (at least all positive integers) 
appear as derivable at once from one rule. As Anne 
Newstead puts it, “only if one held that God’s absolute 
infinite were fully realized in another would one truly 
be a pantheist” and that very possibility is restricted 
through God’s radical transcendence (Newstead 2009, 




549). Now, as Newstead points out in great detail, if 
Cantor places the actual infinite in God, it not only 
appears, that a set of all sets is reintroduced, but that 
there can be a Spinozistic collapse of the possible and 
the actual (Newstead 2009, 545-50). In other words, if 
all is actual and the possible presupposes it, then 
Cantor, under the influence of Spinoza, believed that 
all possibilities must be seen as being actualized. But 
if all that is possible is actual, then God does not 
create as with Spinoza, but rather necessarily 
produces all possible conceptions. But Cantor resisted 
this Spinozistic detour, not just because he posited 
God as absolutely infinite and transcendent, but also 
due to his very idea that the possible presupposes the 
actual. All that is possible is actual only in God and 
from God’s perspective. The absolutely infinite can 
only be acknowledged by the finite. And even if the 
absolutely infinite contains the actual infinities that 
the transfinite presupposes, God need not be 
necessitated to actualize any except those God freely 
chooses.  
Badiou is directly critical of many of the 
propositions put forth here. Firstly, Badiou would say 
that for Cantor, God “in-consists” rather than in-sists, 
as we do, since for Badiou the absolute infinite is the 
name of an inconsistent multiplicity, one that cannot 
be contained (Badiou 1996, 35). We will return to this 
idea via the void. But here it can be said that for 
Badiou, Cantor turns back on the ideas that he 
founded by posting the idea of an absolute infinite. 
However, it is not a matter of where the “count-as-one-
fails” that God appears, as we have argued (BE 41). 
Rather, Cantor posited God necessarily due to the 
need for the actual infinite that the potential 
presupposes. It is not a question of something that 
cannot be totalized, as much as preserving the idea of 
the infinite as that which nothing can be greater than. 
It is also precisely another way of preserving the idea 




of nature as infinite, which Badiou thinks is modern 
(BE 143). That is to say, Cantor runs against Badiou’s 
view by showing that God alone, via the transfinite, 
can mark nature as infinite through creation and via 
what exceeds set theory. Cantor also does so through 
an ontological argument, rather than via a 
cosmological proof, which alone can show nature to 
be infinite. Cantor, rather than closing off the 
transfinite, moves beyond thinking creation as purely 
finite and thereby does not repeat the finitism Badiou 
attributes to traditional theology (BE 142).  
Hallward contends that Badiou sees Cantor’s 
absolute infinite as a mathematical God who is 
“altogether-Other” (which is true), but his idea does 
not imply “an endless enlarging of the universe,” as 
the absolutely infinite marks the point at which 
enlargement is no longer possible (BST 216). Cantor is 
also not positing the absolute infinite relative to the 
transfinite or its cardinality by proposing names such 
as “inaccessible cardinals . . . inaccessible cardinals, 
eventually ineffable cardinals, and beyond,” since 
number itself does not apply here (BST 216). In short, 
Badiou confuses Cantor’s God with the infinity of 
infinities of the transfinite. God, according to Cantor, 
is not an absolute being as God transcends the realm 
of being and is not the inconsistency and that which 
inconsists as God is not the same as the ever larger 
cardinality of transfinite alephs.  
 
§16. THE ONTOLOGICAL/MODAL PROOF OF DIVINE 
INSISTENCE 
   One of the most important things about Cantor 
is the manner in which he refreshed ontological 
arguments by attempting to prove the existence of God 
via notions and concepts alone. In particular, Cantor’s 
very identification of God as that which is maximal 
clearly reverberates with Anselm’s famous ontological 
proofs. Ontological and modal arguments (which I 




take to be often the same thing and already a key 
modal argument for God has been used here as part of 
a critique of process theology) are the strongest and 
most convincing arguments for divine existence. 
Cosmological proofs depend on the impossibility of an 
infinite regress. But already with Cantor, we have seen 
that potentially undermined as far as being qua being 
is concerned. For cosmological proofs, one cannot 
infinitely regress without a beginning, as that would 
imply that an infinity of time would have to take place 
before we arrived at this moment. And that ultimately 
means this moment would not arrive. And yet it does. 
However, the Cantorian transfinite opens up the 
possibility that an infinity is already given all at once.  
As Maimonides already noted, arguments from 
design always presuppose that we know what the 
purpose or goal of a thing is. But that knowledge may 
be hidden to us, in particular, when it comes to what 
God intended. Second, teleological arguments are 
always either arguments from analogy (from design we 
can infer a designer due to how other things are 
designed) or credulity (is it more or less believable 
that the world could be as it is and not be created by 
God?). However, all arguments from analogy are 
problematic, because one has to select the features in 
common that are relevant given the non-identity of the 
two members of comparison. But at the same time, the 
very non-identity will always undermine the 
relevance of the features chosen, given that other 
features will show disanalogy. As for credulity, the 
most famous argument here is what is now called the 
‘fine-tuning’ argument. But here, not only is there 
dependence on measurements that may be imprecise, 
but also on a statistical view: there is a low probability 
of things being otherwise. However, as long as there 
exists even a possibility of being otherwise, the 
argument is only partially persuasive.  




Modal reasoning deals with possibility as such. 
Now, what is interesting is that Hartshorne showed us 
how to treat the ontological proof as a modal proof. I 
think this proof is stronger than Cantor’s ultimately, 
since Cantor’s depends on showing that the actual 
infinite could only exist in God. But it is not clear 
that, for instance, a Platonic heaven could not serve 
the same function. Hartshorne translates precisely 
Anselm’s own argument concerning that than which a 
greater cannot be thought. Now, Anselm’s argument, 
as is well-known, attempts to show that the concept of 
that than which a greater cannot be thought exists 
already in mind. Anselm shows that this idea in mind, 
also by its very nature, shows that which is conceived 
must obtain outside of mind. The proof here is 
deceptively simple. If the idea is confined only to our 
minds, then there is something greater that can be 
thought—that which is outside the mind. But once we 
entertain this idea, we see that that which obtains 
outside our minds is greater than that which only 
obtains in the mind. We cannot think something 
greater than can be thought. For this reason, that than 
which a greater cannot be thought obtains both in 
mind and in reality.11  
Kant famously criticized this argument. He 
argued that no concept can show that the thing 
conceived exists. For example, my concept of a dollar 
has all the same properties as a dollar I hold in my 
hand except for one—that the dollar I hold in my hand 
exists. For Kant, existence is not a real predicate. It is 
only something known empirically. The dollar one 
conceives cannot be used—only the dollar in hand 
can. This is why, for instance, conceiving of a unicorn 
does not show there are unicorns. But God is different 
                                                                                     
11 I am drawing heavily here on the work of Gary Mar, in 
particular his essay “The Modal Unity of Anselm’s 
Proslogion” (1996), in order to elaborate these arguments.  




in nature from dollars or unicorns, due to His non-
contingency, perfection, and infinity. And as Marion 
shows, Anselm is not necessarily using a concept, but 
rather a “non-concept” since God is defined as 
something we cannot conceive (anything greater than 
it cannot be thought) and thereby indicates 
“transcendence”: “Anything ‘conceived within fixed 
limits’ will not be God as a result of this view” 
(Marion 1992, 208). The question of God exists at the 
limits of conception. It is when conception “cannot go 
further” and one experiences limitation when 
attempting to conceive God that our finitude, for 
Marion, is supremely indicated (Marion 1992, 209). 
For Marion, Anselm’s key point is that God remains 
outside of our understanding (Marion 1992, 212).  
But Marion’s point still should be noted. As 
opposed to Kant, the issue here is not how existence is 
derived from a concept, but rather how God’s 
existence is inferred from the inability of producing a 
concept of God that would not exceed us (Marion 
1992, 213). I would say that the issue here is not our 
not being able to think God, but rather that the 
concept exceeds itself. For Marion, the key is showing 
that Anselm’s argument is not ontological, since God 
exceeds the order of being (Marion 1992, 217). But the 
key should be to still affirm that God obtains outside 
of mind or conception, despite or because of the 
excess of the concept itself. First, Anselm himself 
argued that one who denies that there is the greater 
than which cannot be conceived already admits the 
thing he denied, for in denying the thing we attempt 
to think it and conceive of that than which a greater 
cannot be thought. That is to say, it is for Anselm a 
matter of confirming that the conception takes place. 
But the denial of this concept works to show the truth 
of Anselm’s proof by taking it modally as Hartshorne 
showed us.  




A perfect and infinite being that is also 
contingent is a contradiction in terms (LP 50). Any-
thing contingent must by its very nature be imperfect. 
Perfection can only obtain necessarily. For 
Hartshorne, “Kant misled thousands by his blurring of 
the distinction between saying, ‘there may not be an 
idea of perfection’, and saying, ‘there might not be 
anything perfect’. If the idea is not logically possible, 
then there could not be anything perfect; if it is 
possible, then there must be” (LP 97). Hartshorne’s key 
point here is that insofar as the idea of perfection is 
conceptually possible, it must obtain. And even the 
one who denies the argument must conceive that 
which he is denying in order to deny it. When one 
denies that that than which a greater cannot be 
thought obtains outside of mind, one denies that if 
that than which a greater cannot be thought were to 
obtain, it would not be able to not be, either outside of 
or in the mind. But one cannot deny such a thing as 
logic dictates such possibility must be granted to all 
things. In other words, assuming that it were not true 
that that than which a greater cannot be thought 
obtains outside of mind, if it were true that that than 
which a greater cannot be thought obtains outside of 
mind, it would be impossible for that than which a 
greater cannot be thought not to obtain outside of 
mind. If God obtains outside of mind, then it is 
impossible for there not to be God. A key condition 
here is that one agrees that if God obtains outside of 
mind, it would be necessarily so as noted by 
definition above.  
When it comes to God, God’s obtaining outside of 
mind is either impossible or necessary conceptually. 
But one cannot show that it is impossible that that 
than which a greater cannot be thought can exist 
outside of mind. In fact, one constantly has to posit 
that, since one will posit that what obtains outside of 
mind is greater than what is just in the mind. That is 




to say, the modal version of Anselm repeats the 
standard version. This argument has then attempted to 
show that the possible non-existence of God is 
contradictory in modal terms. As for Kant’s idea that 
existence is not a real predicate, that only holds for 
contingent things. The necessity of God means that the 
predicate is included. If we say God is possible, but 
may or not be, we have a contradiction. The very idea 
of God’s possibility shows God’s necessity. This is why 
it is so important to Anselm to show that even the 
denier of God agrees that God is not impossible. On 
the basis of that idea alone, one can show God must 
obtain outside of mind. Now, Meillassoux argues that 
the necessity here claimed is only a “necessity for us” 
without any basis for saying it holds in itself (AF 53). 
But there is no reason to say it is for us, as the proof 
here does not concern what is possible for us, but 
what is possible by definition alone. As Marion 
suggested, it may not even be strictly possible for us to 
conceive of God.  
In his articulation of the modal proof, Hartshorne 
lists several well-known objections. Many believe that 
all claims about what obtains outside of mind have 
been contingent (LP 45). But this claim has shown not 
to be such that just claiming all others have been does 
not necessitate all future ones will have to. Some find 
this proof to be tautologous. But the existence of God 
is not presupposed, just what is conceived, definitions 
of contingency, perfection, etc. Some also say that this 
proof only shows “if he exists, he exists necessarily” 
(LP 45), but the whole proof is that the opponent has 
to show it is impossible to say God exists, otherwise 
the proof holds. Some also argue that “logical 
necessity does not prove real necessity” (LP 45), but 
not only does this criticism presuppose that the real is 
not logical, it also seems to think physics deals with 
necessity or that something other than logic shows 
necessity. There is also a criticism that this proof 




would open the door to saying that any perfect 
instance of a thing would exist (LP 45). For instance, 
the perfect apple exists. But that is why the concept 
here has to be absolutely maximal. An apple itself is 
not something greater than which a perfect apple can 
be thought. Some think what has been shown to 
obtain outside of mind here is a property rather than 
an individual (LP 45). This is perhaps the strongest 
critique. But properties can themselves be things. If 
we call God the perfect one, it is the same as saying 
there is perfection. And only contingent things are 
individuals on this conception.  
The most interesting criticism is one Hartshorne 
attributes to Kant and calls the mystical paradox: “If 
God’s reality followed from our idea, then this idea 
must be (or contain) God himself” (LP 46). Here again 
Marion’s points find their importance, for this 
conception always exceeds us, such that it shows why 
this critique could not hold. One also here might 
assert a pantheistic critique: “If God necessarily exists, 
then it can only mean he is reality itself” (LP 47). But 
we have already endeavored to show why pantheism 
does not hold. The final critique worth considering is 
that there is “no need that perfection be perfect” (LP 
47). This critique ultimately takes the argument as 
saying that perfection must exemplify itself. But this 
proof only says that the contingent is imperfect and 
cannot exemplify it. But God is not contingent. God 
relates to necessity. And it is by this necessity that we 
can again assert that God in-sists (necessarily so) as 
only the contingent ex-ists. Gods obtains outside of 
mind not because he is understood, but irrespective of 
the fact that he is not. God obtains outside of the mind 
due to his not being in the understanding.  
 
§17. DIVINE INSISTENCE 
Such divine insistence places God beyond being. 
This means in turn that God is beyond all predication. 




God is nothing from this perspective, as the human 
cannot contain what God implies. It is partly for this 
reason that the first name for God for Kabbalah after 
infinity [Eyn Sof] is ayin [nothingness]. But ayin refers 
to perception first and foremost. For this reason, the 
Kabbalah calls it the eye, which is also ayin in 
Hebrew. One here has a vision of nothing. 
Undifferentiation is the same as nothing, such that 
God as unique is not able to be differentiated from 
something else. God is one simple essence without 
diversity, duality, complexity, etc. It refers to the 
unique one. God, then, refers to an ineffable mode 
superior to existence as such. God refuses predication 
and contingent existence in order to insistently 
remind us of something beyond these things. God is 
the one who does not manifest or reveal himself in 
this world on the order of the things of this world 
(Ouaknin 2000, 50).  
Many might challenge these remarks by noting 
that when Moses encountered God in the burning 
bush, God says ‘ehyeh asher ehyeh,’ which many 
translate as ‘I am that I am’ or ‘I will be what I will be’ 
(Exodus 3:14). But it is precisely the tautologous 
nature of the statement that should be emphasized 
rather than any reference to being or existence. The 
bush is both burning and not burning at the same 
time. The bush is aflame, but is not consumed. It is by 
this contradictory phenomenon that God names 
himself. In this way, if there is a contradiction, God’s 
name is a name that cannot name. God is nameless. 
God is ineffable, and such an ineffability can only be 
spoken by saying that it is what it is. This is not a 
name (although the names of God will play a role) as 
much as a lesson in the namelessness of God. It is 
revealed to Moses at this moment that God remains in 
God’s essence despite what anyone will say—
determined there without change. God transcends all 
and is determined by himself, but in this way God is 




only something that can be acknowledged in the same 
way we say ‘it is what it is’. God alone states what God 
is, and it is something beyond.  
Now all these formulations echo what negative 
theology long determined. For Plotinus, the One is 
beyond being. It is other, absolutely other, than any 
definition of it. It cannot be revealed, not due to the 
limits of knowledge, but due to the limits of being 
itself. But such negative theology always admits that 
one still must say something about God and cannot 
avoid doing so. Here, one such insistent and 
unavoidable designation has been God as creator, as 
infinite, and as the maximal. In this way, negative 
theology itself admits that its very goal is always 
necessarily undermined. God can only be defined 
negatively (as not a being), but in doing so we 
implicitly say what God is and risk freezing our 
understanding in a false image. Negative theology also 
acknowledges the limits of language. Our languages 
themselves do not offer us any more than difficult 
phrasings, since to say God is not a being means we 
still have to say what God ‘is’, as the ‘is’ intrudes in 
the very grammar and syntax itself.  
Negative theology understands itself as caught in 
this double bind of saying what God is not (God is not 
a being) in order to say what God is, while at the same 
time attempting to affirm that as such, God transcends 
even being itself. God does not know like humans, but 
God knows all or maximally in a way that exceeds our 
very understanding, for example. Negation therefore 
implies and leads to eminence. It is for these reasons 
that deconstruction, even as it attempts to criticize 
negative theology and to distance itself from it, cannot 
succeed in doing so. Negative theology already 
knowingly engages in its own deconstruction and by 
doing so thereby achieves its purpose. Negative 
theology, in denying God on one order only to affirm 
explicitly or implicitly God on another, performatively 




enacts at one and the same time the realization of 
God’s transcendence and eminence. But it also enacts 
the necessary unavoidability of God and our failure to 
think God. One cannot avoid predicating properties to 
God and discussing what God is at the same time one 
realizes a relation to a holiness greater than what can 
be thought and beyond the limits of conception. God 
can be named and conceived only in the very same 
instance that such naming is necessary overturned.  
This is why when Derrida, in “How to Avoid 
Speaking: Denials,” acknowledges that “language is 
inadequate to the hyperessentiality of God” and that 
the “possible absence of a referent still beckons, if not 
toward the thing of which one speaks (such is God, 
who is nothing because he takes place, without place, 
beyond being), at least toward the other (other than 
Being)” (Derrida 1992, 97). But whereas Derrida wants 
to say that negative theology is ultimately false, he 
truly has no grounds for doing so. Negative theology 
accepts its failure as its very proof. It is decon-
structionist avant la lettre insofar as it notes that the 
conditions for the possibility of engaging with God are 
also what make it impossible. And it is superior to 
deconstructionism, since deconstructionism would 
only see it as the moment “a logos necessarily speaks 
about something it cannot avoid speaking of, 
something it is impossible for it to refer to” (Derrida 
1992, 103). But negative theology is still willing to say 
that this shows that God insists and that that 
insistence is not a transcendental illusion, but the real 
proof of transcendence. 
Deconstruction would prefer that we remain 
stuck insisting on the impossibility of a God that 
insists and suggests its possibility. But it is time again 
to twist and turn this rhetorical figure to see how, 
beyond the double binds of thought, there lies a reality 
created and brought before us, and necessarily so, by 
what we can only reach indirectly. Derrida knows that 




his own statements about deconstruction sound like 
negative theology (Derrida 1985, 6-7). But Derrida 
insists that différance is not the same as God. For 
Derrida, the very difference between God and the 
contingent order of being can only be understood by 
way of différance. But this is once again to insist that 
ultimately all there is is our conceptions of things 
rather than anything lying beyond these conceptions. 
Negative theology might agree that in conception this 
is true, but as seen in the ontological argument, God 
obtains outside of mind precisely due to our inability 
to conceive of God as such.  
Derrida may believe he has the very principle for 
making determinations, but these determinations are 
only ever conceptual in nature. It is our contention 
that at some point these conceptual determinations 
give way to a realism, and God marks the first 
opening. Via divine creation, the rest will appear. In 
one way, what makes it possible to even show 
conceptual determinations requires that there be 
something in excess of what these conceptual 
determinations note as existing and a part of being. 
God names the most fundamental excess.  
 
§18. NOTHINGNESS/THE VOID AND ITS MARK: THE HOLY 
NAME OF GOD 
It is not enough for a God beyond being to be 
proved or grounded, given our critique of 
contemporary philosophy. Rather, in addition to 
asserting God in himself as infinite, one needs also to 
demonstrate that God is creator, insofar as this was 
also a key dimension missing from contemporary 
philosophical theology. Now, to approach God as 
creator is necessarily to approach the question of 
creation ex nihilo , creation out of nothing, since true 
creation only takes place in this fashion.12 But to have 
                                                                                     
12 For Maimonides, there is another model of creation—that 




creation from nothing, one first needs to have the 
nothing itself. It is here that one need re-enter post-
Cantorian set theory, along with its interpretation by 
Badiou, in order to establish the nature of the nothing 
out of which God creates all things.  
Set theory treats the question of the nothing first 
and foremost via the notion of the ‘null (or empty) set.’ 
This is a simple set that has no elements. One need 
not presuppose anything in order to posit this set 
since it contains nothing positive. One can simply 
assert its existence. It proves itself in its own writing. 
While any other set is an aggregation of something else 
including other sets, the empty set merely aggregates 
nothing itself. It presents nothing and nothing but 
itself. The null set thereby gives being to non-being. 
This may seem odd since the one thing that should 
not be, per the philosophical tradition since 
Parmenides, is non-being. But the empty set allows for 
the appearance of non-being itself. And in order to put 
forth set theory itself, one only need assert this set, the 
existence of the zero. If set theory is ontology, being 
qua being is an axiomatic system of the void. To think 
being is to think the implications of this existence of 
the void.  
Here, being itself is named for Badiou by that 
which is said not to exist, the void. The unpresentable 
forms the very condition of presentation itself. The 
void for Badiou is not a negation, as it is for Hegel. It 
is not a something that appears once something else is 
destroyed. However, as the Kabbalah will show, this 
nothing itself does come into being via God and is 
                                                                                                     
of the demiurge in Plato’s Timaeaus. Maimonides thinks 
both ideas are compatible with a monotheistic view. 
However, such a Platonic model, as with its latter 
incarnation in Whitehead’s metaphysics, suffers from a god 
rendered limited by an eternal matter. However, it seems 
that God’s perfection requires that there not be something 
equally eternal in this way.  




thereby closer to Sartre’s concept in Being and 
Nothingness, where pure being-in-itself is annihilated 
by the for-itself. But the world is not made of nothing 
for Sartre. Only consciousness is. The world itself is 
the inertness of the in-itself. Without the nothingness 
of consciousness the world would simply remain in 
its formless muteness. Only consciousness allows 
things to be disturbed.  
The empty set is the zero whose material is made 
of nothing, no elements. This empty set subsists in its 
own nothingness. It is not an object empty of a 
concept, but rather a concept without an object. Or 
perhaps even better, the concept of a lack of objects. It 
is thereby a treatment of and engagement with the 
noumenal itself, the in-itself as it is in itself. It is an 
object designated by lack. Negativity itself appears. 
Reality is thereby not something as much as the 
appearance of nothing. The empty set happens as 
nothing. A being itself, the empty set may be contested 
in its being, but not in its existence. Nothingness has 
already sublated itself into the empty set and found its 
being there. But in doing so, the nothing as per the 
dialectic is preserved and noted.  
The empty set, insofar as it includes nothing, is 
itself “universally included” in any set and in any 
presentation and is also perhaps unique in that its 
subset is itself and void (BE 86). The void is thereby 
everywhere and in everything, as much as not 
belonging to the empty set is universal. In particular, 
it is “a subset of every set,” insofar as for this idea to 
be proven false, one would have to show something 
“that belongs to the null set but that does not belong to 
a given set” (which is impossible given that nothing 
belongs to the empty set) (Aczel 2001, 107). As Badiou 
puts it later in Logics of Worlds, the contingency of 
worlds and beings is marked by each thing possessing 
and including the “inexistent” (Badiou 2009, 322-33). 




Badiou emphasizes how this is true of all things with 
an example of a cat:  
 
Let’s return to the example of my cat (7.6). It 
is an element of the set of living beings, and 
it is composed of cells that are in turn 
elements of this set, if one grants that they 
are living organisms. But if we decompose a 
cell into molecules, then into atoms, we 
eventually reach purely physical elements 
that don’t belong to the set of living beings. 
There is a certain term (perhaps the cell, in 
fact) which belongs to the set of living 
beings, but none of whose elements belongs 
to the set of living beings, because those 
elements all involve only ‘inert’ physico-
chemical materiality. Of this term, which 
belongs to the set but none of whose 
elements belongs to it, we can say that it 
grounds the set, or that it is a fundamental 
term of the set. ‘Fundamental’ meaning that 
on one side of the term, we break through 
that which it constitutes; we leave the 
original set, we exceed its presentative ca-
pacity . . . Now the void is not an element of 
the original set ((0)), whose only element is 
(0), because the void 0 and the singleton of 
the void (0) are different sets. So (0) 
represents, in ((0)), a local foundation-point: 
it has no element in common with the 
original set ((0)). That which it presents qua 
multiple—that is, 0—is not presented by 
((0)), in the presentation in which it figures. 
The Axiom of Foundation tells us that this 
situation is a law of being: every multiple is 
founded, every multiple comprises at least 
one element which presents nothing that the 
multiple itself presents. (Badiou 2008, 71)  




Here, Badiou exemplifies how anything includes in it 
something that is not part of it at any other level, just 
as the empty set is included. And presumably, the 
empty set is of course included in a cat. Everything 
that is contains at least one thing that presents nothing 
but itself and that can only be the nothing itself. These 
properties of the empty set can of course also be 
exhibited by numbers themselves, which is the way 
set theory builds up its own elements.  
Given that the empty set has a power-set (itself), 
“since the [empty set] exists, the set of its subsets 
exists” (BE 88). The set of its subset can be named 
simply 1. That is, from the empty set itself, taken in 
this fashion, one can generate the number one by 
counting the empty set itself, its subset. This then 
formulates again how Peano defined numbers. For 
Peano, zero is the empty set, and one is the set 
containing that empty set. Two is the set containing 
both the null set and one (which is the set that 
aggregates the empty set): “The process was then 
assumed to continue ad infinitum, defining every 
whole number” (Aczel 2001, 109). Infinity here 
contains nothingness insofar as the nothingness of 
things leads to the infinite of numbers “starting with 
nothing at all” (Aczel 2001, 227). All numbers are a 
finite form of being, precisely because each contains 
nothing and is formed out of it. But there is no reason 
in principle that things like cats do not contain the 
same nothingness. After all, atoms themselves have 
been discovered to be almost all empty space.  
In any event, numbers show themselves to be 
precisely the presentation of nothingness. Almost 
nothing, they remain in being by counting nothing 
into themselves. They separate the void from the 
infinite itself by interposing themselves. The matter of 
numbers is zero, while their form is the remarking of 
emptiness. Absolute zero itself is the void that 
numbers and anything else is. And the difference 




between the empty set and any other number that 
follows it is always only the empty set itself. Derived 
from the void, pure sets merely double and recount 
the empty set. This model of the production of 
something from nothing will also be the model for 
how God himself realizes things out of absolute zero. 
But God is not the number one and is not oneness in 
any numerical sense. God remains without second and 
thereby cannot be included in these sequences, as 
God’s unity is before the one itself. But it is important 
to note that the empty set is not already one, but itself 
zero. Things do not arise from the one, but rather from 
nothing. The empty set is not a first, but only part of a 
sequence—one it is cut out and distinguished from. 
This cut distinguishes an always already initial 
primordial negativity that the empty set then 
embodies.  
This theory of number only gives ontological 
confirmation of the mystical nothingness from which 
all things unravel and unfold according to Kabbalah. 
The sefirot emanate from the divine and from 
nothingness itself as Sefer Yetzirah emphasizes:  
 
Ten Sefirot of Nothingness / their vision is 
like the ‘appearance of lightning’ / their limit 
has no end / And his word in them is 
‘running and turning’ / They rush to Him 
saying like a whirlwind / And before his 
throne they prostate themselves / Ten 
Sefiroth of Nothingness / their end is 
embedded in their beginning / and their 
beginning in their end / like a flame in a 
burning coal / For the Master is singular. He 
has no second. And before One, what do you 
count? (SY 1:6-7)  
 
Absolute being is nothing for Kabbalah, and nothing 
can change for it without contact with this absolute. 




For Kabbalah also, this nothingness is a primordial 
point that, at this point, can be identified at least with 
the empty set (Scholem 1995, 218).  
For Badiou, the empty set does not just present 
nothingness, but also presents the unpresentable as 
infinity of infinities. Badiou names this infinity of 
infinities ‘inconsistency’ and identifies it with the 
void. The void belongs to all. It thereby names the 
inherence of what allows for any situation to change 
or be re-configured. It opens up and allows for an 
excess that the power set axiom names. The infinity of 
infinites itself derives from how an infinite set implies 
an even greater infinity via its power set. But this 
action is itself established via the empty set that 
shows it can take itself as its power set. The empty set 
is counted as one, but remains as something not yet 
counted in its status just of itself. This is true because 
the void itself cannot be presented as such (BE 93). It 
is only ever remarked by and through the empty set. 
What is counted as one is always a remark of the 
empty set, and the empty set itself is only ever the 
collecting of nothingness. But the insistence of the 
void, as that which cannot be counted or presented, 
makes possible and names an inconsistency always 
there that will inhere through the need for counting. 
In this way, for Badiou, the infinity of infinites is the 
same as the void in and of itself. We only ever 
experience or interact with consistent presentation 
wherein all things are counted, named, and numbered. 
But the empty itself, in its necessary reference to the 
void, presupposes that prior to counting and numbers 
there is a pure multiplicity, a non-being, an 
inconsistency that inheres as unpresentable. The 
empty set presents nothing and confirms its existence 
even as it does not form a one (that occurs via the 
power set). In this way, we have an identification of 
zero with infinity.  




This identification should not be totally 
surprising given that all numbers are made up of the 
empty set ad infinitum. The empty set, via presenting 
nothing, enables there to be a relation between non-
being and being without interfering with their 
identity. Badiou’s thesis that ‘the one is not’ is thus 
identifiable with the idea of both non-being and being-
nothing, as the two cannot be distinguished 
conceptually (BE 93). What is presented and counted, 
such as numbers, only ever makes sense of an 
inconsistency that at any moment will shuffle all the 
cards and upset things into a mess of infinities. This 
inconsistency itself is prior insofar as the being-
nothing of numbers can only arise out of a remarking 
of the presentation of this unpresentable 
inconsistency. But one always encounters this nothing 
in numbers or anything else that is presented.  
 It must be emphasized that set theory implies that 
the void is; “there is a being of nothing” (BE 54). The 
void may not be something presented or presentable 
such as a number, but it is not non-being in the sense 
of the opposite of being. Just as sets aggregate things 
they presuppose, once one can demonstrate the 
existence of the empty set, one has demonstrated the 
existence of nothing as the empty set presupposes it. 
All numbers are a result of an operation, meaning that 
they presuppose the empty set. But this empty set in 
turn presupposes and is based on the being of the 
nothing. This nothing cannot be presented as it is in 
and of itself, but that only means that it is not a being: 
“there exists that to which no existence can be said to 
belong” (BE 67). It thereby also in-sists as God does 
(although we must be careful not to confuse it with 
God). This void that obtains outside of mind and 
independent of any marking is unique, as two voids 
could not be identified in the same way two 
somethings could be, since difference already requires 




that the nothing be remarked via the empty set (BE 
68).  
Nothing can differentiate the void. In other 
words, “it is because the one is not that the void is 
unique” (BE 69). This means that we could say that 
there is a necessary vacuum. It is not a vacuum in 
nature, as nature can only consist of beings already 
delineated like numbers. Posting that there is a being 
of nothing runs directly against the idea that substance 
in its indivisibility or fundamental nature precludes it 
(think here of the substance ontology of Spinoza for 
example). For such substance ontology, a vacuum 
could only limit a substance, but if substance cannot 
be divided, then there is no room for it. Here, on the 
contrary, the empty set itself grounds an existence of 
the void. This is not a phantom of language, insofar as 
sets only act upon a pre-given domain. We then also 
have here an ontological argument for the void, just as 
we had one for God. We deduce the existence of the 
void (non-belonging, ‘there exists that to which no 
existence can be said to belong’) from its very nature, 
just as God could be deduced from his. Again, it is 
precisely by asserting the opposite of this idea that 
helps to form the proof. If we deny that there exists 
that to which no existence can be said to belong, then 
we deny that that there cannot be an empty set. But to 
deny nothing is to deny nothing. Non-belonging must 
obtain since to deny that it does not is to already posit 
something that does not belong. It is not a question 
here of concepts, but rather of what obtains 
independently of concepts and what concepts 
presuppose. The nothing obtains extra-discursively.  
Many do not think that Badiou or set theory 
requires that there be a physically existing vacuum or 
lack. However, it cannot be simply a name and must 
refer to a nothingness that is and obtains outside of 
mind, outside of beings, and outside of sets. It is also 
not simply something that cannot be presented or is 




not part of the field of beings such as numbers are. 
Nothing in-sists prior to these presentations. This in-
sistence refers to and requires something that is more 
than simply an impasse of thought or product of the 
way set theory is written. It does not name a human 
inability to think the totality of all that it is. It is not 
just an index of failure. On the contrary, it is positing 
a real lack that, although it cannot be presented itself, 
is that from which presentation arises (the lack of lack 
makes real). We should not, as philosophy has done 
since Parmenides, posit that nothing is a mere illusion 
based on the impossibility of presenting it as a being. 
Negation cannot appear as such, but that does not 
mean it is a dream. There is an appearing of 
nothingness in the empty set, but even though it is not 
nothing as such, it does not mean nothingness is only 
the empty set. While the philosophical tradition since 
Parmenides has said that nothing does not exist due to 
the seeming inherent contradiction in the idea, these 
considerations lead us to conclude that the nothing in-
sists.  
As Badiou suggests, here poetry (and mysticism is 
itself a form of poetry) is able to present a truth that 
philosophy itself has avoided (BE 54-55). Aristotle 
argued that the void is not possible due to the 
impossibility of movement in a void (Physics IV.7). In 
a vacuum, there would be no resistance. Things would 
move infinitely fast. Thus, anything near a void would 
immediately move into it at an infinite speed. If all 
things near move towards it at infinite speed, then it 
will not be, as all things will immediately overlay it at 
the speed of infinity. But we here speak of a 
metaphysical void that necessarily cannot be 
presented, even though what is presented presupposes 
it.  
Also for Aristotle, something in a void has no 
reason to move, and yet we always see things in 
movement. Aristotle also takes the non-differentiable 




nature of the void as proof against it. But rather than 
its non-differentiable nature showing that we can just 
fill up the world with voids where ever we like, it 
rather shows that the void is unique in nature. There 
is only one void. The absence of things may not be a 
thing or being, but that does not mean it is not. The 
void here should not be confused with empty space, 
as space itself may only be a product of the relation of 
beings themselves rather than a background upon 
which they occur. If philosophy has asked repeatedly 
‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’, then 
we will now begin to be able to answer that there is 
nothing, and that is also why there is something.  
Heidegger also posits that the nothing is and not 
as a being. But for Heidegger, the nothing is treated 
only in correlationist terms. Dasein encounters the 
whole of beings as an idea. The nothing is thereby a 
question only for Dasein, wherein Dasein discloses to 
itself the possibility of the negation of all beings 
(Heidegger 1993, 98-108). In experiencing such a 
disclosure, Dasein then experiences anxiety, but only 
by way of taking the whole of beings as given and then 
negating this whole (Heidegger 1993, 98). The nothing 
nihilates insofar as it allows Dasein to accede to itself. 
But nowhere does Heidegger speak of a nothing 
independent of how things are disclosed to Dasein or 
outside of the anxiety Dasein experiences.  
Even if Cantorianism is premised on the nature of 
the signifier and is a function of writing, the nothing 
still obtains, for the signifier itself is the presence of 
absence as much as numbers are. God, as we will see, 
creates by writing and creation is being written. This 
is why creation is always marked as infinite as it is 
always marked by writing. The void is real. It posits 
itself and shows itself in the empty set. And the abso-
lute in the sense of the infinity of infinities and not 
the absolute infinity does not exclude nothing in any 
way.  




It is important not to confuse God, the absolute 
infinity, with the void or nothingness. This is 
something Scotus and Eckhart do by speaking of the 
nichts or as John of the Cross does of the nada. 
Hallward presents Badiou’s position that “in the 
absence of God, what there is is indeed, as we shall 
see, purely and simply the void” (BST 7). But this 
view is one that holds that the void is the ultimate. 
However, this cannot be, as the void in and of itself 
cannot lead to anything other than itself—from 
nothing comes nothing. In order to have creation, God 
must necessarily be posited. Even the sequence of 
numbers we noted that arises out of the empty set are 
not possible unless an act of counting or remarking 
occurs. If left to itself, the void or even the empty set 
would remain in and of itself. This is why there 
should be no confusion with what Kenneth Reynhout 
posits in “Alain Badiou: Hidden Theologian of the 
Void?” and what we are arguing for here. First, 
Reynhout takes up Tillich’s idea that God is being—a 
thesis that we have attempted to render illegitimate 
(Reynhout 2011, 230). To repeat, God not being a 
being does not mean God is being as such. Second, 
and more importantly, we should not posit that “God 
is the void” as Reynhout does, precisely due to the fact 
that the void does not give rise to creation (Reynhout 
2011, 231). As we have argued, the notion of the 
absolute infinity in Cantor is distinct from the infinity 
of infinities deduced from the power-set and 
cardinality of the infinite. This inconsistency is 
ultimately not even in being itself, as it is 
unpresentable.  
We can agree with Reynhout when he says that 
“God is not one,” “is unique,” “cannot be counted-as-
one,” and “escapes the count of the count” (Reynhout 
2011, 231). But God not being a thing does not make 
God nothing in the specific sense of the void. God 
creates the void which, as void, does not limit God 




since it is nothing. God creates from nothing. While 
we argued that the void insists and is unique just as 
we stated concerning God, if we were to say God is the 
void, then we would say God creates himself. But this 
returns us to the pantheistic problems we have 
attempted to delineate and avoid. Pantheism still is 
not tenable even if one posits a void. The Kabbalah 
will offer us another solution to this problem with the 
idea of the tzimtzum. It will also inspire us to 
conceive of a different relationship between God and 
nothingness other than a simple identification of the 
two. 
This does not mean that Kabbalah does not say 
that nothingness [ayin] is not a name of God. But ayin 
names primarily the idea that God is not a being, not a 
thing of this world (thereby no-thing). The word ayin 
is also related by Kabbalah to its Hebrew homophone 
that means ‘source’. Nothingness is the source of the 
world. It is created from nothing. Ayin is the zero 
point. In fact, all that we see that is is really ayin for 
Kabbalah (Michaelson 2009, 85). Nothingness in its 
primal nature exhibits simplicity due to its lack of 
differentiation with anything else. It is neither this nor 
that.  
In fact, the Kabbalah says that absolute 
nothingness is ultimately only thinkable as a 
“primordial point” that emerges out of the vast empty 
abyss as being pure and simple (Drob 2000a, 94). This 
point is thought as being inscribed as the first letter, 
the “primal letter aleph” (Drob 2000a, 97). Such a 
conception overlaps perfectly with how the void is 
thought by Badiou’s set-theoretical ontology. The 
empty set and zero are themselves nothing more than 
a letter, “the mark of the void,” ∅ (Badiou 2006, 41). 
The void always sublates itself into the instance of a 
letter and insists there. The choice of the symbol ∅ 
notes how the zero is “affected by the barring of 
sense” (BE 69). It is not meaningful in and of itself, but 




only a sign of the nonsense from which meaning will 
emerge. Nothingness cannot be presented. It insists. 
And in its insistence the unpresentable is first and 
foremost merely as a letter, a pure signifier. It defines 
itself by its lacking any referent. Nothingness is 
thereby always split from itself and reduces itself in 
this world to such marking. It will not cease to repeat 
itself, as once a mark occurs its repetition does not 
cease. As we have already seen, no whole can be made 
of it once it is allowed to enact the infinite. It is not 
totalizable. It is already in its very marking a 
multiplicity irreducible to a unity and multiplies. It is 
this insistent and persistent process. It will diverge 
into other things and disseminate a whole world. And 
all from just a non-signifying letter.  
But the literal existence of the void as a mark is 
also a name. Badiou notes that for theologies the 
“supreme being has been the proper name since long 
ago” (BE 69). And the empty set, ∅, is also the Name of 
God. Badiou excludes this possibility as he thinks it is 
linked to presence and the idea that the whole is. But 
as we have noted, God is connected to the 
unpresentable and non-being of the one such that ∅ is 
just another name to write the very proper Name of 
God. As Badiou shows, the very act of marking the 
nothing in and through the empty set is to present a 
proper name as a letter (BE  59). The empty set thereby 
arises in an act of naming itself, but can name itself as 
nothing, as a pure point. And the purely proper name, 
pure act of self-nomination, refers to God. The name of 
the void is the Name of God. This is why God is not 
the void as the void is the proper name of God. The 
unpresentable and nameless one could not be named 
otherwise. And since the name is that from which 
everything derives, it is by way of the name of God 
that all is created. All that is is nothing but an 
elaboration of the divine proper name that names 




itself. It is not yet differentiated from anything, as it is 
only by it that later differences will be understood.  
The proper name here also marks the unicity of 
God. For a purely proper name is unique in and of 
itself. The mark of the void, its name, presents the 
unpresentable by name: “What belongs to this set [the 
null set] is the proper name which constitutes the 
suture-to-being of the axiomatic presentation of the 
pure multiple; that is, the presentation of presen-
tation” (BE  89). And in God’s self-naming, one sees 
that the Name of God does not belong to God but 
rather to being, to this world, since this element 
would not be the void as nothing that it is, as the 
unpresentable. It would be the name of the void, the 
existent mark of the unpresentable. The void would 
no longer be if its name belonged to it. Certainly, the 
name of the void can be included in the void, which 
amounts to saying that, in the situation, it equals to 
the void, since the unpresentable is solely presented 
by its name. Yet, equal to its name, the void cannot 
make a one out of its name without differentiating 
itself from itself and thus becoming a non-void (BE 
88).  
The Name of God is all we have of God in this 
world, in being. God insists on it and on God’s 
transcendence being marked by a purely proper name. 
This name is not one and it thereby leads to 
differentiation and becoming non-void in creating the 
world. The unpresentable is for us only in and by its 
Name. And by that truth the world is built and 
founded.  
The unpresentable always vanishes into such an 
act of pure nomination that that act reveals for us that 
the unpresentable insists. That is why the 
unpresentable insists on itself in the purely proper 
name. God is not the void as such, but the void names 
God, enacts God’s holy Name and gives rise to it, 
embodies it. As much as for Judaism the Torah is 




composed of endless permutations of the divine name, 
the tetragrammaton, so is the universe itself. Rav 
Zadoq ha-Kohen of Lublin said: “Thus I have received 
that the world in its eternity is a book that God, 
blessed be He, made, and the Torah is the commentary 
that he composed on that book’” (ha-Kohen, qtd. Drob 
2009, 52). While God insists beyond being, God 
subsists here by way of the void as the pure name. 
God only can be present to us as his holy name. The 
nameless and unpresentable one insists via a name 
devoid of sense, as pure mark.  
If the empty set is the very foundation of pure 
ontology, of being qua being, it is not because the void 
is the ultimate, but because the void, through the 
empty set, names that which is absent—nothingness  
and God. In the beginning, there is the self-naming, a 
void name, and the empty set. The void itself must be 
created and is so by this act of nomination. Since from 
nothing comes from nothing, the void would not 
instantiate itself. It insists, but only after its 
instantiation. This pure designation is pure unicity, 
which is why God is related to nothingness without 
being it. God is not God’s Name. Before we speak of 
any properties or attributes, God is a name pure and 
simple and founded in an act of self-nomination. This 
is one reason why, in a play on the Hebrew letters of 
the word for nothingness [ayin], the Kabbalah says it 
is also ‘I’ [ani]. But only by a pure act of designation 
can the ineffability of God be maintained.  
Badiou, rather than banishing the logic of 
negative theology, offers us a way to confirm the most 
audacious experiences of the mystic. The empty set 
instantiates the void and thereby forms the Name of 
God. The Name of God is the mark of the void. But 
through creation it will become the primary name of 
Being itself, its subsistence and matter. As rehearsed 
above, letters are of the real. This name is not a 
symbol. It is in and of the real, both as the impasse of 




what cannot be formalized (and thereby only 
presentable as name) and what cannot be directly 
presented. Out of nothing comes the name: “It comes 
out that all that is formed / and that is spoken / 
Emanates from one Name” (SY 2:5). But nothing 
comes from nothing. Only God can be responsible for 
such an act of self-nomination. But once enacted, it 
will be included in all and form the material of all that 
is. It will repeat itself, but only once named. 
Nothingness, the void, could not do the job on its own 
without external force.  
God is not the void or the name, since the name is 
what allows for being. And God is not the being 
common to all things, as that is another name for pan-
theism and a repetition of onto-theo-logy. Creator and 
creation remain opposed as one transcends the other. 
One cannot deduce the name of God. One could not 
deduce from other ideas the pure act of designation 
involved here. God, the unnamable as unpresentable, 
declares it and declared it long ago in events such as 
Moses facing the burning bush: “The name is then the 
proper of the proper, so singular in its singularity that 
it does not even tolerate having a proper name. The 
name is the point where the situation’s most intimate 
being is submitted to thought; in the pure presence 
that no knowledge can circumscribe” (Badiou 2005, 
66). 
As we will see, God’s namelessness means that 
even this name of God is in many ways inadequate. 
For Judaism, one should not even attempt to 
pronounce the Name of God. The Name of God is the 
real of thought and prayer. It is also why the name of 
God is only ever written. For Derrida, writing is an 
infinity of infinities that disseminates and 
differentiates. Writing names and enacts the 
unpresentable. Recall here the nature of numbers and 
how they were created. They were created out of 
nothing, which here means created out of the pure 




name of God (Drob 2001, 18). Numbers were produced 
by empty sets repeating. Out of zero information, out 
of the void itself in its mark, all numbers appear 
through their being counted and repeated. The 
materiality of letters spells out things as they spell out 
numbers. God is repeating and operating his name as 
it elaborates itself into more and more complexity:  
 
When it arose within / the will of the Blessed 
Name / to Create the universe, / in order to 
manifest goodness, /so all creation would 
acknowledge / the goodness of the Creator / 
the Blessed one emanated one point / that 
included ten points. / These are the ten  
sefirot / one point included within all ten. 
(KC 10) 
   
Perhaps, this is what Philo meant when he claimed, 
“the logos, the divine ‘word’ acted as an intermediary 
in the process of creation” (Scholem 1995, 114). Philo 
himself believed, as Kenneth Schenk states, that “God 
had set his logos as shepherd of the universe. He 
could call the logos the commander and pilot of the 
world” (Schenk 2005, 58). But we are not positing that 
God’s Name governs the world and also not that the 
world is a representation or reflection of this holy 
name. In this way, while Philo does say that the logos 
is used to create, and that the logos is the Name of 
God, we differ from Philo at the very least insofar as 
we do not see the world as a Platonic image of some 
higher order (Schenk 2005, 58-61).  
And it is the literalization of the world by 
mathematics and science that will ultimately bear out 
this truth. They literalize the world by depending on 
that which has no sense (letters) to enact sense. This 
literality of being can only arise if we see it as a 
weaving of the divine name—a name that insists in 
each aspect of being. We can do the same. We can 




observe the empty set. We can write it out. We can 
include the name with another. We are again made in 
the image of God.  
Behind difference, there is nothing. The simple 
nature of the mark of the void shows its relation to the 
absolute. The nameable name is built from the 
unnamable one. The infinity and emptiness of the 
mark, of the letter, of the name, lead one to the 
unsayable. As separated from God, we can only repeat 
the name and see this emptiness. The emptiness of our 
words arises as we depend on the name itself of God. 
All of these thoughts find their own expression in 
Judaism and Kabbalah. As Schneur Zalman of Lyadi, 
the rabbi of the Chabad movement, said: “The purpose 
of creation of the worlds from nothingness to being 
was so that there should be a Yesh (Creation, and that 
the Yesh should be null” (qtd. Drob 2001, 207). The 
created world on this view is no more than an 
appearance of the void itself, its elaboration.  
We are not saying that creation occurred at some 
time. It did not happen in time, as time will arise on 
the basis of creation. We can follow Friedrich 
Schelling in saying that creation does not happen in a 
temporal past, but rather in an eternal past that never 
actually was in time.13 We can logically and 
ontologically identify this instant and conceive it, but 
that does not mean we are locating a moment on a 
timeline. Creation is immemorial. But that does not 
mean that the creation is eternal. It was not always the 
case. It was not necessary and did not need to occur. It 
has always already happened from our end, but not 
from the perspective of God. Creation is not an event. 
It is a divine act.  
                                                                                     
13 Slavoj Žižek develops the logic of this concept of 
Schelling’s in detail throughout The Indivisible Remainder 
(2007). 




Edmond Jabes also glosses these ideas throughout 
his books by seeing the world as an infinite self-
emptying of the name.14 The world is the exile of the 
name. All of creation is the nomadic wandering of the 
holy Name in its elaborations. The name is always 
moving nomadically. God exiled his name into the 
world to make the reality of creation itself. This name 
only presents an absentee silence, for our words 
cannot make present what insists in the holy name. In 
this way, the proliferation of the Name disperses 
meaning throughout and gives meaning to what is.  
It is not surprising, then, that Jews refer to God 
simply as ‘The Name’. The name of God is just ‘The 
Name’. And in Hebrew the word for ‘name’ is spelled 
the same as the word for ‘there’, as space itself is 
created only once the name intervenes and not before. 
As Maimonides famously said in the very introduction 
to his commentary on the five books of Moses, the 
whole Torah is made up of divine names. All is 
elaborated from the divine name—especially a divine 
text. The name of God is the “metaphysical origin of 
all language” (Scholem 1972a, 63). All language is just 
a discourse on the holy Name of God and reveals it. 
The world itself is the language and writing of God 
founded on God’s holy name. There is a single name 
at the center of all that is spoken and all that is 
presented.  
Judaism focuses on the four-letter name, YHVH, 
of God. These four letters take the idea of ‘I am that I 
am’ [ehyeh asher ehyeh] and turn it into pure letters, 
no longer referring even to being. God should not be 
noted as one more being amongst beings, as a simple 
name would do. In this way, God’s name should not 
only not be produced, but should only consist of an 
iconic sign, a purely written mark. It should be 
                                                                                     
14 For a good overview of Jabes’s work see Rosemarie 
Waldrop’s Lavish Absence (2003). 




recalled that Hebrew, while being a phonetic language 
also has aspects of pictography. For instance, the 
letters themselves refer to images (the letter gimmel is 
a camel for example). In this way, a word can in and 
of itself take on purely illustrated form. For Peirce, the 
divine name is iconic insofar as its very lettering gives 
rise to its nature and significance. Without its actual 
articulation, it would not be able to function as it 
needs to. This sign signifies according to its nature 
rather than what it refers to. Even if what it presents in 
its shape or sound is not an object we recognize, the 
sign itself takes on the form of an object. A circle is 
such a sign. As Marion wonderfully notes, even the 
name given at the burning bush only marks a 
“tautology” (I am that I am), as any name that would 
describe that which transcends being itself can only be 
a name that tries to capture the nameless (BG 297). 
This four-letter name is a pure proper name. It should 
not be conceived from another point of view. It is 
peculiar to God alone. Yet one should see this name as 
just another of writing ∅. This name should not be 
pronounced. It is made up only of vowels after all. It 
signals the lack of a name to indicate the 
unpresentable. In fact, rather than being pronounced, 
another word is always substituted for it, to hide it. It 
is only ever written in a divine text or text for 
religious purposes. It is named to be hidden and 
written not to be said aloud. The consonants without 
vowels leave nothing to be said. It is a name that forms 
its own secret. 
This is why, rather than contemplating oneself, 
one can simply contemplate the holy name to achieve 
mystical insight:  
 
Peculiarly Jewish object of mystical 
contemplation: The name of God, which is 
something absolute, because it reflects the 
hidden meaning and totality of existence; the 




Name through which everything else 
acquires its meaning and which yet to the 
human mind has no concrete, particular 
meaning of its own. In short, Abulafia 
believes that whoever succeeds in making 
this great name of God, the least concrete 
and perceptible thing in the world, the object 
of his meditation, is on the way to true 
mystical ecstasy. (Scholem 1995, 133)  
 
All that is is only by its “participation” in the great 
name of God. The name manifest itself through 
creation and as creation: 
 
All creation—and this is an important 
principle of most Kabbalists—is, from the 
point of view of God, nothing but an 
expression of His hidden self that begins and 
ends by giving itself a name, the holy name 
of God, the perpetual act of creation. All that 
lives is an expression of God’s language,—
and what is it that Revelation can reveal in 
the last resort if not the name of God? 
(Scholem 1995, 17)  
 
This is why Sefer Yetzirah emphasizes how the 
combinatorial power of letters and numbers is the 
same as creation itself. It is such that God will take on 
more names that simply repeat this name, as creation 
repeats itself in elaborating more and more: “These are 
the twenty-two letters / which engraved / Ehyeh, yah, 
YHVH Elohim, YHVH tzvaato, Elohim Tzvaato, El 
Shaddai. / YHVH Adonai / And with them He made 
three Books/ and with them he created His universe / 
and He formed with them all that was ever formed, / 
and all that ever will be formed” (SY 6:6). Every 
variety can occur in this fashion.  




The name has a simple meaning such that 
seemingly only a simple thing should proceed from it. 
But from the simple the complex can arise. As Moshe 
Idel informs us, there are “mathematical qualities of 
the letters consisting the Ineffable Name,” and he 
thereafter writes that “all of the numbers are nine from 
one direction, and ten from the other direction”  (Idel 
1987, 28). In other words, the ineffable name of God 
should not be looked at as a regular name with a 
referent as such, but taken literally via its lettering and 
marking alone. As Scholem notes,  
 
In this context the Midrash tells how, before 
the creation, God and his name existed 
alone. When the name becomes word, it 
becomes an essential part of what we may 
call the language of God, the language in 
which God, as it were, represents and 
manifests himself, just as he commits with 
his creation, which the medium of this 
language comes into being itself. (Scholem 
1972a, 70) 
 
Creation arises out of the name, which means that 
God, along with his name separated from God, appear 
at creation itself. God then communicates with this 
communication by creating it as a communication.  
Recall that “one shall not take the name of the 
Lord in vain” (Exodus 20:7). It must be respected at all 
turns given its nature. For Levinas, the name of God 
“is a name” [Adonai] which demonstrates how the 
name is related to that which is always at a reserve 
(Levinas 2007, 121). But in turn, that name [Adonai] 
can also take on a name for itself, as it should not be 
spoken unless one is engaged directly in prayer. And 
in prayer itself, as Levinas likes to note, one shifts 
from speaking to God  (‘Blessed are you . . .’) to 
speaking of God in the third person immediately after 




this statement. Here, the moment one speaks to God as 
though it were a personal relation, one is returned to 
the name itself as the remainder of the transcendence 
of God. As Idel argues, “the true name is a dialogue 
between man and God” (Idel 1987, 84). It reveals the 
nature of God and creation of the world. The name of 
God does not tell us what a thing is, but it also is not 
related to a who. It is a pure call. But even saying 
there is this name is too much, as it risks thinking that 
one has captured the unpresentable.  
If God did have a name we could know and 
understand fully and say aloud, God would be limited 
to that name and thereby seemingly presented and 
known. From that perspective God has no known 
name. God is not able to be contained by a name. No 
word could constitute God. Hence the anonymity pre-
served in referring to God just as the name. And since 
God‘s name fills all things and names, the entire world 
becomes the name of God as well: “Kabbalists believe 
in the ‘unlimited mystical plasticity of the divine 
word’” (Drob 2009, 33). Even Levinas, who notes he 
has “avoided conceptions taken from Kabbalah” 
(Levinas 2007, 122), still quotes Maimonides who 
wrote, “The foundation of the foundation and the 
pillar of wisdom consists in knowing that the Name 
exists and that it is the first being” (qtd. Levinas 2007, 
119). The divine one is only ever noted as “‘the name’ 
a generic term,” for God is not a divine species of 
thing (Levinas 2007, 119). In fact, as Levinas here 
emphasizes, Judaism also calls God the Holy one, 
Blessed be he, in order to emphasize the holiness 
(radical transcendence and unpresentability) of God 
beyond being itself. The name of God is not subject to 
any sense and thereby names that which escapes its 
very naming in naming itself. The name thereby 
annihilates itself at the same time that it insists on its 
naming and in calling us to this name. Ernesto Laclau 
writes: 




We have spoken about the need for 
representing an object in its fullness which, 
by definition, transcends all representation. 
Now, this is, at its purest, the problem of the 
mystic. He aspires to give expression to 
direct contact with God, i.e. with something 
which is strictly ineffable because it is 
incommensurable with anything existing. He 
is the deus absconditus, a mystical Nothing. 
For the great monotheistic religions there is 
an unsurpassable abyss between the Creator 
and the ens creatum. Mysticism does not 
deny or overlook the abyss; on the contrary, 
it begins by realizing its existence, but from 
there it proceeds to a quest for the secret that 
will close it in, the hidden path that will 
span it. (Laclau 1997, 16)  
 
This mystical problem is solved only by invocation of 
the Name and an understanding of it as pure 
nomination. As Laclau notes, Scholem distinguishes, 
on the basis of this mystical problem, between the 
allegory wherein one represents something 
presentable by an understandable figure and the 
mystical symbol itself, which is a name that attempts 
to repress something that lies beyond expression 
(Laclau 1997, 16-17). More importantly for our 
purposes, “The symbol ‘signifies’ nothing and 
communicates nothing, but makes something 
transparent which is beyond all expression” (Laclau 
1997, 17). This is precisely how the name of God 
functions for us. But at the same time, its nature in 
itself should not be forgotten. The name of God is 
God’s own act of nomination and is connected to the 
creation of the world and forms its very matter. One 
cannot remain only with what it is for human 
cognition. In this way, Kierkegaard was also wrong: 
while God is not a name, God is also not a concept (LP 




115). To say God is a concept would again restrict God 
to the approach human cognition takes to the matter 
and its inherent limitations. Sanford Drob believes 
that “Ramakrishna states, rather ‘kabbalistically,’ ‘God 
is the container of the universe and also what is 
contained within it’” (Drob 2001, 109). Only God’s 
name is contained in the universe. And God is not a 
container of the infinity of infinities, but the absolute 
infinite. In referring to God’s name we should not 
forget that God transcends even his own holy name, 
the mark of the void. 
 
§19. TZIMTZUM: CREATION OF NOTHING TO CREATE 
FROM NOTHING 
God’s relationship to the void is illustrated and 
explained by what is perhaps the most original 
Kabbalistic concept: the notion of the tzimtzum (this 
word literally means ‘contraction’ or ‘reduction’). The 
tzimtzum is God‘s complete contraction into himself, 
concealment, and withdrawal. Here, God withdraws 
in order to allow space and time to come into being. It 
is the ultimate first act of creation for the Kabbalah. 
God creates out of an act of an excess of divine love 
and creation by limiting the divine itself to allow 
something non-divine to arise. And what arises here is 
nothingness itself, which is immediately marked by its 
name, the mark of the void, the holy name. That is, it 
is a hollow that is made once God withdraws from the 
world. Before this as it were, there was no ‘before.’ 
Time and space themselves are only enacted once the 
absolutely infinite creates an empty space and a 
hollowing. Before, there is only the unending light of 
God.  
This purely excessive act shows the true abso-
luteness of the divine insofar as it is able to allow for 
limitation even in its perfection.15 In this way, 
                                                                                     
15 The name of this self-limitation is Sabbath—the rest taken 




however, God exiles himself in order for there to be a 
world. God insists beyond the world that persists 
without God. A space of nothing is created—nothing 
precisely insofar as it is devoid of God. Marc-Alain 
Ouaknin stresses this rather startling aspect of this 
theory of the divine: “The Kabbalists stress this 
astonishing fact: The space of the world is a space 
void of God, an atheistic, atheological space” (Ouknin 
2004, 278). God is not found in the world of being and 
beings.  
Here Kabbalah is at its most ‘Heideggerian’: 
Revelation takes place via concealment. The space of 
the universe is created as emptied of the absolute. It is 
freed for the contingent and for differentiation. Our 
world is just such a sphere. The first act of creation is 
thereby negative. It involves the creation of nothing in 
order for there to be creation ex nihilo. That creation 
occurs from nothing also contests any Kabbalist or 
ontologist who claims that creation occurs via 
emanation. Emanation is always emanation from 
something already there, rather than from the void via 
tzimtzum. God lets be something by allowing it to 
arise from nothing. The beginning of that creation is 
itself the holy name and nothing more. It is the name 
itself that is the first foundation. As Zohar Raviv 
phrases it, “tzimtzum is the initiatory actualization of 
the zero’s singularity” (Raviv 2008, 418). But the zero 
is immediately canceled out by its mark. We then 
have, as Raviv puts it, the “perpetual pulse of 01 01” 
                                                                                                     
from creation on the seventh day by God. But it is not clear 
that we have reached the seventh day yet. In my view, we 
are still at the end of the sixth day just after the creation of 
humanity. On the other hand, from the eternal perspective of 
God, God has rested. In this way, the observance of the 
Sabbath is not a memorial as much as anticipation of what is 
to come. The Talmud itself says in a few places that the rest 
one experiences on the Sabbath is one-sixtieth of the peace 
one will find in the World-to-Come (Cf. Brachot 57b).  




(Raviv 2008, 419). We will return later to spell out the 
full implications of this statement, but it is enough to 
say now that creation takes place via the creation of 
the primary bit, the act of information.  
The void left by withdrawal is called tehiru or 
sometimes chalal (this term literally means ‘space’ 
such as in open, empty space). One can also think of it 
is as an empty circle or sphere, hence making the 
mark of the void ∅ all the more fitting. This idea also 
implies that God as absolute infinite prior to creation 
surrounds and fills all, as it were. It is only with the 
addition of nothingness that an infinite number of 
things can take place via the creation that follows this 
initial moment. Sanford Drob emphasizes this aspect 
by noting that this “process . . . creates finite plurality 
through a[n] . . . occultation of that which is infinite 
and whole” (Drob 2000a, 130). In this way, the whole 
is not. It is withdrawn as the world is marked by a 
creation that leaves it incomplete. It should be noted 
that the Pythagoreans also argued that the void exists 
(as did the Epicureans) and that it allows for 
separation and differentiation, as Aristotle related:  
 
The Pythagoreans, too, held that void exists, 
and that it enters the heaven from the 
unlimited breath—it, so to speak, breathes in 
void. The void distinguishes the natures of 
things, since it is the thing that separates and 
distinguishes the successive terms in a 
series. This happens in the first case of 
numbers; for the void distinguishes their 
nature. (Physics IV.6)  
 
The issue here is how the unlimited (what we would 
call the absolute infinite or eyn sof) gives rise to the 
limited via the void. All things that are and can be 
known have to combine into being by having a 
definite shape. Just as a sequence of terms or numbers 




are differentiated by the void, they are solely made up 
of the void. For Pythagoreans, that idea is articulated 
via a relation between emptiness and limitation, the 
unlimited and the limited, apeiron and peiron. 
God does not require this act despite what some 
commentators suggest (Drob 2000b, 241). It is rather a 
gratuitous act of love and giving. Yet God’s self-
constriction is necessary for creation to take place, for 
“if he does not exile himself from it all creation would 
be overwhelmed by his essence” (TB xxiii). The 
absolutely infinite would overwhelm creation, but 
creation itself is still fractured and cracked and left 
incomplete by its arising from the void and its mark. 
Ultimately, as Ouaknin notes, the notion of the 
tzimtzum answers the questions of ‘how can there be a 
world if God is everywhere?’ and ‘If God is “in 
everything” how can anything exist that is not God?’, 
which are the questions pantheism attempts to pose 
(Ouaknin 2000, 194). We also answer here the 
question of philosophy and metaphysics, ‘why is there 
something rather than a nothing?’ and ‘how can God 
have created the world ex nihilo , if there is no 
nothingness?’  (Ouaknin 2000, 194). Leibniz, among 
others, felt that the simplest state of being is 
nothingness. Given that things tend to simplicity, it is 
a wonder that there is something, as something 
requires more energy, effort, etc. That we see 
something for Leibniz is already sign of a creator, as 
left to itself things should be in their simplest state. A 
zero state as a state means there is not even any 
information to record that there is nothing. In this 
way, something like God is needed to allow 
information and things to arise.  
This concept also helps flesh out the account of 
creation given in Genesis. Why does God rest on the 
seventh day? This act of rest is itself related to God’s 
creation. The absolute can abstain from creating just as 
much as the absolute can withdraw itself and add 




nothingness to itself. Interrupting creation is an 
indication of absolute power, the power to delimit 
oneself. Creation is violated. God does not create the 
world because God must or requires it to fulfill some 
need. The absolute infinite can violate creation itself, 
even destroy it, if need be. There is no better 
indication of perfection than being limited to the 
infinite itself. In other words, it is an implication of 
that than which nothing greater can be for it to be able 
to limit the maximal. The absolute infinite makes of 
itself nothing and separates himself from that 
nothingness to allow beings to emerge and acquire an 
independence of their own.  
Scholem insists that “tzimtzum does not mean 
the contraction of God at a point, but his retreat away 
from a point” (Scholem 1995, 260). That is, God is not 
reducing himself to what is left, the nothingness, the 
mark of the void, his holy name, but rather retires to 
allow for that point to emerge. It is thereby not 
creation by “emanation,” as God here contracts 
himself to allow creation to occur and offers 
limitations rather than extension (Scholem 1995, 261). 
Here one sees a crucial difference between the 
Kabbalah and neo-Platonist metaphysics, despite so 
many attempts to see Kabbalah as influenced by or 
being simply a redundant restatement of, the work of 
Plotinus, Proclus, etc. Neo-Platonists see creation as 
ebbing and flowing out of the One, but here it arises 
based on the nothingness that the One leaves in and 
by its disappearance. The notion of the tzimtzum also 
drives another stake into the heart of pantheism and 
pantheistic interpretations of the Kabbalah (Scholem 
1995, 262). For this retreat from the point means that 
the tzimtzum is connected to the primordial and 
singular point that arises. For the Zohar, this 
primordial point is connected to the Hebrew letter 
yod, which is itself just a line, a pure mark (Zohar I, 
2a). Drob identifies this primordial point with “a 




thought” (Drob 2000b, 20). We will pursue this idea 
later via connecting the tzimtzum to information, 
since this first point is the first registration of 
information itself. But this point itself is infinite in 
nature, as it is dimensionless and non-differentiated, 
the void itself transmuted as it evaporates into its 
mark, the Name of God. This point, based on the 
abyss, is the center of the world around which all 
crystallizes. It is the beginning. The very beginning 
referred at the beginning of the bible: ‘In the beginning 
. . .’ Creation takes place in a word, the first word, the 
name of God—B’reshit bara Elohim. The manifestation 
of this point conceals God via God’s name. As 
dimensionless, a point itself is not differentiable from 
anything else. It is a pure and primitive notion from 
which spatial notions themselves can only later be 
articulated. The point is thereby a hole into which all 
can disappear, but from which all arises. One is none 
here. The single point based on the nothing’s 
nihilation. As infinitesimal as this point may be, it is a 
word created by an action of nomination: ‘Let there be 
light’.    
The world thus suffers from the absence of God. 
The world exists apart from God as it arises from 
nothing. God is absent from nothing. And only 
nothing could subsist independently from God. Here 
the point that could be written ∅ is the ‘trace of the 
Other’ (as opposed to Levinas’s definition of this 
concept). And for the Kabbalah, there is residue or 
trace of the divine that occurs despite the divine 
contraction. This trace is known as reshimu. This 
trace does not remain with the void, but the mark of 
the void is itself this trace. Again the name of God is 
the trace of the Other. And in this way each thing 
contains within itself a trace of that by which it is 
created. Each thing is a trace of the trace. The world 
empty of God is built of this residue of the divine. 




Here, we have another way of understanding the 
primordial ooze.  
Isaac Luria, the mystic who envisioned the 
tzimtzum itself, says one should think of this residue 
like a bucket of water once full. Even though the 
bucket has been emptied some of the water still clings 
to the sides. The saturation of the absolute infinity 
leaves a remainder even after it withdraws. Another 
way of taking this idea is that the Name is the trace of 
the divine. God would suffocate all things if God did 
not withdraw. But the name interrupts this eternal 
presence and marks its absence. There is a gap then in 
the eternal one. There is a gap in God. God and his 
name are not one. And with such an interpretation, 
time itself as the moving image of eternity becomes 
possible. This interruption is itself nothing, but 
nothingness unfolds and turns into a universe of 
emptiness.  
Insofar as there is a trace, we may understand 
what physicists mean when they say that all vacuums 
are false, that they are charged with energy. Daniel 
Matt suggests directly that the Kabbalistic sense of 
nothingness with its traces of God matches the idea of 
“zero-point energy” or of the false vacuum that “still 
shimmers with a residual hidden energy” (Matt 1998, 
41). For physics, such a vacuum is a “region of space 
from which everything has been removed,” including 
“particles,” “fields,” “waves,” etc. (Davies 1985, 104). 
A pure vacuum is not truly possible in nature. One 
always has “a tiny residue of gas” or energy, such as 
the “universal background radiation left over from the 
big bang” (Davies 1985, 104). For this reason, physic-
cists speak of a real vacuum as an “idealization” since 
any empty space they discover in the world is “alive 
with energy” (Davies 1985, 104-5). What Davies’s 
description here implies, beyond the idea that a pure 
void is a metaphysical rather than a physical concept, 
is that the false vacuum noted by physics is itself a 




product of the Big Bang. Since space does not exist 
before the Big Bang, the empty space and false 
vacuum analyzed by physics is itself made possible by 
the space created in and through the expansion of the 
universe. However, despite this seeming truth, many 
physicists such as Alex Vilenkin “suppose that in the 
beginning the universe found itself in an excited 
vacuum state” (Davies 1985, 192). The universe thus 
arises out of a false vacuum that gives rise to a 
“cosmic repulsion” which leads to the big bang. The 
energy found in this empty space (they also call it a 
“quantum vacuum”), as becoming a “true vacuum,” 
suddenly and for a vanishing instant leads to the big 
bang (Davies 1985, 193-97).  
As another advocate of this view, Sean Carroll, 
makes explicit, space and time obtain prior to any big 
bang as the big bang is just “a kind of transition from 
one phase another” (Carroll 2010, 51). Carroll has to 
speculate that space obtained eternally since “vacuum 
energy” is a “feature of space itself” (Carroll 2010, 
312). Thereby, if our view that space comes into being 
with the big bang is right, false vacuums would only 
be a function of that expanding space. Carroll explains 
that as a “false vacuum decays the formation of 
bubbles [occurs] like when liquid water boils when it 
turns into water vapor” (Carroll 2010, 328). Each 
bubble formed in the void expands via the energy it 
retains and thereby forms a universe (Carroll 2010, 
329). This void is a “de Sitter space” that allegedly 
shows how the energy of the vacuum positively arises 
(Carroll 2010, 329-30). But the problem with this view 
is not only that we cannot confirm that there are other 
bubble universes, but with the very idea of the false 
vacuum being eternal along with space. In fact, 
Judaism was perhaps one of the first religious 
traditions to suggest that our world was not unique, as 
a famous Midrash states that “God created and 
destroyed many worlds before arriving at the one that 




now stands” (Drob 2001, 60). But a key problem is that 
the multiverse view now proposed by physicists is an 
attempt to treat the world deterministically. Insofar as 
there are many universes, it would seem that all 
possibilities are actually realized. Any contingency 
that could characterize the world is thereby 
eliminated. But such an ever-existing eternal world 
that realizes all possibilities is not possible due 
precisely to the insights we have explained from 
Cantorianism. As we will later hear from Meillassoux 
in our engagement with his ontology, there can be no 
total set of all possible infinites and we cannot say 
that one arises. Not only in this way could we not 
know whether one universe is more likely than 
another, but we cannot say all possibilities are 
realized. And if all could be realized, ultimately the 
possibility of nothingness would arise, again requiring 
a creator to achieve something from nothing.  
This does not mean that God designed the world 
from a set of perfect and unchanging laws. On the 
contrary, it is not via laws, but rather a program/name 
that the universe unfolds. This will mean that any 
laws that appear to explain the regularity of phenom-
enon can change at any instant. The laws of the 
universe are not immutable. A multiverse also does 
not explain how we have the laws we do have, but 
shifts the problem to a different level. It says we have 
the laws we do since all possible laws are realized in 
some universe. Beyond whether we could ever 
possibly verify such other existing universes, it seems 
unlikely given that even in our own world what is 
possible is not realized. Another version of this 
deterministic ontological view in physics comes from 
the many-worlds interpretation of quantum physics. 
But this view says that consciousness is part of the 
physical universe, when various aspects of conscious-
ness seem irreducible to the physical world, as many 
such as David Chalmers have shown. When 




consciousness is seen as a piece of reality, every 
possibility is realized in some universe. In one 
universe Schrodinger’s cat lives and in another it is 
dead. All that can possibly occur given the wave 
function does occur. There is no free will and nothing 
is not realized. But as we will argue, our conscious-
ness, as self-referential, exhibits our own alienation in 
the signifier just as the world is so alienated via the 
tzimtzum. This alienation of the world directly 
implied Cantorian transfinity and incompletion.16 For 
                                                                                     
16 A reviewer of this manuscript indicated that some may 
accuse the ontology I develop here of being phallic or 
phallologocentric. While I want to address the issues 
signaled by the critique of phallologocentrism in depth in a 
future work I have planned, let me say this much at this 
point. First, this critique stems from one of two things as I 
currently understand it: 1) that the logic here only 
exemplifies the logic of the male side of the graphs of 
sexuation as Lacan renders it (cf. Levi Bryant’s The 
Democracy of Objects [2011], section 6.1);   and 2) that what 
is emphasized is that just as the human organism is an 
alienated signifier so here reality itself is alienated in the 
letter and via God’s self-negation by way of  his own naming. 
Let me take the second view first. For Lacan, only psychotics 
are not fully alienated in the signifier. Otherwise, it is part 
and parcel of our very being. It is not something that can be 
avoided. It is constitutive. Here, I argue reality itself is 
literalized, which is the complement of that view. It is 
therefore no more ‘phallic’ than our reality as speaking 
beings. One would have to show how differentiality, the 
binary, etc. are avoidable and non-constitutive. Next, our 
being alienated in the signifier is the basis for Lacan 
rendering of the difference between the sexes and for the 
graphs of sexuation. On the male side, all males are 
alienated (there is a closed set of males) except for the one 
who stands outside uncastrated (the primal father). This 
seems to follow a basic theological model—that God is the 
exception and withdrawn (something transcendent). But one 
of the key things (there are others) that is often missed in 
applications of Lacan is that the feminine side is the 




consciousness, it means it is ever absent, like the 
empty set, showing how we are made in the image of 
God.  
Many worlds may have been created, but they 
were each a unique creation and not the deterministic 
realization of all possibles. While the universe may 
have no discernible boundary, such that if we traveled 
in space indefinitely we would never hit the end or 
would simply arrive back at what should be the same 
place we started, it is not thereby infinite. It is limited 
                                                                                                     
logical equivalent (even though irreducible one to the other) 
of the male side for Lacan. The groupings that form the sexes 
are logically identical. That is, the rendering of the feminine 
logic is but the negation of the negation of the male (or vice-
versa) in the same way that not not-A is A. They are but two 
ways then of looking at the same thing—of beings alienated 
(we are, after all, all speaking beings). The feminine side 
says that there is no all (no closed set—no essence of 
woman) of the feminine, but rather each woman is herself an 
exception, a singularity. That being said, no ontology can be 
one-sided and true as much as no psychoanalytic theory 
worth its salt will just be able to describe the desiring nature 
of one sex. No ontology should present one side of the story 
(for instance, offering a view of pure immanence). For us 
then, we will have offered a way of looking at entities as 
themselves alienated in the letter. We will have shown this 
in the following way by combining both the logics of the 
male and female sides (and necessarily so since we will have 
argued reality itself is marked first and foremost by the letter 
via the bit for example). On the male side, we have said all 
entities are equal as beings, as sets, but that the void and 
God transcend it. On the female side, we will have tried to 
show that one can also treat this world as incomplete and 
subject to the implications of the Cantorian transfinite. This 
meant that any set one can isolate is itself an exception and 
singular in its being. All that is is immanent to a code 
iterating itself. Thus, the ontology presented here will have 
comprehended the male and the female aspects of reality as 
much as Lacanian psychoanalysis does so for humanity. 
 




by the Big Bang and by the curvature of space itself, 
which is seemingly limited to the surface of some 
shape, such as a sphere or some other three-
dimensional volume. In this way, while the Kabbalah 
may agree in many of its formulations with the idea of 
a multiverse, it means there are infinite possibilities, 
but not all occur, as creation itself is contingent and 
optional. As Carroll himself admits, this story cannot 
fit the very “universe in which we live,” as one still 
needs some outside force to allow for the inflation 
seen in the big bang to arise out of the void (Carroll 
2010, 330). In fact, as Carroll notes several times, since 
“our universe began at the Big Bang it is burdened 
with a finely tuned boundary condition for which we 
have no good explanation” (Carroll 2010, 5). The early 
universe was “in a very special low entropy 
configuration” (Carroll 2010, 38). These two ideas 
themselves show that the vacuum is not enough. We 
can agree that the metaphysical concept of the void is 
a vanishing instance that leads to a false vacuum or to 
being, but this vacuum itself requires something from 
outside, both to come into being and to possibly give 
rise to entire worlds. The fact that there is a beginning 
with absolute order could not have developed from a 
void state, de Sitter space, or previously disordered 
state, no matter what speculations physicists enjoy 
indulging in.  
We are arguing here that the primeval order and 
concentration of the universe came into existence 
through intelligence, God, not because it shows signs 
of being designed, but due to the metaphysical nature 
of the void itself. Speculating that space is eternal 
helps the metaphysics that underlies the physicists’ 
claims. But there is nothing about space that shows it 
should always be. Even a de Sitter space is a 
contingency. However, one may claim that whereas 
the vacuum is uncaused, the universe is caused by it. 
The issue here is then whether a false vacuum, empty 




space as space itself, can be an uncaused and eternal 
entity. But if this space is always there, it is infinitely 
there. That implies that its energy would have to never 
dissipate. But since it receives nothing from outside 
itself, it is not clear how that would occur given that 
there is nothing necessary about space conceived in 
itself. What we have then is a contingency that is 
supposedly uncaused and lasts indefinitely.  
Beyond treating a contingency as an eternal 
necessity, this view treats space itself as a container 
when space is something that only arises on the basis 
of beings themselves. We argue, rather, that 
nothingness itself requires a foundation, the tzimtzum. 
God created the void or empty space out of which 
things arose. With Big Bang theory, one posits an 
infinitely dense singularity out of which things arose. 
And this model at least empirically lends more weight 
to our view than the one speculated by Vilenkin, 
Carroll, etc. In this way, science can give empirical 
weight, if not confirmation, to a philosophical view, 
just as we are using philosophy to attempt to confirm 
the experiments of the mystics. This “singularity has 
no positive ontological status,” as it is the “limit at 
which the universe ceases to exist,” and it “originates 
out of nothing” itself (Craig 1995, 224). This 
singularity thereby overlaps with the tzimtzum as it 
has “zero dimensionality and exists for no length of 
time” and is thereby described by a “mathematical 
point infinitely dense,” as William Lane Craig 
explains it (Craig 1995, 227). An ontology compatible 
with the Big Bang thereby requires not only a theory of 
the void that vanishes instantly, but also a topology of 
how a point becomes the finite world of three 
dimensions and beings that we now see. The 
tzimtzum forms a key moment of that ontology. 
However, Craig also argues that the Cantorian 
transfinite cannot exist in our world and that “an 
infinite temporal regress of event is an actual infinite” 




(Craig 1995, 3). But even if our own world exhibits 
finitude, that does not mean it is not characterizable 
by the transfinite. As we have argued, this view means 
the world is incomplete. In this way, the Cantorian 
transfinite does preclude the cosmological argument 
that Craig wants to articulate. For Craig, since an 
infinite regress is impossible, then God must be 
posited as the first cause and cause of the Big Bang 
itself. What the Cantorian notion of the transfinite 
shows is that there could be an infinite regress, even if 
there might not in actuality be one. This possibility is 
due to the incompletion that characterizes being itself. 
Such cosmological proofs did not rely on infinite 
regress, but the idea that if time stretches back 
infinitely, then an infinite amount of time needed to 
elapse to reach this moment. But that would mean this 
moment would not arise, as the infinity would never 
find completion. However, the Cantorian infinite 
shows that the infinite is at once, and can be smaller 
or larger than, other infinites. In this way, the moment 
we exist in may be part of another infinite series that 
has already been counted. The infinite for Cantor is 
not based on successive additions. Arguing that new 
parts arise increasing that infinity does not therefore 
count as criticism as Craig thinks it does (Craig 1995, 
32). There can be additions because there can be more 
than one transfinite. Also, the number of events in the 
past might be characterized by one infinite whereas 
those in the present by a greater or larger one. In fact, 
our memories might be a larger infinite subset of 
present experiences. 
Craig also argues that Cantorianism is only 
related to a mathematical world (Craig 1995, 9). But 
sets arise on the basis of things that exist and the 
empty set is the only thing that needs to be posited for 
set theory to work. Also, Craig thinks set theory is 
undone by antinomies it leads to, but those 
antinomies gave rise to an extensionalist view of sets 




that Craig thinks do not relate to the world (Craig 
1995, 21). In this way, Craig’s objection can only 
obtain versus an intentionalist view of sets. More 
importantly, since Cantor’s view shows that being is 
incomplete, one cannot bring forth causal arguments 
to prove God exists. Rather, one can only refer to 
modal arguments that show that if contingent things 
exist infinitely, eventually nothingness will arise. 
Only God can create on the basis of this nothing. It is 
God’s necessity and the insistence of the void rather 
than causality that forms proof and is compatible with 
Cantorianism. If being is incomplete, then it may not 
ever reach a first cause on a causal chain.  
In this way, we agree with part of Badiou’s basic 
critique of Big Bang ontology:  
 
First of all, it is being as such which we are 
declaring here cannot make a whole, and not 
the world, nature or the physical universe. It 
is indeed a question of establishing that 
every consideration of beings-as-a-whole is 
inconsistent. The question of the limits of 
the visible universe is but a secondary aspect 
of the ontological question of the Whole. 
Furthermore, even if we only consider the 
world, it becomes rapidly obvious that 
contemporary cosmology opts for its finitude 
(or its closure) rather than its radical de-
totalization. With the theory of the Big Bang, 
this cosmology even re-establishes the well-
known metaphysical path which goes from 
the initial One (in this case, the infinitely 
dense ‘point’ of matter and its explosion) to 
the multiple-Whole (in this case, the galactic 
clusters and their composition). That’s 
because the infinite discussed by Koyré is 
still too undifferentiated to take on, with 
respect to the question of the Whole, the 




value of an irreversible break. Today we 
know, especially after Cantor, that the 
infinite can certainly be local, that it may 
characterize a singular being, and that it is 
not only—like Newton’s space—the property 
of the global place of every thing. In the end, 
the question of the Whole, which is logical 
or onto-logical in essence, enjoys no physical 
or phenomenological evidence. It calls for an 
argument, the very one that mathematicians 
discovered at the beginning of the twentieth 
century, and which we have reformulated 
here. (Badiou 2009, 111)  
 
The Big Bang ontology that Craig puts forth with his 
causal cosmological argumentation for God therefore 
presupposes that a whole can be made of the world 
(for this reason he believes there is only a potential 
and not actual infinite and must reject Cantor). But 
God is fully compatible with saying that the whole is 
not. Even if the world itself exhibits finitude in fact, 
the transfinite is the infinity as it pertains to the finite. 
A created world can also be non-whole and finite as 
we are arguing here via Cantor, set theory, etc. It must 
also be emphasized that the singularity is not a one in 
the sense of a whole and no more so than the very 
empty set and void that Badiou’s own theory relies on. 
In addition, not every thing is infinite in the Cantorian 
sense necessarily, unless the transfinite is connected 
directly to the logic of the signifier. And in that way, 
again, it is more so about the incompletion of things 
than an actual infinitude of properties for instance.  
God’s absence from the world is also what makes 
atheism possible. It entails a constant atheistic 
temptation. But God’s transcendence leaves us 
without other means. It means also that the least 
obvious thing will be monotheism and belief in God. 
That is why it is important to gain awareness of the 




pure name in which God is revealed. Badiou himself 
is already aware how his thesis concerning the nature 
of the void and its name will provoke theologians to 
start to draw conclusions as we do here:  
 
The theologians, besides, already knew that 
the thesis ‘God is One’ is quite different from 
the thesis ‘God is unique.’ . . . Thus, the 
name of the void being unique, once it is 
retroactively generated as a-name for the 
multiple–of-nothing, does not signify in any 
manner that ‘the void is one.’  It solely 
signifies that, given that the void, ‘unpre-
sentable’, is solely presented as a name, the 
existence of ‘several’ names would be 
incompatible with the extensional regime of 
the same and the other, and would in fact 
constrain us to presuppose the being of the 
one, even if it being the made of one-voids, 
or pure atoms. (BE 90)  
 
To protect it and prevent it from becoming one name 
amongst others, one must recall the absence of God. 
That is a precondition for our own being, and 
forgetting this truth is also always a perennial 
possibility. We can forget God since in the beginning 
God leaves only a pure name to remember him by. 
God is silent except for such a trace. And the mystic, 
in contemplating, calls us to remember. The ineffable 
nature of the divine Name also calls us to silence, to 
preserve how the reference remains outside it, the 
impossible. But also, then, all names and things is a 
point in a line. In each point appears the whole 
precisely due to the whole’s being incomplete. This is 
how the tzimtzum is thereby repeated in a collapse 
and condensation found at each instance and in each 
differentiation. The infinitesimal vanishing point 
enacted in and by the mark of the void, ∅.  




The residue of the infinite then is finite, but 
makes possible the infinite as infinite, the transfinite. 
The tzimtzum is not a myth. It is no more a myth then 
the empty set being the mark of the void is. The 
tzimtzum is confirmed on the basis of the principles of 
set theory and their implication, on the basis of 
philosophical argumentation via ontological and 
modal argumentation and what can be deduced from 
it. On the other hand, these ideas show that the 
tzimtzum is a necessary account of things. Once one 
reaches impasses of being itself, and on the basis of 
the real one confronts, only such accounts remain. But 
these accounts are the products of the mystic’s 
knowledge, the experimental results achieved through 
contemplation of the divine Name. The Name is a 
stand-in for God. 
 
§20. THE NAME AND THE NAMES 
While we have now explained the holy Name, 
this Name does not exclude the other names attributed 
to God. But the holy Name we have emphasized does 
differ in kind from these other names/attributes. In the 
first place, the holy Name itself does not describe or 
attribute some property to the divine. It is a pure 
name, a pure act of nomination. It is also itself an 
icon, a name whose very shape and structure take on 
significance. Most importantly, we are arguing here 
that this divine name, as mark of the void and primary 
bit of information, forms the very material of beings 
themselves. Other divine names we could list either 
attempt to repeat what this name again does or act as 
predicates of the divine. The number of such divine 
names is limited only by what can be said of the 
absolute infinite. We can name the divine one the 
‘perfect one’ or ‘that than which none can be greater’ 
in order to emphasize some property God has in and 
of himself. But divine names can only simply name 
how we perceive God and the effects of creation (‘the 




Merciful one’, for instance). There is no one predicate 
for God, but rather multiple.  
When you try to name and describe the 
absolutely infinite in terms of what it is, one is lead 
necessarily to an endless diversity that the absolute, 
which is simple and unique, does not have in itself. 
While the Name itself, the mark of the void, is the 
divine itself in this world, the divine names/attributes 
(in the plural) one can pinpoint are plagued by the 
problem of referring to and signifying the nature of the 
divine itself. This is not to say that the mark ∅ is the 
only possible way to present the absolute name of 
God. But rather, when we write the Name of God with 
∅ or with the four-letter name of Jewish prayer or 
some other way, we are not writing multiple names, 
but the same name again and again. This one holy 
Name repeats in written form the ineffable nature of 
God, but this can be executed in more than one way. It 
actualizes the name of God as it is in this world, and 
the only way in which God is in this world as a being 
whereas the plural divine names do not actualize the 
divine, but help us comprehend it.  
For Judaism, the tetragrammaton, for example, is 
not a predicate or attribute that attempts to describe 
how God relates to what is created or the manner of 
God’s perfection, as Yehuda Halevi explains his 
Kuzari (Halevi 2003, 67). But any other divine 
name/attribute either attempts to describe again the 
inherent nature of God as absolute and creator or to 
describe God’s relation to the creation and to us. For 
instance, God is called “merciful if he improves the 
condition of any man” (Halevi 2003, 68). That is to 
say, as God created all, if one’s condition improves, 
one sees in it mercy. But in no way with this 
differentiation between the Name and divine names 
are we trying to differentiate between the God of 
religion and the God of Philosophers, the God of 
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the God of Aristotle, 




etc. For us, there is no distinction between the two. In 
prayer, one reaches out to a metaphysically under-
stood creator as much as one does to a merciful figure 
that hears one’s prayers.  
The divine names thus answer the questions 
‘who?’ and ‘what?’ in way that a pure proper name 
does not. Marion thinks that “the divine names have 
no other function than to manifest . . . impossibility,” 
the impossibly of having full knowledge of God (GWB 
106). But even though the names are plural insofar as 
none fully can comprehend God, only the unique holy 
Name indicates such an impossibility in its very 
name. It is only the holy Name that in and of itself 
notes that God is unpresentable and beyond. We are 
ignorant of the nature of God, but at the same time are 
able to form predicates that both indicate that fact and 
confirm the little we do know. Admitting our lack of 
total knowledge of God is positive, but even in 
negatively saying what God is, we still confirm some 
limited knowledge of how God is in himself or how 
we relate to God. This view does not deny then that 
when we try to affirm something of God (some 
particular quality), that our predication does not fail 
in many ways. In addition, when we deny something 
of God (for instance, that God is a being), we speak 
truth. Also, when we say that God is that than which 
nothing greater can be thought, we again speak truth, 
even if we do not fully grasp the implication or 
meaning. In this way, while negative theology must 
always risk appearing as atheism insofar as it denies, 
for instance, that God is a being, this is but a 
consequence of negativity which still in its negativity 
contains a positive determination. Negative theology 
still affirms and must do so. It contains not only a 
desire for God, but also an affirmation, for instance, of 
this transcendence as such, of negativity as such. 
While it affirms an absolute Other, it affirms the 
necessary tension between denial and attribution.  




This is also the danger of any name. A name 
makes it appear as though we have a thing. But any 
name of God denies and annihilates this possibility at 
the same time as God is truly nameless. And this 
namelessness also is what necessitates that we will 
have names that will both describe God and God’s 
relationship to us and to all creation, for no name is 
truly ever able to capture God. It may be an attempt to 
say how God is or how God is for us. In this way, 
divine names as adjectives may not be truly names. 
They are not proper names as such. One’s proper 
name does not describe one. However, when we call a 
person ‘Shorty’ we do not so much attempt to describe 
them as to refer to them via term of endearment or 
insult. However with God, we turn properties into 
attempts at names, dissimulating names, because we 
seek a way to address God, also to discover more 
importantly how we are addressed. The only unique 
and proper name is the Name whereas the names are 
inadequate and yet reveal truths concerning the 
divine.  
We are here taking issue with Maimonides’s 
engagement with divine names. Maimonides wants to 
preserve at all costs, in any act of philosophical 
argumentation, the idea that God is unique and 
beyond anything that can exist in this world. For this 
reason, whenever we say something of God (for 
instance, that God is merciful) we do not say what 
God is, but only that God is not merciful the way a 
human is for instance. We only say that God is not 
cruel. For Maimonides, directly affirmative statements 
concerning God are secretly denials about God. Given 
the manner in which God exceeds human knowledge 
we can only continually say what God is not. If we 
were to compare God to humans more directly for 
Maimonides (for example, if we were to say that God 
is more merciful than humans), then we risk seeing 
God as one being amongst others and on a scale that 




goes from highest to lowest. For Maimonides, God is 
off the scale itself. But even negation here has a 
positive dimension, it tells us something true. 
Maimonides also wants to emphasize that God is 
beyond all emotions as God is not corporeal in any 
way. In this way, when we say that God is 
‘compassionate’, then we are only deriving this idea of 
compassion from what humans know and do and 
thereby risk hiding that God is totally different from 
us precisely due to God’s perfection (Guide 
I.XXXXV).17 God cannot be compared with creatures 
made of flesh and blood that exist in space and time. 
Our understanding is very limited to negating 
whatever we think of God (Guide I.LVIII). But 
Maimonides still affirms that we can know God by his 
effects, by his creation, even if for Maimonides this is 
true because these effects follow from God’s nature, 
rather than truly being part and parcel of God as such 
(Guide I.XXXIV). In this way, we can derive certain 
truths about God via the world and its very existence, 
even for Maimonides. This means that saying God is 
creator is already to know something true about God 
that can be affirmed. For instance, to say that I am a 
human already negates that I am a leopard or house. 
Also, for Maimonides it is positive knowledge to say 
we know that certain terms must be understood 
negatively. We do increase in knowledge when we say 
that God is not a creature or like a creature or being, 
even if we deny that God exists as a being or like a 
spatially extended substance. If, by saying that God is 
merciful, we really mean that God is not cruel we have 
increased our knowledge. But if we speak only of how 
we are affected by the world, we have also spoken of 
God as well.  
                                                                                     
17 Citations of Mamoinides’s Guide for the Perplexed are 
cited throughout by part and chapter numbers. 




For Maimonides, part of the danger is that by 
affirming any attributes of God we will also think that 
God is complex rather than simple. But this is not a 
problem when these attributes are a matter of how we 
apprehend him. As for God himself, any attribute 
recorded would only have to be compatible with pure 
simplicity. Maimonides also believes no property we 
speak of is truly identical with God. That is, God is 
not mercy itself. God is not necessity itself (recall here 
one of the criticisms of the ontological argument). But 
if we say God is all-knowing, we do not say that God 
is knowledge itself since there can be imperfect forms. 
And if we were to say that God is Goodness itself, it is 
only due to Goodness being transcendentally 
interchangeable with the other key properties of God.  
Our position here is closer to Maimonides than to 
Aquinas. Aquinas sees divine names as showing how 
creatures are analogous to God. A person can be 
merciful; God is most merciful or perfectly merciful. 
The term ‘merciful’ is here used in two ways (that is, 
equivocally). For Maimonides, it is a total equivo-
cation such that one should not really even say God is 
merciful. For Aquinas, it is more so a question of how 
one and the same term can be said of creatures in a 
less than maximal way and for God in the most 
exemplary way. And in this way, Maimonides is right 
as the total transcendence of God must be perceived. 
The holy Name marks God’s withdrawals. The divine 
names would describe only something they truly 
cannot. Aquinas thus still places God on the scale 
(Seeskin 1991, 30-31). There is only a difference of 
degree for Aquinas whereas there is a difference of 
kind for Maimonides (Seeskin 1991, 30-33). But that 
does not mean we cannot say how God is. When we 
look at creation, we do not say that it is not that God is 
creator, but just that things are created and in their 
creation call for a creator. We say that God created. In 
this way, not every discussion of God’s properties can 




be a discussion of God’s effects on the world (Seeskin 
1996, 35-36). 
In addition, Maimonides does not listen to the 
mystics of his own religious tradition (and it was 
partly for this reason that Kabbalah exploded 
discursively after Maimonides) who reveal to us in 
part how God does in fact create the world. God’s 
creation may be good and therefore God is good, but 
we can also say that God created the world using 
numbers and letters. Also, God does not depend on 
creation. God insists beyond creation. It is for this 
reason that the via negativa of negative theology has 
already required three steps. First, one says God is 
merciful. Then one negates this name by noting how 
God is not merciful like a human, as God is not a 
being, not corporeal, etc. In the final step, one negates 
that negation by noting how this mercy follows from 
God’s creating and that God has only one pure proper 
name. Here, the path of negative theology attempts to 
have names as both attributes and proper names at the 
same time (the Merciful one or most Merciful one) by 
turning adjectives into names.  
Divine names are problematic for they attempt to 
enact a language for the unnamable. They therefore try 
to name without naming. But this problem does not 
escape the Name. As a purely proper name, it also has 
the problem of never belonging essentially to what it 
names. No proper name of a person belongs to that 
person. And the Name of God also is not God and 
separate from God. This is yet another reason that the 
tetragrammaton is not pronounced, since it is not fully 
appropriate to God. For this reason, we try to note 
who a person is by describing them. We attempt to do 
the same with God. But in the case of a person, their 
otherness as other escapes, as Levinas points out. So 
does God as absolute other. The proper name indicates 
and adds on, even to a person. But whereas the proper 
name marks how the individual remains before us 




even though their otherness is hidden, God’s name 
marks that God is fully withdrawn and only leaves 
behind a point, a name, a mark of the void. The pure 
name marks God’s withdrawal. The name of a person 
however can evoke that person and call them forward 
into presence. When they come upon us, we can greet 
them with it. But in prayer when we list divine names 
of God, we do not call God forth to us in this way. 
Rather, the very iteration and reiteration of names 
empties them of meaning and predication to the point 
that God’s very absence and insistence beyond them is 
marked. Laclau uses an analysis by Scholem to make 
this point:  
 
Now, how is it possible to express the 
inexpressible? Only if a certain combination 
of terms is found in which each of them is 
divested of its particular meaning—if each of 
them does not express but destroys the 
differential character of that meaning. We 
already know the way in which this can be 
achieved: through the equivalence. I will 
take as an example one of the cases studied 
by Scholem: the litany haadereth vehae-
munah Zehay olamim, to be found in the 
“Greater Hekhaloth” and included in the 
liturgy of the High Holidays. I quote its 
beginning: “Excellence and faithfulness—are 
His who lives forever Understanding and 
blessing—are His who lives forever 
Cognition and expression—are His who lives 
forever Grandeur and greatness—are His who 
lives forever Magnificency and majesty—are 
His who lives forever Counsel and strength—
are His who lives forever” etcetera. The other 
attributes of Him who lives forever are lustre 
and brilliance, grace and benevolence, purity 
and goodness, unity and honour, crown and 




glory, precept and practice, sovereignty and 
rule, adornment and permanence, mystery 
and wisdom, might and meekness, splendour 
and wonder, righteousness and honour, 
invocation and holiness, exultation and 
nobility, song and hymn, praise and glory. 
(Laclau 1997, 17)  
 
This is another way to achieve the desired goal of 
negative theology. In repeating divine attributes, we 
do not grow in knowledge, but rather, as Laclau 
emphasizes, all the terms are made “equivalent” and 
made to refer to a God that transcends them—
something beyond these names that can only be 
accessed and indicated for us by listing these failed 
names (Laclau 1997, 18-19). 
For us, God can only be noted via particular 
experiences of names that fall short of the absolute 
itself (Laclau 1997, 19). It is not enough to say God is 
transcendent, but one must insist on repeating divine 
names. This is the way that the philosophy and 
religion differ, as philosophy would be content with 
just noting a thesis. But the same God is at stake. 
These divine names/attributes do not tell us what 
belongs to a thing, but indicate the absence of a thing 
that has withdrawn from this world and that insists 
beyond it. However, the properties of a thing that 
belong to a thing are supposed to explain it. God’s not 
being a thing makes this action problematic. But we 
can still say what reason requires us to of God in 
himself (e.g. perfect, necessary). If we could not, we 
would risk having many gods. It is the monotheistic 
intervention that says that all the different possible 
attributes we truly attribute to God and that we refer to 
God based on God’s effects refer to one and the same 
thing and in many cases are interchangeable. 
Otherwise we might have those who think there are 
multiple gods. We can also say we know of God based 




on the fact that there is a creation and it requires this 
creator. And we can also discuss how God relates to 
us even if we do not truly understand God.  
Kabbalah calls God nothingness [ayin] because of 
a lack of proper attributes. God, in order to reveal 
himself, does so only through a pure name and 
through creation via numbers [sefirot] and letters that 
follow from this name and themselves involve infinity 
in their finitude. Calling God absolute [eyn sof] means 
God is not determinable as something finite. The finite 
can in many respects be understood and fully so. 
God’s infinity lies in being unfathomable. For Kant, 
things in themselves are unknowable, but that view 
risks disseminating a negative theology of all things. 
However, a thing itself, as extended, will have limited 
known properties. Also, saying that God is not often 
leads us already onto the right path. We take the 
Kabbalistic determination of God as infinite [eyn sof] 
not to mean that all things are God. And in fact, all did 
not proceed from the one, but rather from its 
withdrawal.  
Also, many want to see God as a unity of 
contradictions. God would then be both the whole 
union of beings and nothingness at the same time. But 
against this view we have argued that one must make 
choices. God is not both all-knowing and ignorant at 
the same time, for example. God is not the union of all 
including the opposite. If God’s being eyn sof means 
there is nothing physical or corporeal about God, then 
God does not have presence in a physical world but is 
thereafter withdrawn from it, rather than filling all 
places. There is a place empty of God. God’s Name 
may be present in all things, but not God himself. All 
things may be connected due to their being created in 
through the tzimtzum, but that meant there is a 
distinction in all between the universe and God. All is 
not one. One cannot predicate everything of God, even 
if God has a long list of divine names/attributes. As 




opposed to Spinoza, God is not an infinite extension,18 






                                                                                     
18 I agree completely with Badiou’s critique of Spinoza and 
have nothing to add to it (BE 112-22). While I will later take 
up a Spinozistic viewpoint on the irreducibility of matter 
and mind, I reject Spinoza as a pantheist in general and in 













§21. ALL IS MATHEMATIZABLE 
On the basis of this holy Name we have 
attempted to isolate and identify that creation occurs. 
But how does creation occur on the basis of the mark 
of the void? It has already been hinted that such an 
account depends on seeing all as mathematizable, 
seeing the holy Name as the primary bit of 
information. In this way, it will not be enough to 
evoke this idea, but rather we need to formulate a 
clear ontological model for it. This means doing no 
less than trying to philosophically articulate the 
insights brought to us in Sefer Yetzirah, that the world 
is created in and through letters and numbers. Such a 
view first means that, as Galileo would put it, the great 
book of nature is written in a language. That language 
is mathematics. But by mathematics, one means more 
than just numbers, one means letters, differential 
relations, etc. For Galileo, the mathematical laws that 
grounded the workings of nature were supported and 
created by God. But we want to contend something 
perhaps more radical—that the world of nature is built 
up out of the very holy Name of God himself. That is, 
it is not that God simply created an ordered world 
expressible in exact figures, but that the world itself is 
built up out of the elementary element produced by 
God in creation as we have described it so far. It is not 
a matter of saying that mathematics, numbers, letters, 
etc. can represent or symbolize what is (we are not 




proposing a representationalist model), but rather of  
arguing that all is expressible in terms of numbers, 
letters, etc. because all is made of them: “He engraved 
them, He carved them / He permuted them, He 
weighed them, / He transformed them, / And with 
them He formed / every letter in the Universe, / Seven 
days in the Year, / Seven Gates in the Soul, / male and 
female” (SY 4:6). This is essentially a position the 
Kabbalah itself requires: “If God spoke the world into 
being, the divine language is energy; the alphabet, 
elementary particles; God’s grammar, the laws of 
nature” (Matt 1998, 28). The claim is more radical 
than arguing that things can partially be expressed as 
an equation (that for instance, how a rock falls can be 
expressed as an equation).  
One way to think about this expression is via the 
celebrated ‘wave functions’ of quantum physics. The 
wave function succinctly expresses the essential 
features of all that is known and knowable about a 
quantum event or system. Equations express the 
relations that obtain amongst quantities and between 
things. One can take what one witnesses and put them 
into symbols. But one needs to ask why these 
expressions involving numbers and letters in and of 
themselves can comprehend the things they stand for. 
We contend it is possible because the things they 
stand for are already made of such matter. Formulas 
thereby must take on a real existence, rather than that 
of an ideal mimicry or reflection. Mathesis is poesis in 
and of itself and not fundamentally a mimesis 
(although it can play this role epistemologically). The 
question then shifts from an epistemological one to an 
ontological one. In the past one asserted that numbers 
and mathematics are vital because one can know the 
world through them, yet this is only possible because 
their very being is made of numbers. We do not mean 
here just that physical objects can be counted or that 
human perception projects unity and numbering onto 




a pre-existing world. We also do not mean simply that 
things have physical properties such as shape and 
proportion that can be measured. Being measured is 
allowed by a thing’s being numerical in its very being.  
The revolution Galileo and others inaugurated by 
literalizing the world, subjecting it and expressing it 
via numbers, merely revealed a truth already at work. 
It is not one dimension of the world, but the world 
itself. Many will agree that Descartes, for instance, 
helped us to see the matter of the world as defined 
primarily by its being extended in space. They will 
say that Descartes idealizes the world of matter and 
bodies by seeing them as pure extension in this way 
and therefore purely amenable to geometry. This is not 
a trick that Descartes or someone else pulled on us. 
Rather, the volume and shape of things can be 
expressed using the equations of geometry because 
that is the very nature of their being. This view is 
counter-intuitive insofar as intuition and the ‘natural 
attitude’ tell us that the world of matter is something 
primarily known by the senses and thereby seemingly 
something that exists in and through itself. But matter 
itself can be seen at its most elementary level to be 
comprehended by mathematical operations. Physics 
itself deals with the material world only in and 
through applied mathematics. Science deals with 
patterns, but this is not an idealization of the world 
insofar as the world itself is already ideal. The 
possible patterns that express relations have a reality 
of their own as the very things we see, touch, etc.  
Whether or not there is a single pattern for all 
things (for instance a wave function comprehending 
the whole universe) is a separate issue (we will 
address it when addressing the work of Stephen 
Wolfram). For us, it would be the expression of the 
divine Name in its initial articulation at creation. But 
we may not be able to express this name ourselves, 
since it might require the whole universe to do so. If 




there is one possible pattern for all that is, it is not a 
matter of finding it or expressing it as a representation 
since the world itself is the thing. It would require a 
reproduction of the world itself. But that a single 
pattern detailing the ordering of all objects may not be 
possible in this world does not exclude that the 
universe itself does this. It simply means that one 
should not look for a representation of all within the 
world. The very incompleteness of the world may 
even preclude it. An entire universe of mathematical 
objects representing all the possible expressions will 
not contain one expressing itself, etc. But that again is 
why it is not a matter of detailing representations, but 
how the world itself is already created from number.  
On the other hand, if one can express things in a 
pattern or equation, then one can show it is possible to 
articulate it. A “clear and precise symbolism” for 
expressing “any possible thought” was already 
dreamed by Leibniz and called by him 
“characteristica universalis” (Moore 2001, 64). For 
Leibniz, all could be known and evaluated via such 
symbolism and calculation, as he lays out in his 
Dissertation de arte combinatoria of 1666. It should 
not be surprising that Leibniz was directly under the 
influence of the Kabbalah and Kabbalists (mainly 
Christian ones by the way) when articulating this 
mathesis universalis, a universal and purely symbolic 
language that often called a ‘cabala of the learned’ 
[cabala sapientium].19 But Leibniz did not study his 
                                                                                     
19 While Leibniz was the first to envision a version of what 
we are trying to articulate here, Leibniz’s own metaphysics 
as far as I can tell does not attempt to do so. Leibniz’s own 
monadology is built on the notions of identity (A=A), non-
contradiction (A is not not-A), and sufficient reason (there is 
a reason for everything). Here, Leibniz is basing his theory 
on traditional subject-predicate logic rather than any sense 
of coding or computation by way of syntactic information. In 
this way, Leibniz can take a notion like that of Julius Caesar 




Kabbalah closely enough, as he only searches for a 
universal formal language that will represent our 
thoughts distinctly and clearly via calculable symbols. 
In this way, Leibniz did not take the more radical step 
of seeing reality itself as made up of these symbols, 
rather than just being expressed by them. While 
Leibniz does endorse the idea that God creates the 
world with a well-made language, he sees one as only 
being able to express this language rather than take the 
world itself as a language. Also, Badiou criticizes 
Leibniz for allegedly hunting “down the void with the 
same insistence that he employs in refuting atoms” 
(BE 327). But what Badiou misses here is that saying 
that all can be mathematized does not necessarily 
involve refusing the void, since numbers themselves 
are made of it. While Leibniz may have difficulty with 
the indiscernability of the void itself and thereby does 
not want to admit it, the undifferentiated ultimately 
leads to the differentiated and that action is what 
grounds seeing the world as structured by number 
                                                                                                     
and list all the predicates of any nature belonging to Caesar 
(crossed Rubicon, defeated Gaul, born by Caesarean section, 
a particular height, etc.) and see all these predicates as 
contained within the concept. Caesar is then a set certainly, 
but one only including such phenomenal, historical, etc. 
predicates in this logic. Caesar is not his DNA, a rule or 
program, a real pattern, a mathematical set of relations, etc. 
for Leibniz. That is, Leibniz does not ever attempt to say 
Caesar is computation by using some non-representative and 
non-semiotic set of code. In this way, while we do not 
disagree with Leibniz that a figure is a list of all these 
concepts as a set, the set must also include the code. To take 
a crude and inadequate example (but instructive none-
theless), Caesar is his full DNA sequence. One can list it as 
one of the items in the set. This is not to turn the set into 
something other than an extensional one since the basic 
nature of such a set allows it to contain anything. Rather, it 
shows how a full rendering requires the set contains a 
program, rule, and/or set of mathematical relations as well.  




itself. As we have tried to argue, one can hold that 
“indifference” is prior to difference and still maintain 
the essence of Leibniz’s universal mathesis, for the 
incompletion of the world does not exclude its being 
created (BE 326-27).  
While Badiou thinks that Leibniz excludes “the 
indiscernible, the indeterminate, the un-predicable” 
(BE 318), these things necessarily exclude themselves, 
as seen in the void disappearing into its mark. Badiou 
himself admits that “presented in-difference is 
impossible.” But we can take Badiou’s criticism of 
Leibniz here to be not that Leibniz is not a realist, but 
that Leibniz does not allow that differentiation arises 
from the void itself, from a pure name. And in that 
way Leibniz’s learned Kabbalah forgot a lesson. But 
Badiou is wrong in saying that “God cannot tolerate 
the nothing which is the action” and cannot tolerate 
“two indiscernible beings” if we take this statement as 
true outside the context of Leibniz (BE 318). God is 
not a “complete language,” as Badiou contends that 
Leibniz claims, but rather in creating the world via his 
holy Name, God creates it as an incomplete language 
marked by the signifier. Such a conception would 
always have superfluous extras that repeat the same 
things. It does not exclude noise. God is himself the 
unnamable surplus that founds the world. And as we 
noted, God can be named by the sign of the empty set 
or the name given to him in the Hebrew tradition. 
Both names are thereby indiscernible from each other 
and yet are noted as two. 
We will return to these considerations when 
discussing the nature of what Badiou calls the event 
and its relation to the Name. But at this point it is 
enough to say that God’s creation of the world does 
not require a “complete language” as Badiou claims:  
 
Being and meaning are made to coincide 
only insofar as the name, within the place of 




the complete language named God, is the 
effective construction of the thing. It is not a 
matter of an extensive superimposition, but 
of an ontological mark, of a legal signature. 
In definitive: if there are no indiscernibles, if 
one must rationally provoke the 
indeterminate, it is because a being is 
internally nameable. ‘For there are never two 
beings in nature which are perfectly alike, 
two beings in which it is not possible to 
discover an internal difference, that is, one 
founded on an intrinsic nomination.’ If you 
suppose a complete language, you suppose 
by the same token that the one-of-being is 
being itself, and that the symbol, far from 
being ‘the murder of thing’, is that which 
supports and perpetual its presentation. (BE 
320) 
  
Badiou here attempts as it were to make Leibniz be 
more of an ontological Kabbalist than he is. Leibniz 
does not see being as nameable in this way since he 
sticks to a representationalist model. In addition, that 
being is nameable does not require a complete 
language, but rather an incomplete one insofar as the 
name itself through the signifier requires a transfinite 
marking. This signifier is what makes it possible that 
two sets can have all the same elements and still be 
marked as two sets as the set itself is a framework 
independent of the elements aggregated in it. And the 
signifier itself is not necessarily part of a 
representationalist model. 
 
§22: THE HOLY NAME AS THE PRIMORDIAL BIT: AN 
ONTOLOGY OF INFORMATION 
To show how this model of creation presents the 
world as made out of number, we need to refer again 
to the holy Name as the primordial information bit 




since it is via a theory of information that we will see 
how we speak here not of models, but of information 
itself as the very being of the world. Jacques Derrida, 
in Of Grammatology, contended that “the so-called 
‘thing itself’ is always already a representamen” 
(Derrida 1976, 49).20  Derrida here argues that anything 
we perceive or conceive is already mediated by the 
signifier and thus by conceptual determinations. But 
Derrida does not take the further step of arguing that, 
ontologically, things themselves are represented 
because they are, in their being, really made of 
                                                                                     
20 Let’s be clear. We are not arguing for a version of 
representationalism. Representationalism is based, as De-
leuze would say, on resemblance, identity, analogy and 
opposition. For instance, a painting of an apple represents 
an apple because it resembles it somehow. Representation is 
thereby stuck in the logic of mimesis first systematically 
formulated by Plato. As a shadow of a dog resembles a dog 
we see and/or the one we imagine, the concept is the perfect 
exemplification. But code or a rule does not follow this 
logic. DNA for instance is not identical to me in the sense of 
being a perfect analogue or resemblance. One thereby breaks 
with representation by not having degrees of being ordered 
along these terms. Also, if one posits that there is some thing 
in-itself beyond mental representations of a thing, one is still 
within the logic of representationalism. Making the diff-
erence between concept or mental imaginings and thing the 
very heart of things is imprisoning us in the very 
representationalism Kant systematized, as if some shadowy 
substratum identified with the true thing is forever 
withdrawn all we have are representations. Stating there is a 
thing rather than code or quantum wave functions is to 
remain with the idea that there is a series of analogues in 
this fashion. The digital concept is of course not analogue. 
Ultimately and literally re-presenting a thing (bringing it 
back to life from the dead for instance) involves a breaking 
with this logic of representation both insofar as one has an 
emulation of that thing and not a likeness and insofar as it 
occurs by way of a program that relates to the in-itself as 
pure differentiality. 




differences, that they are ontologically constituted by 
the signifier. Kant already hinted at this direction 
when he argued that our own minds play a 
constitutive role in determining the nature of reality. 
In this way, a purely mimetic view of reality gave way 
to one constituted by the poesis of the human mind. 
But the human mind is itself a limited way of 
engaging with a world that always exceeds it. Even 
Kant had to presuppose things in themselves that 
transcend how the mind makes work of reality.  
It is our contention that the very thing in itself is 
constituted by the signifier, by information. This idea 
is as old as the Kabbalah itself and also found in other 
traditions. For example, John, one of the authors of the 
Gospels, says that the logos is the divine source of 
information which creates the world by ordering it via 
distinctions (John 1:3). This gospel thereby picks up 
on a Gnostic tradition wherein the informational 
patterns combine to form things on their own. Given 
that John [Yochanan] came from the land of Israel 
might mean he was influenced by sources such as 
Sefer Yetzirah (said to have been first composed by 
Abraham himself over 3,000 years ago and passed on 
orally). In any event, what we are proposing here is 
not necessarily new, but we hope at least to give new 
philosophical and theological foundation to the idea 
that an information matrix forms what emerges and 
thereby constitutes the very basic fabric things. 
Aryeh Kaplan, the translator of Sefer Yetzirah and 
eminent disseminator of Kabbalah, emphasizes how 
this central text is about the ontology of information 
itself by noting how the writing that constitutes the 
world via the tzimtzum involves the actualization of 
information (SY 32). The “letters and digits” of which 
Sefer Yetzirah speaks form the “basic bits of 
information” that through their engraving enacts 
creation itself (SY 143). Vlatko Vedral notes that 
information itself can replace mathematics as the 




language in which the very nature of things is 
expressed:  
 
Here is a quote from Galileo clearly 
expressing the view that the truths in the 
Universe are coded into mathematics: 
‘Philosophy is written in this grand book—I 
mean the Universe—which stands 
continually open to our gaze, but it cannot be 
understood unless one first learns to 
comprehend the language in which it is 
written. It is written in the language of math-
ematics, and its characters are triangles, 
circles, and other geometric figures, without 
which it is humanly impossible to under-
stand a single word of it; without these, one 
is wandering about in the labyrinth.’ But we 
want to go beyond Galileo’s sentiment in two 
key respects. First, we want to use 
information instead of geometric characters. 
Second we want to explain how the 
information in the Universe arises. Once the 
information is decoded and compressing into 
appropriately defined laws, we can then 
understand our reality according to the 
information encoded in these laws. The laws 
themselves must be an integral part of this 
evolving picture. Otherwise we are stuck in 
an infinite regression. The universe can 
rather be seen as an information process, in 
other words a gigantic quantum computer. 
(Vlatko 2010, 191)21   
                                                                                     
21 Some might take issue with our argument that the 
universe is a computer. For instance, they might argue that 
computer programs run instructions similar to logical rules 
and steps (If x, then y; if y, then z; etc.). Since we are arguing 
that the universe as computer is founded by the holy Name 




                                                                                                     
of God (and its elaborations) and identify this name as the 
mark of the void, they would say that all we have is a name 
or at best bits rather than instructions as in a program. At 
most such a name can merely repeat itself or lead to a 
repetition of the same without further instructions. But the 
bit itself is already instructions. That is, 0 means off and 1 
on in its most basic meaning. To speak about a string of bits, 
such as 01110 for example, is already to have instructions 
indicating what should be of one type rather than other. 
Also, to think of a program as a set of rules would mean that 
God is constantly commanding things to act as they do 
rather than them unfolding on their own. If the universe is a 
computer, and it must have rules and instructions in this 
already developed sense, then we more so have a model 
where matter already exists and through some act of 
commanding or active manipulation it runs as a computer. 
We reject this view inasmuch as we reject the idea of eternal 
matter. To anticipate the snowflake example we take from 
Wolfram, there the patterns of a snowflake arise precisely via 
a string of instructions for just freezing or heat-release. In 
this way, each part can correspond just to an on/off 
command. One can also think of things on the relation of 
language. A statement like ‘if x then y’ is already fairly 
advanced. The core of language of itself arises from 
phonemic opposition itself. In the initial phonemic 
opposition a child first acquires one has the seed of all that 
will be spoken. The name of God already as YHVH can be 
seen as a string of bits and commands. Each letter would 
itself represent a bit then. Whether such a string of 
commands would produce the sort of complexity one sees in 
Woflram’s ‘Rule 30,’ only an experiment would say. But a 
name itself can be a command. How this command would 
relate to moral and behavioral commands would be another 
topic in and of itself. But at this point, I think we can say 
that it is part of the holy Name itself being a program that 
relates it to commands. All religious commands in Judaism 
for instance are done in the Name of God. Also, some might 
think we are collapsing two distinct ideas into one: the holy 
Name as mark of the void and as program. But these are two 
aspects of the same thing. As pure mark YHVH can be the 
mark of the void, but it also can itself express as a program. 





Beyond seeing the world as expressible mathe-
matically, Vlatko represents a new tendency in 
physics and science in general to see information as 
the basic language of nature. But more so, to avoid an 
infinite regress, we need to see the universe as 
composed of information. The universe as a gigantic 
computer is both information as software and 
hardware at one and the same time. For us 
information is itself a physical pattern as much as an 
ideal one. Anything on any level that is thought, 
imagined, felt, touched, etc. can be rendered as 
information and more as a pattern of bits such as those 
processed by computers (01).  
This information itself is not necessarily 
linguistic in nature, although words also form one 
version of it. As Badiou puts it, “the notion of 
information” we are working with is “that of a code,” 
something “differential” (BE 362). It is not the idea of 
information in any semiotic sense where one thing 
represents another (for instance, smoke indicates fire). 
                                                                                                     
In this way, even if we say that God’s Name is primordial bit, 
this does not exclude it also from being made of a string of 
bits and commands to form the program out of which the 
universe unfolds. Such a program, if it cannot unfold from a 
single bit, is itself made up of multiple such elements. In 
addition, we have argued that the world is created via 
numbers and letters. And it is by such letters and numbers 
alone that we have rules. For instance, a rule can be abcbac. 
This string of letters can simply read as [a,b,c] then [b,a,c]; 
that is, just from a string of letters one has a rule for 
switching them around. The ‘then’ aspect is itself immanent 
and implied in the string. Given that letters are numbers in 
Hebrew, we then already have them in play. Also, the string 
can be take itself as a whole and thereby a mark. In this way, 
we return again to YHVH as both mark of the void and holy 
Name of God/rule/program. Keep in mind that the Torah 
itself was given to us without any punctuation marks. It is in 
itself just a string of letters.  




This is then the idea of syntactic information wherein 
the elements, signs, and features work regardless of 
any possible reference to things in the world. This 
type of information transmits, displays, processes, etc. 
in symbols regardless of what they stand for. 
Information embodies relations and the transformation 
of those relations. What we encounter does not appear 
random. It involves distinct patterns. But bits can also 
be ordered randomly if need be, just as numbers can 
be generated randomly. But this information is not a 
parallel universe. Rather snowflakes only emerge 
when water molecules appear in arranged patterns 
and in this way the molecules themselves function as 
differential informational entities. For this reason, the 
bit is the best way to represent things, as the 
traditional bit is simply the differential relation 
between 0 and 1, on and off.  
Our rejection of semiosis will seem strange to 
many since information, even as coded bits, is taken 
by many to mean information as instructions. That is, 
the software one installs on a computer tells it what to 
do. Bits themselves as the expressions of on/off 
relations may seem to simply involve actions. But the 
universe as computer is both hardware and software at 
the same time. Things do not need to receive 
instructions to be. They are those instructions. Think 
again of genetics. The genes exist as constantly 
unfolding processes that do not need to be 
commanded by something outside of them, but rather 
are information encoded unfolding itself. Like all that 
is, these processes are ultimately traceable to the act of 
creation itself. 
There is nothing about information processes that 
allow for one to differentiate between them and 
physical or mental processes. The very features of our 
world are computations and they are manipulable and 
intelligible as such. We here have the notion of 
information that Claude Shannon first encoded. Bits 




work without any reference to what they are ‘about’ or 
even that these bits are supposed to refer to anything. 
Any difference can be encoded in such bits, and such 
bits can later be said to represent or refer to 
something.  
The semiotic concept of information is always 
already dependent on the differential and syntactic 
idea. Recall that for semiotics the sign is always 
triadic in nature. The sign not only stands for 
something beyond itself, it does so for some mind that 
interprets it. The sign in semiosis is therefore in many 
ways another name for causality or the interpretations 
made by mind. Smoke causes me to think of fire. It is 
also a question of epistemology and whether one thing 
can indicate something about another, a referent. The 
sign relies on this mind to exist in the first place. All 
the causal interactions of the world, such as a rock 
bearing the signs of a previous volcano, can only 
become meaningful when related by a mind. Semiosis 
is thereby dependent on humans who can differentiate 
between signs and things. That is to say, semiotics is 
already a conscious observation on what is presented 
rather than the substance of things themselves even if 
other living things for example receive signals and 
signs from the world and process themselves. One first 
needs differentiation itself before one could ever say 
smoke indicates fire otherwise all would be a blurred 
monolith.  
Bits are intrinsic to the world, but the world as a 
set of references and objects is not intrinsic to bits and 
information. David Chalmers emphasizes this 
definition of information in his own work:  
 
. . . which I will call information states, and 
a basic structure of difference relations 
between those states. The simple nontrivial 
information space is the space consisting of 
two states with a primitive difference 




between them. We can think of these states 
as the two ‘bits’, 0 and 1. The fact that these 
two states are different from each other 
exhausts their nature. That is, this 
information space is fully characterized by 
its difference structure. (Chalmers 1997, 278) 
 
What Chalmers here calls an information space is the 
space of the world itself. All that is is always 
structured in itself. If this is what Derrida meant by 
saying that the thing in itself is a representamen, then 
we agree with Derrida. However, Chalmers thinks that 
such information spaces are only “abstract” and “not 
part of the concrete physical or phenomenal world” 
(Chalmers 1997, 280). But this is because Chalmers 
himself remains wedded to a representation model. He 
thinks that information is something we consciously 
abstract from the world without considering that what 
makes possible this expression is that the world was 
always already an information space in itself.  
All that is is ultimately discrete. It is that 
discreteness that makes the universe possible and 
allows it to be modeled. We can then compute how 
the universe itself changes and develops. But this 
ability does not mean that we need to differentiate 
between an abstract space of possibilities and the 
actual thing. The actual thing is already made of 
differences, information, bits. Again, we should not 
confuse the fact that we can represent things digitally 
with the idea that the digital thing is just a 
representation or model. Things are already 
computing. The universe itself is the computer that 
computes digital information and all physical, 
material, mental, etc. phenomena are those 
computations. The universe is the computation, in our 
terms, of the holy Name of God and its complications. 
The bit is not only the simplest possible model. It is 
the substance of things. At any level we choose 




(atomic, molecular, galactic, etc.) there are differences 
between states. The physical world is not something 
that we abstract from and then compute. It is already 
itself a computation. We therefore see our view as 
overlapping with what has been called ‘ontic 
pancomputationalism.’  All systems whether physical, 
mental, spiritual, etc. if they are of this world then 
they are computational in nature. It is not that 
computation comes before the physical, but that the 
software of the universe is also its hardware. Anything 
we see is a computation entity as much as anything 
we think. The universe is built up from differential 
bits. Atoms and the subatomic are not then any more 
fundamental then trees and texts, as both are built up 
from these same information bits, 0 and 1.  
To recall the Pythagoreanism and set theory 
elaborated above, all is number, sets, and bits. It is the 
same ontological orientation. This view was perhaps 
best first formulated by John Archibald Wheeler 
(although perhaps Konrad Zuse first had the idea of 
the universe as a computer and first formulated digital 
ontology). Wheeler wrote, “the building element [of 
all] is the elementary ‘yes, no’ quantum phenomenon. 
It is an abstract entity. It is not localized in space and 
time” (Wheeler 1982, 570). For him, the bit is not in 
space and time because space and time articulate 
themselves in and through bits. It is not just that the 
laws of physics can be formulated as information, but 
that all that is is in differential states that give rise to 
effects. And it is only the differentiation that makes up 
things and the position of things that allows for space 
itself. Space is not an empty container. Time is also 
not a container. Time might seem to us to be 
continuous and interrupted. But just as a movie is 
made up of frames so things are made up of discrete 
instances that in their computation and elaboration 
give rise to the idea of spatial and temporal continuity.  




Many here would believe we are just confusing 
the things in themselves with the information that 
represents them. But this is not an inversion, as along 
it was information that allowed for things themselves 
to arise. Physics and computer science show us this 
endlessly, for instance, in the way that computers 
allow us to grasp on a screen a thing such as the very 
text I am writing. Wheeler explained:  
 
every ‘it’—every particle, every field of force, 
even the space-time continuum itself—
derives its function, its meaning, its very 
existence entirely—even if in some contexts 
indirectly—from the apparatus-elicited 
answers to yes-or-no questions, binary 
choices, bits. ‘It from bit’ symbolizes the idea 
that every item of the physical world has at 
bottom—a very deep bottom, in most 
instances—an immaterial source and 
explanation; that which we call reality arises 
in the last analysis from the posing of yes–no 
questions and the registering of equipment-
evoked responses; in short, that all things 
physical are information-theoretic in origin 
and that this is a participatory universe. 
(Wheeler, qtd. Gupta 2010, 159)  
 
The most primary bit is the holy Name made from the 
tzimtzum. It is this event of ‘symmetry breaking’ 
where without any other use the divine decides on the 
basic path the universe will take. But it is this first act 
that sets things in motion and the effulgence of bit 
after bit. Bits come from nowhere. There is no prior 
information telling us how bits should be formed and 
ordered. Only God is required so that information can 
be created from emptiness itself. There is no infinite 
regress as information itself is founded on 
nothingness, on pure indifference. There is no more 




fundamental law or moment than creation itself, and 
creation itself is about the informing of the bit.  
Think here of four states (00, 01, 10, 11), these 
states require two bits alone to be registered, but eight 
states will take three bits and so on (Lloyd 2007, X). In 
this way, just by a complication of 0 and 1 one can 
reach an endless amount of information. And 
information is unique here. If we were to see in 
creation the formation of matter, energy, light, etc., 
these ideas are themselves divisible, not made of the 
void itself, not something that by their very natures 
can be seen as arising from nothing. For this reason, 
the way in which numbers were created out of the 
empty set is not just a model or idea pertaining simply 
to the numerical itself, but to the entirety of creation. 
Out of zero information, the empty set, we receive all 
the numbers just as we receive all that is insofar as it 
is made of bits. A transfinite amount of information 
can be obtained from the initial zero information of 
the void—but only if the divine plays the key role of 
Creator as from nothing otherwise comes nothing. As 
Seth Lloyd puts it, “In the beginning was the bit’ 
(Lloyd 2007, ix). Lloyd expands on this idea here by 
saying that “things or its arise out of information or 
bits,” whether it is the genetic code that “programs the 
structure of future apples trees” or the atoms 
themselves that make up the molecular structure of 
DNA (Lloyd 2007, xi). For this reason, Lloyd calls the 
‘big bang’ the “Bit Bang,” as before it there was 
nothing, no energy, no space, no time, etc., since to 
generate more information one needs differentiation  
(Lloyd 2007, 45-46). The big bang happened every-
where. It says the world has no center. But as we are 
contending, this is not to say that all is one as a whole, 
but rather that all is one as marked by the transfinite. 
This is the idea of the ‘Bit Bang,’ which shows that the 
signifier, the differential, is what is there at the start.  




A state of emptiness is a state needing no bits to 
describe it. Yet Lloyd and others do not see the need 
for the divine in order for such a state to lead to 
information, as its paucity of information would 
simply remain the same, in a simple state, as Leibniz 
thought. But perhaps the difference between 
philosophers and physicists is that philosophers by 
nature ask ‘why is there something rather than 
nothing?’, especially if a zero state is one that is 
simple and one in which nothing can be described or 
arise on its own. Lloyd contends that the universe is a 
computer and that it has been computing from its first 
instance, but also argues that only a computer the size 
of the universe itself “can accomplish what the 
universe does and thereby we cannot predict the 
future or anticipate by building a computer that does 
the work of the universe itself” (Lloyd 2007, 4). In 
other words, “the universe is a physical system. Thus 
it could be simulated efficiently by a quantum 
computer—one exactly the same size as the universe 
itself” (Lloyd 2007, 54). But short of the universe 
itself, there is no reason why elements of it could not 
also be simulated or possibly emulated. A “prefect 
depiction of the universe is indistinguishable from the 
universe itself” (Lloyd 2007, 153), but such a 
description would require the universe itself as a 
whole for the description. But if all can be digitized 
and that means that it is marked by incompletion, 
limited aspects such as physical being can be 
described in full. As Lloyd himself notes, there is a 
finite “number of bits required to specify the 
microscopic state of [an] apple and its atoms” (Lloyd 
2007, x).  
Lloyd here introduces quantum physics into the 
picture. We already met this viewpoint when we 
discussed how the wave function can express the 
reality of things by noting in one mathematical space 
all possible outcomes and positions of a thing. 




Quantum physics holds that there is no true being of a 
thing, as its wave function contains all its 
possibilities. In some amplitudes a thing expresses 
itself in one way and in another a completely opposite 
way. The wave function therefore has an amplitude 
for every possible state. This theory therefore seems to 
introduce the wave function as the most fundamental 
aspect of realty. All things are ultimately wave 
functions. There are no atoms or molecules or cats 
(Schrodinger’s or someone else’s) in addition to wave 
functions. The wave function comprehends things.  
This idea can also be expressed via what is called 
the ‘qubit.’ This new understanding of the bit captures 
the idea that there is a superposition state in which 0 
and 1 can both occur. In this way, a qubit is not just 0 
or 1, but also 0 and 1. It is therefore the differential 
relation of 0, 1, and 01 rather than just 0 and 1. Here, 
in superposition, two mutually contradictory states 
obtain at the same time. But the essential ontological 
points being made here hold in terms of how the 
differential is at the heart of creation itself. Moreover, 
creation is needed since if superposition is possible, 
only an observer can allow the states to disentangle 
and for there to be differentiate. In this way, prior to 
the tzimtzum, one has a state of superposition that 
God himself in his withdrawal allows to arise. Such 
superposition also explains why things appear 
continuous rather than discrete as the “wave nature of 
things along with the things be in similar states makes 
them not strictly discrete (Lloyd 2007, 152). In 
addition, quantum theory does not just apply to the 
subatomic, but to the large as well as the small, just as 
information does. The difference is that a qubit, as 
Hans Christian von Baeyer explains, “is not fully 
specified until its longitude and latitude are fully 
described, out to an infinity of decimal places” (von 
Baeyer 2005, 191). The qubit, in its very differential 




structure, could hold an endless amount of 
information and embodies incompleteness itself.  
One of the most powerful arguments for seeing 
the bit itself as the fundamental element of reality and 
that from which reality is made (rather than from 
things like atoms, substances, things, objects, etc.) is 
that such bits are purely relation entities and avoid the 
problems signaled by Kant’s second antinomy. This 
problem is the infinite regress with regards to things, 
atoms, objects. It seems that we can always divide 
things into more discrete parts indefinitely. Most 
simply, take an infinite regress as a sign of 
incoherence as such. If there are objects and parts all 
the way down, then it is not clear why or from where 
objects came from. In any event, Kant takes the idea 
that all answers to the second antinomy are false as a 
proof of idealism.  
The easiest way to take what Kant argues is to say 
that both sides (the idea that ‘all things can be 
infinitely divided’ versus the idea that ‘there is an 
indivisible element out of which all things are 
composed’) have equally logical proofs, but cannot 
both be right. So we need a way for Kant to say both 
are false and articulate a new way to solve the 
problem. Part of Kant’s proof concerns the idea that 
one side posits that time is finite (has a beginning and 
end). For Kant, space and time are 
always incomplete, since they are finite yet our 
minds always project them out. Both parts of the 
antinomy presuppose that matter exists as a thing in 
and of itself. For Kant, things are constituted ideally 
by the structure of the transcendental subject. One 
option of this antinomy is finite and the other infinite 
and taken as contraries and contradictory. An infinite 
series would never begin and thereby cannot be. It 
would also be totally confused in its infinity. A finite 
series would end, but we cannot say or point to such 
an end without positing a next step. The main upshot 




is that the Kantian idealist solution of saying we 
cannot say how the in-itself is structured proves at 
least to be at this point better argued than its 
predecessors.  
But we are arguing that the in-itself is structured 
and is so by bits. This presents a new solution to this 
Kantian antinomy, for bits are not atoms or particles 
that cannot be divided and not underlying indivisible 
substratums or atoms. Rather, bits form an elementary 
basis precisely because they are purely differential in 
nature. It is this differential nature that prevents the 
infinite regress. One does not need to ask further what 
a bit is made up of. Bits cannot be subdivided into 
smaller units. The bit is the smallest possible unit. 
The bit has no parts—only relations. The bit is made 
up of nothing and that is also why it forms a stopping 
point unlike the atom and solves Kant’s antinomy. 
The logic of the signifier also shows that bits are not 
finite as they lead from and directly imply the 
transfinite. Information is the very entity to base a 
theory of everything on, including a theory that refers 
to God and creation ex nihilo .  
To posit objects as a solution to Kant’s antinomy 
would mean that these objects are either substratums 
(eternal or not) or divisible. If eternal, then one needs 
to have all the objects that now are always be. If the 
substratums are not eternal, they are contingent, and 
thereby if the space in which they occur is eternal we 
are led to the modal proofs of God via contingency. 
More importantly, it is not clear how a substratum 
itself can exist other than as an eternal thing in itself, 
as it is removed from the change that it underlies. It 
thereby appears indestructible and yet, if the thing it 
underlies disappears, so does it. If these substratums 
are divisible, it is not clear what would cause an end 
to their division. With such an infinity of division, it 
then becomes completely arbitrary when one says one 
has an object, as anything could be collected as an 




object. With this insight, we are back to our own 
theory of sets, information, etc. In this way, even if 
one were to suggest that substances are a solution to 
Kant’s antinomy as part of a rejection of Kant’s 
idealism, then this view can only found itself on the 
one we are advocating.  
For this reason as well, there is no reason to 
search for a God particle. The bit provides the answer. 
Kant’s own antinomy was influenced by the 
Newtonian idea of matter as being made of solid and 
hard masses that cannot be penetrated. These particles 
combined and were explicable by the laws of nature. 
But with the bit we no longer have such hard 
substance, but rather relation itself as the ultimate ur-
element. The bit allows one to understand how the 
macroscopic and microscopic world are interwoven 
and interconnected. One does not need to reduce 
everything to some indivisible hard particle, but rather 
understand how on every level things are structured 
information patterns. Big and small occur at the same 
time. Atoms do not absorb all else and explain it. We 
do not mean merely that the properties of trees, for 
example, cannot be reduced to the atomic properties, 
as these properties are not found in them, but more so 
that an atom or molecule is just as much an 
information pattern as a tree.  
Many would argue that a tree may have emergent 
properties, but it cannot exist without atoms. But as 
others have noted, a metal has, like many other things, 
a particular melting point. However, the individual 
atoms of that metal do not have a melting point. In 
this way, only the metal when it occurs on a large 
scale can melt and thereby affect what happens to the 
atoms. The emergent whole has effects on what seems 
to be its components. Atoms also cannot exist without 
trees, etc. and without informational patterns which 
obtain at all levels. Paul Davies writes:  
 




Quantum physics teaches us that electrons 
simply don’t exist ‘out there’ in a well-
defined sense, with places and motions, in 
the absence of observations. Even when a 
physicist uses the word ‘electron’ he is really 
referring to a mathematical algorithm which 
enables him to relate in a systematic way the 
results of certain very definite and precisely 
specified experiments. (Davies 1988, 175)  
 
In this way, atoms are no different from anything that 
is both expressed mathematically and as a pattern. It is 
itself composed of information and relations 
systematically. Rather than contending there is a hard, 
impenetrable thing out there, one should hold that the 
same information rules apply to the bottom as to the 
top. The only really elementary thing is the bit itself, 
differentiality.  
Once all things are seen in terms of bits, atoms 
are no more basic than apples, as both are reducible to 
bits and expressible as patterns. An apple is not 
reducible to its atoms, for when one has only atoms 
the apple disappears. And the apple also is not made 
up of components any more than anything else, 
insofar as it is a matter of bits and information. Also, 
an apple, just as a human, remains the same even if 
the atoms contained in it are not all the same. We 
recycle cells in our body and yet remain the same 
body. Apples also have seeds that emerge within new 
subparts that can lead to new apples containing and 
involved in new atoms. The issue here is then not just 
epistemological. Not only can one not understand the 
nature of large-scale phenomenon from atoms, but 
atoms themselves cannot be without the ‘infostuff’ of 
which they are made. Furthermore, particles are no 
longer considered by most to be the most fundamental 
entity, but rather that fields are. Particles are only ever 
perculations in a structured field. Particles have a 




derivative status. Once one begins thinking in terms of 
field, one is already thinking in terms of structured 
patterns. It is important to note that we posit patterns 
rather than some underlying thing that persists 
through change. The pattern itself is developing and 
changing. 
Our view here must be differentiated from the 
one James Ladyman and Don Ross advocate in their 
book Every Thing Must Go. Ladyman and Ross 
contend that “neither things, nor properties, nor 
events turn out to be ontologically fundamental” 
(Ladyman and Ross 2009, 51). For these authors, what 
truly exists are “real patterns” which mean 
“mathematical models,” “sometimes constructed by 
axiomatized theories, sometimes best expressed by set 
theory” (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 119). “So real 
patterns behave like things” (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 
120). There are “not things,” as all there is is structure 
(Ladyman and Ross 2009, 137). In addition, these two 
authors identify their view with Cassirer’s notion of a 
field (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 140). Ladyman and 
Ross thereby see all as part of a differential system 
wherein each element is related to others.  
These two philosophers clarify what they mean 
by a real pattern when discussing Napoleon. Here, “a 
person is an extended pattern over a run of data,” such 
that one tracking Napoleon in 1801 could get 
information and data that enables them to say how 
this pattern will look in 1805 (Ladyman and Ross 
2009, 229). A person like Napoleon is therefore 
determined by patterns. And if we could not project 
how Napoleon would be via the pattern, then we have 
an individual in the sense of irreducible entity or non-
projectible pattern. For this ontology, a real pattern is 
like a “trend in the market data” where its reality is 
dependent on whether or not one can project on its 
basis (that a broker would not say that trend is just a 
flash in the pan) (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 230).  




But for Ladyman and Ross, not all patterns one 
can articulate are real. If physics does not offer us a 
way to track the pattern or a way to empirically verify 
the pattern, then it is not real (Ladyman and Ross, 
235). In this way, God for them is not an idea they 
need to take metaphysically seriously. It is true that 
God is not a pattern just as much as God is not a being. 
But metaphysics has to explain where the patterns 
came from, what allows them to exist, etc. But there is 
no reason to say numbers, fictional characters, etc. are 
less real than books, market trends, etc. All patterns 
are made of bits and thereby are ontologically 
equivalent. Ladyman and Ross want to distinguish 
between real physical patterns and other ones that are 
built out of them. But once the bit is made the most 
fundamental aspect of reality, one can no longer hold 
this distinction, as writing is made of bits as much as 
our thoughts or a table. Ladyman and Ross would call 
fictional characters like “Tarzan” “second-order” 
patterns that are based on extra-representational real 
patterns (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 243). For us, all 
patterns are extra-representational since they are all 
made of bits. For example Sherlock Holmes is not 
represented in the “human genome” and is thereby 
not a real pattern (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 247). But 
“prices, neurons, peptides, gold, and Napoleon” are 
all real patterns as much are any atomic or subatomic 
particle (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 300).  
The position here is based on verificationism. But 
verificationism cannot verify itself. This means that at 
the most fundamental level, anything that is a pattern 
has being. The main issue should be what makes for a 
pattern, as opposed to whether or not the pattern is 
perceived as a physical being. To say that some 
patterns only exist in one way rather than another is 
itself the second-order issue rather than that of the 
patterns themselves. Real patterns track another real 
pattern (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 243), but we still 




have to ask where that real pattern comes from via a 
question of regression (and the answer should not be 
metaphysically simply that physics and the other 
sciences provide them).  
On the face of it, and in terms of many larger 
picture issues in metaphysics, our views and those of 
Ladyman and Ross agree insofar as we both offer what 
has been called a Structural Realism—that the world 
consists of informational stuff that interacts and forms 
all there is.22 But they also argue that, “The fact that 
we only know the entities of physics in mathematical 
terms need not mean they are actually material 
entities” (Ladyman and Ross 2009, 160). We are 
arguing precisely that their being mathematical in 
nature as bits, etc. is what makes possible this type of 
physics. Ladyman and Ross also put forth that the 
“world is made up of a new substance or substantative 
particular called information (‘infostuff’)” (Ladyman 
and Ross 2009, 189), but they never provide 
philosophical and ontological reasoning that supports 
this view other than accepting whatever current 
physics and physicists put forth as the basic ontology 
which philosophy must always work with. For them, 
scientists populate ontology with all its possible 
entities, and philosophers are just “janitors” who 
come and order what the scientists provided 
(Ladyman and Ross 2009, 234). We do not have such a 
deflated conception of metaphysics.   
Ladyman and Ross also do not make clear 
whether information is a fundamentally 
epistemological concept for understanding the 
modality of the world or if the world is itself 
information. In this way, while we both put forth a 
                                                                                     
22 They say at one point that what they call second-order 
patterns are not less real than any other pattern, but only 
ones that have a historical relationship, wherein the one 
pattern always follows another   




structural realism, our own ontology is more 
fundamentally a digital one. This means not only that 
the universe is a computer, but that all that is 
composed of bits, digits, etc. including matter, energy, 
material objects, and so forth. Material objects are not 
secondary manifestations, as they are differential 
structures and made up of bits as much as the text I 
am composing on this computer. All is reducible to 
the digital, including apparently continuous 
phenomena. 
 
§23. AGAINST THE ONTOLOGY OF THE VIRTUAL (FOR IT AS 
EPISTEMOLOGY) 
One must beware of taking information states and 
projecting them into another realm distinct from what 
it is. All that is is actual. It may develop and change 
on the basis of the initial creation and the income-
pleteness of being. But there is not a potential or 
virtual realm that exists wherein information is coded 
and an actual realm wherein things appear. Some 
people, for example, take a gene to be a set of 
instructions that tell molecules what to do. But the 
genes are not an abstract space. They are as actual as 
any other molecule and themselves made of bits. It is 
not a question of informational code preceding 
material configurations. The material configurations 
are themselves already informational code. While 
logically we might be able to distinguish the two, we 
need to beware of creating a split reality wherein 
information is one aspect of reality that what we see 
merely imitates or actualizes. We can deduce all 
possible mathematical states, but that does not mean 
that this state should itself be projected to form one 
half of reality. Again, that would be to take 
information as a model rather than reality itself.  
For example, Chalmers suggests that a compact 
disc “has an infinite number of possible physical 
states,” but it realizes only some of these on a player 




(Chalmers 1997, 282). Here one should take the 
compact disk for what it is, rather than projecting a 
model and taking that space to form one part of 
reality. There is not a combinatorial structure that 
exists in one realm that is then only realized 
physically. Anything that is is already a structure. The 
processing of information involves states that transmit 
information, such as in the example of a disc that has 
locations etched into it and has an effect on a player. 
But one does not need to split reality in order to make 
this point.  
For these reasons, we need to oppose the 
Deleuzian distinction of the virtual/actual if it is read 
in the way Manuel DeLanda does. DeLanda thinks the 
virtual as representational models. For him, these 
models are not eternal Platonic ideas and are not 
essences. Rather, DeLanda thinks these models as 
“spaces of possibility with a definite structure” 
(DeLanda 2011, 17). These spaces express “invariant 
properties” and note the “existence and distribution of 
special or remarkable points” (DeLanda 2011, 18). 
These topological spaces thereby are “phase spaces” 
that detail “possible solutions” to a particular problem 
and can be associated with material processes that 
enact one of these solutions (DeLanda 2011, 19).  
DeLanda wants to insist that these spaces are “not 
transcendental entities in a world beyond that of 
matter and energy,” but rather are “immanent to the 
material world” (DeLanda 2011, 19). However, if they 
are only immanent it is not clear where and how they 
exist except as representational models that we 
conceive. These spaces have to be independent in 
some sense if they are not just projections we have of 
reality. But a purely immanent reality cannot be 
autonomous, and DeLanda wants these spaces to have 
this property. It is then unclear where and how these 
possibility spaces exist other than as representations 
in the mind. DeLanda contends that if “all matter and 




energy cease to exist” then these possibility spaces 
would not continue on (DeLanda 2011, 20), but that 
still does not show that they do not exist as models or 
representations in the mind, since minds are made of 
matter and energy too. DeLanda wants to uphold “the 
objective existence of the diagrams of assemblages” 
and their reality and wants to distinguish them from 
what is actual at the same time (DeLanda 2011, 202). 
But DeLanda thus has a model where a sphere of 
potentiality exists on its own, and is then manifested 
and enacted by various instances. One projects into 
another space all the possibilities one can articulate 
and then sees reality as one manifestation of those 
possibilities.  
This is what Henri Bergson always contended 
was the ultimate psychological basis of the concept of 
possibility. But the actual itself is already structured. 
It is not some purely continuous phenomenon, but is 
itself discrete. It is made up of actual information. In 
this way we oppose the idea that there are possibility 
states other than as mental conceptions and as 
epistemological tools. There is no virtual realm of 
being. Even such epistemological tools would be 
actual. If one does not think them or write them, these 
epistemological tools remain. They can be recreated 
on the basis of the already given structure of the 
world. And if one requires that all possibilities are in 
some space, then they need to exist somewhere 
transcendentally as we saw earlier with Cantor, since 
the possibility of conceiving presupposes an actual 
domain. For this reason, to avoid positing that all 
possibilities exist in God and what is created only 
manifests a limited actualization of these possibilities, 
we either need to do away with the Deleuzian 
distinction of the virtual and actual or articulate it in a 
matter that does not end up repeating what DeLanda 
articulates.  




One model that would already challenge this 
Deleuzian model is the ‘holographic principle.’ This 
view states that there is a precise limit on the amount 
of information that can be encoded in the world 
actually. It is often called the ‘entropy bound.’ It states 
how many quantum states are possible. It states also 
that the universe we experience and perceive would 
be a projection of a holographic encoding of an almost 
endless amount of information. Leonard Susskind 
writes:  
 
[It is further imagined] that in the limit of a 
very large region the bounding surface can be 
taken to be a flat plane at infinity. In some 
way, the phenomena taking place in three-
dimensional space can be projected onto a 
distant “viewing screen” with no loss of 
information. In what follows I will refer to 
such a two-dimensional surface as a “screen” 
and its discrete lattice sites as “pixels.” A 
pixel can only store one bit of information 
and is therefore either lit or dark. Hooft has 
made the analogy with a hologram which 
stores a three-dimensional image on a two-
dimensional film. As in the case of the 
hologram the flat two-dimensional image 
must be rich enough to code the full 
rotationally invariant description of three-
dimensional objects. (Susskind 1995, 6378)  
 
In Susskind’s model the informational space itself is 
actual and projects itself onto a screen that is our own 
universe. One need not invent an immanent space that 
is not truly independent of what is, but not the same 
as it is, as DeLanda does.  
The main issue surrounding the notion of the 
virtual as it appears in DeLanda’s interpretation of 
Deleuze is the question of representation. The digital 




series no longer forms a referent for what appears in 
the same way that a territory did for a map, since it is 
no longer involved in a relation of resemblance, 
analogy, or proportion with what would ‘represent’ it. 
Rather, what appears appears as a purely self-
referential world of images/beings, since its referent is 
itself, what it is made up of—the digital series is what 
appears.23 Our world of pure immanence is not simply 
a world in which representations have replaced or no 
longer obtain their meaning from what they once 
represented or resembled (as in the map/territory 
relation), but rather their ‘virtuality’ lies precisely in 
the fact that they refer only to a digital series of which 
they are composed. The interesting and remarkable 
thing about the images/patterns produced here, the 
very initial reason why they pose for us the question 
of the virtual, is that they no longer are what they are 
simply because they refer to something they resemble 
or are analogous to, but rather because they are 
ultimately made up only of code, of the minimal series 
of 0s and 1s. Image and referent have collapsed into 
one thing as images no longer merely refer in a strictly 
representation manner to a thing, but rather refer and 
derive from themselves in another form. But the true 
reason for ascribing virtuality here to what appears on 
our computer screen or otherwise is that we know that 
it is related to some computer code or information 
bytes that do not appear. What appears seems to be 
merely the manifestation of something not given and 
heterogeneous to what appears, computer code, for 
instance, and the images on the screen. In this way, 
one initially thinks what is given as the ‘mere 
appearance’ of what is not explicitly there, but here it 
                                                                                     
23 We are then arguing and will develop in the next section 
that the analog/digital divide is an irreducible one, insofar as 
the digitization of all leaves the analog qualities of things as 
irreducible aspects of mind.  




is not what is on our computer screens that is virtual 
so much as the relation between the given and what is 
not given and the fact that the two are the same thing.  
 It is not so much that what appears is virtual as 
that what appears forms the actualization or 
realization of something not given (computer code) 
and that it is within this relation that the virtual is 
‘found’. What is called the virtual cannot be ‘mere 
appearance’, nor is it the imaginary, illusory, false, or 
irreal. It is fully real as it appears and insofar as it 
refers to itself and forms the manifestation of itself in 
another heterogeneous form. Computer code or the 
digital series and what appears on our screen would 
then be two different orders or regions when they are 
understood as separable. While what appears on our 
screen is related to computer code, the two are not 
separable. They are inseparable. They are two 
different versions of the same. It is not that what 
appears on our screens refers to some something more 
real or separate from it.  
In Deleuzean terms, one here has a real or 
conceptual distinction that is not also a numerical 
distinction or distinction in existence.24 The virtual 
                                                                                     
24 One can already see in operation the molar-molecular 
distinction that Deleuze and Guattari elaborate in A 
Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 505-6). 
Molecular phenomena are the micro phenomena or 
processes and medium that give rise to the larger, 
perceptible phenomena of common perception. Here, the 
digital series would be the molecular processes that give rise 
to the molar phenomena of what appears on one’s screen. 
However, as John Mullarkey notes in “Deleuze and 
Materialism” (1999), such a distinction does not reduce the 
molar to the molecular (60). Instead, it is a distinction not of 
a hierarchical nature (64), but rather one designed to show 
how subconscious processes give rise to perceptible 
phenomena. I will return to these issues and in particular to 
the non-reductivism argued for here in Chapter Three. 




thereby poses the question of how one can split the 
world up into two without lapsing back into an 
ontological dualism. The virtual is defined by Deleuze 
as “real without being actual, ideal without being 
abstract; and symbolic without being fictional” (DR 
208). In fact, for Deleuze, the virtual is very much “a 
part of the real object—as though the object had one 
part of itself in the virtual into which it plunged as 
though into an objective dimension” (DR 209). In this 
way, whereas realization involves selecting possibles 
that, in being realized, completely resemble the real 
when existence is added to them and limiting what 
possibles are actually given and selected, the 
actualization of the virtual is not governed by the 
“rules” of “resemblance and limitation, but those of 
difference or divergence and of creation” (B 97). Now, 
as Elizabeth Grosz argues, Deleuze is, in part, 
motivated to differentiate the virtual from the possible 
because the possible/real model precludes novelty and 
real creation since the real is already made and 
predetermined in the order of the possible (Grosz 
1999, 27). Different/ciation names the relationship 
between the virtual and the actual insofar as it shows 
how the Ideas, the virtuality of which consists in 
structure, are incarnated in various systems.  
In other words, the complex notion of 
different/ciation articulates Deleuze’s own version of 
structuralism—a structuralism whereby the virtual 
nature of structure demonstrates how structuralist 
theory is divorced from a representational model of 
thought. Here, the representation of stable identities 
gives way to a world of simulacra wherein “identities 
are only simulated, produced as an optical effect” (DR 
xix). The simulacral nature of the modern world, not 
unlike Baudrillard’s conception, is a production of 
many things, but, in particular, of the failure of a 
                                                                                                     
 




straightforward logic of representation as well as “the 
more profound game of difference” (DR xix). “The 
Idea is thus defined as a structure. A structure or an 
Idea is a ‘complex theme’, an internal multiplicity—in 
other words, a system of multiple, non-localisable 
connections between differential elements which is 
incarnated in relations and actual terms” (DR 183). 
The Idea as structure forms the heart of Deleuze’s 
ontology insofar as it is an ontology of Structuralism. 
However, Deleuze’s concept of structure will diverge 
significantly from the usual (by the usual one means 
as elaborated by a Saussure, Levi-Strauss, or Lacan) 
definition of structure, in particular by evacuating the 
negative dimension from the relations that determine 
the basic elements and being primarily interested in 
difference as a creative process of self-differentiation. 
In addition, and more importantly, Deleuze’s elabor-
ation of Ideas as structure will demonstrate how for 
him the virtual is and functions as structure, how 
structure is virtuality as such.  
In Deleuze’s formulation, structure does not 
presuppose the identity of any phenomenon, but 
rather articulates and demonstrates how its identity is 
produced. Here, the intelligibility of the identity of 
anything is not governed by resemblance, but rather 
by its development. Ronald Bogue, for instance, offers 
the following example: “Just as the structure of genes 
bears no resemblance to the structure of an actual 
animal, so the structure of a virtual idea bears no 
resemblance to the structure of its actual embodiment” 
(Bogue 1989, 59-60). Another easy example, and one 
of Deleuze’s favorites for exhibiting the basic character 
of Ideas, is social Ideas. Here, these social Ideas are 
not the product of discourse or the formulation of 
merely the intelligible principle of a society or social 
organization. Instead, social phenomena themselves 
are, ontologically, the incarnation and actualization of 
basic social Ideas, just as an organism would consist 




in the actualization of a biological Idea. These Ideas 
thereby do not simply name psychic or 
epistemological entities, the concepts of discourse, but 
rather something that is both virtually and actually. 
The realization of the possible is the realization of 
something that lies outside of what is realized. In 
addition, the members of a set of possibles have no 
existence. They are in a way differently than the real. 
They make up an entirely different ontological order 
and regime. The distinction between possible and real 
is not then amenable to a univocal conception of 
Being. The virtual has reality, the reality of the Idea 
and structure. It is actualized rather than realized.    
If Ideas as essences stand outside of their 
appearances, then these appearances can only ever be 
accidental and accidents. If the virtual is simply the 
possible, then existence merely happens. Possibles are 
realized and move from a state of nonexistence to 
existence in an unintelligible, sudden, and non-
meaningful manner. Things pop out of nowhere into 
being by God’s command. However, we have been 
arguing, rather, that the very world of beings develops 
through elaborations of the holy Name, although 
creation ex nihilo is also always possible. Since the 
Idea for Deleuze is immanent to its actualizations, 
nothing merely pops out of nowhere or is suddenly 
created ex nihilo by God. Ideas produce the space-
times of their representations, rather than being 
embodied in already existing environments.  
The only theorist who to my knowledge comes 
close to Deleuze on this point is Anthony Giddens, 
who claims that “structure has a ‘virtual existence’” 
(Giddens 1979, 63). While Giddens argues that 
structure should not be confused with models and is 
inseparable from its instantiations, he also views it as 
“a set of differences” in such a way as it appears to be 
based on a negative and oppositional understanding of 
difference (Giddens 1979, 63). In addition, it is un-




clear on Giddens’ account what sort of ontological 
status structures, as virtual, have. Whereas for Deleuze 
structures or Ideas are precisely what anything is the 
embodiment and actualization of, it appears that for 
Giddens, while structures are not simply models 
created by observers, their status as memories of social 
actors is not fully sketched out (Giddens 1979, 63-64). 
Also, it seems that for Giddens such structures only 
have a social existence. Finally, Giddens argues that 
structures are “non-temporal and non-spatial” 
whereas Deleuze attempts to show how the virtual 
involves actualization and thereby time (Giddens 
1979, 3).  
It is not simply that the structure is these images 
or entities that derive from it, since it is also not 
simply an essence as opposed to mere appearance 
(HDW 261). The symbolic dimension is more 
fundamental and not reducible to what is immediately 
perceptible, to a series of images. Instead, the 
symbolic, the structure, must not be confused with 
something that is given sensibly or immediately 
perceptible, with a schema or a product of 
imagination, and with a strict metaphysical essence or 
universal. In particular, in Structuralism, the whole is 
not distinguishable from its elements, but rather the 
whole consists in its differential elements and 
relations. There are certain basic differential elements 
that make up the whole and show how the parts vary. 
In other words, structure is a combinatory of basic 
differential elements, but these elements ‘are’ only 
insofar as they are differentially related to each other. 
They do not appear, as it were, and while they form 
the condition for seeing the sense of appearing, they 
do not make appearances seem to be merely 
occurrences that derive from some intelligible 
essence.25 Structure is then the coexistence of all these 
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“elements,” “relations” and “relational values” “in a 
completely and perfectly determined whole” (HDW 
268). But the whole is not itself actual since what is 
actual are only the “particular relations, relational 
values, and distributions of singularities” (HDW 268).  
Language as such, as virtual whole, as structure, 
is “actualized following exclusive rules in diverse 
specific languages” (HDW 268). Society, the social 
Idea, as a whole does not exist, but any “social form 
embodies certain elements” and “relationships” (HDW 
268). These particular relations and forms are then of 
course the actualization, the differenciation, of the 
virtual structure, of the structure as virtuality, as a 
virtual coexistence of determined differential 
elements. What can be called actual or actualized is 
“that in which the structure is incarnated” (HDW 267). 
This virtual structure of coexisting elements has a 
reality since it is only ever found in the very 
phenomena which incarnate and exhibit the structure.  
However, structure is said not to be a set of 
possibilities, since it is strictly virtual. Since structure 
is not form (as opposed to content), since it involves 
the structuration of its content, it is inseparable from 
the actual appearings that incarnate it. One then 
understands time, duration, as itself the actualization 
of the structure (HDW 269). Such characteristics bring 
one back to the virtual Whole as articulated in 
Deleuze’s Bergsonism. For Deleuze, the virtual Whole 
is differentiated, and this differentiation forms its 
reality.26  For this reason, “the reality of the virtual is 
                                                                                                     
the virtual for the most part as if it were synonymous with 
potentiality or (despite efforts to the contrary) possibility 
(17, 96, passim), she also articulates the manner in which 
the virtual is a “dimension of sense” and shows how 
language articulates this virtuality in an exemplary manner 
(20).  
26The difference between differentiation and differenceation 




structure” (HDW 269). In order to concretize the 
relationship between the virtual and the actual and to 
understand the many aspects Deleuze wishes to 
attribute to it one must see here the fundamental 
homology between the Bergsonist unconscious (time, 
duration, past in general, memory) and the 
Structuralist unconscious. This attempt should not be 
surprising since language and memory have an 
obvious and fundamental affinity. We have Sense in 
the same way that we have the pure past coexisting 
with the present. We can place ourselves in the pure 
past, into memory, immediately in the same way we 
find ourselves already in Sense (B 57). But Sense in 
the Structuralist manner is not something found 
merely in what is heard, but is rather found by way of 
seeing language in terms of negative differential 
relations and elements. Sense or meaning is, as it 
were, actualized in actual acts of speech and writing. 
Sense then is not language as it is heard, but rather 
Sense is the ontological foundation of the language 
that we hear.  
The virtual Whole is thus structure in the strict 
Structuralist sense of the term. Memory and language 
as structure are then, as it were, one and the same, or 
determined in the same fashion. These issues bring 
about what Deleuze identities as the second criterion 
for Structuralism: sense. Sense here names precisely 
the manner in which the basic elements of structure 
take neither “extrinsic designation nor intrinsic 
signification” (HDW 262), but rather are meaningful by 
way of location or position. Location here does not 
name a spatial sense in the same way as one orientates 
                                                                                                     
will be explored in what follows. As we shall see, the very 
difference between t/c will make all the difference and 
explain the relation between the virtual and the actual. 
 
 




oneself physically, but rather “sites in a properly 
structural space,” a “topological space” (HDW 262). 
Structure is made up by way of its relations and 
elements such that it is an “unextended” or 
“preextensive” space, a “pure spatium” (HDW 262). 
Space here would be a function of relations, but 
insofar as entities are incarnations and embodiments 
of structure, space seemingly precedes them. For this 
reason, Structuralism is necessarily “a new 
transcendental philosophy,” since anything already 
has its place and functional site already found with a 
Structure (HDW 263). In other words, here relations 
precede relata, since anything conceivably can occupy 
the relations due to the manner in which the relations 
determine the meaning or sense of the relata.  
Sense itself can only ever be an effect, a result—
the result or effect of a combination of elements and 
relations. And since these elements and relations are 
in and through themselves non-significant, sense 
emerges from non-sense, emerges from the non-
meaningful. Deleuze describes this effect not as “a 
product but an optical effect”, as the result of position 
(HDW 263). Or, following the terminology of 
Difference and Repetition, one could call it a 
“chaosmos from which the cosmos emerges” (DR 199). 
Sense ultimately functions as the emergent property 
and consequence of functions devoid of sense. Sense 
is emergence itself.  
The virtual/actual relation thus must be 
explicated by “the complex notion of 
different/ciation” (DR 209). The difference between 
differentiation and differenciation must be understood 
as the difference between the t and the c (that is, as a 
purely phonemic difference). Of course, the difference 
between two phonemes is not something that appears. 
A phoneme is itself a purely differential element. In 
speaking, we hear the sound ‘t’, but not the phoneme 
t. Since the phoneme is not the actual letter, it is 




virtuality itself. In this way, the difference here is 
caught up with our understanding of structure in the 
strictly Structuralist sense. These structures are 
unconscious (for instance, Lacan’s famous thesis that 
‘the unconscious is structured like a language’).  
But here Deleuze differentiates his ontology of 
Structuralism from the usual Structuralist 
understanding. Whereas Structuralism has understood 
difference as the negative differential relation between 
elements such as phonemes, Deleuze institutes a 
different conception of difference. Deleuze’s third 
criterion for recognizing and defining structure is “the 
differential and the singular” (HDW 264). A phoneme 
names the very basic element of structure and thereby 
virtuality as such, but not because of any negative 
differentiation:  
 
What is distinct from the voiced elements, 
and the associated concepts and images, is 
called a phoneme, the smallest linguistic 
unit capable of differentiating two words of 
diverse meanings: for example billard 
[billiard] and pillard [pillager]. It is clear that 
the phoneme is embodied in letters, sylla-
bles, and sounds, but that it is not reducible 
to them. Moreover, letters, syllables, and 
sounds give it an independence, whereas in 
itself the phoneme is inseparable from the 
phonemic relation that unites it to other 
phonemes: b/p. Phonemes do not exist inde-
pendently of the relations into which they 
enter and through which they reciprocally 
determine each other. (HDW 264) 
 
The phoneme is not the heard or pronounced sound 
‘b’. It is not even the image ‘b’. It is the smallest 
relation that operates to differentiate two words, two 
entities, found within any language whether written, 




spoken, signed, or what have you. Deleuze here 
employs the example of ‘b’ and ‘p’ from French. In 
French, ‘b’ and ‘p’ are embodied and instantiated in 
various words and letters and sounds, but the two are 
not simply made up of such embodiments. Instead, 
the phonemic relation has a relative independence of 
any word or sound embodying it. Such independence 
makes up, in part, the virtuality of the relation, but 
also the very fact that b/p is only ever the relation 
between make up their virtuality. The phoneme then 
is this relation.  
But such a relation is not simply negative in 
quality. It is not simply a question of saying ‘b’ is not 
‘p’ and ‘p’ is not ‘b.’  Rather, they are differentially 
related by way of a mutual determination. Deleuze 
here opposes any linguistics that construes the 
differential relation between phonemes as one of 
opposition (DR 204). What is usually taken by 
Structuralist linguistics as a relation of opposition is 
really and fundamentally one of reciprocal 
determination. For Deleuze, the confusion is primarily 
a matter of “terminology,” since what these linguists 
mean by an opposition ultimately turns out to be 
“simply correlation” (DR 204). Since phonemes can in 
principle be related in any given language to one 
another, it is not simply a case of opposition or 
negative difference. In fact, for Deleuze, the attempt by 
Trubetzkoy and others to view phonemic relations as 
opposition stems more so from the hegemony of 
Hegelian dialectics and metaphysics when, in fact, the 
very idea of the phoneme is at odds with Hegelian 
philosophy (DR 204). According to Deleuze, despite 
the well-known Saussurean claim that language is 
ultimately only a system of differences without 
positive entities and Trubetzkoy’s claim that absence 
is constitutive of language and the manner in which 
both of these views assume an oppositional model, the 
phonemic relation “points to the contrary” (DR 204). 




Perhaps, reading phonemic relations as oppositional 
stems from viewing them from the perspective of their 
embodiment rather than in their sheer status as 
relational entities.  
Because phonemic relations make up the 
virtuality of the linguistic Idea and demonstrate the 
virtuality of the Whole, the virtual system of relations 
that constitute Ideas, it is primarily “when the virtual 
is reduced” to a species of possibility that opposition 
supersedes reciprocal determination (DR 205). As 
possibles, such relations would only be able to 
actualize something from nothing, from a position of 
nonexistence. In this mutual or reciprocal 
determination, simply stating that one is not the other 
is not enough to give them any status. To further mark 
off the mutual and reciprocal determination found 
here, Deleuze distinguishes three kinds of relations. In 
the first example “3+2,” the two elements (3 and 2) are 
independent of each other (HDW 263). These two 
elements are real and exist independently of being in 
relation to each other. In the second example “x² + y² 
= r²,” the terms of the relation are undetermined 
insofar as no value is given to any of them and any 
value can be inputted for any (HDW 263). However, 
each term must be given a determined and specific 
value. In the third example “ydy + xdx = 0,” the 
elements not only “have no determined values 
themselves,” but also “determine each other 
reciprocally” (HDW 265). The phonemic relation is 
not like the addition of two numbers (this relation 
would correspond to the actual), but also not like that 
of a complex equation (which would correspond to 
structure insofar as any values can be inputted and the 
terms remain undetermined). The phonemic relation 
would be like a differential equation from which a 
structure can be derived. The symbolic for Deleuze is 
ultimately like a differential equation—one where all 
is determined reciprocally. Such a symbolic is not 




made up of negative difference and absence, but rather 
mutual and reciprocal determination. Both dy and dx 
are totally undetermined outside of each other and 
only exist in relation to each other. Singularity comes 
into play insofar as, for example, a specific language is 
made up of and can be recognized by the specific 
phonemic relations it contains (HDW 265).  
But in order to differentiate the virtual from the 
possible, Deleuze must differentiate it from Levi-
Strauss’s understanding of structure as an ideal 
combinatory, a reservoir. According to this 
conception, what is actualized merely follows due to 
limitations or selecting from pre-formed possibilities. 
However, since structure involves the emergence of 
sense from non-meaning and mutual determination, 
acutalization cannot be a matter of selecting pre-
formed possibilities. Instead, Deleuze’s view leads to 
showing how actualization occurs by way of various 
combinations which are always a partial instantiation 
of the virtual Whole. As long as the combinatory is not 
a set of possibles, it forms a virtual structure. In 
addition, Levi-Strauss’ conception does show how the 
virtual involves the coexistence of all at once: “To 
discern the structure of a domain is to determine an 
entire virtuality of coexistence that preexist the 
beings, objects, and works of this domain. Every 
structure is a multiplicity of virtual coexistence” 
(HDW 267-68). The virtual Whole is not a mere set of 
pre-formed entities which wait to be given existence, 
but rather a set of relations that are virtual due to their 
differential nature. For this reason, what virtually 
coexists is differentiated even though it is not yet or 
not viewed in terms of its differenciation or 
actualization (HDW 268). Whatever is actualized is 
then a part in relation to the virtual Whole. It is a part 
insofar as it is partial, the effect and result of 
differential relations and elements that are 
reciprocally determined. In terms of language, a 




specific language actualizes the language Idea. Or 
perhaps even better, a particular speech act actualizes 
the virtual Whole of a language. Here, one moves from 
the virtual to the actual insofar as the virtual is found 
in its actualization.  
But we must ultimately reject this model for 
thinking the digital universe of bytes as much as we 
reject DeLanda’s treatment of it in terms of the 
possible, possibility, or phase spaces. While Deleuze 
may admit that the digitization of the Real is its 
structuration, he still requires reference to a virtual 
Whole, a structure or Idea, of which individual beings 
are only embodiments. As seen above, an entire 
language exists as a virtual whole. Individual words, 
etc. are embodiments of it, if only partially. But all we 
ever have are these partial embodiments. Deleuze does 
not argue that these virtual wholes/structures are an 
intelligible essence to which appearances refer. 
Instead, bytes have to be understood as virtual only in 
the sense of being made up of negative differential 
elements and relations. But anything that is, whether a 
word or tree or building, is also made of bits, as a 
pattern. Computer code on the screen is not virtual, 
but the structure of which this code is an actualization 
is. But that does not mean we need to posit a virtual 
whole. Rather, the world is made up of actualities 
only. The holy Name of God is that actuality, the mark 
and pattern that elaborates the world into what it is. It 
is not a whole, even if one not given when referring to 
parts. The entire language of French is not a virtual 
whole. The French language is transfinite in nature. 
This means there is no whole except as a transfinite 
set that can itself be exceeded by its subset. Yet one 
can isolate it is a model.  
Deleuze’s model, then, is still too epistemological 
and not sufficiently ontological. It offers us a way of 
comprehending things, but not of detailing the 
universe of beings as they are. Nothing lies behind our 




screens or the things that make up created being. But 
our screens do not also consist in the actualization of 
the virtual because there is not a whole, incomplete or 
otherwise, on Deleuze’s terms or a set of Ideas. These 
Ideas are only ever models that we articulate as much 
as we articulate texts of philosophy. But we would not 
say that the philosophical text constitutes one half of 
reality itself. Rather, the screen is information itself as 
a screen, as much as what appears on the screen is 
code, both as computer code and the atoms that 
compose it. The actual takes precedent over any 
potentiality or virtuality.27 The actual holy Name of 
God is the primordial bit and primordial actual 
existing pattern that in its complications gives rise to 
the world and the universe as computer. Recall that 
the holy Name and God are not one. It is not a 
realization of some possible thought of God, but what 
arises from the tzimtzum itself. And even if God were 
to be seen as thinking in actuality of all the infinite 
natural numbers for example, what we have in this 
world as number is not realization of these numbers as 
they too arise via the holy Name, rather than as 
expressions of God who himself withdraws. That is to 
say, even God for us would not be the site of Deleuze’s 
Structure-Ideas in terms of explaining what is. And if 
they do obtain there, they obtain there as actual 
domains, but not with a relation to what is created 
itself, as that is done by the elaboration of only one 
element, the holy Name. For us the only way in which 
these Ideas of Deleuze could occur would be for them 
to be actually encoded as per Susskind’s elaboration 
holographic principle. Or perhaps, they could exist in 
an infinite dimension of time. But there they would 
obtain actually. Let’s consider a part of Deleuze’s own 
                                                                                     
27 In this way, we echo some of the key points of Badiou’s 
own critique of Deleuze as elaborated in Deleuze: The 
Clamor of Being (1999).  




theory, the Bergsonian idea of the pure past, as a 
potential candidate for this dimension. For Bergson, 
the distinction of the possible and real in this manner 
indicates that the possible is always “less than the 
real” and involves judging that things are possible 
prior to their realization (CM 99). However, Bergson 
argues that the opposite is true. The real precedes the 
possible as the possible only forms “the addition of an 
act of mind which throws its image back into the past” 
(CM 100). The possible then does not precede the real, 
but is an abstraction of the real. Such an abstraction 
leads to the illusion that things existed in some 
possible state prior to their realization, prior to their 
givenness, when it is the case that this is merely a 
retroactive illusion. Given realities are retroactively 
posited as part of the past so that they are seen as 
possible, but this retroactive illusion depends on 
thinking that Being is “given once and for all, 
complete and perfect,” so that realization involves 
adding existence to an already completely constituted 
possibility (CM 104). But Being is never given 
completely as such a totality since time as duration 
forms a pure flux: “time is what hinders everything 
from being at once” (CM 93). Time, the passing of 
things, proves that there is an “indetermination in 
things” which time itself is (CM 93). When one treats 
every-thing as given at all at once, one is not dealing 
with time, but with space or the spatialization of time, 
simultaneity. Since time implies passing, change, 
movement, it cannot be reconciled with everything all 
at once simultaneously being in a static manner. Of 
course, simultaneity is a form of a time, but it is 
precisely a spatialization of time since time involves 
flux, the passing away of things and coming into being 
of others.  
The movement of things, the pure continuity of 
becoming, is what Bergson calls duration, and things 
as much as consciousnesses are involved in duration. 




All that is given to consciousness gives way to 
something, so that the givenness of things involves 
flux and becoming, but the constant supersession of 
givenness does not only characterize consciousness 
(duration is no more simply inside than it is simply 
outside). Time implies that things move and pass, and, 
in this way, time is in a sense always already past 
(MM 137). The present names, it would seem, the 
moment in which this passing takes place. But while 
one can idealize the present as a pure “mathematical 
instant” (which involves a retroactive illusion similar 
to the erection of the possible), the present is subject 
to duration as “the indivisible limit which separates 
past from future” (MM 137). As subjected to duration, 
the real (as opposed to idealized) present is precisely a 
limit always passing away into the past and giving 
way to the future. The present is then constantly 
passing away.28  
  But how does the present pass away? If the 
present marks such an “indivisible limit” which 
divides the past from the future,” then when the 
present is about to come into being, it is not yet (MM 
150). But when the present exists, it is already gone, 
no longer now (MM 150). The present is always caught 
between its being not yet and no longer. It is always 
precisely missing. It is seemingly never in existence. 
Since the present is always already past and not yet 
the future at the same time, how does a new present 
                                                                                     
28 Note the overlap between Bergson’s determination of time 
and that of Augustine (Confessions Book XI). While Bergson 
follows Augustine in criticizing conceiving of time as a 
function of movement and of thinking of time simply as 
present, past, and future, Bergson furthers an ‘Augustinian’ 
understanding of time by accounting transcendentally for 
the passing of time itself (other than putting it down to the 
functioning of mind) and by developing the notion of an a 
priori past. 
 




replace an old one? To think that the present becomes 
past when it is replaced with a new one involves 
wondering how “a new present comes about if the old 
present did not pass at the same time that it is 
present” (B 58). The paradox of the old present having 
to be both present and past simultaneously in order 
for something new, for a new present, to arise means 
that the past would never arise unless it always 
already was. An old present could not give way to a 
new one unless it was always already part of the past, 
unless the past already was. In other words, for 
Bergson, the ground for the present truly to pass away 
is the past in general, an a priori past that is always 
contemporary with the present that is passing. 
There is actually a better model than Bergson’s 
that achieves this idea, as Bergson’s virtuality seems to 
be only a temporality capable of holding together what 
was, but not adding to it or elaborating on it. This is 
David Bohm’s, in which the implicate order is the 
more primary level of reality. Such an implicate order 
would have to contain in and of itself the Idea-
Structures of which Deleuze speaks. Another model is 
that of Karl Pribram. Here, the idea of the hologram is 
used differently than as in Susskind’s model. For 
Pribram, memories are not located in one part of the 
brain. Even if a person has part of their brain removed, 
memories said to be associated with the excised part 
are still accessible for a person. Now, every part of a 
holographical piece of film contains all the required 
information to make up the whole image. In this, 
every part contains all that is needed to recall the 
whole (Talbot 1992, 17). For us, this would mean that 
any particular instance or being would enable the 
nature of the incomplete whole to be elaborated and 
understood on its basis. For Deleuze, there is a virtual 
whole, and virtual wholes as Ideas, that are not given, 
but still obtain as wholes virtually. For us, the created 
world is incomplete insofar as it is marked by the 




transfinite and the signifier itself in its very character. 
It is thereby a matter of an actual created world.  
One should also note that bits themselves, as this 
idea is used in reference to computers, are always 
actual. Computer-mediated phenomena, cyberspace 
and all such related phenomena (the Internet, e-mail, 
VR, etc.), are all “comprised of information in the form 
of binary numbers which either resides in computer 
memory or on some other storage medium such as 
hard disks, floppy disks, optical disks, punch cards, or 
magnetic tape” (Koepsell 2000, 80). The binary 
numbers referred to here are “Bits,” “BInary digiTS” 
(Koepsell 2000, 78). A Bit is “the smallest unity of 
information” and forms the state of the switches 
which are either in the on or off state (O or 1) 
(Koepsell 2000, 78). In this way, Bits make up the 
digital series and form the “fundamental unit of 
cyberspace” (Koepsell 2000, 78). Since all computer-
mediated phenomena are made up of Bits, the various 
storage media for Bits, for Koepsell, make up the 
“substrate within or upon which the various” 
computer-mediated phenomena “subsist” (Koepsell 
2000, 80). Since these storage media are common, 
everyday objects (perceptible, “take up space”), any 
and all cyber-phenomena “are ontologically 
dependent upon storage media for their existence,” so 
that if these media are not in place, there is no 
cyberspace (Koepsell 2000, 80). Cyberspace then is 
only “by virtue of storage media” (Koepsell 2000, 80).  
Such phenomena as email, the Internet, and VR 
and what is related to these phenomena have their 
dependence on these storage media since they cannot 
exist without them. And since these storage media 
“have extension” in common perceptible space, there 
can be “no reason to doubt that cyber objects have 
extension” (Koepsell 2000, 80). For this reason, 
computer-mediated phenomena do not differ from 
other objects in common, everyday space because they 




are bound up with and are only by way of storage 
media in which they are stored. In this way, for 
example, “real world analog information which exists 
in forms which we may directly experience” are 
transformed “into binary form by output devices,” but 
this perceptible information, for example the images 
presented to one on one’s computer screen or while 
wearing the goggles of VR, “are simply pictures 
composed of bits and translated into analog images” 
(Koepsell 2000, 81-82). What appears on one’s screen 
is entirely reducible to bits (Koepsell 2000, 82).  
However, Koepsell is wrong when he says that 
these considerations show computer-mediated phe-
nomena are illusory or have illusory substance. For 
him, these phenomena are illusory and only have 
substance by way of the storage media in which the 
bits they consist in are stored (Koepsell 2000, 82). All 
things are made of bits. Even what is on our screen is 
information and bits. There is only a “difference in 
degree” “between digitally coded and expressed 
information and that which is encoded and expressed 
in analog forms” since there exists “no good reason to 
believe that an expression is significantly different 
when it is stored or transmitted in digital form than 
when it is sorted or conveyed in analog form” 
(Koepsell 2000, 87). Ultimately, according to Koepsell, 
the difference between the analog and digital being 
only one of degree rests upon the fact that the analog 
is only by virtue of the digital.  
What appears to one perceptually while wearing 
VR goggles and the corresponding digital series stored 
in some medium such as the hard drive are not simply 
different in degree, for all the reasons that the analog-
digital distinction itself forms a distinction between 
two mutually exclusive domains. The two are simply 
not isomorphic and the analog does not consist in a 
“representation of the digital” (it does not resemble 
the digital, it is not a likeness of the series of 0s and 




1s, it is not in some proportion to the Bits). The fact 
that the analog image or picture is comprised of Bits 
and dependent on some substrate for its existence 
does not mean that it is reducible to this substrate for 
its meaning and sense. In fact, the true difficulty with 
such computer-mediated or cyber-phenomena is that 
they involve coding in their very actuality and 
substantiality. Because the analog in many ways is 
irreducible to the digital (see our discussion of 
Chalmers below), the two form two heterogeneous 
orders, and yet one is dependent on and comprised of 
the other. In this way, one sees that the issue consists 
in such aspects and involves primarily the question of 
how one can reconcile such aspects.  
Koepsell seemingly recognizes this point by 
arguing that even though “digitized expressions and 
analog expressions are distinct in their form (but of 
the same substance), they serve the same function—
namely, each conveys meaning” (Koepsell 2000, 86). 
In this manner, it is not a question of simply reducing 
one form to the other, because as two forms the digital 
and the analog make up heterogeneous and non-
isomorphic orders. Rather it is a question of 
reconciling this heterogeneity while showing that they 
do not make up two distinct ontological orders 
resulting in a dualism, since they are of the same 
actual substance of information and never separable. 
This actuality can be seen in its own articulation 
via a look at topology. In topology, one studies the 
nature of space. For Deleuze and DeLanda, there is a 
set of all possible phase spaces and states of things. It 
exists virtually. While both want to say that such a 
phase space is not logically or ontologically prior to 
actual physical states, they do want to isolate it as part 
of an ontologically different order of reality. A fully 
cosmic consciousness would then be one that can 
envision all the possible universes and phases that 
objects can undergo. Deleuze would never allow for 




the idea of a transcendent God. His own view of God, 
if he were to elaborate one, would follow from his 
work on Spinoza. Here, he would buy into a cosmic 
pantheism wherein each thing that exists is an 
expression of the whole of the things, the set of all 
possible states, the ultimate phase space (the plane of 
immanence). For this reason, opposing the 
virtual/actual distinction as elaborated by Deleuze and 
DeLanda also involves rejecting a version of 
pantheism. 
A topological space is a collection of points with 
some coherence and structure. Topology wants to 
study the invariant properties of any extended thing, 
any spatial object. In this way, there are no absolute 
properties of any objects in terms of its spatiality since 
these properties are part and parcel of a set of 
relational items (such as edges, points, etc.). It studies 
the qualities of objects that remain invariant even as 
the object undergoes transformations. The standard 
example is that topology shows how a doughnut can 
be transformed into a coffee mug. The two objects can 
be considered equivalent as various invariant struc-
tural traits remained the same through the trans-
formation. In this way, one could isolate a phase 
space, a set, of the structured relations that both have 
and that enable the transformation.  
What is interesting here is that all is based on the 
internal structure of neighboring relations and that 
two things that to the naked eye appear to be two 
completely different shapes and things from the 
perspective of topology are fundamentally equivalent. 
Due to this equivalence, the fundamental structure 
informing both objects can be found by looking at 
either. In this way, each being contains and refers to 
the whole structure by itself. Even if in the world we 
just had coffee mugs, we would be able to elaborate 
them into doughnuts and comprehend them insofar as 
the topological space can be founded on the basis of 




the coffee mug alone. In this way, we do not need any 
virtual space. We only need the actual thing. We only 
need an actual coffee mug to understand a large 
number of structural principles that can give rise to its 
equivalences. The topological space is thus an 
epistemological model that we elaborate. A coffee mug 
can be expressed as a set of mathematical relations. 
Those relations geometrically can be transformed to 
show how given certain invariant properties the donut 
is spatially equivalent to a coffee mug. But one does 
not need to project any virtual being to do so.  
The coffee mug itself is already that structure. It 
is fully actual in and as the coffee mug. This is why an 
ontology of information does not ultimately need the 
notion of virtual to do any more than epistemological 
work. Coffee mugs, like all else, are composed of 
difference and structural relations. A doughnut is a 
variation on a coffee mug and a coffee mug a variation 
on a doughnut. But that does not mean each is just an 
actualization of a virtual space. Rather if one were to 
be twisted into another then it is via actual actions 
and via the very structures themselves in their 
actuality translating themselves. This is what happens 
in the very earliest stages of human life, for instance, 
as the embryo develops. But one need not posit a 
virtual phase space of which the embryo is an 
actualization other than to epistemologically 
comprehend how structurally one embryological 
shape could transform into another.  
Ontologically, one simply has a structural shape 
that transforms into another. The structure is itself 
already actually pertaining and constituting the living 
being. To speak about language in the same terms one 
could say that once one has spoken, one has exhibited 
the basic structures of the language even in speaking 
one sentence. If one here posits a virtual space, one 
does so in order to try to show there is no eternal 
essence of what a coffee mug is and to show that 




things are elaborations of structure. But that does not 
require that the structure itself be given its own 
ontological realm.  
The mind can take what is actual and vary it as 
well. But mental variation is itself comprehended by 
another structure. There are no essences as all things 
can be seen as the unfolding and elaboration of the 
most basic structures of information. There is no 
Platonic heaven. This accords with how the transfinite 
itself can be based on the pure logic of the signifier. 
One need not posit anything more actual than the 
signifier itself or the holy Name of God in order to 
maintain the actual domain that makes possible 
Cantorianism and its insights. The worry here is that 
by making all things an elaboration of such basic 
structural ideas, one makes many things appear 
identical whether they are doughnuts or coffee mugs.  
 
§24. INFORMATION INSIDE-OUT: MIND AND MATTER 
In order to avoid making all seem like perfect 
equivalents despite our varied experience, we need to 
introduce a distinction within being (and not the 
virtual/actual distinction) in order to comprehend 
specific properties that do not seem to be expressible 
fully mathematically and also to account for how 
structurally equivalent things involve different 
appearances. Structure alone can account for these 
things. For instance, the numbers 4 and 5, just based 
on inclusions of the empty set, were differentiated. 
But the problem still remains if we are going to 
support the topological idea that in terms of their 
mathematical nature, coffee mugs and doughnuts are 
homeomorphic.  
Here, we will have recourse to David Chalmers’ 
theory of consciousness, which itself is tied to a 
“conception of the world on which information is 
truly fundamental, and in which it has two basic 
aspects, corresponding to the physical and the 




phenomenal features of the world” (Chalmers 1995). 
For Chalmers, the perception of things like color 
patches in a visual field is “not so different in kind 
from the structure of binary digits” insofar as there are 
structural relations between them (Chalmers 1997, 
284). In this way, Chalmers argues that “when human 
experience realizes an information state the same 
information state is realized in the experience’s 
physical substrate” (Chalmers 1997, 284). A 
phenomenal conscious experience of differential 
relations means then there is a physical structuration 
of things in terms of information, bits, etc. as well. The 
perception of things as structurally related is 
something we are not just consciously aware of, but 
also something realized in the world outside of mind, 
such as in the brain. If the brain is itself structured by 
information, differential relations, etc., then the 
experience we have consciously also has this same 
structure (Chalmers 1997, 286).  
For Chalmers, this idea also explicates the law-
based nature of phenomena—the manner in which 
phenomenal experience and physical phenomenon 
have structure. But it is important to note that the one 
and the same information space can be embodied in 
both conscious experience and non-conscious purely 
physical processes. In this way, one shows how 
consciousness relates to something like the brain by 
showing how each explicitly unfolds structural 
relations (Chalmers 1997, 287). This isomorphism 
shows how matter and consciousness are part of the 
same reality without one being reducible to the other 
insofar as they both exhibit patterns of difference and 
can express structurally the same relations (Chalmers 
1997, 288). The world is one of “pure information” 
wherein each part and expression of it is an 
expression of an information space made up of 
differences (Chalmers 1997, 303). This also means that 
the “same experience will arise” invariantly if the 




same information space that we experience 
consciously is embodied in the brain for example.  
We can now understand what consciousness is. 
Consciousness is the awareness of various “brute 
‘qualities’” enabled by these structures but not fully 
explicable by them (Chalmers 1997, 292). 
Consciousness, as information for instance, has 
various states. These states include experienced 
qualities like happi-ness, an awareness of the 
tanginess of a piece of fruit, the grating quality of nails 
on chalkboard, etc. These are purely phenomenal 
properties that have a nature that cannot be 
“exhausted by their location in an information space” 
whereas physics is “pure information” with “nothing 
to distinguish instantiations” of two identical 
information spaces (Chalmers 1997, 304). What goes 
beyond pure information then is consciousness itself. 
It is both made up of information and is also aware of 
things that cannot be expressed or understood by 
differential relations. Consciousness is thereby a 
unique realization of information spaces via 
phenomenal judgments (Chalmers 1997, 292).  
All states might have this quality insofar as all is 
made up of information. In this way, a thermostat is 
information (one that indicates cooling and one 
heating for instance) such that it too bears witness to a 
state not reducible to the information composing it. 
For this reason, Chalmers advocates “panpsychism” 
insofar as there is a “natural supervenience of 
experience of the physical” in all cases (Chalmers 
1997, 299). For this reason, all information is 
expressed both physically and phenomenally. All 
information occurs both as consciousness and as 
material process. Phenomenal consciousness, 
however, reveals properties that cannot be explained 
by the isomorphic structure of information found in 
both, just as in the physical we will have to find 
material properties that cannot be explained by how 




that physical process embodied pure structural 
differences, whether this property be “mass and 
charge” or another related purely to extension and 
materiality (Chalmers 1997, 305).  
  This view leads Chalmers to formulate his view 
in a particularly insightful slogan:  
 
The ontology that this leads us to might be 
called double-aspect ontology. Physics re-
quires information states but cares only 
about their relations, not their intrinsic 
nature; phenomenology requires information 
states, but cares only about their intrinsic 
nature. This view postulates a single basic 
set of information states unifying the two. 
We might say that the internal aspects of the 
states are phenomenal, and the external 
aspects are physical. Or as a slogan: 
Experience is information from the inside; 
physics is information from the outside. 
(Chalmers 1997, 305)  
 
This view neatly fits our previous view and expands 
on it. All phenomena are composed of information, 
bits. All beings whether mental or material express 
structural principles, are expressible mathematically. 
But there are things that we experience, specific 
qualities, which cannot be reduced to these 
mathematical equations, for instance, that express 
these phenomena. Such properties are only 
experienced by the mind, whether it is softness of a 
color or the itchiness of a growing beard. This is 
precisely what consciousness in essence captures for 
Chalmers, as seen by the earlier parts of his book and 
his Zombie argument. But on the material side, there 
are also such properties. The heaviness of bodies or 
their persistence is not something that can be reduced 
to information. To take the most famous example, 




Galileo could express falling stones in mathematical 
terms, but could not capture the quality of resistance 
that it experiences while falling. The very resistance 
in its materiality would be a material qualia. 
We then have a monism of information that has 
an inside and an outside. It is interesting to compare 
this view with Spinoza on substance. For Spinoza, 
there was but one substance, but it had an infinity of 
attributes of which humans are only aware of two 
(mind and extension). Now, perhaps also the created 
world comprehended by information has other 
possible fundamental attributes, but we along with 
Chalmers, only seek to isolate two, that which is on 
the inside via mind as consciousness and the 
proprieties irreducibly related to it (a good example 
again is qualia). And on the outside, information also 
has irreducible properties, just as extended physical 
existence. This distinction is itself internal to 
information, part of its very being. The very being of 
information includes that it has two fundamental 
attributes that are irreducible to each other as much as 
they are not reducible to the information that they are 
internal to. That is, mind and extension are 
themselves different in kind.  
While qualia are part of this mental dimension, to 
fully flesh out this idea we would have to discuss all 
purely mental phenomena. For instance, in dreams 
and imaginations one sees all sorts of things. One 
might be able to express mathematically the brain 
activity and/or the way in which one’s eyes move and 
react. But there will be some irreducible dimension of 
things (beyond the mere feeling of being in the dream) 
such as the receding of a space in a dream. But this 
will only be the irreducible inside of information. On 
the outside, one could speak to, for example, the 
irreducible flickering of the eye rubbing against the 
eyelid. 




Another way Chalmers helps us to understand 
this distinction between the two fundamental 
attributes is that consciousness is how the first-person 
feels the world, whereas extension involves a third-
person viewpoint on things. One might here then 
point out how the world of matter as extension 
Descartes revealed also reveals a world of volume and 
shape that also has properties not reducible to this 
geometrical expression and embodiment. For instance, 
bodies of different densities not only have different 
mechanical properties and in their very density 
express something that is not reducible to the 
geometrical information they are composed of. Here, 
we can explain the difference between the coffee mug 
and the doughnut despite their being identical from 
the perspective of geometrical information. It is from 
the perspective of mind and matter, physics and 
phenomenology, as the two irreducible attributers of 
the monistic created world of information, that they 
are perceived as different. Our hands touch these two 
items and it is the roundness of the doughnut that 
stands out. On the side of extension, the sheer 
cylindrical density of the coffee mug helps 
differentiate it from the doughnut.  
Chalmers follows Saul Kripke in saying that 
(given the irreducibility of consciousness) “when God 
created the world, after ensuring that physical facts 
held, he had more work to do. He had to ensure that 
the facts about consciousness held” (Chalmers 1997, 
124). I think we can now make sense of what this 
‘extra work’ consisted. Since consciousness is not 
reducible to the physical, it would appear that it needs 
an extra act to bring it about. However, we can now 
clarify this remark that it is not just that God needed 
to do something more to create consciousness, but that 
consciousness is itself an internal attribute of a created 
world of information.  




Let’s return to the example of my voice to further 
explain the fundamental ontological distinction we 
are introducing and the work it does. My voice can be 
expressed simply and is made up of information. For 
this reason, it can be recorded on a computer and 
replayed. Without this possibility of reducing my 
voice to the bits of the information, phone calls would 
not be possible. Just as writing, as a series of symbolic 
letters, can be reduced to bits, so auditory symbols 
such as phonemes can. My voice’s sound waves are 
themselves understood in their amplitude. But what 
cannot be embodied in information is my voice’s 
deepness that one hears. Chalmers helps us by 
discussing the quality of a ring: “I hear a ring. Nothing 
about the quality of the ring seems to correspond 
directly to any structure in the world, although I 
certainly know it originated with the speaker, and that 
is determined by a waveform. But why should that 
wave form, or even these neural firings, have given 
rise to a sound quality like that?” (Chalmers 1997, 7). 
The very shrill quality of a ring for instance is not 
something that is embodied in the ring itself as 
information, as waveform. That would be a 
phenomenal qualia that only consciousness perceives 
and forms the mental aspect of my voice. From the 
side of pure extension, the sound waves themselves of 
the voice lay themselves out. In the same way that a 
rusty fan grates on one, these sound waves undulate in 
their brute amplitudes.  
Now it is interesting that the proper software for 
emulating voices has not yet been made. That is, while 
one can record a voice and reproduce it as such 
without any quality being lost, the technology for then 
having the recorded voice produce new sentences as 
the speaker would has not been perfected. In the 
recordings, one no more encounters a representation 
of voice or quasi-voice over the phone than one does 
in speaking ‘face-to-face’. A voice over the phone can 




command and have real effects in its telephonic 
presence. In addition, to say that it is ‘as if’ one were 
present assumes that voice at one location is fully 
present. But such an assumption is undercut by the 
very phenomenological fact that voice can be present 
elsewhere and not simply ‘here and now’. One may 
initially think that telephonic voice was a mere 
appearance that is made possible by some real or fully 
present voice, when telephonic voice is just as much 
voice as it is in a ‘face-to-face’ discussion. One has the 
very body of the speaker in another location. 
Telephonic voice is not a representation of one’s 
voice—it is one’s voice as much as at any other time. 
One is disembodied without leaving one’s body and 
through one’s very body. While the virtual or 
telepresence might initially appear to name some ‘as 
if’ quality of phenomena, telephonic voice shows, 
once again, how the virtual is not ‘less real’, but rather 
exhibits a reality and actuality unto itself. One cannot 
as of yet have a computer invent new sentences that 
sound exactly like how one would speak of them. But 
this seems more so like a technical barrier that one 
day will be crossed, since the voice is in its very being 
information. While the sadness of a voice will still be 
something only consciousness is aware of, the voice 
itself will be able to be emulated one day.  
That one’s voice is bits of information also keys 
us in on how the oneness of the voice is noted—that 
the voice one hears in person is the same voice as one 
heard on the phone. That experience is also part of the 
mental expression of information. The mental 
attribute of information notes how the voice repeats 
itself, not just insofar as the same waveform with the 
same structural relations is repeated, but insofar as 
consciousness is aware of a repeating qualia. Here, we 
can also think of Neo in the movie The Matrix. In that 
movie, all Neo experiences is a function of pure 
information. The whole world is composed of bits. But 




Neo experiences people, spoons, jackets, sunglasses, 
etc. These objects may not refer always to the same set 
of bits, but it is consciousness that picks up on the 
mental expression of the information in order to see 
them as such.  
We can also find another aspect of this mental 
attribute in terms of the type of object Lacan called 
objet a. One might say that one’s voice over the phone 
is a representation since it is translated into electrical 
pulses in order to be conveyed. But voice like any 
another phenomenon is fundamentally information in 
its being such that these electrical pulses are one’s 
voice. Now one’s voice and breath are thereby not 
simply the ‘living here and now’ of what is perceived, 
but the perceptible voice heard in relation to the 
electrical pulses or digitization of the voice that allows 
one just to see the inside and outside aspects of 
information, rather than being opposed to information 
as such (the relation between the analogical voice and 
the digital series which compose it). Also, one need 
not here speak of the apparatus as necessary, since it 
is the informational nature of voice already that makes 
the use of this apparatus possible. One does not need 
to speak of electrical pulses or digitization to 
understand the nature of voice and its disembodiment, 
since voice is separable from oneself due to a more 
fundamental, constitutive ‘digitization’—one’s 
subjection to the signifier or language, as much as all 
creation is subject to it via the tzimtzum.  
The telephone is not the first instrument to 
separate the voice from the perceptible body of a 
person, rather speaking itself makes this constitutive 
of voice. While the telephone transported the voice 
and allowed it to be in more than one place, language 
itself makes of voice something separable from the 
body or presence. As Mladen Dolar argues in his 
fascinating essay “The Object Voice,” Saussurean 
linguistics and phonology (i.e., structural linguistics 




or Structuralism) instituted a new understanding of 
voice by questioning a naive or simply empirical 
understanding of voice and the relation between voice 
and meaning:  
 
The Saussurean turn has obviously a lot to 
do with the voice. If we are to take seriously 
the negative nature of the linguistic sign, its 
purely differential and oppositive value then 
the voice—as the supposedly natural soil of 
speech, its seemingly positive substance, its 
firm substratum—has to be put into question. 
The voice has to be carefully discarded as 
the source of an imaginary blinding that has 
hitherto prevented linguistics from 
discovering the structural determinations 
that enable that tricky transubstantiation of 
voice into the linguistic sign. The voice is 
the impeding element that one has to be rid 
of in order to initiate a new science of 
language. (Dolar 1996, 7) 
 
The focus on voice or sound as empirically heard 
blinded one to the structure that allows for meaning 
and the intelligibility of voice.  
In this way, beyond the heard voice, one 
penetrates to something that does not appear and yet 
structures the meaning and appearing of voice and 
meaning:  
 
Beyond the voice ‘with flesh and bones’ (as 
Jakobson will say; some decades later), 
there lies the fleshless and boneless entity 
defined purely by its function—the silent 
sound, the soundless voice. The new object 
demands a new science: high hopes are 
now vested in phonology instead of 
traditional phonetics. The question of how 




the different sounds are produced is seen 
as obsolete; what counts are the differential 
oppositions of phonemes, their purely 
relational nature, there reduction to 
distinctive features. They are isolated by 
their ability to distinguish the units of 
signification, but in such a way that the 
specific signifying distinctions are irrele-
vant, their only importance being that they 
take place, not what they might be. The 
phonemes lack substance, they are com-
pletely reducible to form, according to one 
of the most famous of Saussure’s dictums, 
and they lack any signification on their 
own. They are just senseless quasi-
algebraic elements in a formal matrix of 
combinations, and it is ultimately only to 
them that the Saussurean definition of sign 
fully applies (such will be Jakobson’s criti-
cism of Saussure): they are the only stratum 
of language which is entirely made of 
purely negative quantities, their identity is 
‘a pure alterity.’ They are the senseless 
atoms that in their combination ‘make 
sense.’ (Dolar 1996, 7-8)  
 
The phoneme, as a purely relational notion, is the 
voice reduced to its basic elements. A phoneme is 
itself a purely differential element. In speaking, we 
hear the sound ‘b’, but not the phoneme b. Since the 
phoneme is the actual letter as information.  
Derrida articulates this difference nicely in his Of 
Grammatology by way of differentiating between the 
“sound heard” and “the being-heard of the sound” 
(Derrida 1976, 63). The being-heard is purely struc-
tural and “radically dissimilar” to the sound heard 
(Derrida 1976, 63). The “sound appearing” [le son 
apparaissant] is then differentiated from “the 




structure of the appearing of the sound” [l’apparaitre 
du son] (Derrida 1976, 63). The “appearing sound” 
and the “appearing of the sound” must then be 
distinguished in order to make sense. Such a 
distinction neatly maps onto the mind/extension 
distinction (Derrida 1976, 64). The appearing sound is 
the one of consciousness, wherein one can hear that it 
is grating or mellifluous, while the appearing of the 
sound might refer to the sound as pure extension as 
sound waves bouncing off other things and spreading 
out. The two are distinguished and ontologically 
distinct, yet expressions of the same information. This 
“unheard difference between appearing and the 
appearance [l’apparaissant et l’apparaitre] . . . is the 
condition of all other differences of all other traces, 
and it is already a trace” (Derrida 1976, 65).  
Now, the phoneme exists only as differential 
meaning in a mutual relationship to another phoneme, 
b/p. But such a relation is not simply negative in 
quality. It is not simply a question of saying ‘b’ is not 
‘p’ and ‘p’ is not ‘b.’ This mutual determination allows 
for language and words to be differentiated (for 
instance, ‘back’ and ‘pack’). They are what allow 
human speech to be distinct from mere noise. They 
are what allow one’s own language to be intelligible 
while a foreign language appears as mere noise. These 
phonemes as purely relational entities are not 
substantial in and through themselves, but only ever 
found in their actualizations, in the enunciations of a 
language.  
Here, sense arises from non-sense, from what is 
not in itself meaningful. In this manner, all the 
perceptible sounds of a language, of speaking, can be 
reduced to a set of differential relations. One can then 
map the sounds of speech by way of a table of 
differential relations. Voice is already digitized by way 
of phonemes. Speech is then seen as being intelligible 
by way of a set of differential relations, which also 




accounts for how empirical variations (for instance, an 
accent) can arise without meaning changing (Dolar 
1996, 8-9).  
The empirical variations of voice make up a 
“surplus” that is added onto the purely signifying 
dimension of speech and voice (Dolar 1996, 8). The 
tangible voice is in its very being the structured 
language of which any speech act forms holds within 
itself (Dolar 1996, 9). Voice is a grid of differential 
relations. The real substance of voice, as signifying, is 
not the sounds heard which is in its qualia part of the 
mental attribute of information, but the structure 
itself. In this way, following Jacques Lacan’s second 
graph of desire, from his essay “Subversion of the 
Subject and the Dialectic of Desire” (E 306), Dolar 
attempts to show how given the reduction of voice to 
differential relations, voice now becomes an object, a 
partial object, a left-over (Dolar 1996, 9). What is left 
over after the mapping of voice in its intelligibility, its 
reduction to phonemes, what could not be reduced, is 
not some “positive feature,” but simply voice qua 
object as what remains after the mapping, the non-
meaningful surplus (Dolar 1996, 9-10). Voice qua left-
over is the “nonsignifying remainder” that resists 
intelligibility. It is that part of voice that exceeds the 
intelligibility of what is sounded and heard.  
Voice qua remainder “has nothing to do with 
some irreducible individuality of the voice,” the 
personal aspects of voice, rather, if this left-over 
emerges by way of the differential relations, then this 
voice embodies an excessive presence (Dolar 1996, 10-
11). The differential relation is not actual, not 
explicitly or empirically heard, so that the voice qua 
left-over embodies in an excessive manner the purely 
relational nature of the phoneme and thereby gives 
body to meaning as an excess: “So the voice seems to 
endow this empty and negative entity with a 
counterpart, its ‘missing half,’ so to speak, a 




‘supplement’ that would enable this negative being to 
acquire some hold in positivity, a ‘substance,’ a 
relationship to presence” (Dolar 1996, 11). There is 
then a dimension of voice which exceeds its signifying 
aspect and remains irreducible to it. It can exist as an 
object, as a partial object in the specifically Lacanian 
sense—an objet a.  
Such partial objects are representatives of a lost 
ontological plenitude and thereby consist in the 
presence of absence. They are a function of one’s own 
alienation in the signifier. Here, voice as the excess 
and embodiment of purely differential relations forms 
an embodiment of what is not actual and cannot 
strictly be. It is the embodiment of oneself as empty 
set. Voice is then detached as a partial object, as 
something heard in what is spoken beyond meaning, 
as an excessive presence. Once one speaks, one’s voice 
is part of language, speaks through language as it were, 
as if through a megaphone. One’s sounds are not 
intelligible because of oneself, but because of the 
virtual structure which informs them. This structure is 
trans-individual and located nowhere in particular. 
We speak through something else in order to be 
intelligible.  
Now, as Dolar emphasizes, it is Derrida who 
made voice the fundamental object of philosophical 
inquiry, insofar as he showed that ‘hearing-oneself-
speak’ formed the basic ‘experience’ from which all 
ideal notions emerge (Dolar 1996, 12). Voice, from a 
Derridean perspective, is the source of the illusion of 
full presence and ontological plenitude. It founds the 
philosophy of pure ideality. However, voice qua 
object, a voice not simply that of full presence, but of 
an excessive presence, escapes intelligibility (Dolar 
1996, 15). This very excessive remainder voice also 
disrupts any notions of presence by embodying an 
irreducible non-signifying dimension, by presenting 




voice as surplus object. Voice qua object is the flip-
side of the critique of voice qua full self-presence.  
Dolar, like Derrida, wishes to show how full 
ontological plenitude is not found in voice. But for 
Derrida, in his analysis of Husserl’s theory of meaning 
in Speech and Phenomena (better translated as Voice 
and Phenomena), it is not simply that ‘hearing-
oneself-speak’ founds the idea of self-presence; it also 
founds the idea of disembodiment, a soul, something 
non-material. In ‘hearing-oneself-speak’, in interior 
monologue, one seemingly establishes an other-
worldly dimension: “The phenomenological voice 
would be this spiritual flesh that continues to speak 
and be present to itself—to hear itself—in the absence 
of the world” (SP 16). Without the world, the voice of 
interior monologue hears itself and exists. It creates a 
purely solipsistic space. For Husserl, the voice of 
interior monologue does not require signs or marks 
since “it is immediately present to itself” (SP 43). One 
does not communicate with oneself since this would 
imply one is divided from oneself and not fully 
present to oneself (SP 48). Such a position would 
seem to contradict the basic transparency constitutive 
of the cogito. Hearing-oneself-speak is consciousness 
and marks the minimal condition for consciousness.  
That ‘hearing-oneself-speak’ does seem to erect a 
purely auto-affecting full presence to self follows from 
the fact that the signs one uses seem “to fade away the 
very moment it is produced” and seem already to be 
idealized (SP 77). The sign, the signifier, effaces itself 
at the moment it is enunciated in interior monologue. 
The sign one uses to communicate immediately seems 
to become something non-worldly as the “opacity of 
its body” is transformed “into pure diaphaneity”: 
“When I speak, it belongs to the phenomenological 
essence of this operation that I hear myself [je 
m’entende] at the same time that I speak. The signifier 
is animated by my breath and by the meaning-




intention” (SP 77). Hearing-oneself-speak means that 
one speaks and hears simultaneously, such that the 
sign and its ideal meaning coincide in order to make it 
appear that one does not even use signs or that one 
merely auto-affects oneself and is fully present to 
oneself. One hears oneself seemingly instantly, at 
once, without any mediation, obstacle, or interruption.  
When one sees oneself, one has to pass through 
something exterior to oneself (a mirror, water, any 
reflecting surface, etc.), but when one hears oneself 
speak there seems to be nothing exterior or alien 
separating the self from itself (SP 78-80). One 
apparently purely affects oneself through oneself. One 
does not have to expose oneself to the world or to 
experience oneself as part of the world. Also, when 
one writes or makes a sign with one’s hands or face, 
one once again does not seemingly have the pure 
immediacy of hearing oneself speak: “The signifier 
would become perfectly diaphanous due to the 
absolute proximity to the signified. This proximity is 
broken when, instead of hearing myself speak, I see 
myself write or gesture” (SP 80). The bodies of the 
signifiers used seem to efface themselves in their very 
enunciation with hearing oneself. 
This seeming immediate presence gives rise to, 
and is the source of, the illusion of disembodiment, 
the idea that one could be a disembodied mind, a pure 
consciousness, a soul without a body. In hearing 
oneself speak, in auto-affecting oneself, one seemingly 
has no worldly body, but only “a spiritual flesh” due 
to the self-effacement of the signifiers or any 
mediation involved (SP 81). But, of course, there is 
always iterability. Any sign one uses even in interior 
monologue is constitutively iterable, such that the 
meaning and ideality of those signs is constituted by a 
fundamental repetition which allows for them to be 
trans-individual, occur in multiple contexts, and 
never to achieve full ontological presence. In this way, 




hearing oneself speak gives rise to the illusion of full 
self-presence and disembodiment because it is an 
immediate, spontaneous disavowal of iterability. Even 
in hearing oneself speak, one must use signs subject to 
iterability in order to be intelligible. One is never fully 
self-present, since the signifier one uses is iterable and 
thereby trans-individual and intelligible in one’s 
absence. One relates to oneself then by way of 
something exterior to oneself. One is always already 
mediated.  
The possibility of disappearance and absence 
inherent in the meaning of signs means that hearing 
oneself speak is founded on absence and not full 
presence. Hearing-oneself-speak is then the origin of 
the illusion of being disembodied or being able to be 
disembodied, but this illusion is always undermined 
by what makes it possible—the iterability of the signs 
involved. One could say that with the telephone what 
makes voice disembodied is precisely what makes it 
fully embodied—iterability. Iterability gives rise to the 
illusion of disembodiment and perhaps to the only 
type of disembodiment we know here and now. The 
belief in any other form was premised on a ‘hearing-
oneself-speak’.   
Although the Internet and other computer-
mediated phenomena have given rise to the belief in 
potential disembodiment, what makes this belief 
possible also shows how there will always be a body 
involved. One cannot exist purely disembodied as 
digitized any more than one can by hearing-oneself-
speak. Perhaps this is why hearing-oneself-speak on a 
sound recording device is so disturbing and one 
always misrecognizes one’s voice (‘is that how I 
sound?’). We would not even recognize ourselves as 
disembodied because disembodiment is in part predi-
cated on the illusion of a lack of otherness within the 
self. It is then voice as information that shows the soul 
itself is pure information and that mind is an internal 




irreducible attribute of information. Also, we can say 
that mind here is an expression of our being subjected 
to the signifier.  
Badiou only uses the concept mind in one section 
when discussing the empty set:  
 
The set of subsets of the void is the set to 
which everything included in the void 
belongs. But only the void is included in the 
void . . . Therefore, p (0), set of subsets of the 
void, is that multiple to which the void, and 
the void alone, belongs. Mind! The set to 
which the void alone belongs cannot be the 
void itself, because nothing belongs to the 
void, not even the void itself. It would 
already be excessive for the void to have an 
element. One could object: but given that 
this element is void there is no problem. (BE 
88)  
 
In this way, mind is another way of stating that the 
empty set includes itself. Mind is an expression of the 
mind’s self-belonging. This is then another reason 
why mind appears as a function of information. It is 
not simply by hearing oneself speak that mind is 
founded, but mind itself is a function of information. 
This is why mind finds itself confronted not just by 
qualia but also objects a, like voice, that fill out the 
subject. Thus, even though we need to see 
consciousness as being an attribute of information, 
that  does not mean we need to think of consciousness 
as itself a plenitude.  
Jacques Lacan’s conception of the subject proves 
to be a powerful corrective to this position (of 
consciousness as plenitude). The difference between 
the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the 
enunciated is rendered by Lacan by way of a re-
reading of the well-known liar’s paradox. The subject 




alienated into language, and thereby the subject of the 
unconscious (since the unconscious arises from one 
being subjected to language), is fundamentally and 
ineradicably divided. Subjected to the signifier, 
subjected to language, the subject is subject to the 
unconscious, is a decentered and split subject, a 
subject divided against itself, precisely because the 
subject is alienated in language. This split is brought 
out by distinguishing between the subject of the 
enunciation, the act of enunciating, and subject of the 
enunciated, the content of what is stated. This 
differentiation is brought out by the ancient paradox 
of ‘I am lying’, which after this differentiation is no 
longer seen as self-contradictory, but actually can be 
seen to be a true statement (as common sense has 
always understood it being able to be).  
For Lacan, one can distinguish between “the level 
of the enunciation,” the place from which one speaks, 
the ‘I’ as shifter that refers only to the act of speaking, 
to the act of enunciating, and “the level of the 
statement,” the content of what is spoken, its meaning 
(FF 138). While previously a statement like ‘I am 
lying’ seemed paradoxical because the content was 
true and yet asserted a falsity, by distinguishing 
between enunciation and enunciated one can see how 
the ‘I’ “of the enunciation is not the same as” that “of 
the statement” (FF 139). Only a “shifter” designates 
the ‘I’ who is lying, so that it merely designates the act 
of speaking while the content of the statement ‘am 
lying’ is determined transindividually as part of the 
lexicon of meaning (FF 139). The very act of 
enunciation is differentiable from the content and 
meaning of the statement ‘I am lying’. Even the ‘I’ of 
the statement, the shifter which designates the subject 
of the content as whoever is speaking, is different from 
the very act and place from which the statement is 
issued. While the one who utters the statement is 
designated by the shifter, the very act of enunciating 




the statement is differentiated from what the statement 
contains, just as a set can be distinguished from the 
members of the set.    
This is particularly apt to an enunciation, since 
the meaning of the content is not determined by the 
act of uttering, but objectively (FF 139-40). The 
distinguishing of these two levels shows how the act 
of enunciation does not determine the meaning of the 
statement and the ‘I’ of the statement is part of the 
content determined objectively. Instead of seeing the 
subject as identical with what it states, the content of 
the statement, the division between the two levels 
shows the subject as split. The Lacanian subject, the 
subject subjected to the signifier, alienated into 
language and the subject of the unconscious (the 
speaking subject), is not identifiable with either level, 
but rather “the subject is nothing but this very split” 
(Fink 1995, 45). The subject is neither the ‘I’, the 
shifter, nor simply the act of enunciation (Fink 1995, 
37). The subject does not appear in the content of 
what is uttered since the content is given meaning by 
being part of the stock of syllables and is not the act of 
stating. Instead, the content takes the place of the 
subject and represents the subject objectively.  
It is in this way that one can understand the 
Lacanian thesis: ‘the signifier represents the subject 
for another signifier’. The subject does not appear in 
and is not identifiable strictly with the content of what 
is said, but rather is represented and given meaning by 
something objective. One is always already caught in a 
self-referential medium wherein one only appears 
without appearing. All appearing is governed by the 
non-given subject. The fact that the subject is not 
identifiable with either the act of enunciation or the 
content does not mean, however, that the Lacanian 
subject, the speaking subject, is “some kind of 
underlying substance or substratum” (Fink 1995, 41). 
The subject is the division between the two levels and 




“has no other being than as a breach in discourse” 
(Fink 1995, 41). The content is the stand-in for the 
subject which does not appear in what is said. In this 
way, one does not take on new identities in chat, but 
rather, believing one does is a way of disavowing the 
fundamental void of subjectivity, that the subject is 
the split in discourse.  
One disappears from one’s speech. Voice as objet 
a then appears to fill in the space one disappeared 
from as pure mind. The Lacanian notions of alienation 
and separation articulate even more precisely what 
Lacan means by the subject as split or decentered, the 
subject as barred, $, and how this relates to fantasy 
formation.29  With the notion of the “lamella,” 
Lacanian theory articulates how one is finite and 
lacking merely from the fact that one must reproduce 
sexually (FF 197). Instead of being an ‘immortal’ and 
indestructible life, as an amoeba would be, this 
immortality is “subtracted” from one by having to 
reproduce in a sexual way (FF 197). While the objets a 
are the representatives of this immortal life substance, 
this full, ontological plenitude, it is also the case that 
it is in this way that the subject can be understood as 
lacking. The objets a are the representatives of this 
ontological plenitude that one ‘loses’, losing 
paradoxically what one never had, that incite desire, 
since desire is partly understood as orientated around 
                                                                                     
29 The Lacanian terms ‘alienation’ and ‘separation’ can be 
understood as Lacan’s rendition of the ‘Oedipus-complex.’  
But instead of giving a genetic and historical account of 
subjectivization as Freud does, Lacan here gives a structural 
(and to some extent transcendental) account. Instead of 
positing a confrontation with the father or external authority, 
an act of renunciation, or act of internalization, Lacan 
renders renunciation as always already the case (as a 
consequence of finitude). In this way, Lacan’s account will 
appropriate the Freudian account by giving a transcendental 
account of what Freud renders in genetico-historical terms. 




a desire for plenitude. However, since the subjective is 
constitutively split, desire is a desire for what one 
never had. And since this ontological plenitude is also 
understandable as das Ding (since it is characterized 
in a homologous way as that which one constitutively 
‘loses’, as being the always already lost full ontological 
plenitude), the objets a hold out the promise of 
jouissance as the enjoyment of full ontological 
plenitude.  
The subject is represented only in what it 
articulates, in the chain of its content, in the chain of 
signifiers. This chain is what can be made present of 
the subject since the subject is neither the act of 
enunciation nor the enunciated content, but rather the 
split between them, the absent cause. Language 
precedes the subject and the subject is represented 
through it. The organism can only arise as subject and 
become subject by being represented in the chain of 
signifiers (FF 203). One emerges into a world in which 
there is already speech and writing, in which one 
already has a place and has already been understood. 
One becomes subject thereby by being caught up in 
the discourse that precedes one. Since the subject does 
not appear in the chain of signifiers in either speech or 
writing or any other form a chain of signifiers can 
take, the subject is not reducible to this chain or even 
to the act of articulating it. Instead it is the split 
between these two levels.  
But in being caught up or alienated in language, 
“two lacks overlap” (FF 204). The real lack of the 
subject as sexually reproducing, the constitutive ‘loss’ 
of what one never had, and the lack instituted by 
becoming a speaking subject or in general subjected to 
language as a chain of signifiers: 
 
The first emerges from the central defect 
around which the dialectic of the advent of 
the subject to his own being in the relation to 




the Other turns—by the fact that the subject 
depends on the signifier and that the 
signifier is first of all in the field of the 
Other. This lack takes up the other lack, 
which is the real, earlier lack, to be situated 
at the advent of the living being, that is to 
say, at sexed reproduction. The real lack is 
what the living being loses, that part of 
himself qua living being, in reproducing 
himself through the way of sex. This lack is 
real because it relates to something real, 
namely, that the living being, by being 
subject to sex, has fallen under the blow of 
individual death. (FF 204-5)  
 
What Lacan calls “the Other” with a capital ‘O’ here 
means and represents the objective status of language 
and the fact that language precedes the subject as 
already being constituted and having objective 
meaning. “The Other” is the word-stock of language 
that has an objective status and meaning outside of the 
subject. The establishment of the subject begins with 
the subject being caught up in the field of the Other.  
The Other is the set of signifiers structured in an 
oppositional and synchronic manner that precedes the 
subject and has an objective status. The Other as this 
set is also not completely external to the subject, but 
rather extimate, since the subject is caught up in it and 
internalizes language (although the Other still has its 
objective status). The constitution of the subject 
thereby arises when one is caught up in the field of 
the Other in an extimate way. Neither subject nor 
Other can be reduced to each other, but they are 
extimately related. The very chain of signifiers that 
represent the subject is in the field of the Other, and in 
this way the subject is represented “in an other place” 
[ein andere Schauplatz].  




But while the signifier resides in the field of the 
Other, this other place is internalized into the subject 
and thereby both internal and external. In this way, 
the subject as caught up in the field of the Other and 
represented therein is the subject of the unconscious, 
since for Lacan ‘the unconscious is the discourse of 
the Other.’ To be the subject of the unconscious is to 
be subjected to the Other, the entire set of signifiers. 
To say that ‘the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other’ is another way of saying that ‘the unconscious 
is structured like language’ since the Other is the 
entire set of signifiers structured in a way 
homologously to a Structuralist (Saussurean and 
Jakob-sonian) understanding of language.  
Since each signifier is differentially opposed to 
all the others, it positively emerges from absence, and 
each signifier’s self-identity and positivity rests on its 
being articulated to its place. However, this implies a 
difference between each signifier and its place. The 
absent place that precedes each signifier and each 
signifier fills in is constituted by the subject. The 
subject is the name for this absence. It is the absent 
cause responsible for allowing a chain of signifiers to 
be articulated. It is the absent place that allows for one 
signifier to arise after another. As the absent place, it 
causes the chain to slide from signifier to signifier. 
Here, this absent cause structures what appears, one’s 
discourse, by not being able to appear. The absent 
cause is mind. 
The signifier can be separated from its place for 
the same reason one can distinguish between a set and 
its members. The subject is neither the set of signifiers 
nor its members, but the very difference between the 
two. As the absent cause of a chain of signifiers, it is 
the lack between the two and the lack that allows a 
signifier to emerge in its place. The subject is thereby 




the empty set.30 In other words, “the zero is the 
presence of the subject” (FF 226). And it is the subject 
as zero that allows a series of numbers to be 
articulated since “the series of numbers can only be 
figured by introducing the zero, in a more or less 
masked way” (FF 226). It is neither the set nor the 
members of the set but the difference between the two, 
just as it is the very split between the level of 
enunciation and enunciated.  
In this way, the subject itself is the void place as 
zero. We are made in the image of the Name of God. It 
allows for one signifier to be articulated after another, 
just as the zero for Frege was the concept non-
identical to itself that allowed for the series of 
numbers to be articulated and for counting one after 
the other to occur. The subject as empty set is the 
absent cause, the lack, that causes and allows for one 
signifier to be articulated after another. It is the lack 
that clears the space in which a signifier can emerge, 
the space to which a signifier can come. The subject is 
thereby the very spacing that allows for one signifier 
to be articulated after another. However, as this lack, 
the subject is non-identical to itself. This non-identity 
is of course the subject as desiring, the subject as split 
and divided, the subject as subject of the unconscious. 
It is this desire that animates and causes the chain of 
signifiers to slide. The signifiers stand in for the 
subject as constitutively absent and represent the 
subject while the subject as lack allows for the spacing 
                                                                                     
30  See Jacques-Alain Miller, “Suture” (1977/1978), for a 
detailed reading of the subject as empty set and its relation 
to the chain signifier. This essay gives the fundamental logic 
of what I am spelling out here as the lack initiated by the 








in which the signifier can emerge and fill in and retain 
its identity.  
It is in this way, as subject of language, that the 
subject lacks and ‘is’ this lack since it is the subject as 
divided, as being finite and split, and it is desiring 
that allows it to be this absent cause. This lack 
transfigures the real lack. The two lacks thereby 
overlap. The subject has the real lack as having lost 
something and thereby being divided, and this real 
lack allows the subject as empty set to absently cause 
one signifier to be articulated after another. These two 
lacks fold over each other, but it is the lack that 
emerges due to one being caught up in language that 
organizes and configures the real lack. This logically 
prior, but really second, lack assumes the real lack as 
the desire that absently causes the chain to slide. In 
this way, the real lack will have been assumed by the 
subject as lack in the Other (but the real lack is always 
heterogeneous to the Other, to the symbolic).  
The speaking subject thereby assumes the real 
lack: Wo Es war, soll Ich werden. The subject’s very 
being is reconstituted and reconfigured by being 
caught up in language and speaking. By speaking, one 
becomes where the real lack was. One emerges as 
speaking subject from the very locus of one’s being 
and assumes it. One’s being as really constituted is 
thereby assumed in the act of speaking.  
The subject is thereby either meaning, the 
objecttive meaning its stand-ins have, or existence, the 
want-to-be of desire. The subject, although it is the 
split between the two levels, is broken up and halved 
into these two levels. The subject of enunciation and 
the subject of the enunciated content are therefore the 
two halves of the subject. One half is being (or really 
desire as non-being, as existence) and the other 
meaning, thinking as chain of signifiers (or really 
being, being as essence, as what one is, as opposed to 
that one is). Alienation is this either/or of being, desire 




as ‘want-to-be’, or meaning (FF 211). The subject as 
being, as really lacking, is only the absent cause of the 
chain of signifiers and only ever appears there in its 
stand-ins; it is heterogeneous and cannot appear in the 
field of the Other. In this way, it either has being as 
the absent cause of the sliding of the chain or ‘is’ the 
meaning that it becomes in the field of the Other. This 
either/or is then an either/or between meaning (being 
as essence) and being (being as ‘want-to-be’, 
existence).  
Becoming a subject is thereby the same as this 
forced choice. In becoming subject, in speaking, one 
chooses meaning, but meaning deprived of being. If 
one chooses full ontological plenitude and refuses 
finitude, refuses to speak and have one’s meaning 
articulated in the field of the Other, one gets neither 
meaning nor being. One can either become social or 
anti-social, autistic. There is thereby an imperative 
that obligates one to make a certain choice here: to 
speak, to assume one’s finitude, to give up on 
ontological plenitude by articulating one’s desire for 
the impossible in and through signifiers.  
One answers this question by choosing what one 
is for others, what one is in the field of the Other, 
what one is. This choice stops the sliding of desire 
from signifier to signifier by choosing one signifier 
that ultimately represents one. One says implicitly ‘I 
am this’, ‘I am this for others’. One answers for what is 
lacking in the field of the Other and oneself, the place 
where the two lacks overlap, by offering an answer to 
this question. One constructs oneself and a substitute 
form of enjoyment.  
Such a construction gives one the formula of 
fantasy: $ ^ a (FF 209). The “little losange” signifies 
the joining of the split subject to an objet a (FF 209). It 
signifies the split subject joined to a by way of 
alienation and separation (the lower half being the ‘v’ 
of the vel of alienation and the top signifying 




separation) (FF 209). Alienation constitutes the subject 
as split and lacking, while separation fills out this lack 
by stuffing it up (E 314). The objet a is this stuffing.31 
One answers the lack in the field of the Other and the 
lack in the real (the subject being both these lacks both 
in the symbolic and real senses) by choosing a as a 
substitute form of enjoyment and choosing a chain of 
signifiers, one’s symptom as a set of signifiers defining 
what one is.  
Since the objets a are the representatives and 
equivalents of das Ding, the constitutively lost nature 
of the thing of jouissance, of ontological plenitude, 
causes one to answer the constant sliding of desire by 
filling in the lack in the set of signifiers, the lack 
where what is constitutively lost is felt as absent. One 
thereby chooses how one will enjoy in lieu of full 
ontological plenitude. But fantasy attempts to cover 
over alienation by giving the subject a substitute form 
of enjoyment. This fantasy is organized around one of 
the objets a in such a way as it organizes the way one 
enjoys and desires. The sliding of desire through 
signifiers is thereby arrested by constructing a 
substitute form of enjoyment.  
This fantasy is not simply one of the many 
daydreams one has, but the underlying fantasy that 
organizes all fantasies and desires. It signals the way 
in which one has responded to the question ‘what am 
I?’ by answering for the constitutive lack in the field of 
the set of signifiers. In this way, it cannot be a 
signifier, but instead a representative of the thing of 
jouissance. Fantasy thereby covers over the subject as 
                                                                                     
31  Deleuze has already hinted at how Lacan’s partial objects 
can be seen as “shreds of pure past” and thereby constitute 
virtual objects (DR 101-5). For a discussion of Deleuze on 
Lacanian partial objects, see Dorothea Olkowski’s Gilles 
Deleuze and the Ruin of Representation (1999), 152-62. 
 




lack, as desire, by giving the subject as lack, as ‘want-
to-be’ being.  
In answering the question ‘what am I?’, the basic 
answer for Lacan reads as follows: “‘I’ am the place 
from which a voice is heard clamouring ‘the universe 
is a defect in the purity of Non-Being’” (E 317). 
Fantasy and the symptom thereby give one the being 
that one constitutively loses as a speaking being. One’s 
very Dasein is within this phantasy and symptom, for 
it is here that one stops the sliding of desire and offers 
an answer to lack, to ‘want-to-be’. Fantasy then is a 
fundamental part of consciousness and one expressed 
internally by the monism of information 
characterizing the world as much as consciousness is 
also involved with qualia.32    
There is one more role consciousness will have to 
play here, one that may be surprising to attribute to it 
given our realism. Quantum physics is infamous for 
suggesting that all things are in superposition until 
consciousness arises and perceives things, thereby 
disentangling what is into distinct states. This implies 
that “before consciousness evolved,” one cannot say 
the universe existed as such (Chalmers 1997, 340). 
The creation of consciousness itself caused a collapse 
of the universal wave function and the superposition 
to end. The universe thus comes into being as it were 
when consciousness does. As Chalmers notes, this 
view seems “incompatible with the view” that sees 
consciousness as a fundamental attributer to 
information itself, and Chalmers himself rejects the 
idea that consciousness brings about a collapse of the 
                                                                                     
32 Some here might ask why a qualia is itself not infor-
mation. But recall that we are using information in the 
syntactic and not semiotic sense. Qualia might be 
information as signs, but that sense we have maintained all 
along is derivative and in this case an irreducible dimension 
based on the syntactic.  




wave function (Chalmers 1997, 340). Chalmers rather 
prefers Everett’s many-worlds interpretations of 
quantum physics insofar as the superposition would 
affect mind as much as anything else: the “brain of a 
person” “itself being a superposition” as much as 
anything else (Chalmers 1997, 346). For Everett, it is 
not that consciousness collapses the wave function of 
Schrödinger’s cat such that it is due to consciousness 
that we see the cat as alive rather than dead. Instead, 
one mind experiences a live cat, another a dead one, 
etc. Each time the wave function is collapsed and 
superposition ends, a new world is created with a new 
experience. Superposed states are then parts of one 
world that divides itself for Chalmers. The world just 
splits infinitely into many different worlds with 
different minds. A new mind is made with each 
splitting (Chalmers 1997, 347). There are then an 
endless number of distinct experiencing 
consciousnesses. We then have in even a short period 
of time “a large number of minds that have an equal 
claim to count as me” (Chalmers 1997, 356).  
But I think that Chalmers is wrong. Mind is not 
the brain, as he himself has shown. In this way, while 
brain is entangled with the rest of the world, there is 
no reason to say mind is as well. Only mind as a non-
physical system can collapse a wave function. Only a 
consciousness that involves something not 
comprehended by physics from the mental side can 
collapse a wave function. The physical side does not 
do it. The objects we encounter are not therefore 
where we found them. Our apprehending them causes 
them, as it were, to be there. Mind itself, once God 
allows it to arise in the image of his divine name, 
reveals the very structure of the universe whether it be 
the tzimtzum or shvirah. It is only after mind as self-
referential, as itself related to the empty set arises, that 
one can discover the realism of creation itself. The 
mind before this self-referential mind was only 




capable of seeing qualia. But self-referential mind 
created in the image of God, insofar as it is withdrawn 
and in the image of the divine name insofar as it 
relates to the empty set, enacts consciousness both as 
related to objets a and to a collapsing of the 
superposition of the world and reveals its creation by 
God.  
 
§25. IS STEPHEN WOLFRAM’S NEW KIND OF SCIENCE A 
SCIENCE OF KABBALISTIC CREATION? 
This creation by God might seem however to 
exclude one key aspect of mind and consciousness—
free will. This impression might arise due to our 
contention that reality itself arises out of and as an 
elaboration of the holy name. In order to demonstrate 
that we also want to maintain that at least for humans 
there exists free will, we will have to differentiate our 
view from that of Stephen Wolfram, who offers a fully 
deterministic view of the universe as a computer. 
Wolfram articulates his views in his lengthy, but 
brilliant treatise A New Kind of Science. It is 
surprising that, given Wolfram’s radical new theses 
concerning the nature of space, time, and reality itself, 
his work has not been given more attention by 
philosophers. This may be due to the fact that 
Wolfram’s work builds on previous insights by 
William Fredkin on the universe as computer, John 
von Neumann on cellular automata, Alan Turing, and 
others. However, despite Wolfram’s work 
presupposing the work of others (and Wolfram’s often 
surprising lack of acknowledgement of this fact), 
Wolfram lays out more so than any other figure before 
him some of the fundamental principles of the idea 
that the universe itself is a computer.  
The universe on this view runs and is in its very 
reality a computer program that generates all the 
reality we know as it computes itself and iterates its 
basic instructions. Wolfram refers to the most basic 




type of computer program (although not too basic to 
illustrate the key principles of any program)—cellular 
automata. Many will recall John Conway’s “Game of 
Life,” wherein each game evolves from its initial 
starting point. This starting point is simply a series of 
grids and instructions on how to fill in one line of 
those grids. The program then repeats itself over and 
over again and iterates the instruction in order to fill 
line after line of grids. In doing so, this game produces 
patterns that most of the times reveal larger patterns. 
Ladyman and Ross note that this game allows one to 
see how objects emerge out of more basic patterns, as 
one sees 
 
‘gliders’, ‘eaters’, ‘spaceships’, etc. that have 
only virtual persistence (That is, two suc-
cessive instances of ‘the same’ glider share 
only structure, and common participation in 
structures larger than themselves. A glider is 
clearly mereologically composed of a smaller 
number of illuminated cells. However, its 
successive instances are composed of 
different cells, and successive instances a 
few steps apart have no cells in common). 
(Ladyman and Ross, 2009)  
 
Anyone using this game then sees objects in the same 
way we see trees, coffee mugs, buildings, etc. except 
the game helps one to see how these objects are the 
results of patterns and made up of them. It is part of 
the mental dimension of information that we can 
recognize such objects. These isolated objects can be 
treated as sets. But they will always be patterns inside 
of patterns just as our individual genetic code is a 
pattern inside a larger pattern of physical patterns 
(and these patterns also of course can be divided all 
the way to bits/differentials). It is then not objects or 
things that persist over time or underlie appearances 




that are primary, but the patterns that give rise to 
them. 
One of the new things Wolfram discovered was 
that if one allows such cellular automata to run end-
lessly (and only at a certain point did computers 
become computationally powerful to enable this to 
arise), one sees that they lead to random patterns. That 
is, while most cellular automata even after a very large 
number of iterations show only a repetition of the 
same patterns (even if such patterns show nesting of 
the same patterns within such as in fractals), Wolfram 
discovered that the thirtieth program he ran (what he 
refers repeatedly to as ‘Rule 30’ throughout his text) 
displayed at a certain point purely random patterns 
and repetitions. Rule 30 did so despite consisting of 
iterations of the same basic set of rules for filling in 
grids like any other cellular automata this. Wolfram’s 
lengthy text is ultimately his attempt to spell out the 
implications of what occurs when one accepts that 
Rule 30 truly does at one point show us randomness.  
First, such programs can help us explain the 
complexity and randomness we witness in the 
universe itself. It is by repeating a very simple rule 
that a perhaps infinite amount of complexity arises 
from pure relations alone. One does not need the 
complicated to achieve complexity. Everything from 
the formation of snowflakes to the patterns on mollusk 
shells can be seen as themselves evolving out of a 
simple set of repeating rules. Except, since these 
things like all others are made of information, the 
pattern here is the repetition of how water molecules 
freeze in relation to each other rather than how grids 
are filled in. In this way, the very structuration of the 
world is patterning. There is no substrate here. Even 
an atom like that of carbon is a configuration of bits 
that enable it to appear and function as it does. The 
very laws of nature are algorithms that produce and 
compute physical systems rather than independent 




Platonic forms that things exemplify or incarnate. It is 
not that things embody some higher order, but rather 
that physical systems are themselves processing and 
computing in the same way a computer program does.  
Some have criticized Wolfram, claiming that 
when he uses cellular automata to show how 
snowflakes are generated by simple rules governing 
how water molecules freeze, or are lost around a seed, 
that his program only uses a few hundred cells when 
billions of molecules are involved in reality (Weinberg 
2002).33 However, this critique overlooks ‘the 
principle of computational equivalence’ (NKS 715-26). 
Just because nature develops the snowflakes out of 
billions of molecules patterning with each other does 
not mean that, given the same rules, it can be shown 
using a simpler program. In this way, in the program, 
Wolfram does not have to say each cell refers to a 
specific water molecule. The issue is how and why 
computation gives rise in simple rules to such 
complex patterns. Regular arrays can themselves 
simply repeat like fractals such that billions and 
billions of steps can be involved and at each level 
repeated. One would only need a few steps to show 
this. The rule here is how water molecules freeze 
forming a piece of ice added to this snowflake or how 
heat is released in that process disallowing other ice 
particles to form alongside it (NKS 370). In this way, 
the key is capturing the simple rule for the patterning 
of how this freezing along with heat-release works. 
The rule itself may be shown in a few steps even if 
                                                                                     
33 The criticisms I am articulating here of Wolfram are best 
articulated in the only two real attempts prior to this text to 
engage philosophically with Wolfram (and I rely here on 
what is said in these two texts): David Naiditch, “Divine 
Secrets of the Ya-Ya Universe” (2003) and Ben Carter, “God 
in Stephen Wolfram’s Science” (2003). 




billions of small pieces of ice are formed on an actual 
snowflake.  
While these criticisms raise important points, 
they overlook some key points that a metaphysics 
based on Wolfram’s new kind of science will entail 
(and Wolfram is for us what Galileo and Newton were 
for a previous metaphysical conjuncture). These two 
issues relate to the rules of which Wolfram speaks. 
First, while Wolfram has shown us how simple rules 
can in their iterations give rise to maximal complexity 
and randomness, he has not shown how the iteration 
of rules can give rise to new rules. That is, if 
Wolfram’s vision is to be taken as comprehensive, it 
seems to me that the simple rules at the heart of the 
universe (what we call the Name of God) would not 
only have to give rise to everything that is, but in 
doing so give rise to new rules. Since our world is 
complex and exhibits randomness, it is not just a 
fractal—a nested repetition of the same. The only 
model Wolfram gives that is not even implicitly a 
deterministic running of one permanent set of rules is 
sexual reproduction, where change is produced 
through a mixing of programs rather than just random 
mutations (NKS 386). In this way, when we see things 
like trees or planets, we are not just seeing a fractal 
repetition of the simple program. But trees and planets 
would seemingly have different programs involved in 
them were we to simulate them at some level. In this 
way, rules must also be able to give rise to subsets 
with new rules. I say this occurs because the Name of 
God in its iterations is itself a writing of God. We can 
think here of the trace of God already delineated. This 
trace itself is already more complicated than single bit. 
even if it can in and of itself be treated as such. 
This problem overlaps with the second one. 
Where do these rules come from originally? As already 
noted in an endnote, we are arguing that such rules 
must be immanent and implied in the letters, 




numbers, and bits through which God creates. That is, 
what we have is a string of letters that repeats. But in 
such a string, we have rules. And in the repetition 
new rules can arise based on how those strings are 
divided and segregated from each other. God allows 
for the permutation and combination of the letters.  
Wolfram may already be at work on these issues 
in his latest research. But one way these issues will 
find confirmation and expression is in our own 
understanding of how human language arises in its 
complexity. Freud believed the kernel of our 
entanglement with the signifier was found in the 
fort/da relationship famously described in his ‘Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle’ essay. What this relationship 
implied was that all the complexities of language 
including its many grammatical rules begin with a 
simple oppositional relationship. If we can 
understand how language arises in children, then we 
will better understand how the program computing 
the universe itself works. This claim might shock 
some (that we will understand the universe itself by 
understanding linguistic development), but if we 
accept the principle of computational equivalence, 
then systems like human language can achieve the 
same complexity (NKS 845). The mind itself, like any 
other sufficiently complex system, is a microcosmos of 
the universe, not in the sense that it necessarily must 
reflect the universe (be a fractal nested pattern) (NKS 
1196), but in the sense that it achieves a universe in 
and of itself while being part of the overall program.  
In any event, it is our contention that one cannot 
go back beyond the holy Name of God such that in it 
already one must have a complicated enough set of 
rules to give rise to things. While Wolfram’s own work 
makes it appears that rules are simply primitives 
beyond which we cannot go, we are arguing that rules 
themselves are part and parcel of the universe being 
determined by bits (letters/numbers). Take the very 




simple rule ‘If x, then y’. It must already presuppose 
the elements upon which the rule works. Wolfram 
does not engage with this issue as we have. 
Now Wolfram, like Fredkin before him, thinks 
that one eventually will be able to find one single rule 
that explains the behavior of all processes, mental, 
physical, or otherwise, that are elaborated in this 
world. We of course agree and have already named 
this rule and principle the holy Name of God. This 
ultimate program would be something simple (not 
more computationally complex than a cellular 
automata) and not some overly elaborate and 
unanalyzable construct. The information processing 
that this one rule allows for elaborates everything 
knowable about existence itself.  
A problem does arise with this view. We can only 
know we have the right rule by allowing it to run, in 
order to see that it truly gives rise to the processes that 
inform our world. For Wolfram, in fact, we cannot 
know ahead of time what the rule or program will 
produce. He calls this throughout his text the 
principle of ‘computational irreducibility’ (NKS 737-
50). Wolfram could not have known before running 
endless iterations of Rule 30 on a computer that it 
would end up becoming random, rather than simply 
repeating the same overall pattern as so many other 
programs did before. Likewise, we can only know 
what will happen in the universe by allowing the 
program to enable itself. As we earlier mentioned, the 
view that all is information means that we need a 
computer the size of the universe to emulate it.34  And 
here we see also that we would need a program that 
would run through as many iterations as have been 
                                                                                     
34 Another way of formulating this thesis will be in 
relationship to the fundamental ontological thesis that 
Wolfram has introduced to us: “All is computation” (NKS 
1125). 




undergone in the universe to understand all its 
processes and that would run as long as the world will 
last to know anything about what would happen in 
the future. But given the billions of years our world 
has been developing, it is not clear we could humanly 
see a computation of all the steps needed to reveal 
such things. We would certainly need a computer that 
processes itself much faster than the universe itself 
does.  
In any event, even if we did not lack the time, we 
cannot predict what the ultimate outcome of things is. 
But that does not mean we cannot get an idea that we 
have isolated the right program. Even the very large 
number of iterations current computers can do would 
show us how the early universe originated, even if the 
program would never reach a point simultaneous with 
us. But despite this lack of foreknowledge, Wolfram’s 
view is still deterministic, insofar as all is just a matter 
of iterations of the fundamental rule.  
Another implication of Wolfram’s view is that 
history also is irreducible. Given that to know how 
things are we have to allow a computation of the very 
program itself, things have to go through the very 
historical process they did and how things are today is 
a direct result of that history. For example, even 
something as seemingly universal and abstract as 
mathematics, Wolfram argues, is the result of how 
mathematics was idiosyncratically conducted in 
ancient Babylon. In this way, even though, 
axiomatically, we could invent many ways to do 
mathematics, the actual way we do it is a cultural 
outcome of historical evolution.  
Yet another implication of Rule 30 is what 
Wolfram calls the principle of ‘computational 
equivalence’. This principle allows us to say that any 
computer is capable of illustrating for us how the 
complexity of the world arose. It shows us why even 
the computers we have can simulate and emulate at 




least some of the key ideas and processes involved 
here, even if we may not have a computer able to 
generate the entire universe itself as it was up to now. 
However, all systems depend on the same simple 
rules, so that any one system (even one like ‘The Game 
of Life’) can produce the same complexity as any 
other.  
Wolfram has been taken to task for arguing that 
the models he illustrates via the use of programs like 
cellular automata do not have to operate exactly like 
physical processes—even the very processes he claims 
to be explaining. But there are many ways that such 
processes might work. All Wolfram needs to do is 
show how an equivalent process can unfold. It may be 
easier to use a simpler program that does the work 
more efficiently than the natural process does but 
allows one to see the same results. Wolfram also has 
been taken to task since these rules seemingly cannot 
be verified. If he were to offer an equation explaining 
phenomena, one could then see if this equation does 
predict and explain how a process works. But if his 
programs can do the equivalent work as the natural 
processes, then he has thereby verified that he has 
explained how the phenomenon works in principle. 
We take Wolfram to be putting forth a philosophical 
view at this point rather than actually always laying 
out the specific mechanism involved in a particular 
phenomenon.  
In any event, Wolfram needs the ultimate rule of 
the universe itself to explain all. For this reason, he is 
mostly attempting to prove that such a rule could exist 
rather than trying to find the specific and actual rule 
used in the case of all phenomenon such as for 
snowflakes. From a scientific point of view, at this 
stage the computer programs Wolfram presents need 
to be able to reproduce the behavior of a system. 
Having such a presentation means one can study the 
system itself and even see how it will develop. The 




shapes on mollusk shells do follow simple rules, even 
if we do not exactly know how physically the pigment 
is secreted at one point and not at another. The tissue 
of the mollusk cell grows step-by-step unraveling 
itself. Wolfram’s own presentation of how a computer 
program can simulate it proves the most basic 
ontological point: that the phenomenon is at its basis 
an act of computation.  
This view also indicates that the laws of physics 
will show the same complexity as what our own 
minds show, such that even divine intelligence 
“permeates the universe” (NKS 1192). Because even 
the most basic and low scale phenomena are produced 
by the same rule, there can be just as much complexity 
when it comes to how molecules are arranged as with 
how human thoughts are. But what is more important 
here is that Wolfram sees the divine, as we do, as 
arising not in the designed sophistication of the 
human body for instance, but in the irreducible basic 
relations of patterns (NKS 838).  
Now, Wolfram is not a theist. In fact, his model is 
so deterministic it allegedly eliminates “miracles or 
divine intervention” that are incompatible with the 
laws of things (NKS 1025). However, insofar as 
Wolfram argues that things are irreducible, he cannot 
preclude, as we will argue following Meillassoux, that 
these laws can change at any moment. It is also 
important to distinguish Wolfram’s model from that of 
chaos theory and from the idea that complexity comes 
from influences outside of a system (like a boat 
swaying due to the complexity of the waves) (NKS 
300-1). Wolfram shows us how systems develop by 
iterations of fundamental rules and structural 
relations. It is these rules and relations that determine 
things rather than what chaos theory calls ‘initial 
conditions’, wherein complexity at the level of initial 
conditions will emerge in the behavior of the system 
(NKS 13). The chaos does not come from external 




influences on a system. Chaos theory was able to show 
how randomness arises when one looks at how initial 
conditions play a role (if one pushes a roulette wheel 
with a hand, one does not know what the initial 
conditions of the hand push are), but Wolfram shows 
us something new—how the iterations of rules 
themselves can lead to randomness. The complexity at 
stake is generated by the evolution of structural 
relations themselves. Chaos theory contends that 
chaos arise because one cannot have accurate 
measurement of the basic conditions informing things. 
Wolfram is contending almost the opposite—that even 
in knowing the basic program one cannot know what 
will happen (NKS 155, 381).  
Wolfram sees all things as being made of the same 
thing—information. But given that his information is 
itself embodied in rules and relations, it is ultimately 
space itself that becomes what the entire universe is 
an elaboration of (NKS 536-37). Space does not 
precede things created as some sort of empty 
container. Rather, space arises out of the relation 
between the nodes and through the network of 
processes that are elaborated by the program itself 
(NKS 508). The universe is then a giant network of 
space-time that unfolds itself (NKS 482-86). Time 
itself is just a product of the iterations of the program. 
One is updated, as it were, as one receives the 
information from these updates (NKS 481-88). As it 
unfolds the unfolding itself generates a sense of time, 
as one sees the passage from one step to the next.  
Wolfram’s view is reminiscent of the Hindu 
notion of Indra’s net. This idea shows how emptiness 
itself, interconnection, and origination arise. All 
phenomena arise out of a single rule. The mutual 
structuring relations are repeated, such that all that 
exists is but a part of the great net. But insofar as it is 
just a matter of differences themselves, the net itself is 
composed out of iterations of nothing. This network is 




as simple as possible. Before the network elaborates 
itself there is nothing—not even space. Space is a 
collection of discrete nodes in a network. Space is 
made by indicating how the nodes should be 
connected to each other. All that is built into things is 
the structural relations themselves that unfold, 
forming networks with nodes that enable space itself 
to arise.  
  Why cannot space be an absolute and eternal 
background, as it was for Newton and for many 
physicists even today? First, this view was needed for 
Newton in order to have a constant frame of reference. 
Not only did Einstein show how one can have frames 
of reference without absolute space, but in this view of 
Wolfram’s, the network itself produces frames of 
reference and relation. More importantly 
metaphysically, I think we can say that an eternal 
empty space itself will not give rise to anything, as 
argued earlier with reference to the false vacuum. 
I think this view articulates how Wolfram’s 
conception of things is also Pythagorean, precisely 
insofar as it says that all can be shown to be a program 
unfolding. What the Pythagorean call the “Tetractys” 
shows how the “dimensions of the universe were 
created”: “1 is the point, its dimension is zero . . . and 
it generates other dimensions: 2 points define a 
straight line, with 1 dimension, 3 points form a 
triangle, with dimensions 2, 4 points linked between 
form a tetrahedron, with dimensions 3” (Ouaknin 
2004, 211). Here, the universe is spatially created by 
the rearticulation of points/nodes. For the Kabbalah, 
existence itself begins in a concealed point via the 
tzimtzum. These points spread out into all 
dimensions. Information is itself a form of 
connectivity. The complicated nature of reality cannot 
be explained by equations per se (which is again why 
a representationalist model will not work), but only by 
way of programs iterating and computing relations. 




Nature must follow rules to be intelligible, but that 
does not mean those rules have to be embodied only 
in equations like those Newton formulated. Wolfram’s 
view thereby is also eminently Kabbalistic. The 
ultimate program that Wolfram is searching for would 
itself write the book of the world (NKS 465-71). We 
call it the holy Name. Interestingly, the Kabbalah likes 
to emphasize how the words for book and name in 
Hebrew have the same numerical value. The sefirot 
themselves would function as the processes in this 






CHAPTER FOUR   
 
The Resurrection of the Dead and the 





§26. FREE WILL 
For Wolfram, complex systems cannot be 
predicted, but they are still the result of deterministic 
iterations. In this way, what will happen is 
undecidable. But unless it would require an infinite 
amount of computer programming information to 
generate things, we cannot say that things are 
completely and totally unpredictable and incalculable. 
Randomness here really only means not predictable by 
us, as we have to let things unfold (NKS 750-52). In 
other words, Wolfram thinks free will is nothing more 
than our inability to know how rules will develop and 
to deduce what the rule is from the complexity. But 
the rule still determines what will unfold, even if it is 
unspecifiable what complexity this rule will reveal. In 
this way, many would say that an omniscient God 
would know what will happen and that the rule itself, 
in addition to this knowledge, demonstrates the 
impossibility of free will in any ontology that 
conceives the universe as a computer. To clarify: 
knowledge is such that if one knows a state of affairs, 
to know something is to know it to be true, and if that 
state of affairs refers to a future occurrence, then one is 
stating that one knows a future event is true prior to 
its actual occurrence. But this truth implies that a 
person could not have acted otherwise, not only due 
to the way the rule unfolds, but due to God, for 




instance, knowing that a person in fact does x or that 
event x does occur.  
One might reply that for Wolfram’s model it is 
only the rule’s own determinism that is at issue, given 
that the principle of computational irreducibility 
holds. However, while Wolfram does not maintain a 
theist position, a theist would have to maintain that 
this principle of computational irreducibility does not 
hold for God. God’s knowledge of all includes 
knowledge of the future. This has been a classic 
position, since God as cause or emanatory of the world 
knows what will arise. As Gersonides put it, God 
knows things as much as God knows his own essence 
(Gersonides 1987, 116). For Gersonides, the perpetual 
rebel and black sheep of medieval Jewish philosophy, 
given the very contingency of particulars, God knows 
in general how all should be ordered and determined, 
but not the particularity of particulars as such 
(Gersonides 1987, 117). God does not have knowledge 
of mutually exclusive possible events since they are 
contingent (Gersonides 1987, 118). God only knows 
what is necessary and a necessary result of his 
creation. For Gersonides, this view is itself necessary 
since God’s knowledge of particulars in all their 
particularity would cancel their contingency. Human 
free will is possible since it occurs in the realm of 
contingency. God may know that humanity will 
necessarily arise in creation, but God does not know 
each particular human personally. God only knows 
the necessary order of things. God may even know on 
this view that two possible contingencies may occur, 
but will not know whether both, one, or none do 
occur. God knows “the intelligible order inherent in 
these particular forms when they emanate”, but “does 
not know them . . . in their individuality” (Gersonides 
1987, 120). God thereby only has abstract knowledge 
of human affairs. God does not know in advance the 
particular life story of each person. However, God 




does know not, for instance. if a person chooses a 
particular way of life or if they will experience certain 
outcomes (Gersonides 1987, 136).  
Gersonides and Wolfram together seem to place 
us between the proverbial rock and hard place. If we 
are to grant things contingency and thereby free will to 
humans, we cannot grant God knowledge (God would 
also be subject to the principle of computational 
equivalence), but also we cannot grant that all unfolds 
as elaborations of God’s Name, as then all is seemingly 
determined in that regards. We thereby have to deal 
both with knowledge and the universe’s program to 
show human free will is possible (if it is). First, let us 
take up the issue of program itself. It is a possible view 
in Judaism, for instance, that miracles are programmed 
into the world at creation. Maimonides makes this 
point in his commentary on Mishna Avot 5:6. This is a 
view that is best considered in the context of our 
critique of Meillassoux’s position later. Here, we can 
say with Charles Manekin that the computer program 
that is the universe can be just like the “rules of a 
computer adventure game” that we know today 
(Manekin 2003, 324). Just as the programmer of the 
computer program does not know how each 
individual person will play the game, Gersonides is 
saying that God does not know what each person will 
do contingently in the world created. We should think 
about things given this analogy with a game that can 
be played in many ways given its rules. God knows 
how the universe is programmed, but within that 
programming has laid out specific choices that can be 
made even within the overall framework of the game. 
God knows all about the world as God knows truly 
and understands fully the program and all its 
implications. In many ways, a programmer knows 
this, but not perfectly. Both do not know how exactly 
the game will be played at any particular playing of it. 
No move made in the game cannot be explained by 




what the game makes possible. If I play the game 
poorly, my representative in it will be eliminated 
quickly. This is the same way divine providence 
works in the world for Gersonides in terms of reward 
and punishment for individuals, even if God does not 
know these things in advance. Knowing the program 
itself and its rules and operations is the same as 
Gersonides’s claim that God “knows particulars from 
the aspect of their universal natures” (Manekin 2003, 
325). For example, while God on this view does not 
know Noah, given the program anybody as goodly as 
Noah will experience the world in only certain 
possibly ways (Manekin 2003, 328).  
God is then here like a mother. A mother tells her 
child not to cross the street without obeying the 
proper rules since otherwise the child will be harmed. 
A mother may even try to scare her child into not even 
thinking about running across a street without 
guidance. But a child, despite this parenting, may 
choose to disobey and be caught in an accident. The 
knowledge of the mother did not cause the accident. It 
was the child’s choice that did. The knowledge the 
parent has does not in this way prevent the child from 
acting freely. In this way, it is possible that just as a 
computer game does, God can program the world 
through his holy Name to allow for various moments 
of choice where one can move in certain ways. Things 
then react accordingly. 
But while this view of programming is 
acceptable, we do not want to hold that God cannot 
know individuals in their particularity. The key 
problem with this view is it ascribes a temporal nature 
to God and God’s knowledge. God is eternal and 
timeless. God does not know things one by one or in 
time. There is no sense of time for God. God is able to 
see the entire sequence of numbers at once without 
counting them one by one since God is eternal. God’s 
own infinity allows all numbers to be grasped in one 




act. God in this way does not know what will happen 
before things occur. Before creation, there is no time. 
There is only a before creation after creation on this 
conception (and as per one of our points earlier, only 
once consciousness is able to reveal it through a 
collapse of the superposition of the wave function). 
Anything God knows before creation is timeless. Time 
is the thread of the unfolding of things. As creation 
unfolds, God as eternal sees it all happen at once 
timelessly. God then does not know events before they 
happen, God sees them as they happen. God knows 
how we play the computer game (to continue the 
analogy) as we play it in one act. We therefore are free 
to make the choices in the way the program allows. It 
is not such that we could not act otherwise, given that 
it was known beforehand that it is true how we act. 
God knows it as we act as much as we do. But this 
divine knowledge does not detract from us and also 
does not detract from God as God as eternal also 
knows us in our contingency and individuality.  
God is not infinite in the sense that God goes on 
and on. God is outside space and time as their creator. 
God is thereby not bound to the laws and limitations 
of space and time. God can therefore as spaceless and 
timeless and not limited by their rules can interfere in 
space and time as God will. Beyond space time, God is 
not bound by these rules. But as such there is no 
reason to say God knows something before or after. 
God is simultaneous with all in a way we are not. If 
we play a computer game with someone over the 
internet, we each see the program unfold in our own 
space-time. But God sees all at once including each of 
our decisions. God created us in his image. That is 
why only humans have this freedom. Only humans 
have mind insofar as we are also an empty set moving 
things along and insofar as we are self-referential in 
our very essence. This is the essence of the Turing 
test. It is not just a matter of what we recognize as a 




human, but also that only a human can react to 
choices via self-referential understanding of them in 
order to show free will and intelligence. Only a 
human will recognize a choice as a choice and as a 
freely chosen action. We therefore have endeavored to 
show how even if creation is a computer computing 
itself free will is possible insofar as the nature of the 
program allows for choices as much as contemporary 
ones do and also in terms of God’s complete 
knowledge of it.  
 
§27. CRITIQUE AND APPLICATION: QUENTIN 
MEILLASSOUX AND THE CONTINGENCY OF CREATION 
God’s interest in the world’s affairs involves 
miracles and the revelation of prophecy to those 
chosen. God need not only create miracles in and 
through the program itself, but can intervene at any 
point to send the program in a new direction. But as 
previously suggested, we cannot make good on these 
claims without the resources which the ontology of 
Quentin Meillassoux provides us. This is not to say 
that Meillassoux argues for God, miracles, etc. 
explicitly. But as noted from the beginning, in his own 
atheism, Meillassoux enables a fuller understanding of 
monotheism.  
Meillassoux’s project centers on a definition of 
correlationism and an attempt to exit the human-word 
circle. Meillassoux believes that it is by forcing the 
correlationist to admit to the purely contingent nature 
of human thought and its relation to the world that 
one can establish a new concept of the absolute, 
immune to any correlationist rejoinders or critique. 
Because correlationism is based on recognizing the 
sheer facticity of the structure of human thought itself, 
this absolute is one that argues that all is contingent, 
such that the only thing necessary is contingency itself 
(AF 54). One has to conceive “the absolute’s capacity-
to-be-other relative to the given” and to acknowledge 




that human existence contains within itself “the 
possibility of its own non-being” (AF 59). By 
rendering the human-world correlate as no longer 
absolute, Meillassoux promotes absolute contingency. 
It is only contingently true that anything that is known 
is correlated to some act of consciousness as the very 
manner of human thinking itself need not necessarily 
work as it does (AF 59-60).  
In its absolute form, contingency means that all 
can become other than it is without reason at any 
instant (AF 54). The contingency that the corre-
lationist must admit becomes apparent in an analysis 
of the correlationism embodied in Kantian 
transcendental idealism. Here, what appears to us 
only does so given the transcendental conditions for 
the possibility of knowledge. But we cannot say 
whether how space and time are intuited by us or how 
the categories Kant deduces are the way they are 
necessarily. Another alien subjectivity may experience 
the world in different ways. But if we say that the way 
the world is given and structured by consciousness is 
itself contingent and that this is the only thing we ever 
can assert (for the correlationist), then all is contingent 
by necessity.  
Meillassoux takes this contingency as seriously as 
possible by asserting that the idea that all is 
contingent means “it is absolutely impossible that 
there is a necessary being and that the principle of 
sufficient reason no longer holds” (rather he asserts a 
“principle of unreason” that states “there is no reason 
for anything to be or to remain the way it is”) (AF 60). 
In this way, Meillassoux will have “to demonstrate the 
absolute necessity of everything’s non-necessity” (AF 
62).35 It must be kept in mind that once it is asserted 
                                                                                     
35 Meillassoux attempts here to derive necessity from 
contingency in a way that I would say distorts the sort of 
modal/ontological proof I have put forth. Meillassoux says 




that all is contingent, anything can occur including 
that nothing occurs or that all things simply never 
change and remain as they are (AF 63). Another name 
for the absolute contingency that Meillassoux seeks to 
establish at the heart of being itself is “hyper-chaos,” 
wherein almost every possibility is possible (AF 64). 
The only possibility restricted would be necessary 
beings such as God and the contradictory (as for 
Meillassoux the contradictory cannot be other than as 
                                                                                                     
being must be necessarily, since being itself cannot be 
contingent in its nature (AF 76). Nothing that is can be 
necessary. It could always be otherwise. So anything that is 
is contingent. But here Meillassoux overlooks the fact that it 
is then possible that there be nothing, the void. Meillassoux 
is thereby claiming that the contingency being makes being 
as such necessary. But one cannot derive the necessity of its 
being from its contingency. One can only derive that 
something insistent and beyond being necessarily exists 
partly due to the contingency of being requiring its possible 
void. Ray Brassier, in “Concepts and Objects,” in The 
Speculative Turn (2011), 60-62, essentially criticizes 
Meillassoux and perhaps others for relying on what Brassier 
believes is an intellectual intuition into the absolute (in 
Meillassoux’s case the absolute nature of contingency). But I 
do not think one needs such intuition to think contingency. 
The issue is more so that such modal proofs can speak to the 
nature of reality itself. That they can upsets Kant’s own 
critique of ontological proofs and shows that being is a areal 
predicate insofar as all that is contains it. In this way, in 
overcoming Kant and correlationism, the key is not giving 
into this aspect of Kant rather than his idea that we cannot 
know things-in-themselves. Rather, whatever one can say 
about contingency and necessity must hold for reality itself 
since modal categories necessarily belong to things of all 
types. No intellectual intuition is required to see it or know 
it. However, I would say I endorse a Cartesian realism 
wherein God is necessary to bridge between what can be 
known via thought and the world itself. First one must prove 
God to see how this is so. That is in my estimation a 
virtuous circle. 




it is) (AF 92). Meillassoux thereby rejects the idea 
there must be any necessity other than that 
contingency is necessary. 
Meillassoux would thus reject the modal and 
ontological arguments we have previously offered. It 
should be kept in mind, as Meillassoux said in a 
lecture entitled “Time without Becoming,” given at 
Middlesex University on May 8, 2008, that the hyper-
chaos is “so radical that even becoming, disorder, or 
randomness can be destroyed by it, and replaced by 
order, determinism, and fixity. Things are so 
contingent in hyper-chaos that time is able to destroy 
even the becoming of things.”36 Both order and 
disorder, change or persistence, are equally possible 
and equally able to be for Meillassoux. There need not 
be eternal becoming any more than it not need not be 
that all remains fixed as it is. The laws of nature are 
not necessary and could be otherwise.  
In establishing this view Meillassoux is not 
however saying that all is a matter of chance. Chance 
relies on an ability to aggregate all probabilities into a 
single set (AF 101). But if all is absolutely contingent, 
then no one probability is more likely true than 
another. All is equally probable and improbable in 
this ontology. The whole does not exist for 
Meillassoux, such that a totality of all numerical 
probabilities and possibilities cannot be determined. 
The totality of all that is, whether it be a multiplicity 
of worlds or this one, cannot ever be given. 
Meillassoux’s argument here is Cantorian. Whereas 
one can give, for instance, all the possible roles for a 
six-sided die, one cannot state what the total set of 
possibilities is for the world given the Cantorian idea 
of the transfinite. Any set in which we tried to list all 
these possibilities would necessarily be exceeded by 
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3729-time_without_becoming.pdf>. 




its subset (AF 102). All possibles cannot therefore be 
presented. Note we are here speaking of the transfinite 
nature of all possibles rather than what is actually.37  
All is thereby equally probable at the ultimate 
level and thus the absolute contingency is reinforced 
by Cantorianism and the inherent incompleteness of 
being (AF 127). While the infinite can be thought in 
Cantorian terms, there can be no one-Whole totality 
that is ever complete when we try to think all that can 
be. It is best then to say that probability does not hold 
in Meillassoux’s hyper-chaos—there is only pure 
possibility and contingency. “Time can then bring 
                                                                                     
37 This distinction is important here. It is not clear that there 
is a transfinite set of anything other than numbers and 
possibly letters/words. We cannot argue there is in fact an 
infinite amount of things in actuality. For example, physics 
offers us an idea of how many atoms there are in the 
universe. Even if we think of possible combinations, it is not 
clear we reach infinity without an infinite amount of time. 
Graham Harman gives the example of a rope being able to 
cut in an infinite number of ways: see “Meillassoux’s Virtual 
Future” (2011). But to say that a rope can be cut in infinite 
ways is to identify a rope with a number line. It is not clear 
how a finite set of rope can be so identified without at least 
as a start some way of treating being in strictly numerical 
terms. Not only that, but to cut a rope in an infinite number 
of ways, one would need an infinitely thinner set of knives. 
At some point the knives would become so thin as to no 
longer do the job of cutting. It seems rather that a finite set of 
a rope does not have a transfinite set of cuts. This is one 
reason why Meillassoux’s reasoning is still open to the 
modal argumentation we bring forth against his view. Also, 
even if we want to say that the universe can just contain a 
number or set of numbers, for example, so that we can speak 
easily of the transfinite set of all possibles, then we need a 
theory of number that I do not see present in Meillassoux’s 
work. Our view however can confirm Meillassoux’s claim 
here insofar as number is something created and could be 
the only thing created.  




about any non-contradictory set of possibilities” 
including “new laws” of nature which did not exist as 
some potentiality already found pre-formed in some 
virtual reservoir or as “situations . . . which were not 
at all contained in precedent situations”  (Meillassoux 
2007, 72). In this way, for Meillassoux, what occurs 
merely arises out of what is already for no reason and 
without there being any hint it was coming. What 
arises is also not a potentialization or actualization of 
the virtual. It simply emerges on its own without 
sufficient reason or detectable cause.  
Here, Meillassoux goes so far as to uphold that 
being can arise on its own out of nothing: “we thus 
make irruption ex nihilo   the very core of temporality 
delivered to its pure immanence” (Meillassoux 2007, 
72). What occurs is not baked into what is. It can arise 
for no reason. The future can be something radically 
different from the present for no reason and without 
any resource in the present for giving rise to this 
future. For Meillassoux, this is how “life” itself 
emerged out of matter (Meillassoux 2007, 73). Nothing 
need indicate beforehand what will arise as there are 
leaps and ruptures in time itself. As may be clear, 
Meillassoux’s view is perfectly open to the 
miraculous—a violation of how things can work at any 
time without its very possibility being allowed by the 
laws of nature (which could suddenly change for no 
reason) and not being prefigured by how things are. 
The miraculous is therefore just as possible in this 
hyper-chaos as anything else. A purely excessive 
occurrence can come upon us at any moment whether 
it be the parting of the Red Sea or the sun stopping 
while the walls of a city fall.  
For Meillassoux, such radical contingency is due 
to the lack of God, to there being nothing necessary 
other than contingency itself. But that the laws of 
nature can be abridged suddenly and for no reason 
exhibits a divine intervention that many monotheists 




philosophers such as Maimonides feigned to think 
possible. For Meillassoux, this  
 
irruption ex nihilo   presupposes, against the 
usually rigorous version of a concept, that 
there is no principle (divine or otherwise) 
superior to the pure power of the chaos of 
becoming: non-metaphysical in that the 
radical rejection of all necessity assures us of 
breaking with the inaugural decision of the 
Principle of Sufficient Reason. (Meillassoux 
2007, 75)  
 
Now, while we are happy to agree with Meillassoux 
that all that is is radically contingent such that all 
could occur at any time and that this is shown by the 
radical incompletion of things based on the insights of 
Cantor, we cannot accept that rejection of God is 
necessary. For this reason, we will now have to 
articulate a fundamental critique of Meillassoux’s 
position on these grounds. God’s creation can be 
radically contingent in all the ways Meillassoux lays 
out except that it does not include irruption from 
nothing itself. In fact, Meillassoux’s own ontology 
precludes this claim due to his claim that being itself 
must be for him—that there cannot be nothing.  
Creation can appear to have no ground as no 
contingent being grounds itself and could be 
otherwise. Physical laws can change at any instant 
and miracles occur. As noted earlier, in Judaism, 
miracles were seen as created in the original act of 
creation when, right before the creation of Adam and 
Eve, God brought future miracles into being (Mishna 
Avot 5:6). However, this view was probably upheld (as 
in the case of Maimonides) due to a belief in the 
eternality of the laws of nature. But here Meillassoux 
shows us how that those miracles need not already be 
prefigured but can arise. In this way, to say that 




miraculous events are programmed at creation is to 
say that the very contingency of creation is what 
makes them possible. The very unfolding of the divine 
program itself can suddenly switch and allow them to 
arise.  
We have then another way of formulating the 
principle of computational irreducibility. The 
unfolding of the program may suddenly shift, just as 
Rule 30 suddenly moves from a repetitive pattern to 
something following no pattern and just as other 
programs suddenly end after an unknown number of 
iterations. And it could have always been otherwise, 
that other events could have been allowed to unfold. 
There cannot be a total regress without any ultimate 
and necessary principle. Life may suddenly and 
inexplicably emerge from matter, but this is not in 
itself an emergence from nothing as such. Nothing 
needed to pre-exist the miraculous advent and the 
supremely contingent irruption, but that is not the 
same as being emerging from the void. 
Part of the problem here is that Meillassoux 
equates the divine with what he calls potentiality 
versus virtuality (Meillassoux 2009, 461). Virtuality 
names the idea that events emerge without being 
prefigured in what is, whereas potentiality names the 
idea that there is a set of possibles and what emerges 
is one of them. But the divine need not be identified 
with potentiality as we have argued here. Also, 
Meillassoux, despite some of his statements, is not 
arguing that things proceed from an actually existing 
world, but rather that there appear things that are 
irreducible and not explicable on the basis of what 
occurred before. Besides life, Meillassoux believes 
matter itself and thought/consciousness are two other 
examples of such radical irruptions, as life cannot be 
reduced in expiation to matter, matter cannot be 
expressed solely in mathematical formulas, and 
consciousness is itself a dimension of its own 




(Meillassoux 2009, 461-62). But there is a difference 
between saying that life emerges from matter but 
cannot be explained by it and arguing that life emerges 
out of nothingness itself or the void on its own.  
Now, Meillassoux also claims that this hyper-
chaos can not only lead without reason to the 
destruction of laws of nature and the emergence of 
new laws, but also to the “abolition of the world” as 
such (Meillassoux 2009, 446). But there is the problem 
(and here our critique will start to fully unfold) that 
Meillassoux also claims that “it is necessary that there 
be something rather than nothing because it is 
necessarily contingent that there is something rather 
than something else” (AF 76). In other words, it is a 
necessary implication of the absolute nature of 
contingency that there always be being itself and not 
nothing. It is necessary given Meillassoux’s principle 
that there always be some existing contingent being. 
Existence is not contingent. It is necessary (AF 74). 
However, that means existence as such is eternal 
without void. Not only does it ruin Meillassoux’s 
explanation of irruption from nothing as being non-
divine, but it also shows that he cannot argue that the 
divine is not. For if contingent being is necessary, then 
there must always be something. But that means there 
is infinitely being, such that at some point, inexorably, 
all that is contingent will not be. The necessity and 
eternality of contingency being implies that 
nothingness itself arises. But nothing can arise from 
nothing. Matter cannot arise from nothing as life does 
from it. In this way, if all is contingent, it is not that 
contingency is necessary, but there must be at least 
one principle that can give rise to things from nothing.  
One could also say here that what Meillassoux 
has shown us is that the radical contingency of created 
things makes divine intervention at various instances 
possible. For example, we could say it is divine 
intervention that explains how consciousness arises 




out of life and life from matter. The divine inter-
vention is precisely the irreducible emergence itself. 
The name of that principle is of course God. In this 
way, the key modal argumentation already given for 
God holds despite Meillassoux’s claims and in fact 
must hold in order to possibly conceive creation itself 
as radically contingent and marked by hyper-chaos. In 
addition, our argument for reality in and by the Name 
of God also holds as only this view can actually 
explain the radical contingency of things. Meillassoux 
simply would have to see all occurrences as 
inexplicable happenings that occur without reason 
and enact the hyper-chaos. In this way, it is no more 
probable or likely that we have the ordered world we 
have rather than one where one thing appears after 
another without rhyme and reason. However, follow-
ing the idea that the universe as a computer unfolds a 
program, we both have the idea that radical 
contingency can unfold and that it is not surprising 
that there will be repetitions, patterns, order, etc. In 
fact, this program/name itself enacts the very non-
totalization and incompletion of the world insofar as it 
consists of structural relations and thereby expresses 
the world’s alienation in the signifier.  
To take up again Wolfram’s model, what 
Meillassoux shows us is precisely that Wolfram’s 
model need not only be non-deterministic when it 
comes to human freedom, but when it comes to the 
world itself. This model is precisely one in which 
what occurs is not some actualization of a prefigured 
possibility, but rather surprising and unknowable 
advances in the unfolding of the iteration of rules. The 
principle of computational irreducibility allows us to 
see how at any instance things might simply stop (this 
occurs in some simple examples of Turing-machine 
modeled programs Wolfram presents) or shift from 
ordered pattern to purely random event (as Rule 30 or 
Rule 110 do in Wolfram’s presentation of cellular 




automata). Miracles are pre-programmed into creation 
precisely insofar as the world itself is the hardware/ 
software of a computer unfolding in computations 
structured enough to exhibit maximum complexity.  
The model we have been arguing for also shows 
how creation is not a necessary result of God’s essence 
and is thereby itself contingent in a way different than 
on Maimonides’s conception (Guide II.XXI). 
Meillassoux holds that being itself is not contingent, 
but our position is thereby more radical insofar as God 
could not have created the world. Being itself is 
thereby a pure gift, an excessive and gratuitous event. 
In this way, we oppose the idea that creation is simply 
a realization of one possible world that existed in the 
mind of God. Even if in God all things are, they are in 
him actually as thoughts. But the world itself as 
created need not then be one realization of possibility. 
To evoke again some of the implications of God’s 
eternity—there is no time or ‘before’ prior to creation 
itself. God as timeless thinks all possibilities as actual 
and at the same time as the world itself unfolds and is 
created in one act, as it were, from this divine 
perspective.38 Creation itself is a purely gratuitous 
                                                                                     
38 This is not to say, that in the tradition of Kabbalah there is 
not a tradition that the world is simply an actualization of a 
possibility thought in God and that God creates necessarily 
by essence. We simply here oppose all such possible 
ontologies. An example of this opposing position is that of 
Moshe Cordevo: “First of all, [the beginner] must know that 
the Creator, EinSof, is one and has no second. He is the 
cause of Causes and the Prime Mover. He is not in the 
numerical sense, for [the concept of] mutation and form and 
multiplicity do not apply to Him. [One] is rather a word 
utilized by way of parable and likeness, since the number 
one stands by itself and is the beginning of each number, [all 
numbers] being contained within it in potential, while it is a 
part of every number in actuality . . . in all things by 
actuality. All things are in Him by potentiality. Necessary 




event that from our perspective appears as an act of 
pure divine love since it could have been otherwise.  
 As opposed to what others claim (Drob 2000a, 
103), creation is not necessitated by God’s being, as 
God is not a corporeal creature with needs including a 
need for otherness. This also means, as opposed to 
Spinoza (think here of the 33rd proposition of the first 
book of his Ethics, where the infinity of God’s nature 
necessitates that an infinity of modes occur), who also 
tried to turn the Kabbalist view into an ontology, we 
are saying that not all that is possible is created. Not 
all that God thinks need be in our world. Not every 
possibility that we can think of occurs in this world. 
For instance, via a survey of all possible programs in 
the computational universe, we will find many 
alternative worlds, but the key is seeing how our own 
world arises out of just one and is an unfolding of it. 
This is also part and parcel of the incompletion of the 
world. It is not a plenitude wherein all that is possible 
is actual. But we can, by identifying the different 
possibilities epistemologically that did not occur, 
show how our own world could have been otherwise. 
God’s absolute freedom cannot be subjugated in any 
way.  
Even when we contemplate from our own 
perspective God’s perfection via his goodness and 
majesty, we see that God creates, but that still our own 
creation could not have been. Spinoza believed that 
God necessarily creates as a result of God’s absolute 
infinity and thereby sees the world as fully 
deterministic. There is no incompletion in Spinoza. 
The world is an infinite totality. But the very infinity 
of the world means there is always a surplus of 
possibilities that could have been. A world alienated 
                                                                                                     
cause of all being. Just as number one is secondary for all 
numbers. For no number can exist save by it. He is not a 
number.” (qtd. Raviv 2008, 356). 




and made in the name of God and thereby via the bit, 
the structural relation, the signifier, is such a world. 
Meillassoux’s position also rules out thinking the 
contingency of existence as such, but that means he 
contradicts himself and thereby holds also that all that 
occurs necessarily does so, as given an infinite amount 
of time and the eternal existence of things, all things 
will be realized. On this account, it cannot be said that 
for Meillassoux things are truly contingent, as the 
necessity of being itself means all that is must be and 
become as such at some point. Also, it should not be 
the case that existence should not become. The 
abolition of the world is thus ruled out by Meillassoux 
when the radical contingency of the world requires it. 
If being must be then, all is necessary and not 
contingent. But as we argued earlier, there is 
something because there is nothing. It is not necessary 
that there be something. And if it were necessary, then 
again we would be faced with the emergence of 
nothing itself ultimately and thus the need for a divine 
principle to create out of this nothing. Only on the 
basis of divine creation can the radical contingency of 
the world and its openness to its own miraculous 
nature be fully thought.  
Of course Meillassoux would say that everything 
that could happen does not have to happen, as all is 
contingent. But if being itself is eternal and infinite on 
his account, then ultimately all will occur. Here, we 
therefore take from Meillassoux the atheist those 
insights that are compatible with theism while 
showing how those which are not cannot stand on 
their own principles. They can only stand on the 
principles we have set forth here. It is surprising that 
there is something rather than nothing, as nothing 
exists in the void and is much simpler than what is. 
Meillassoux must admit that it is fully possible that 
everything cannot exist. Over infinity, the possibly of 
nonexistence will have to become actual. And an 




infinity would have to have passed already given the 
eternality of being. But everything has not passed into 
nothingness. We are. And there must be something 
necessary obtaining outside of mind that allows what 
is to be—God.  
Note: I am not claiming that Meillassoux here 
engages in a slip of the tongue, but rather despite the 
magisterial nature of his argumentation, the falsity of 
atheist ontology must emerge. Now, I think that 
Meillassoux himself or one of his supporters might 
reject this God on other grounds and thereby give the 
appearance of saving the atheist position. Meillassoux 
interestingly argues that God does not exist, but God 
may come into existence. This God is not a necessary 
cause or being for Meillassoux but rather itself a 
product of Meillassoux’s vision of radical 
contingency: “a God who is no longer the first and 
necessary cause, but rather the last contingent effect—
a God who is no longer absolute (only contingency is 
absolute), but who is nevertheless ultimate (the value 
of which is indispensable, but the advent of which is 
without necessity)” (Meillassoux 2009, 463).39 Now, 
                                                                                     
39 But let us be as clear as possible. Meillassoux may say that 
God can come into existence. But all he means by this is that 
the dead can arise for him as anything can happen. But God 
and the resurrection of the dead are far from being identical. 
Meillassoux is in no way advocating or attempting to show 
that God will exist, as God means something eternal, 
omnipresent, all-good, etc. Meillassoux, despite his own 
rhetorical flourishes and those of his explicators (which 
imply he is arguing God will exist), is an atheist. He is 
critical of an atheism of chance and necessity. That is, he 
disagrees with the multiverse insofar as it is says all possible 
universes will occur, disagrees with the idea that purely 
random processes bring about events in the world, and 
disagrees with the idea of not hoping for justice and 
salvation. But these things in and of themselves do not 
remove him from the idea that, per his thinking God was 




when Meillassoux says that God does not yet exist, he 
does mean that God is already prefigured in the world 
and just needs to be actualized like some possibility 
(Meillassoux 2009, 460). Given hyper-chaos, there is 
no reason that God should remain non-existent on 
Meillassoux view. Also, God’s future existence is not 
guaranteed, as nothing is guaranteed or necessary for 
Meillassoux, but it is an ever-present possibility.  
But when Meillassoux speaks of God arising in 
the future, Meillassoux does not really mean God in 
any sense we recognize. He means just that “renewal 
of past bodies” is a permanent possibility and that 
such a renewal would redeem past injustices: “I will 
use the term ‘God’ in the minimal sense that it would 
have in the framework of divine non-existence: the 
advent of a reign of existence which allows me to 
hope for something other than death for the departed” 
(Meillassoux 2009, 459-60). One can always hope for 
the resurrection of the dead and cannot rule it out 
given Meillassoux’s notion of hyper-chaos. 
Meillassoux’s atheist argument against God here is not 
just the ontological one recounted earlier, such that 
there can be no necessary being, but a rehearsal of a 
classical argument, the argument from evil 
(Meillassoux 2009, 451-57). One should hope for the 
resurrection of the dead, as there has been injustice, 
grief, suffering, etc. in relation to what we have 
experienced in the world in the past and present. To 
refresh one’s memory, the argument from evil 
Meillassoux is relying on here says that the evil and 
suffering in the world proves God’s inexistence insofar 
as a truly omnipotent, omniscient, and omni-
benevolent deity would never allow such suffering. In 
particular, such a God would not allow the good to 
suffer. Ultimately, as many have noted, this argument 
rests on the idea that there is an excess of suffering in 
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the world, as even an ardent atheist will admit that 
goodness of free will entails that humans will give rise 
to suffering, that some suffering can aid a person in 
growing spiritually, etc. In this way, the argument 
ultimately contends that there is a surplus of suffering. 
There could be less suffering and also exist free will, 
suffering as a pedagogical tool, etc.  
But it is not clear how the atheist determines that 
there is an excess other than via some subjective 
measurement of how things appear to them. It may be 
that there is just the right amount of suffering as per 
divine reasoning to allow for instance for humans to 
act freely. Also, while this argument argues God does 
not exist, if there is some possible act of fundamental 
justice in which the good are rewarded, past suffering 
is overcome or forgotten, etc. then it would prove that 
there is a God presiding over this world as the 
suffering that supposedly shows this God does not 
exist would not be excessive in any manner. The evil 
in the world then becomes justified on its own terms. 
God has moral reason for this suffering. God need not 
make sure there is no evil in the world. It must simply 
be that creation as such must include a non-excessive 
amount of suffering and also the possibility that even 
the appearance of such evil is redeemed for God to be 
said to obtain outside our conceptions.  
We can also say that there is only a problem of 
evil in conjunction with God. Without God, suffering 
simply happens senselessly. There is no reason to say 
it is just or unjust. Only with God do we ask if people 
are receiving their just reward. For example, in the 
pagan world, suffering was not an injustice, but a 
matter of fate (thus, making it better never to have 
been born in the words of Oedipus). Maimonides, for 
example, attempted to show that there are three kinds 
of evil and that almost all of the evil that we truly feel 
is unjustified arises from human action (Guide III.XII). 
God allows evil and suffering in order to aid us to 




achieve new things and grow in awareness. Some evil 
arises out of our having a physical body such as 
disease. But if we did not exist, we would never 
experience anything. For Maimonides here, the 
suffering that arises based on the free choices humans 
make is done out of ignorance of the right way of 
acting. People can be taught and corrected to do what 
is right by each other. Finally, we in our freedom 
inflict suffering on ourselves.  
Ultimately, then, the argument from evil cannot 
be maintained by someone such as Meillassoux who 
himself leaves open the possibility of the resurrection 
of the dead. We will also try to show that this 
resurrection is possible. It is also something that, 
following Kant, is reasonable to believe will occur. For 
these reasons, there is no reason to say God does not 
yet exist. Both ontologically and morally, we should 
uphold God now. While Meillassoux has shown us 
how to conceive the created world as purely 
contingent in order and reminded us of how this 
includes both miracles and the future resurrection of 
the dead, these positions not only do not ultimately 
rule out God, they only can be held in conjunction 
with the upholding of God.  
 
§28. THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD 
For Judaism, this future resurrection of the dead 
will occur. It is a principle of faith. In one version, the 
one for instance that Gersonides upholds, “this 
miracle will be performed by the king messiah in 
order to convince the nations of the world to recognize 
and to worship God and to strengthen Israel’s faith in 
him” (Manekin 2003, 315). In this way, it will be by 
some power the messiah himself enacts and in the 
messianic age that this resurrection of the dead will 
occur. In fact, a Jewish male over the age of 13 prays 
three times a day for this resurrection. But in doing so, 
the prayer attributes the power to the God himself. On 




this take, there is a view that the resurrection of the 
dead will be performed by God himself:  
 
Three keys are in the hands of the Holy One, 
blessed be He, which are not entrusted to 
any messenger, and they are: The key of rain, 
the key for a woman lying-in, and the key for 
the resurrection of the dead. The key of rain, 
as it is written [Deut. xxviii.12]: “The Lord 
will open unto thee his good treasure, the 
heaven, to give the rain of thy land in its 
season”; the key for a woman lying-in, as it is 
written [Genesis xxx.22]: “And God 
remembered Rachel, and God hearkened to 
her, and opened her womb”; and the key for 
the resurrection of the dead, as it is written 
[Ezekiel xxxvii.13]: “And ye shall know that 
I am the Lord, when I open your graves and 
when I cause you to come up out of your 
graves, O my people.” The sages of the West 
say, that also the key to a man’s earnings are 
in the hands of God alone, as it is written 
[Psalms cxlv.16]: “Thou openest thy hand 
and satisfiest the desire of every living thing. 
(Taanit 1:2)  
 
On this account it is not clear whether the future 
resurrection of the dead will be accomplished by the 
messiah itself or directly by God. In either way, 
Judaism holds that this event will occur, and it is for 
Maimonides the thirteenth and final principle of faith.  
Meillassoux has already suggested how this 
miracle itself is possible. But in his version, this 
resurrection produces a “non-necessary immortality in 
which death would remain a possibility. But this 
would be a possibility that might never arrive,” 
because the reinstated bodies will no longer be subject 
a biological law of decays (Meillassoux 2009, 462). For 




Meillassoux, it is something that one can hope or work 
for, but its very basis follows from the non-existence 
of God and on hyper-chaos. While we agree that the 
radical contingency of creation is one condition for 
the possibility of this occurrence, there is reason to 
believe that this miracle itself will happen given the 
very nature of God. In the first place, we have the 
moral argumentation best articulated by Kant at the 
end of his second critique. There, Kant attempts to 
show that our reasoning sensibilities would be 
insulted by the idea that the morally good in this 
world suffer and die without ever being rewarded for 
their goodness whereas the evil in this world often 
prosper. The very notion of the highest good requires 
that virtue leads to happiness rather than happiness 
leading to virtue, since otherwise the very idea that we 
feel and experience this absolute obligation to be 
moral would itself seem absurd and cruel. But given 
that in this world virtue does not lead to happiness we 
must posit that there is a divine judge that rewards 
and punishes ultimately justly and that we have 
immortal souls in which we can exist for this 
judgment and in order to achieve ultimately a purely 
good will.  
But as Alenka Zupancic persuasively argues in 
her essay “Kant with Don Juan and Sade,” the 
premises of Kant’s argument do not entail that we 
should posit an immortal soul as much as an immortal 
body (Zupancic 1993, 115-25). If the consistency of 
ethics requires that we are given a chance to work 
towards developing a purely good will, then we need 
the instincts, drives, passions, etc. of the body to work 
against in order to achieve this state. Also, happiness 
itself is a bodily experience in part. What we have 
here then from Kant is moral argumentation not only 
for God, but also for an afterlife that includes bodily 
resurrection. In contrast to Meillassoux, the very 
resurrection of the dead is required by the nature of 




God. For Kant, the upshot of this sort of argumentation 
would be that we have rational grounds to have faith 
in this future resurrection, as much as we have 
rational grounds to believe in God (even if we cannot 
know or prove as such for Kant that these things are).  
   Given the moral argumentation for the resur-
rection of the dead, it is also important to show it is 
metaphysically possible. For Meillassoux it is 
sufficient to simply raise it as a possibility. But given 
that for Meillassoux any non-contradiction is equally 
possible and might arise at any moment, we have no 
reason to see beyond this how and why the 
resurrection of the dead makes metaphysical sense. 
First, it is possible insofar as all is itself information. 
Even if this information itself is lost, God can retain it. 
Given that things are made of information itself, one 
simply needs to restate this information to have the 
thing itself. Take again the example of my voice. Even 
after I am dead recordings of it may survive. This is 
my voice itself as much as my voice over the phone or 
the voice heard when speaking to one. This is possible 
of course because my voice as with anything else can 
be expressed fully mathematically and via 
computation since it is fundamentally information. 
What is true of my voice is true of my body and mind. 
When the technology arises, my voice will be 
emulated not just in terms of what has been said, 
insofar as a machine would be able, using basic 
computer programs, to speak sentences I have never 
spoken in myself at this point. Things can be 
described in purely digital form such that they can be 
recreated as such and not just representations or 
simulations of such things. The digital nature of 
reality itself entails the possible emulation of things.  
Now, to emulate the entire universe might take 
something as large as the universe given that the 
universe itself is a computer and computation. But 
that does not exclude the possibility of parts of the 




universe, such as a human being, being emulated 
fully. We are not talking here about an approximation 
or idealization of a human being. We are talking about 
the full consciousness and eventually the body itself 
being emulated. Just as there is a set of rules or rule for 
the universe, such that when those rules are 
implemented the universe itself unfolds, there is a set 
of rules and digital instructions for emulating any 
specific human. Such emulations would have to 
emulate every molecule, atom, etc. that is necessarily 
connected with the person. But such atoms and 
molecules are themselves composed of information. It 
is well-known that our body, for example, does not 
consist of any specific set of atoms for instance. The 
atoms making up our body are replaced multiple 
times. It is a pattern that makes us up. In this way 
emulation requires atoms, but not the particular atoms 
that compose me at the moment of this writing.  
One can get a sense of what type of technology 
would be required here by thinking about science 
fiction and the particular example of the ‘teleporter’ 
on Star Trek. Here, one is able to emulate the pattern 
of someone such that one can send it to any location 
in space-time. As Michio Kaku notes, “to teleport 
someone, you would have to know the precise 
location of every atom in living body, which would 
probably violate the Heisenberg uncertainty principle 
(which states that you cannot know both the precise 
location and the velocity of an electron)” (Kaku 2009, 
55). A key here would be that one would not just have 
to note where the atom is now, but to propose any and 
all possible velocity and location relations such that 
one could emulate the object. Quantum objects 
contain information about many things, but of course 
when we observe such quantum phenomena they lock 
into one thing. One thereby would need to 
comprehend the very wave function informing 
whatever phenomena one would want to teleport. One 




would then be communicating all possible infor-
mation states and not just one. But given that we exist 
throughout our lives in many states as long as the 
basic pattern was retained one would have emulated 
the thing.  
Quantum information, once observed, loses its 
superposition. But that does not mean that one cannot 
comprehend the thing by comprehending its very 
wave function including all possible states. Kaku 
further states that, for instance, a “light beam” can be 
“sent down a fiber optic cable. Remarkably the light 
beam contains all the quantum information necessary 
to describe the original matter beam (e.g. the location 
and velocity of all its atoms)” (Kaku 2009, 65). In this 
way, through bouncing light off existing atoms one 
can already capture all its essential information. Now 
as Kaku also notes, from a Newtonian or Aristotelian 
perspective, teleportation is not possible since one 
either has things made of tiny hard indivisible balls 
that would need to be preserved or one has some 
unknown underlying substratum that itself cannot be 
expressed mathematically (Kaku 2009, 56). But here 
due to the fundamental view that all things are made 
of information, once one has this information, one 
could use it to emulate whatever one has.  
Think here of teleporting an apple. One would 
need to collect all the quantum information relative to 
each atom. One could then send this information and 
have a machine reform it at the other end. In episode 
four of the first season of Kaku’s television show Sci Fi 
Science: Physics of the Impossible, Kaku lays out how 
one could, using the same technology that forms the 
basis of MRI machines, collect this information. An 
MRI device uses radio waves generated by electro-
magnetic fields to interact with atoms—forcing them 
to emit pulses that can be recorded. A more developed 
MRI device with more powerful electro-magnets and 
more developed sensors for collecting information 




would form an atomic map of one in one’s entirety. 
Data contains no matter according to Kaku. At the 
other end of the teleporter, Kaku proposes in this 
television episode that one would of course need 
atoms to use, but these atoms would be manipulated 
using the data sent to form an emulation. At the other 
end there would a fabricator that, using the data and 
information sent, could assemble atom by atom a twin 
entity. One would thereby send information rather 
than atoms. Or perhaps better, one would send the 
information that fundamentally makes the atoms what 
they are.  
This is not to say that atoms cannot be 
transported. Quantum entanglement itself enables 
this. Once two atoms are entangled, one atom 
immediately informs the other atom. The key here 
though is not how a future teleportation would in fact 
work, but that it is physically possible as well as 
metaphysically possible. If such a device is possible, 
then metaphysically there is no reason why a human 
could not be resurrected as this information itself is 
available to God. The key is that the identity of a 
person or anything else is found in the basic pattern of 
information informing that thing rather than in any 
substantial thingness. The key is also that if the 
essential information is had then one does not need to 
transport an original, but only need emulate that 
original as expressed in information. One converts 
something into the data and set of instructions it 
always already was from a metaphysical perspective 
and then uses that data to emulate the thing itself. The 
twin itself would be identical in all ways including in 
terms of consciousness at the moment of 
transportation even if later such a twin might develop 
new experiences. We are not speaking here of a 
biological, genetic clone, but a twin with the exact 




same physical brain.40 Teleportation would ultimately 
not be much different than contemporary fax 
machines. This machine sends the essential 
information contained on a sheet of a paper and 
reproduces it perfectly at another location. If what was 
                                                                                     
40 Whereas a biological clone develops in new ways and is 
seemingly distinct from its twin like a natural-born twin is, 
the metaphysical clone we are speaking of here relative to 
teleportation would not be as distinct. In fact (and this is yet 
another future testable claim we are making), I believe the 
metaphysical clone will be entangled with what is cloned 
just as atoms can be entangled with each other in quantum 
physics. This means that no matter the distance, the clone 
tele-transported will have a relationship with its twin. One 
can imagine one having memories of the other, dreaming at 
night things that relate to the day of the other, etc. The 
model here would not be dissimilar to what we already find 
in split-brain cases as investigated by Derrick Parfit in 
“Divided Minds and the Nature of Persons,” in Metaphysics: 
The Big Questions (1999). In such split-brain cases, one 
experiences two distinct things at the same time. But here 
rather than having two selves in one body, we have one self 
in two bodies. Parfit concludes from split-brain experiments 
(where the two hemispheres of the brain are actually cut and 
separated) that the Bundle theory is correct. He does so in 
part because when someone with a split-brain sees red and 
blue in two different eyes, the experience is not unified, but 
rather when asked what one sees the split-brain writes red 
with one hand and blue with the other. Here, one 
metaphysical clone sees red and the other blue. Each with 
its own experiences, but at the same time one may have a 
dream of seeing the other color that night. The split-brain 
theory says there is no underlying self that exists throughout 
all our experiences. We have a soul split in itself as an 
irreducible dimension of copied identical information. We 
have already mind is split in Lacanian terms and thereby 
that there are unconscious thoughts we are not aware of. 
Consciousness is only ever partial in that regard and in 
regards to the information it forms a dimension of. 
  




on the page could not be computed and expressed as 
information, this would not be possible. We have 
already discussed how this occurs with our voices in 
every phone call. In the resurrection of the dead, the 
pattern itself would be emulated again.  
In his Physics of Immortality: Modern Cosmology, 
God, and the Resurrection of the Dead, Frank Tipler 
proposes a specific way in which future technology 
will not just be able to teleport a person, but actually 
resurrect those who have passed. Tipler’s view of 
course rests on the metaphysical idea that the “soul is 
nothing but a specific program being run on a 
computing machine called the brain” (Tipler 1995, 2). 
Tipler imagines intelligent robots containing infor-
mation on humanity (such as all our genetic 
information) in the future being sent out to colonize 
the entire universe (Tipler 1995, 19). Now, the dead 
resurrected would not be simulations as 
representations, but a simulation “so good that every 
single atom in each [person and each object] . . . has 
an analogue” (Tipler 1995, 206). Such a perfect 
situation would itself be an emulation as each and 
every property would be captured and reproduced. A 
powerful computer that covers the entire universe 
colonized by the intelligent robots would emulate 
these people for Tipler. Such emulated people would 
have consciousness and be aware just as we are and 
would not even know they are in a computer. In many 
ways it would be the same as we ourselves exist in the 
universe which is itself a computer. In this way, 
emulated people see themselves as real as we see 
ourselves (Tipler 1995, 207).  
While one cannot imagine an emulation of the 
entire universe, unless the entire universe is itself 
used, a computer will be able to emulate us for Tipler 
if it has all the information needed, in the same way a 
computer can emulate other computers (Tipler 1995, 
208). Here, Tipler argues (as any Structural Realist 




would need to) against Kant that “existence is a 
predicate” such that whatever is exists even if it is just 
a relation between concepts and information (Tipler 
1995, 207-10). Whereas Kant opposed a mental 
representation of a coin to the coin one experiences 
empirically, this view forgets that conception can be 
much more than just mental imaginings.41 Such 
mental representations already had being (they existed 
in mind). Some, such as Kant, believe that when we 
observe a tree, we have only our mental 
representations of this tree. For Kant, given that all we 
have are these mental representations as conceptions, 
one must posit a tree in itself over and above these 
representations (these mental representations are of 
course not the tree—they do not grow and bear fruit). 
But mental representations like these are but one type 
of conceptualization. Conceptualizations as done by 
computers and information have themselves being as 
well. As much as consciousness is information on its 
inside, one’s thinking and feeling oneself to exist 
would be the same as we have, insofar as we are 
ourselves, here and now, are made up of information. 
The resurrected dead would then not be any different 
than we are now even if they were resurrected by a 
universal computer.42   
                                                                                     
41 Here, we will be ultimately implying that contemporary 
credit cards disprove Kant. That is, whereas Kant argues one 
cannot spend an imaginary thaler even though it has all the 
same properties as the one he claims to hold in his pocket, 
one can spend money that is nothing more than computer 
code by swiping one’s card. This is then registered in one’s 
bill and/or deducted from one’s count. The swiped code 
enacts the sale, and the thalers are spent. 
42 This universal computer would produce what the 
Kabbalah calls yechida, the universal soul. In it there is 
recognition of God and constant desire to contemplate God’s 
unicity. Kabbalah focuses on types of souls in a way not too 
distinct from Aristotle. Plants for example have the lowest 




In thinking of this universal computer, one can 
think here of the vision of Ray Kurzweil.43 Kurzweil 
envisions computers the size of blood vessels and 
even smaller. Once the entire universe is filled with 
the all these microscopic computers, it can be untied 
into one single thing which will have divine proper-
ties such as omnipresence, omniscience, etc. Another 
key metaphysical idea that Tipler picks up on that is 
key to any true Structural Realism (like the one we 
have been trying to articulate) is that of the identity of 
indiscernibles (Tipler 1995, 207). If two things are 
identical in all their parts and properties, then the two 
things are one and the same thing. The key is that an 
emulated dead person would then be the same as they 
were when living. Tipler argues that this resurrection 
of the dead “is physically possible even if no 
                                                                                                     
type of soul called nefesh in which there is feeding and an 
ability to reproduce. There is here some basic awareness of 
at least the needs one must acquire to survive physically. 
Animalistic soul (called ruach) of course involves and 
contains nefesh, but goes beyond through the ability to move 
oneself and an ability to perceive the world through the 
senses. The human soul contains the lower two, but also an 
awareness of morality, truth, and beauty (that is, that there is 
something ideal rather than just the physical). Given that we 
have said all is information, we would have to also attribute 
some type of soul to the inorganic (for instance, stones), to 
atoms, galaxies, etc. We might choose what Kabbalah calls 
chaya. That is, these things are living as such, but only have 
the most basic form of awareness. If we are to imagine what 
they are as information both inside and out we might 
imagine for example a silence beyond words or from the 
perspective of their sheer materiality resistance. The com-
puters we have now therefore already have minds and souls. 
But a computer simple follows rules and instructions such 
that its qualia would be something like a looping that does 
not recognize itself as such.  
43 Ray Kurzweil develops his ideas in many places, The 
Singularity is Near (2006). 




information whatsoever about an individual can be 
extracted from the past light cone” as “sufficient 
computer capacity to simulate our present day world 
by simple brute force” would occur (Tipler 1995, 220). 
For instance, information on the human genome 
would allow possible humans to be made genetically. 
All possible human experiences would then be had by 
those creatures to ensure that each person is emulated. 
Tipler argues such a computer would be itself fueled 
by the Big Crunch at the end of the universe itself and 
thereby have an endless supply of energy. There is a 
singularity at the end in the collapse of the universe. 
Even if this collapse lasts a few instances, the infinite 
energy created by it makes for unlimited computing 
capacity.  
Tipler famously calls this end point the ‘omega 
point’, following Teilhard de Chardin. The universal 
computer stretching across the universe collapses in 
size along with the universe itself in this collapse. But 
this only fuels its power and thereby allows it to be as 
big as the universe itself and to simulate it. In this 
way, the resurrection takes place precisely at the end 
of this world. The key is that one upholds, as we have 
been doing throughout this text, that what makes a 
thing what it is is the fundamental pattern it expresses 
rather than some substratum underling change (that is, 
physical continuity) (Tipler 1995, 227). Now, many 
will contend the soul is just such a substratum. In fact, 
it’s not clear how one could ever argue that underlying 
substratums are not like souls, since as they persisted 
through change, there is no reason they will not 
persist through the change of death. But the Kabbalah 
has a view of the soul like Aristotle, as the name of 
different types of organizations. Soul is thereby like 
mind. We do not need permanent underlying souls to 
have selves, even selves that exist beyond death. 
One objection, from those who believe there is 
some real substratum that persists through change, is 




that it seems some phenomenon cannot be accounted 
for without such substratums. For instance, if we do 
not posit some underlying objecthood to the cane 
toad, then we cannot understand how it is possible 
that when that toad was transferred into a new 
environment it lead to disastrous results. The cane 
toad, on this account, has an objecthood that includes 
certain properties, powers, etc. But I am not sure one 
needs here to posit some substratum with all these 
properties to account of the cane toad. One simply 
needs patterns. For example, in the environment of 
my computer there exists a virus program. It can be 
copied such that it is indiscernible from itself. It is one 
thing. It is a unity as a set containing its code, 
relations, etc. If one plugs it into a computer running 
different operating software it may not be recognized 
or it may destroy the computer or it may be 
neutralized by some other program. A cane toad is no 
different. It can be isolated out as a unity by 
consciousness or in being itself, but that does not 
mean it has to be an object, rather than a 
mathematizable set of relations. 
We can also imagine one asking how this model 
can handle two distinct sets colliding or interacting. 
For instance, one can think of a tree growing on the 
side of a mountain. But here we have two patterns that 
collide and can even overlap. The tree pattern must 
grow alongside the mountain. It is not then unlike a 
spider web growing along a cave. The cave has its own 
pattern and the spider web grows alongside it and in 
conformity with the space it allows. One might here 
want to think about the interactions of patterns using 
analogy with Einstein’s notion of space-time and 
gravity. If the universe is just a series of networked 
nodes as Wolfram shows (NKS 532-37), then when we 
see one pattern affecting another it is like a curvature 
of space itself by the gravity of the pattern, as it were, 
in its iteration. We can see in each case two distinct 




sets or one including both things. We do not in fact 
know whether for instance to see the mountain and 
tree as one thing or as two things. Or to zoom in and 
focus on one of the branches of the tree or to zoom out 
and see the mountain as part of a merge which is part 
of the earth, etc. In each example, we have either a 
smaller or larger set of relations and a pattern. All are 
in being, but any can count as patterns that express 
themselves. We can only truly account for this aspect 
of being by posing an ontology of information and 
sets. Only sets can capture how any different things 
can be arranged. If we were to posit things as 
essentially made of continuous substratums then we 
have to posit some Platonic-like withdrawn thing, an 
in-itself tree that persists despite a branch falling off. 
Also, it is only by positing bits/information (names, 
numbers, sets—the differential) as the substance of 
being that being can express these characteristics 
without having to arrange hierarchies of levels. We 
have here both one model of causality (that one 
pattern influences another—although causality can 
just be thought of as a step by step process where one 
iteration of a program leads to the next articulation) 
Now from the perspective of Husserlian 
phenomenology, consciousness itself would see things 
disclosed as unities with pieces and moments. 
Moments are parts of a unity that cannot persist 
outside the unity. Pieces have their own independent 
status. Pitch (and here we have a good example of a 
material and mental qualia) in the musical sense 
cannot exist except as united to sound (Sokolowski 
1999, 20-23). But we see in this example that pieces 
are really qualia that only consciousness is aware of, 
whereas everything else is moments, things that can 
be as they are. It is theoretically possible that we could 
for instance construct a branch from atoms without it 
ever having been connected to a tree. This is so be-




cause the branch itself is a set of relations, 
information.  
Many readers here might still be skeptical and ask 
where one set begins and the other ends, if being is 
seen as constantly shifting from set to set. Let’s return 
to the doughnut and coffee mug examples. I say I have 
this doughnut in my hand. But I have then named and 
isolated an aspect of being, a set. It is completely 
arbitrary that I focused my attention in this way, 
rather than seeing my hand and the doughnut (and if I 
dunk it, the coffee mug as well) as all being part of a 
single set. This arbitrariness is also what brings to the 
fore the need for names. As in isolating a set, we are 
naming if only as a ‘this’ (this doughnut). But names 
in English do not reveal anything about the thing. The 
word water in its lettering tells us nothing. In 
addition, the letters have no numerical value. But in 
Hebrew, the holy language of creation, a set identified 
as water, can reveal properties by its name alone. 
Here, the name of a thing helps to isolate it and to call 
attention to it as a pattern.  
These patterns are already given to us. The 
pattern for the tree growing in the courtyard is not 
determined by us. Our encounter with it is determined 
already for how it has arisen on the basis of the 
information informing being. But mind itself can also 
combine things into unities as sets. It can for instance 
take the house and tree together as a set for 
consciousness. Anything that can be generated from 
simple rules or expressed as mathematical relations is 
in itself a set on its own, independent of mind. There 
is also here a continuous creation by God. While God 
is withdrawn from the world in the tzimtzum and 
reality is an unfolding of the program that is God’s 
holy name, God permutes and combines the letters of 
creation beyond how this name unfolds on its own. At 
any time, God can continue writing using the void that 
his withdrawal affords as a basis. Notice here we are 




not stating a techne versus physis distinction, insofar 
as even human generated things can result from 
simple programs.  
Most such sets are delimited by us using visual 
perception. That is, it is a function of mind as 
Husserlian phenomenology already showed us, to be 
able to engage with the world as a system of 
interlocking and interrelated unities. While mind via 
visual perception is not alone here, as writing and 
other means can do so, it forms a good example. As 
our guiding genius Wolfram says, our “visual system 
seems to . . . just pick out certain features which 
quickly make us see the picture as a collection of 
patches with definite features” from the “mixture of 
just three fixed colors” (NKS 577). That is, visual 
perception itself is a form of analysis detecting 
patterns, iterations, densities, nested features, 
randomness, etc. in the patterns making up being. On 
the basis of detecting three basic colors as well, visual 
perception itself builds up patterns using only basic 
elements and simple rules. Sensible intuition then 
tells us what has limits by itself interacting with the 
information that makes up being. Surfaces, sides, and 
volumes are given to us as inherent aspects of finite 
things. But we now see that this is part of sets. Mind 
itself, as function of information, interacts with it in 
order to reveal things. We may only see one side of a 
cube, but the cube itself can be expressed as a 
geometrical set of relations. And through 
anamorphosis of visual perception we can see that the 
hand and the doughnut also can be unified. Visual 
perception is thereby an interaction that should be 
thought of along the lines of two interference patterns 
or waves overlapping—the wave of sight and its 
program and the program of patterns it interacts with. 
Given the view of space elaborated by us via Wolfram, 
it may also simply be due to the program itself in its 
nodal unfolding that causes one to only see parts, 




sides, profiles, etc. of things. That is, space is real and 
part of the relational nature of things such that its 
unfolding and folding causes visual perception in 
interacting with it to only be aware of parts of it. I only 
see one side of the cube spatially because the cube 
itself in its own set develops, folds, and imbricates its 
own spatial field relative to all else and within the 
overall program and space of the universe itself. 
Part of the arbitrariness involved here is that 
metaphysically we move from all that is to the bit as 
the fundamental level, but also see all things as 
complications of the holy Name. We are then not 
dealing with any things in themselves. The in-itself is 
made up of information. When we look at a cube, we 
are not dealing with a thing itself, but a mathematical 
set of relations that mind only can reveal part of via 
visual perception, for instance. All that is is figurable 
in the overall pattern that is differentiatable into sets 
and sets of sets. These sets are names. But we cannot 
find an origin of language. Every time we would look 
for such an origin we are presupposing language. For 
instance, if we said a certain tribe first spoke and used 
language to communicate, unless we post a baseless 
irruption a la Meillassoux, we will presuppose the 
language as intelligible—otherwise when spoken it 
would make no sense. This lack of origins means also 
that language is divine in quality. But its divinity in 
naming and isolating sets points not to its role in 
creation, but to how it is necessary in allowing us to 
engage with the world in its differentiation. For the 
Kabbalah, this is part of the reason God created with 
letters and numbers and why the names of things are 
divine when they reveal this aspect and the nature of 
the set. All of this is not to say that being itself is some 
formless aporia that mind then divides up (and mind 
itself is an irreducible dimension of information, of 
differentiation). On the contrary, being itself is already 
differentiated as letters, numbers, bits, information, 




etc. It is precisely because the in-itself is made up of 
sets of patterns that it is possible for mind to engage 
with it as it does. 
One can also think of this question with reference 
to our earlier discussion of a coffee mug. The question 
here would be: what if I smash the coffee mug? The 
coffee mug would then disappear as a thing as it 
apparently goes through an essential change. But the 
smashed pieces in their being smashed also can 
express a non-random pattern based on simple rules, 
as Wolfram showed—such fractures and cleavage of 
shards often express basic aspects no matter how 
broken (NKS 374, 995). There is also no reason here 
that the coffee mug cannot suddenly raise up and 
reform. As Wolfram shows us, entropy is not 
universal—there are some patterns that simply break 
down and then reform (NKS 435-54). But we cannot 
understand such phenomenon if we are invested in 
substratums, as such substratums would either persist 
as withdrawn things in themselves in some Platonic 
realm or necessarily disappear with the smashing of 
the coffee mug.  
To return to Tipler, given that all possible 
humans having all possible experiences or with all 
possible brain states, one then eventually will find an 
emulated version of every human who has lived since 
“two beings who are identical both in their genes and 
in their mind programs are the same person” as much 
as “two atoms in the same quantum state cannot be 
distinguished” “even in principle” (Tipler 1995, 229). 
If a system is reproduced exactly, it is an emulation. 
For those who would argue that different locations in 
space-time would show how there is no identity of 
indiscernibles, Tipler holds this sense of location does 
not hold per quantum physics (Tipler 1995, 234). One 
might also say that space and time are themselves a 
product of relations such that as the informational 
patterns are reproduced so can space and time.  




Think here of the famous Ship of Theseus. This 
ship constantly has all its boards replaced such that 
the question arises whether it is the same ship after a 
time. But insofar as it retains the same pattern and it is 
numerically one as a thing named, it has an identity 
regardless of what its boards are made of or if they are 
always the same, just as we constantly have cells and 
atoms replaced. Here then, our bodies do not need to 
persist over time in order to exist. They can return 
insofar as our identity essentially is a pattern and not 
any actual uninterrupted continuity. By rejecting the 
idea that one needs some soul underlying physical 
change to have identity, Tipler believes he has shown 
that a “soul is no longer necessary for individual 
immorality” (Tipler 1995, 235). In any event Tipler 
thinks without the brain there is nothing such that we 
need to reproduce the brain as such. The brain has a 
very large, but not infinite number of neurons and 
connections with those neurons. One could then relate 
each connection to a computer bit (Tipler 1995, 22). 
One could then determine the finite number of states 
one needs to reproduce a brain and its neural 
connections (Tipler 1995, 32). Our memories might 
fade into nothingness, but if every possible genetic 
human experiences all possible scenarios then they 
will be recovered.  
If all brain states can be emulated, then 
eventually those corresponding to our own will also 
be uncovered. This reliving, as it were, of our pasts 
occurs instantly insofar as in the computer we have a 
durational consciousness that Aquinas called 
aeternitas, wherein “all past, present, and future tem-
pus and aevum events in the universe” happen at once 
just as they do for God (Tipler 1995, 134). The way we 
experience time now is not of this nature due to the 
way we are related to atoms and their vibrations. But 
when we are near the singularity and related to the 
computing power of the universal computer, this type 




of durational consciousness will not describe 
subjective experience. Near the end of things all will 
recede from us infinitely insofar as the big crunch will 
be prevented by how the universal computer utilizes 
the singularity created. Here we will be capable of an 
endless amount of individual thoughts. The resur-
rected dead continue to live on and experience time 
subjectively from the perspective of eternity.  
Tipler’s view of a material resurrection of the 
dead by a universal computer can be seen then to 
follow the first possibility Judaism suggests—that the 
messiah will resurrect the dead. For Tipler, the life 
lead by the resurrected body can be literally infinite as 
part of the universal computer built across the 
universe (Tipler 1995, 255). Judaism itself also has the 
idea of a world-to-come, and it is never clear if the 
messianic age is the world-to-come or if they are two 
distinct ideas. In any event, Tipler cites Sanhedrin 
90b-91b to show how Judaism itself already saw how 
if one “replicates the pattern of a long-dead person” 
one would have that person him/herself (Tipler 1995, 
287). As opposed to Kant, who claimed one just 
needed a soul, Judaism already contended that body 
and soul (consciousness) will have roles to play in the 
afterlife. While Maimonides thought only a select few 
who perfect themselves rationally can achieve 
immortality, this view violates the idea that all will be 
resurrected (Tipler 1995, 289). It also violates the 
normative view that “if God were to create another 
body exactly like the first in temperament, form, 
memory, and endow it with the old soul, then the 
recreation would be the original person” (Tipler 1995, 
290). Of course, this does not deny a view of the 
world-to-come as a purely spiritual state. For instance, 
what are called near-death experiences might them-
selves offer insight into either the world-to-come or 
the future resurrection itself. Judaism is itself always 
unclear on what to expect from the afterlife, meaning 




it is probably the case that there will be both a world 
to come and a resurrection of the dead.44 The world to 
come may be a purely spiritual state that arises after 
the resurrection.  
In any event, on Tipler’s account, it is clear that 
the computer designer would be the messiah, as it 
were, while the Omega Point would be the messianic 
age. Tipler’s theory relies on such an omega point 
occurring since one needs infinite computing power to 
simulate all possible humans in all possible worlds 
since the information that the dead had is most 
probably lost to entropy, disintegration, etc. The 
universe itself always contains a finite amount of 
information in fact. This finiteness means a computer 
with infinite energy at the singularity will be able to 
compute all possibilities. Tipler also believes that life 
has an innate will to persist and that our future 
descendants will be noble enough to want to resurrect 
us, even if these descendants are artificially intelligent 
robots. They might also emulate us out of mere desire 
to know what we were like. When we are emulated we 
will regard it as reality. The computer itself will 
present us with experiences.  
It is important to note that even if one does not 
find the actual way Tipler sees the resurrection of the 
dead as plausible, given its dependence on too many 
contingencies (for instance, future universal 
colonization), his view is metaphysically possible 
insofar as one accepts the idea that the universe is a 
computer, that physical reality is information and 
thereby ultimately mathematical in nature (that is, that 
the world is made of number), etc. For instance, Tipler 
                                                                                     
44 For an excellent overview of Jewish views of life after 
death, see Simcha Paull Raphael’s Jewish Views of the 
Afterlife (2009). Raphael highlights the way in which in the 
Talmud, for instance, the world-to-come and resurrection of 
the dead are figured. 




claims that we as conscious beings are ultimately 
understandable as computer programs. In particular, 
we are simply computer programs that exhibit 
consciousness insofar as we pass the Turning test 
(Tipler 1995, 124). Tipler also makes it explicit that he 
sees living beings as encoded information, and that 
the process of life is passing on coded information 
(Tipler 1995, 124-26). Interestingly, Tipler argues that 
we are free to act on this account insofar as the world 
is indeterminate, insofar as one cannot have complete 
information about all of it just by examining a part 
(Tipler 1995, 187).  
Some might object here that Tipler only shows 
how a computer might represent things. They would 
argue that even a perfect representation of something 
is not that thing. For instance, the resurrected people 
Tipler speaks of would not be flesh and blood. But it’s 
not clear that this critique holds. Insofar as the 
computer emulates one’s brain one can perceive all 
the same things. In that way, a perceived apple that is 
tasted inputs the same information as one tasted 
otherwise. To perceive an apple is not distinguishable 
from a virtual world presentation of an apple, if that 
apple perfectly emulates the properties involved. 
Perfect copies are the things they copy. While 
Chalmers argues that consciousness opens its own 
irreducible dimension, consciousness for him still 
“arises from a physical basis, even though it is not 
entailed by that basis” (Chalmers 1997, 125). Here 
then, Chalmers argues also that if one’s “physical 
structure were to be replicated by some creature in the 
actual world my conscious experience would be 
replicated too” as consciousness supervenes on the 
physical (Chalmers 1997, 124). Also, the emulation 
here does not need to be flesh and blood insofar as 
flesh and blood are themselves composed of 
information. One would have to show that aspect of 
flesh and blood cannot be digitized despite things 




being already composed of information. It then does 
not matter if electronic encoding of patterns occurs or 
that those patterns are encoded in another physical 
form. The key is that the thing itself is its pattern.  
Interestingly, key parts of Tipler’s theory are 
subject to verification such as the idea of there being a 
Big Crunch, since this idea means the universe is 
closed and that at some future point the universe will 
long expand, and begin to contract due to the 
relationship between energy and matter in the 
universe relative to gravity and the density of things 
(the amount of these things can already be inferred 
based on current measurements, although these 
measurements today include the as yet verified idea of 
dark matter). At the present, the cosmological 
evidence may point against this idea, but it is still an 
open issue, especially given the open state of dark 
matter. Now, in Brachot 17a we learn that “in the 
world to come there is no eating, drinking, or 
intercourse, rather, the righteous sit with crowns on 
their heads.” But this view does not mean we are not 
embodied, but rather that our embodiment might deal 
with instincts and passions in another way or simulate 
our needs.  
For Meillassoux, because the resurrection is just a 
possibility and not a necessity, we should feel “an 
injunction to act in the present in order to hasten its 
approach and to make me live in its existence” 
(Meillassoux 2009, 465). If we follow the models 
proposed here, that means we should act to bring 
about the needed technology to emulate things as 
Tipler describes. Part of doing that, we hope, is 
creating the corresponding theology that shows how it 
is possible given the very nature of reality. But on our 
own view, it is a matter of rational faith that this 
resurrection will occur somehow, either by God or by 
the messiah (who may simply in part be the one who 
produces a computer powerful enough to do what 




Tipler outlines). This rational faith involves the idea 
that the holy Name of God, as it elaborates the created 
world itself, will at some point unveil a pattern in 
which all the human patterns will reemerge including 
those now extinguished. To add to this faith, a 
Kabbalistic metaphysics shows us how this 
miraculous event is possible given the inherent 
structuration of things.  
 
§29. THE EVENT OF THE NAME 
The resurrection of the dead will certainly be a 
miracle. But if one were to die today, one would find 
oneself either experiencing a form of the afterlife, such 
as reported to us by near-death experiences or im-
mediately awake in the resurrection (unless of course 
they are the same thing). Even if one then had a 
distinct memory of dying, one would then find oneself 
surrounded by those who passed before, or see oneself 
hovering over one’s own body. In any event, one still 
would not be certain one is not dreaming and as to 
what is occurring. In this way, for the resurrection of 
the dead to occur, as far as we are concerned, it 
requires the seemingly supplemental, but necessarily 
foundational act of naming it and declaring it. As no 
signs can ever fully attest to it with certainty, the 
event is instantiated in and through its declaration 
and then arises as what it is. Now, the world one 
experiences in the resurrection of the dead might be 
radically different than this one, the powers one will 
have including one’s knowledge may also differ 
significantly, but recognition of what is occurring still 
requires a declaration. This is also why the messiah 
may play a key role as the messiah will be the one 
who declares that the dead have been resurrected.  
The resurrection of the dead is then an event in 
the strict sense of the word. It is an extraordinary 
occurrence. But it is also an event in the sense that 
Badiou gives to the term. Now, Badiou wants to 




restrict the notion of the event to the fields of the 
amorous, political, artistic, and political. But we will 
show that not only the resurrection of the dead is an 
event, but that religion itself contains events, in 
particular the most important event, the revelation of 
God at Mount Sinai. To understand Badiou’s specific 
philosophy of what makes an event an event, it is 
easiest to look at how he explains the amorous event.  
What is unique about Badiou’s own position 
concerning love is that he subtracts love from the 
discourse of knowledge and places its truth in the very 
encounter between two individuals. Love is an 
encounter, an event. This encounter is not predictable. 
It is not immediately known or seen by the Two. It 
only will have been. It arises through a “declaration of 
love” that makes it so. A performative declaration 
thereby brings the Two as Two (as the ‘I’ and ‘you’ of 
‘I love you’) into being.45  This performativity presents 
the paradox of an entity calling itself into being.46  But 
such is the nature of an event. The reference and 
meaning of the declaration will have been decided 
through the declaration. It performatively enacts what 
it describes (‘I love you’) and constitutes two 
contingent finite subjects. This performative that is 
also a constative statement draws upon the “void” of 
the situation which is precisely the impossible to 
know disjunction constituted (Badiou 2000, 272). But 
since there are two (‘I’ and ‘you’), one can never be 
                                                                                     
45Alain Badiou, “Being by Numbers” (1994). The two lovers 
are then faithful to this event of naming and become its 
subjects. Badiou does not specify if both have to make the 
declaration, but it would seem that at least both must make 
this declaration and/or be interpellated by it as true for it to 
take place.  
46 To this extent, Badiou’s notion of an event overlaps with 
the Derridean notion of an event. For Jacques Derrida on the 
strange performativity of events, see “Declarations of 
Independence” (1986). 




sure that the declaration has not been feigned or that it 
is still true. One cannot be sure that the other will 
make the same declaration. In this manner, one must 
after having heard oneself in the declaration 
constantly wonder at the other as other (as disjoined), 
search for proofs that there really is love, and remain 
true to the event that made the two lovers.  
Here, the situation has entirely changed in that 
every and any action can be a sign of love. One way of 
showing that the event has taken place (but also how 
it is not knowable from the outside) is through “lover’s 
babble,” which sounds nonsensical to outside 
observers.47 Another way involves the magic or 
mystery that the lover attributes to his/her beloved (a 
look, a disposition, a way of speaking, etc.) that 
appears to a third party as mere everyday qualities. 
This ‘babble’ thereby marks the difference that has 
been instituted through an event that is not locatable 
in time or space or from the outside. The event-truth 
of love, as found in its circular and self-referential 
declaration, is thus undecidable and not falsifiable.48    
To be an event, an event requires such decla-
rations. Love is perhaps unique insofar as it only 
exists in and by the declaration itself of love, whereas 
artistic events in which a new type of art emerges 
involves actual works that pre-exist any declaration 
categorizing them as new. But it is always undecidable 
whether the event has occurred, even despite its being 
declared. That the event involves such self-
                                                                                     
47Badiou, “On a Finally Objectless Subject” (1988). 
48 This event-truth occurs as a disjunct of the ‘I’ and ‘you’ of 
‘I love you’ is certain, but Badiou further argues that this 
truth is addressed to all (Badiou 2000, 272). By being 
addressed to all, it brings in all of humanity, shows that even 
though there is two there is one situation for all, and the 
truth is only the truth of the situation, that the situation is 
always radically split (Badiou 2000, 273). 




referentiality means it is related to the void as such. 
The naming of the event is based on the act itself of 
naming (BE 206). For this reason, the resurrection of 
the dead might not count, strictly speaking, since it 
occurs whether one recognizes and names it as such 
and the naming only comes after something has 
occurred. Even if one did not declare it, it would still 
be what it is. It would just not be recognized in this 
way. Events for Badiou appear to be things that occur 
in the pure act of naming and depend only on others 
seeing and recognizing the event as happening (such 
as in a political declaration of a new communal entity 
where in the declaration brings it into being even if 
bodies, people, places, etc included in that communal 
entity already pre-existed it). However, Badiou also 
writes the following:  
 
The act of nomination of the event is what 
constitutes it, not as real—we will always 
posit that this multiple has occurred—but as 
susceptible to a decision concerning its 
belonging to the situation. The essence of the 
intervention consists-within the field opened 
up by an interpretative hypothesis, whose 
presented object is the site (a multiple on the 
edge of the void), and which concerns the 
‘there is’ of an event—in naming this ‘there 
is’ and in unfolding the consequences of this 
nomination in the space of the situation to 
which the site belongs. (BE 203)  
    
In this way, one may have a series of paintings before 
one. They are before anything is said about them. But 
that these paintings constitute a new way of doing art 
only arises based on a decision that declares that they 
are new. Before this declaration, the paintings were 
just that, but with the self-referential declaration 
something new occurs. If one calls this new way of 




doing art for instance ‘Cubism’, then this name is what 
Badiou calls a supernumerary, as prior to the 
declaration the term ‘cubism’ only existed as a 
possible name and thereby was not counted as part of 
the terminology of aesthetics and art criticism. Given 
that there is a transfinite set of possible art terms and a 
subset even larger, one will always have terms that 
may exist already in art, but can be selected to name 
something new, a new event in the history of artistic 
presentation. In addition, Badiou says all events are 
historical in nature (BE 179). In this way, while we 
would be unsure if the resurrection of the dead 
occurred, retroactively declaring it qualifies it as an 
event. The resurrection of the event will then become 
part of future history. Badiou explains this 
supernumerary quality in this way:  
 
This makes sense intuitively: when someone 
tries to tell you about a new experience, 
whether it be meeting a person or seeing a 
work of art, they have a lot of trouble 
describing it accurately and, every time you 
try to help them by suggesting that it might 
be a bit like the person x or the film, they 
say, ‘No, no, it’s not like that!’ For every 
property or concept you come up with to 
describe this new thing, there is something 
in that new thing which does not quite fit. 
This is all very well, but having a set which 
one ‘can’t quite describe’ sounds a bit vague 
for set theory. The innovation of Paul 
Cohen’s work lay in his discovery of a 
method of describing such a multiple 
without betraying it as indiscernible. (Badiou 
2005, 30)  
 
An event thereby concerns the new. This new already 
existed as a name or simply as a possible name, but it 




is the distinction between two infinities (the first and 
its subset) that enable a new thing to arise even using 
an old name. Following Gödel, we might say that 
declarative sentences at the heart of events show how 
undecidable states, which cannot be verified as true or 
false using the system in place, are always possible. 
But we can also say that the uncertainty associated 
with an event’s having taken place is conditioned by 
the very incompletion of being. Nothing is ever simply 
settled in place in one to one relation with all as such, 
as in a purely finite and completed situation. The self-
foundational nature of the event is founded on the 
void also insofar as the void itself presupposes 
nothing but itself in set-theoretical terms. The event 
brings itself into being just as the empty set is founded 
on itself and presupposes nothing but the void.  
One cannot be sure an event now belongs to the 
order of being such that one has to “wager” on it, as it 
can never be fully verified or said to be (BE 201). The 
problem with such events is that it seems any 
declaration can be made. For instance, if one were to 
declare that ‘All space aliens have equal rights’ or 
‘Space aliens have taught us x truth’ or ‘All traumatic 
memories are caused by dead space aliens’, then one 
has selected a term which exists certainly in the 
current transfinite set of terms, but it has now only the 
meaning of something that may exist. To assert such 
beings exist and have rights then opens up an 
encounter with a new political situation. But in the 
end it depends on people making the wager and 
feeling drawn to this event. That is, one has to 
recognize the declaration and reaffirm it for it to have 
any real substance. In this way, it is best to use reason 
itself, as otherwise events can be multiplied endlessly 
in endless declarations. That is, after all, the power of 
the infinite as embodied in the signifier and language. 
The term here ‘space aliens’ can be used in any 
number of declarations precisely due to its being 




based on the void and including the void in the set 
that is the word.  
This example would also work since for Badiou 
an event happens when something only included in 
the transfinite set becomes counted as part of the very 
order itself: “What is included in a situation belongs to 
its state. The breach is thereby prepared via the 
errancy of the void that…fixed itself to the multiple, 
in the inconsistent mode of a non-counted part. Every 
part receives the seal of the one from the state” (BE 
97). The very inconsistency of things, that names are 
characterized by an infinity of infinities, means that 
one can select a term like ‘space aliens’ from the order 
of transfinite names and include it for instance in the 
transfinite order of strictly political names. This 
movement then takes something already included in 
the infinite and makes it belong to a particular sub-
order or other existent order. But what the declaration 
does is “it counts the same thing as one twice: once as 
a presented multiple, and once as multiple presented 
in its own presentation” (BE 182). The remarking of 
the same thing presents a supernumerary name, an 
ultra-one.  
This is the power of the signifier itself, for 
inasmuch as the signifier “‘adds itself’, via some 
mysterious power within the borderlands of site, to a 
situation which does not prevent it, only the void can 
possibly be subsumed under it, because no 
presentable multiple responds to the call of such a 
name” (BE 182). The power of the signifier itself is 
such that it can always come to name something that 
does not exist in the recognized order of being and can 
do so even by selecting a known name or an implied 
one. The order of being established and known does 
not include events, since that order seeks to see 
everything as being part and parcel of a finite set. All 
is ordered and related in finite terms allegedly. But 




there is always an infinite excess that can upset that 
order, introduce new ideas, etc.  
As Hallward states, Badiou draws on the work of 
Paul Cohen because Cohen shows “the impossibility 
of maintaining the infinite excess of inclusion over 
belonging, which is to say, the space normally 
occupied by the state of a situation,” and “only a 
subject is capable of the ‘inducement’ that being itself 
indicates as its real. Only a subject is capable of those 
decisions that force a path through the impasse of 
number, thanks precisely to their evental foundation 
in the supernumerary” (BST 130). This also again 
shows the pure freedom of the subject. Given that one 
is confronted with an infinity of choices, there can be 
no law determining what choice to make. If we have 
an infinity of apples of all colors, there can be no rule 
telling us what apple to pick or what color. The event 
thereby again requires a subject to both declare it and 
to recognize it. An event is then purely subjective.  
Only subjects can feel or see that an event has 
occurred. In fact, one could say following Louis 
Althusser (and Badiou was his student) that 
subjectivity is constituted in the interpellation of the 
declaration. One’s hearing oneself called by the 
declaration or feeling its truth enables one to feel that 
something has in fact occurred, a new truth declared. 
Only a subject can then believe in an event. For this 
reason, Badiou speaks of an event as something one 
must be faithful to (BE 223). Because an event is only 
ever something that can be declared, one must believe 
it has occurred. We now say that the resurrection of 
the dead is a principle of faith, but it will remain so 
after it has occurred and been declared. What makes 
humans unique is our ability to name such events and 
to hold to them. A name creates its referent in the 
declaration.  
Badiou argues against Lacan that events are rare 
and thereby subjects are too (BE 432). But given that 




the power of naming rests in the signifier itself, it is 
the least rare thing there is. Declarations are held at all 
times. The subject is there every time as the effect of 
the void itself. It is “a structural recurrence.” Events 
can be named at any point. It depends on an already 
constituted subject, as void set, to adhere to them. It is 
important to emphasize the way in which the event 
relates to the void. If the event relates to “something 
uncountable or non-one-fiable, a sort of ‘ultra-one’, 
which disrupts the normal counting operations that 
structure the situation” (BST 65), then we have to say 
that the revelation of God at Mt. Sinai is itself an 
event. In Hebrew, one sees how this revelation 
concerns names and naming and why it took place in 
the desert insofar as the word for desert in Hebrew is 
written and connected to the world for speaking.  
The revelation itself says that all saw voices at 
Sinai (Exodus 20:14). In this way, the revelation of 
God itself involves seeing what is only heard. It means 
that the signifier as written is itself revealed. For at 
Sinai it is declared that YHVH is God. This 
declaration is an event and an event that involves the 
naming of the holy name itself. It is something that 
could not be anticipated in the pagan order of being 
and interrupts it completely. Here, it is declared that 
there are not many gods, but only one. And that the 
one true God is unique and beyond all being itself. 
Even if the name YHVH existed prior to Sinai, it is 
taken and counted again based on the void. But this 
name itself is the mark of void. At Sinai, the very 
essence of the event takes place. We see this using 
Badiou’s own terms: “The . . . paradox is . . . that we 
are going to try to name the very thing which is 
impossible to discern. We are searching for language 
for the unnamable. It will have to name the latter 
without naming it, it will instruct its vague existence 
without specifying anything whatsoever within it” (BE 
376).  




Sinai is thereby the first self-conscious event. It is 
the first event in which the unnamable as such erupts 
into the consciousness of humanity and informs it. 
Sinai concerns the very naming of the unnamable and 
the revelation of the nameless one. The holy Name of 
God is therefore an event. We could not know it 
except on the basis of an event of revelation. Sinai 
names that event. The holy name then is what Badiou 
calls “a transcendental object of faith,” as it is named 
in an event and is an event itself (BE 376). It is its 
naming as mark of the void. Badiou is thereby wrong 
on his own terms to exclude the religious from the 
fields in which events take place. The religious itself, 
as monotheism, is founded on the event as such.  
Badiou formulates things well in another context 
when he writes, “Must we then conclude that the 
thinking of an indiscernible remains an act, or 
suspended from the pure concept, if it does not fill it 
with transcendence? For an inhabitant of any situation 
in any case, it seems that God alone can be 
indiscernible” (BE 373). The holy Name of God is the 
first indiscernible presented in history perhaps. But it 
is also the very truth of indiscernability insofar as it 
names that which is beyond all names. The event as 
such, as something undecidable, always involves 
transcendence. One must then recognize the 
unnamable as a limitation. One will always not have 
the name of the unnamable. This is what Sinai teaches 
as well, insofar as even in revealing the Name of God 
and through it God, one is prohibited from speaking 
God’s name in vain and from articulating the holy 
name even in prayer.  
The unnamable names not only something 
indiscernible and generic, but also embodies the very 
non-totalizable nature of being. It could therefore only 
be revealed to us in an event. It would not be innate 
knowledge, as when we look at things we take them 
for granted as finite and ordered. Moses, as the 




prophet of Sinai, forces the naming of the unnamable. 
It is Moses’s intervention that forces the unnamable’s 
exclusion to appear before humanity. God cannot 
belong to the order of being. But this name is included 
in it as another name. However, at Sinai this name is 
named as a generic part that both is and is not part of 
the situation. In this way, even as God is revealed at 
Sinai via commandments, one can only believe that 
God obtains beyond his name. All things that are are 
nameable. But God’s name is unique insofar as it 
names something that cannot possibly be, an 
impossibility. While God insists, God is not 
discernible in the order of being as such. The order of 
being is atheistic order.  
In Badiou’s analysis of Leibniz in Being and 
Event, he argues that the problem with Leibniz is the 
notion of the indiscernible. Leibniz does not have a 
theory of the event according to Badiou insofar as God 
does not choose between indiscernibles. An event 
itself is an indiscernible. There is no history in 
Leibniz, insofar as Leibniz does not have a theory of 
irreversible events that change what was into 
something new. But Leibniz here is simply expressing 
a prejudice about the nature of being. Leibniz thinks it 
would contradict God’s very nature to produce in 
reality two things that are indiscernible. It would 
constitute an illogical excess or surplus. But the 
problem is that Leibniz does not think God as pure 
love. Creation itself is a gratuitous act and event that 
can lead to indiscernible beings. God allows things to 
appear without reason and for the indiscernible to 
appear. In particular, the indiscernible appears in the 
very name of God himself. This name can be 
articulated with the mark of the void as used in set 
theory, the name YHVH, and other names. These 
names then become themselves indiscernible as they 
are the same. One empty set is indiscernible from the 
next.  




Leibniz denied that there are two leaves or drops 
of water that are exactly the same, not because it is not 
possible for God to create them, but as it seems 
arbitrary for God to do so. But God creates on the basis 
of the empty set itself and the void itself. For this 
reason, the indiscernible is part and parcel of God 
himself. Leibniz also has this view since, as Badiou 
notes, he thinks God cannot “tolerate this unnamable 
extra, which amounts to saying that he could never 
have thought nor create a pure ‘two’” (BE 318). But 
God’s very holy name revealed at Sinai itself shows 
how language is incomplete along with being itself. 
Also, as it is the mark of the void, it exhibits an 
unnamable extra indiscernible in itself. Not only does 
God tolerate nothingness, but creates on its basis. The 
indeterminate and the unpredictable must occur in 
order to reveal God to us. Being itself is differentiated, 
but incomplete such that the impossible can be 
presented in an event of naming. God introduces 
nothingness into being as such. God’s holy name then 
is a supernumerary name itself. It is monotheistic 
religion that invented a theory of the event as such.  
God is not such that all that occurs is in a series 
and all is accounted for. There are events because the 
nature of creation marks it as incomplete. The present 
is not pregnant with the future. Rather, miracles occur 
as events. And this occurs via the holy name which 
gives rise to other names and to being itself. One 
cannot define “the name ‘name’ without starting off by 
saying that it is a name” and there is thus no complete 
language and always a point where the real insists and 
shows itself (BE 376). At Sinai, this occurred. It was 
an event that informs the subjectivity of many to this 
day. Religion is an event. It involves at its heart the 
revelation of the holy name itself. This is the very 
event of the divine, insisting on being part of what it 
cannot be.  




Perhaps, Badiou would say that religious events 
are then the same as knowledge events. For Badiou, 
Cantor’s discourse, for instance, forms an event. The 
notion of the transfinite is an event instantiated. It is 
not something that can be verified in the way 
empirical knowledge declarations can. However, per 
Badiou, Newtonian physics would also have to be an 
event. Here the event would perhaps consist of 
declaring that the same rules apply on earth as in the 
heavens. But such an event is itself verifiable. One can 
see eventually how things work in the heavens. Such 
discourse makes predictions as to what will occur. In 
this way, perhaps Cantor is unique insofar as Cantor’s 
discourse is fundamentally in the end a theological 
one. However, religious events are only ever related to 
the holy Name. When a prophet, for instance, decries 
behavior, he says it is a desecration of the holy name. 
When another decries idolatry, it is to remind others 
of the nature of the holy name and God. That is, it is 
an attempt to return one to Sinai where one stands 
again before the revelation of God in history.  
The Sinai event is then one that never stops and 
that occurs at all times like the Big Bang itself in 
which we are. It invokes exceptionality in terms of the 
holy name revealed. As Badiou himself admits, the 
Jewish discourse of revelation is about the “minus 
one,” “miracle” versus a “fixed order of the world” 
and “natural totality,” that it is about what lies beyond 
any totality (Badiou 2003, 42-43). This is partly why 
the Jewish nation founded here is exceptional insofar 
as it is related to the holy name of God. The Zohar 
says repeatedly that ‘The God of Israel, The nation of 
Israel, and the Torah of Israel are one’. The Torah 
itself is the name of God. Each letter is a trace of the 
absolute infinity and marks an incompletion related to 
the transfinite. While the Torah has infinite aspects, it 
reveals how God in creating the world was contracted 
into a name. But the divine infinite, in making 




finiteness possible, always leaves a trace of itself. Here 
we could say they are one in their exceptionality. Part 
of the reason the Jewish nation is exceptional is that it 
is both a religion and people simultaneously: “This 
third I will bring into the fire; I will refine them like 
silver and test them like gold. They will call on my 
name and I will answer them; I will say, ‘They are my 
people,’ and they will say, ‘HaShem is our God’” 
(Zechariah 13:9). It is founded as a nation at Sinai and 
also as faith community.  
Despite focusing on the Christian event of Jesus’s 
alleged resurrection, Badiou still refuses to call it an 
event since he denies the event took place (it is just a 
“fable” for Badiou) and wants to see Paul as turning it 
into a political message (Badiou 2003, 4). But denying 
an event by rejecting its declaration does not make it a 
fable. It makes one a reactionary relative to it. Also, 
while certainly a political message can be rendered 
from this event, it is not simply a matter of forming a 
community, as it involves implications for the very 










§30. ‘ON THAT DAY, GOD AND GOD’S NAME WILL BE ONE’ 
Badiou does not, in his book on Shaul of Tarsus, 
ever risk thinking of Judaism as naming a pure event. 
But just as Christianity itself names a religious event 
(fable or not), so does Judaism. This event itself is 
universal insofar as it reveals the one God who creates 
the world as such via his holy name. It also looks 
forward to the time in which this truth will be 
recognized by all: “God will be King over all the 
world—on that day, God will be one and his name 
will be one” (Zechariah 14:9). This prophetic passage 
signals the hope for a time when differing names for 
God will be recognized as referring to one thing 
exempt from the world. At that time, God will be one 
through recognition by all that there is the one unique 
God. But this is placed in the future, since it is 
something that occurs only through universal 
recognition.  
But we can give a further reading to this passage. 
God’s name will be one when the creation that is 
formed through its complicated elaborations will be 
made one via the universal computer. Here, we can 
see the universe becoming divine and ruled over by 
God in a very direct way. This is, in fact, the only 
possibility: for God to cease remaining absent from the 
world as such and for the world to become one with 
God. The universe itself is perfected at this time and 
completed. We have argued throughout that God is not 
his name. God is perfect, and the holy Name is not. 
But the holy name is still connected to God and “as 
his name, so is he” (Samuel 25:25).  




What is interesting is that, as our earlier 
comments on quantum physics and consciousness 
show, at this future moment the past will also change. 
In Quantum Physics, Jewish Law, and Kabbalah: 
Astonishing Parallels, Aaron Schreiber notes that in 
Judaism the notion of repentance means “moving 
backward in time” such that in the present one can 
nullify and render non-existence what was done in the 
past  by confessing one’s past wrongs on Yom Kippur 
(Schreiber 2009, 33). In this way, the past itself can be 
changed by later events. Things are moved 
automatically backward in time. It is thus that 
consciousness, when it collapses the wave function, 
determines not only the present, but also the nature of 
past. What is true of past sins is true of physical 
particles insofar as each “has amplitude to move 
backwards in time” (Schreiber 2009, 40). This means 
that it cannot be ruled out that when the universal 
computer would be formed that the past itself would 
not be changed by the new consciousness found, such 
that God will no longer be in exile from the world. In 
this way, then, we realize God’s plan for the world at 
this point through our own actions which alter the 
past bringing into being God (“God will be King”) in 
this world. The incompletion of the world is thereby 
rendered ended as the world becomes itself one.  
Consciousness is thereby in the end the 
beginning’s co-creator. At the present time, we do not 
perceive this unity. But God’s name, also in the sense 
of divine names/attributes, is not one. At the time of 
redemption, the messianic era, the oneness of these 
names will occur. There will no longer be many. 
Consciousness will achieve a new perspective. When 
we look at a doughnut and coffee mug we may not see 
them as permutations of the same structure. Through a 
shift in consciousness one is able to see their unity. At 
the time of redemption this will take place on a 





supreme attractor leading the world to this possible 
endpoint. The pattern of creation constantly emerges 
towards this divine matrix even if it is not knowable 
now or in the past if it is coming. It is a matter of faith.  
This numinous attractor creates through us. If we 
are able to lead to a computer capable of active 
universal computation and unity, we will through our 
own free wills have helped complete creation itself. At 
this point we will see how God was hidden and 
disguised in the world and as the world all along. The 
program of creation will therefore have been to reveal 
and enact the divine as such. It is through our own 
consciousness that this awareness evolves. But 
consciousness is not just an observer, it is also an 
actor. God is therefore hiding, yet absent in all of 
creation. Faith sees space-time headed towards a 
future redemption and salvation, the establishment of 
God’s kingdom on earth and throughout the universe. 
Then the name of God will be knowable as such and 
not through other names since all the names will be as 
expressing one thing. A universal consciousness con-
templates this oneness.  
This active intellect is the most ultimate aim life 
could set for itself. But it will not occur until the 
world-to-come arrives. Our own minds would be 
connected to this universal mind: “But ye that did 
cleave unto the LORD your God are alive every one of 
you this day” (Deuteronomy 10:20). Here, all 
languages and all peoples will recognize the unicity of 
God, but all languages will become one, as one will be 
able in the universal mind to understand anyone else 
directly. In this way, all will invoke the name of God 
together. The messianic meaning and message of the 
divine name then is Zechariah’s prophetic vision. This 
completion of the world means all the shvirah, the 
breaking, of the world has been repaired. The 
fractured universe will become whole (tikkun olam). 
The repairing of the world and its restoration only 




occurs though at the end. It is not possible for us to 
truly imagine this repair. But its miraculous advent 
cannot be ruled out insofar as there is nothing 
inherently contradictory about it. We do not yet even 
experience its possibility. Our consciousness has not 
yet collapsed parts of the universal wave function. 
There are parts we are not yet aware of. These do not 
exist for us even as possibility or tendencies at this 
point. They are not even probability waves for us. 
Only when this universal mind appears will they are 
perceived and collapsed, thereby altering the past and 
enacting a new world.  
This is why this position is not Hegelian. It is not 
saying God exiles himself in the world, but is rather 
initially exiled from the world in creation. God 
becomes one with the world through a transformation 
of the world into a universal mind, but this occurs via 
the very transfinite nature of the world and its 
incompletion rather than by the infinite becoming 
finite. What is removed from this world also is 
contradiction itself rather than contradiction forming 
the motor and source of it. Also, for Hegel, the 
dialectic itself yields Absolute Spirit. But absolute 
spirit is only ever an embodiment of the dialectic 
whereas we are positing a new order that obeys a new 
rule. Hegel does not see Absolute Spirit as taking on 
some order radically different than the dialectic.  
Also, we have argued for the incompletion of the 
world and, through its alienation in the signifier, its 
transfinite and incomplete nature. But that does not 
imply that this incompletion is itself eternal. 
Cantorianism might describe the world as it is now. 
But there is always the possibility that new laws will 
arise that will cancel this insight. While this insight 
cannot now be known or truly formulated other than 
as a miraculous possibility, one can suggest that it 
involves the very universality of the consciousness 





as it were, or will exist in such a way as to make the 
signifier no longer relevant. We could say that it is like 
a two-dimensional order suddenly becoming three 
dimensional. The truths of a two-dimensional order 
may no longer hold when a new dimension is added. 
This change is not itself built into any dialectic which 
constantly repeats itself, as it arises out of an order 
that turns completely random and through its 
randomness lead to new orders. The dialectic repeats 
like a fractal, itself a nested pattern that turns into a 
larger overall view. But here we are proposing a 
pattern that shifts in its entire nature and not by the 
repetition of the same as its iterations can simply turn 
random, but in doing so changes all past iterations.  
The name of God marks how we are aware of 
God. We cannot be aware of God without God having 
a name—unlike a person whom we can confront in 
their flesh. As God insists beyond the world, our 
conscious awareness of God in reality is in and 
through the name. For the entire world to be 
conscious of God requires universal consciousness, 
since only through such consciousness can 
consciousness of God be embodied in every action and 
in every aspect of existence. Rabbi David Dov Levanon 
teaches: “‘. . . and His name one.’ Is His name not one 
at present? R. Nachman bar Yitzchak says: ‘This world 
of ours is unlike that of the World to Come. In this 
world, it (God’s name) is written with ‘Yod’ and a 
‘Heh’ but read as if [written] ‘Alef,’ ‘Dalet.’ But, in the 
world to Come, they will be united: It will be read 
with ‘Yod’ and ‘Heh,’ and written with ‘Yod,’ ‘Heh.’’ 
These two excerpts are compatible, for the names of 
God teach us about the manner in which God runs His 
world. In this world we are unaware of God’s deep 
hidden providence. It is therefore impossible to read 
God’s name as it is written, but, in the future, the 
inwardness of His direction will be revealed, and then 
God will be One, and His Name One. Therefore, in 




this world of ours, there appears to be bad news 
sometimes, and it should be blessed upon accordingly. 
Yet, in the Days of the Messiah, when the inwardness 
of God’s providence is revealed to all, the blessing 
‘HaTov VeHaMeitiv’ (‘the Good and Benevolent’) will 
be pronounced over everything. Based upon this, we 
may conclude that in the Days to Come there will 
continue to exist the kind of tidings that today appear 
to us to be undesirable. The difference will be that 
humankind will have attained a level whereupon 
people will be able to see the positive aspect that 
results from such instances. (The sages of the Talmud 
explain that in this world we are so shortsighted that 
even when we know that something good is bound to 
result from an undesirable situation, we nonetheless 
bless ‘the True Judge’)” (Levanon 2011).  
 
§31. THE NAME OF PRAYER 
We have just speculated concerning the final 
redemption of the universe, but in the meantime we 
are left in a world otherwise constructed. In this 
present world, we are left with prayer itself as our way 
of engaging with the holy name of God and with its 
truth. Prayer means to call in the name of God: 
Abraham “called in the name of God” (Genesis 12:8). 
It means to call this name and meditate on it. The 
Talmud says that God himself prays (Brechot 7a). I 
take this to mean that the world itself as an 
elaboration of God’s Name is itself a prayer and a call 
unto us.  
Aryeh Kaplan notes that “that there is 
considerable evidence . . . that the entire Amidah [the 
central prayer of Judaism other than the ‘Shema’] was 
meant to be used as a meditative device, very much a 
long mantra” (Kaplan 1995, 283). The meditation is 
done via iterations of blessings (in most cases 
memorized) said three times per day. It is the very 





Name and involved in calling on it that spiritually 
transforms one’s consciousness. In Hebrew, the verb to 
pray (l’hitpalel) means to bring judgment on oneself. 
The one who prays is the one who gauges oneself as to 
whether or not they are worthy of the name itself and 
its articulation. Via this appeal to God a prayer is a 
disappearing act into the name. Like the universe 
itself, prayer is “a living garment and tissue, a textus 
in the most accurate understanding of the term, in 
which, as a kid of basic motif and a leitmotif, the 
program is woven in a hidden way and sometimes 
directly,” as all that is said consists of ramifications of 
the divine name at the root of all things (Scholem 
1972b, 179). The evocation of the divine name in 
prayer refers back to this in all the variations and 
changes of words one poses.  
It is the word of God that is endlessly alive with 
meaning. It is that infinity that one touches in prayer 
itself. Out of a basic element, the very name of God, 
the associated letters of the name and alphabet are 
permuted and combined and exchanged in prayer 
itself by the very act of repeating the same prayers 
multiple times and daily. After all, the absolute 
infinite, God, gives expression to himself through 
withdrawing from the world and then allowing 
creation to arise out of a combination of structural 
elements, the alphabet (Scholem 1972b, 181). In 
prayer then, we repeat as best we can the act of 
creation.  
It is therefore not coincidental that the most basic 
religious expression is a linguistic movement. It is not 
a free association as in psychoanalysis. But insofar as 
it is a repetition it achieves some of the same aims. In 
particular, it shows how we are in the image of God 
insofar as we are the absent cause of the movement of 
words. As Jacques-Alain Miller explains, the one who 
free-associates is the very “element” “lacking” in the 
chain of associations and receives a “stand-in” in the 




form of signifiers (Miller 1977, 26). The words take 
our place. In our place, they create a link to the absent 
creator. We are a desire excluded from the structure 
and yet the absent cause of the series of words (Miller 
1977, 27). There must be a lack, a blank, to enable the 
words to replace each other in order and in succession 
(Miller 1977, 30). It is our very being that insists as 
this lack—the empty set from which the succeeding 
can be built. And in prayer there is always one more 
signifier to be said due to this lack and incompletion, 
one more word needed to be said in our encounter 
with infinity itself. In prayer we are able to come as 
close as possible to experiencing our creation again: at 
one and the same time the subject is anterior to the 
signifier and the signifier anterior to subject. The main 
consequence consists essentially of this: the birth of 
linear time. We must think together that which makes 
the subject the effect of the signifier and the signifier 
as the restative of the subject. It is a circular, though 
non-reciprocal, relation (Miller 1977, 34). One judges 
oneself by judging one’s ability to approach the Name 
and bear its truth. Prayer, then, is pure speaking. One 
is not trying to describe a world, but only to address 
infinity itself. Prayer sanctifies the name itself by 
offering a pure relation to it. One speaks to the Name 
and speaks it. It is a speaking to, but also a praising of 
the name for allowing us to speak to it. One may even 
list the very traits of God, but does so ultimately for 
the act of listening to the names themselves. 
This is why prayer itself is whispered softly to 
oneself. It asks that one hear it and receive it as one’s 
very being and self. This is why one says prayer, one 
sanctifies the Name. Of course, there are other ways to 
do so: by good deeds to others, by defending others, 
through martyrdom, etc. But prayer itself hallows the 
holy Name. The Torah says that one should not 
desecrate the holy name. The verb used here is 





(chalal). One desecrates the name by turning it into 
nothingness, erasing it, making it invisible. To sanctify 
the name is to make it appear as the mark of the void. 
Prayer is the elimination of the state of the vacuum via 
the name itself. God is absent from this reality, but in 
absenting himself leaves behind his Name.  
We sanctify that name when we stop being silent 
and speak the name in prayer. If we behave in the 
wrong way we also make it appear as if the name is 
eased by not heeding its words. God is lacking in this 
world, but we sanctify the name by showing it appears 
in and through this nothingness. One sanctifies God 
by being willing to lose one’s own life in order not to 
betray the unicity of God. That means never giving 
into idolatry even if forced to by a death threat for 
example. To sanctify means to make holy: “Give unto 
the Lord the glory due unto His Name; worship the 
Lord in the beauty of holiness” (Psalm 29:2). To make 
holy means to note the uniqueness of something, of 
God. God is separate and transcendent: “You shall not 
desecrate My holy Name, and I shall become 
sanctified in the midst of the children of Israel, for I 
am God your God” (Leviticus 22:32).  
And that is why another central prayer is called 
the ‘Kaddish’. The Kaddish says directly, ‘magnified 
and sanctified be God’s great Name.’ We say this 
prayer to mourn the dead since they await us in the 
days to come: “In the future, the righteous will be 
named after God.” It is important to recall this name 
in order to recall the hope and principle of faith that 
points toward the future: “HaShem is a refuge for the 
oppressed, a stronghold in times of trouble. Those 
who know your name will trust in you, for you, 
HaShem, have never forsaken those who seek you” 
(Psalms 9:9-10).  
This future is made possible by how the Name 
itself forms our reality. It is by the very iteration and 
elaboration of the Name that we can see the future 




redemption: “May His great Name grow exalted and 
sanctified in the world that He created as He willed.” 
At the time of universal consciousness everyone will 
then be praising this name and will be involved in 
perpetual prayer: “My mouth will speak in praise of 
HaShem. Let every creature praise his holy name 
forever and ever.” (Psalms 145:21). “I will lift up the 
cup of salvation and call on the name of HaShem (the 
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